

CONFIDENTIAL

OPERATION CARYATID.

This is a confidential document provided to the Home Office Terrorism and Protection Unit following the briefing note prepared by Richard Riley for the Home Secretary on 9<sup>th</sup> August.

It provides a summary of the background to the current investigation and sensitive matters of detail which may emerge in forthcoming legal proceedings.

Its contents should not therefore be disclosed further without the agreement of the author.

During December 2005 Jamie Lowther-Pinkerton (Private Secretary to Their Royal Highnesses Prince William and Prince Harry) contacted Commander Peter Loughborough (Commander of The Metropolitan Police Royalty Protection Department). The Private Secretary reported:

1. Suspicious activity associated with his mobile phone, in the form of voicemail messages registered as 'old messages' i.e. previously listened to, which he knew he had not heard before.
2. An apparent link between the content of voicemail messages left on his mobile phone and subsequent press reporting in the News of The World.
3. Suspicious activity associated with the mobile phone of The Personal Assistant to The Princes. Although she had set a personal PIN number on her telephone, to be entered before voicemail messages could be

retrieved, the phone repeatedly reset the personal PIN number to the factory default code.

Given the evident protective security implications Commander Loughborough asked for a Senior Investigating Officer from the Anti Terrorist Branch to be appointed to lead an investigation, working with him the Royal Household and the two service providers involved (O2 and Vodafone).

The evidence now gathered will demonstrate that the voicemails of the Private Secretary and Personal Assistant to The Princes and the Communications Secretary to His Royal Highness The Prince of Wales have been repeatedly and unlawfully intercepted over an extended period of time by two suspects, who it is anticipated will be charged with offences under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000.

The interception appears to have been effected by the first suspect obtaining a codeword from the telecommunications company, passing himself off as a bona fide employee and then arranging for the victim's PIN number to be reset to the factory default code. The Unique Voicemail Number of the telephone has then been obtained, dialled and by entering the default number the suspect has gained access to the voicemail messages stored on the telephone. The investigation shows that voicemails have also been retrieved by a second suspect (The Royal Correspondent of the News of the World), that a relationship exists between them and that substantial payments have been made from News International to the first suspect.

Further enquiries continue into this aspect of the case.

Whilst the current police investigation has concentrated on the three victims referred to, it appears from material already gathered and the product of yesterday's arrests that the voicemail messages of other public figures, including one Cabinet Minister, have been intercepted. This includes interception of the voicemail messages of the two Princes though this does NOT form part of the evidence supporting the anticipated charges.

Analysis of all material gathered during all stages of the investigation is ongoing.

The Crown Prosecution Special Casework Section has been regularly consulted as the investigation proceeded.

The two service providers involved have fully supported the police enquiry and are now taking steps to mitigate the identified risks. Representatives of all UK service providers are being contacted with the assistance of the ACPO Data Communications Group and single points of contact within each company are being sought to deal with customer concerns and to take forward the required work on preventive strategies.

In the meantime operational briefing has been provided to both Royalty and Specialist Protection Officers sufficient to allow basic preventive advice to be provided to protected Principals.

A broader programme of preventive briefing within the political, security and intelligence community may be required and your views on how that might be achieved would be welcomed.

Peter Loughborough

Commander.

9<sup>TH</sup> August 2006

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