Monday, 16 July 2012 1 trying to understand how these competing interests 1 2 should fit and whereas the newspaper men can speak about 2 (10.00 am)3 3 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: On many occasions during this it from their perspective, I think it's also very 4 4 important to put it in the context of the wider concepts Inquiry, I have spoken about the public interest that 5 5 drives and justifies the importance of free speech and with which you are very familiar. Thank you. 6 a free press. Today the Inquiry will analyse these 6 MR JAY: May I ask you, first of all, shortly, please, to 7 7 set out your main areas of academic interest and important concepts in some detail and will do so 8 8 research? First of all, Professor Hornsby. alongside other public interest concepts much talked 9 about, including the public interest in individual 9 PROFESSOR HORNSBY: My main areas are philosophy of mind and 10 10 language but I teach courses relating to issues about self-determination and the protection of private 11 free speech, hate speech, pornography, in connection 11 interests such as privacy, confidentiality and 12 12 individual freedom of expression. For the right balance with gender and philosophy. 13 to be achieved, it is important that we fully understand 13 MR JAY: Thank you. Professor Mendus? 14 14 what is involved and what is potentially at stake. PROFESSOR MENDUS: My main area of interest is modern 15 15 political philosophy and I have specialised, over the The Inquiry is occasionally criticised for 16 considering ethical issues but it is also important to 16 past 25 years or so, in concepts of toleration. 17 MR JAY: Thank you. 17 bear in mind that the terms of reference specifically 18 refer to the culture, practices and ethics of the press, 18 PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: My main areas of interest are in moral 19 19 and legal philosophy and in recent years I've and I have always recognised that different press 20 20 interests and different types of newspaper may well specialised in human rights punishment and issues about 21 21 international law. approach ethical considerations from different starting 22 points. 22 Q. First of all, please, may we establish a lexicon? We've 23 23 That brings into focus the role which might heard terms -- indeed, have used terms -- such as 24 24 rights, interests, freedoms, prejudicial, in the context reasonably be expected to be played by a code of conduct 25 25 in general and by the Editors' Code in particular, along of freedom of expression, free speech and a right to Page 1 Page 3 1 with what, if anything is necessary, could be done to 1 each of those, but Professor Tasioulas first of all. 2 2 improve it and make it more effective. what are rights and how and why should we be 3 3 Tomorrow I will consider evidence in relation to the distinguishing them from the other juridical and moral 4 data protection legislation and issues of plurality. 4 concepts I've just mentioned? 5 MR JAY: Thank you. The first three witnesses today are 5 A. We need to distinguish them because typically in 6 professors Hornsby, Mendus and Tasioulas, please. 6 political and other forms of discourse they're supposed 7 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Thank you very much indeed. 7 to carry a great deal of weight, and because they carry this great deal of weight, people are often eager 8 PROFESSOR JENNIFER HORNSBY (affirmed) 8 9 PROFESSOR SUSAN LESLEY MENDUS (affirmed) 9 rhetorically to present various arguments in terms of 10 PROFESSOR JOHN TASIOULAS (affirmed) 10 rights and that leads to a kind of proliferation of 11 Questions by MR JAY 11 rights claims that threatens to debase the currency of 12 MR JAY: Professor Hornsby, you are professor of philosophy 12 rights language. So it's important to differentiate 13 at Birkbeck College University of London; Professor 13 what a right is from other sorts of values or 14 Mendus, professor of political philosophy at the 14 non-values, for example. So there may be an interest 15 15 University of York; and Professor Tasioulas, professor that someone may have in something and it may be quite 16 of jurisprudence at UCL. Each of you has put in 16 an important interest -- maybe even, say, an interest in 17 a submission, for which the Inquiry is grateful. 17 preserving their life -- but it doesn't follow that 18 That submission doesn't contain any fact, although 18 whatever would preserve their life is something they 19 we might debate about what that means, but as far as the 19 have the right to. They only have the right to that 20 20 opinions we can see in those submissions are set out, do thing if somebody else is under a duty to deliver this 21 you sincerely believe in those opinions? Sorry, that 21 thing. So a right will exist not just when I have an 22 22 sounded rather cack-handed. interest in something but when my personal interest has 23 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: It gets quite difficult. Thank you 23 sufficient weight to impose a duty on others to act in 24 all very much for coming and for participating in this 24 certain ways and whether it imposes a duty on others 25 25 exercise. I hope you can see the value that I place on will in part turn on what the costs would be to those Page 2 Page 4

1 other people of imposing that duty. 1 I would want to distinguish two questions. One is 2 2 whether, as a matter of morality, the right not to be But I think one of the systematic problems with 3 3 discourse about rights generally is people move too tortured is absolute, and the second question is an 4 4 readily from asserting there's an interest in a certain institutional question, whether we should have absolute 5 5 area to the claim that it therefore follows they have rights in law. There might be good reasons for the law 6 a right to that interest being fulfilled. 6 to present these rights as absolute and then to deal 7 Q. So when one asserts a claim to a right, is there always 7 with cases as they come up, because if the law says, 8 a correlative duty? 8 "Look, it's not an absolute right", you have to look at 9 PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: It's possible that "rights" gets used 9 the consequences of that, and amongst the consequences 10 in all sorts of different ways, but I think there's 10 would be a tendency for people then to abuse that 11 11 a kind of consensus, at least amongst philosophers, that thought and then to engage in torture in cases where 12 the strict sense of a right is one that implies the 12 it's absolutely not justified in any way, assuming it's 13 13 existence of a duty and that's why the idea that ever justified. 14 14 MR JAY: Thank you. May I move on to is the first main violating someone's right is a moral wrong because it is 15 a violation of a duty that bears on you, rather than 15 topic: free speech in a mature democracy, as distinct 16 simply some kind of reason that you might ... 16 from freedom of the press. Is there a right to 17 17 Q. The law is very familiar with the difference between individual free speech or freedom of expression, first 18 absolute and qualified rights, and of course in the 18 of all, Professor Hornsby? 19 European Convention of Human Rights, certain rights are 19 PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Yes, I think there is such a right which 20 absolute -- Article 2, Article 3 -- and certain rights 20 accrues to individuals as autonomous citizens but 21 are qualified -- Article 8, Article 10. But how does 21 I think that in understanding why a right to free speech 22 one determine whether a right is, on the one hand, 22 should be accorded to people in a democracy, one needs 23 23 absolute or, on the other hand, qualified? to see beyond the questions of individual autonomy and 24 PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: Good question. It assumes that there 24 to understand that in a democracy, people need to be 25 25 are absolute rights and it's not clear to me that there informed, as voters whose will is supposed to be Page 5 Page 7 1 are absolute rights. There might be some rights that we 1 implemented by governments, and they can't be informed 2 quite properly treat as absolute for legal purposes. 2 and make up their own minds unless speech, which is 3 3 So, for example, it might be that there are very communicative and thus informative, is free. 4 4 Q. Thank you. Professor Mendus, do you agree with that or compelling reasons for treating the right not to be 5 tortured as an absolute right for legal purposes, even 5 would you like to expand on that at all? 6 though morally we might concede that even that right 6 PROFESSOR MENDUS: I certainly agree with that. It's very 7 7 often said that the importance of free speech for there may be situations where it could be overridden by 8 competing considerations but you wouldn't want that to 8 individuals is, as has been said, for the development of 9 9 autonomy, so that people shall be in a position to act be embodied in law. So that raises this much more sort 10 10 in a way which they themselves believe to be correct and of background issue that even getting the morality of 11 11 they can only do that if they have information. free speech rights at an abstract level is one thing. 12 12 How this gets implemented in law is another thing. The move from the right to be informed or an 13 13 But going back to your question, you distinguish the interest in being informed in a democracy and an 14 14 extensive free speech or free press commitment is quite absolute rights by the question: are there some rights 15 15 a difficult one. So it doesn't follow directly from the duties generated by those rights can never be 16 16 overridden by any competing consideration? So someone commitment to autonomy and to being informed in 17 17 who says that the right not to be tortured is an a democracy that there should therefore be very 18 absolute right, the duty that you have not to torture 18 extensive free speech, much less that there should be no 19 arising from that right could never, under any 19 limits on free speech or free communication. 20 circumstances, be defeated by any other consideration. 20 Q. Thank you. It may be implicit in what's been said 21 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: You say that's legal. That's the 21 already but is the right to individual free speech an 22 famous example of the terrorist who knows where the bomb 22 absolute right or a qualified right, Professor 23 is that will destroy the railway station and 2,000 23 Tasioulas, first of all? 24 people and that's the philosophical issue. 24 PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: If you mean by "an absolute right" 25 25 PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: That's the philosophical issue. a right that can never be overridden by competing Page 6 Page 8

|  |   | ١,   |  |
|--|---|--|--|
| 1  | considerations under any circumstances, which is how  | 1  | the European Convention says that there must be other  |
| 2  | I characterised it earlier, then I would say that it's  | 2  | qualifications. So the Racial and Religious Hatred Act   |
| 3  | not an absolute right. But I think that's the less  | 3  | in this country and the Criminal Justice and Immigration   |
| 4  | interesting question. I think the more interesting  | 4  | Act it seems to me quite proper that they're in place  |
| 5  | question is: how do we specify what that's a right to,  | 5  | and that they do impose restrictions on free speech and  |
| 6  | ie, how do we specify the duties generated by that  | 6  | expression.  |
| 7  | right? In order to specify those duties, we need to take into account a series of considerations.   | 7  | I think when one hears the term "free speech", one   |
| 8  |   | 8  | thinks of that which is heard in the marketplace of ideas, but of course it's usually thought free speech  |
| 9  | So I think it would be wrong so it's qualified in   | 9  |  |
| 10   | this sense: my right to spree speech does not extend as   | 10   | and expression, so people should be allowed to sound   |
| 11<br>12   | far as my interest in free speech. It might serve my interest in free speech to get all the leading   | 11 12  | off, they're expressing their opinions, but it does seem to me there are qualifications to that because of the   |
| 13   | philosophers to listen to my theories about free speech,  | 13   | harm to groups of people, not a direct effect, as in the   |
| 14   | but they have no duty to do that so my interest goes  | 14   | case of a crowded theatre or the riot, but an effect on  |
| 15   | beyond any right that I have, and so I have to think  | 15   | individuals who are caused to feel hatred and groups who   |
| 16   | about, insofar as I have this interest, to what extent  | 16   | are vilified by pieces of speech.  |
| 17   | this will impose duties on others, and taking that into   | 17   | MR JAY: When we speak, even in this qualified way, to  |
| 18   | account determining that question will take into  | 18   | a right to individual free speech and taking on board  |
| 19   | account things like: well, what burden will it impose   | 19   | the difference between rights and interest may it be   |
| 20   | upon others who have to listen to me giving my  | 20   | more helpful to talk not in terms of correlative duties  |
| 21   | philosophical views about those things.   | 21   | but rather in terms of the state not having a right to   |
| 22   | LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But quite apart from the burden on  |  | interfere with individual rights unless there is a good  |
| 23   | others, isn't there also a question about the   | 23   | justification capable of being advanced? Can I ask each  |
| 24   | qualification to the right to free speech? The  | 24   | of you to comment on that possible formulation?  |
| 25   | example I have to keep this grounded in examples  | 25   | PROFESSOR MENDUS: Could I comment on that? I wouldn't  |
|  | Page 9  |  | Page 11  |
|  | <u> </u>  |  | <del>-</del>   |
|  |   |  |  |
| 1  | otherwise you're going to lose me is shouting "fire"  | 1  | myself phrase the debate quite so clearly in terms of  |
| 1 2  | in a crowded theatre. Would that be an example?   | 1 2  | rights and duties. That's just a personal preference.  |
|  | in a crowded theatre. Would that be an example? PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: That's right. The question is: could   |  | rights and duties. That's just a personal preference.<br>That's not the way I personally would approach it, but  |
| 2  | in a crowded theatre. Would that be an example?  PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: That's right. The question is: could my interest in shouting "fire" in a crowded theatre  | 2  | rights and duties. That's just a personal preference.  That's not the way I personally would approach it, but I guess we're here, to some extent, to try to understand   |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5   | in a crowded theatre. Would that be an example?  PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: That's right. The question is: could my interest in shouting "fire" in a crowded theatre generate a duty on anyone else to let me shout and not   | 2 3  | rights and duties. That's just a personal preference.  That's not the way I personally would approach it, but I guess we're here, to some extent, to try to understand why free speech is important and what its importance is.  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6  | in a crowded theatre. Would that be an example?  PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: That's right. The question is: could my interest in shouting "fire" in a crowded theatre generate a duty on anyone else to let me shout and not to interfere with me doing that and not to punish me for  | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6  | rights and duties. That's just a personal preference.  That's not the way I personally would approach it, but I guess we're here, to some extent, to try to understand why free speech is important and what its importance is.  Now, there are any number of accounts of the  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7   | in a crowded theatre. Would that be an example?  PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: That's right. The question is: could my interest in shouting "fire" in a crowded theatre generate a duty on anyone else to let me shout and not to interfere with me doing that and not to punish me for doing that, and the answer is: clearly not. So to  | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7   | rights and duties. That's just a personal preference.  That's not the way I personally would approach it, but I guess we're here, to some extent, to try to understand why free speech is important and what its importance is.  Now, there are any number of accounts of the importance of free speech. One claim it's been   |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8  | in a crowded theatre. Would that be an example?  PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: That's right. The question is: could my interest in shouting "fire" in a crowded theatre generate a duty on anyone else to let me shout and not to interfere with me doing that and not to punish me for doing that, and the answer is: clearly not. So to specify the content of the right, the duties it  | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8  | rights and duties. That's just a personal preference.  That's not the way I personally would approach it, but I guess we're here, to some extent, to try to understand why free speech is important and what its importance is.  Now, there are any number of accounts of the importance of free speech. One claim it's been alluded to already is the claim: well, free speech,   |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9   | in a crowded theatre. Would that be an example?  PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: That's right. The question is: could my interest in shouting "fire" in a crowded theatre generate a duty on anyone else to let me shout and not to interfere with me doing that and not to punish me for doing that, and the answer is: clearly not. So to specify the content of the right, the duties it involves, I have to think about what benefit I would get   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9   | rights and duties. That's just a personal preference.  That's not the way I personally would approach it, but I guess we're here, to some extent, to try to understand why free speech is important and what its importance is.  Now, there are any number of accounts of the importance of free speech. One claim it's been alluded to already is the claim: well, free speech, Mill seems to think, will deliver truth in the free   |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9   | in a crowded theatre. Would that be an example?  PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: That's right. The question is: could my interest in shouting "fire" in a crowded theatre generate a duty on anyone else to let me shout and not to interfere with me doing that and not to punish me for doing that, and the answer is: clearly not. So to specify the content of the right, the duties it involves, I have to think about what benefit I would get and what cost it would impose upon others.  | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9   | rights and duties. That's just a personal preference.  That's not the way I personally would approach it, but I guess we're here, to some extent, to try to understand why free speech is important and what its importance is.  Now, there are any number of accounts of the importance of free speech. One claim it's been alluded to already is the claim: well, free speech, Mill seems to think, will deliver truth in the free marketplace of ideas. So he seems to think the world is   |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11   | in a crowded theatre. Would that be an example?  PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: That's right. The question is: could my interest in shouting "fire" in a crowded theatre generate a duty on anyone else to let me shout and not to interfere with me doing that and not to punish me for doing that, and the answer is: clearly not. So to specify the content of the right, the duties it involves, I have to think about what benefit I would get and what cost it would impose upon others.  LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: If any of you want to come in at any  | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11   | rights and duties. That's just a personal preference.  That's not the way I personally would approach it, but I guess we're here, to some extent, to try to understand why free speech is important and what its importance is.  Now, there are any number of accounts of the importance of free speech. One claim it's been alluded to already is the claim: well, free speech, Mill seems to think, will deliver truth in the free marketplace of ideas. So he seems to think the world is like a huge seminar room: everybody says the thing that   |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12   | in a crowded theatre. Would that be an example?  PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: That's right. The question is: could my interest in shouting "fire" in a crowded theatre generate a duty on anyone else to let me shout and not to interfere with me doing that and not to punish me for doing that, and the answer is: clearly not. So to specify the content of the right, the duties it involves, I have to think about what benefit I would get and what cost it would impose upon others.  LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: If any of you want to come in at any time, don't feel driven by the questions. The purpose  | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12   | rights and duties. That's just a personal preference.  That's not the way I personally would approach it, but I guess we're here, to some extent, to try to understand why free speech is important and what its importance is.  Now, there are any number of accounts of the importance of free speech. One claim it's been alluded to already is the claim: well, free speech, Mill seems to think, will deliver truth in the free marketplace of ideas. So he seems to think the world is like a huge seminar room: everybody says the thing that they want to say and sooner or later, truth comes out.  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13   | in a crowded theatre. Would that be an example?  PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: That's right. The question is: could my interest in shouting "fire" in a crowded theatre generate a duty on anyone else to let me shout and not to interfere with me doing that and not to punish me for doing that, and the answer is: clearly not. So to specify the content of the right, the duties it involves, I have to think about what benefit I would get and what cost it would impose upon others.  LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: If any of you want to come in at any time, don't feel driven by the questions. The purpose of having the number of you together is to encourage the   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13   | rights and duties. That's just a personal preference.  That's not the way I personally would approach it, but I guess we're here, to some extent, to try to understand why free speech is important and what its importance is.  Now, there are any number of accounts of the importance of free speech. One claim it's been alluded to already is the claim: well, free speech, Mill seems to think, will deliver truth in the free marketplace of ideas. So he seems to think the world is like a huge seminar room: everybody says the thing that they want to say and sooner or later, truth comes out.  Now, that defence of free speech strikes me as very,  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14   | in a crowded theatre. Would that be an example?  PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: That's right. The question is: could my interest in shouting "fire" in a crowded theatre generate a duty on anyone else to let me shout and not to interfere with me doing that and not to punish me for doing that, and the answer is: clearly not. So to specify the content of the right, the duties it involves, I have to think about what benefit I would get and what cost it would impose upon others.  LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: If any of you want to come in at any time, don't feel driven by the questions. The purpose of having the number of you together is to encourage the debate between you because you know far more about the  | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14   | rights and duties. That's just a personal preference.  That's not the way I personally would approach it, but I guess we're here, to some extent, to try to understand why free speech is important and what its importance is.  Now, there are any number of accounts of the importance of free speech. One claim it's been alluded to already is the claim: well, free speech, Mill seems to think, will deliver truth in the free marketplace of ideas. So he seems to think the world is like a huge seminar room: everybody says the thing that they want to say and sooner or later, truth comes out.  Now, that defence of free speech strikes me as very, very limited indeed, partly because there are  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15   | in a crowded theatre. Would that be an example?  PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: That's right. The question is: could my interest in shouting "fire" in a crowded theatre generate a duty on anyone else to let me shout and not to interfere with me doing that and not to punish me for doing that, and the answer is: clearly not. So to specify the content of the right, the duties it involves, I have to think about what benefit I would get and what cost it would impose upon others.  LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: If any of you want to come in at any time, don't feel driven by the questions. The purpose of having the number of you together is to encourage the debate between you because you know far more about the topic certainly than I do I won't speak for Mr Jay   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15   | rights and duties. That's just a personal preference.  That's not the way I personally would approach it, but I guess we're here, to some extent, to try to understand why free speech is important and what its importance is.  Now, there are any number of accounts of the importance of free speech. One claim it's been alluded to already is the claim: well, free speech, Mill seems to think, will deliver truth in the free marketplace of ideas. So he seems to think the world is like a huge seminar room: everybody says the thing that they want to say and sooner or later, truth comes out.  Now, that defence of free speech strikes me as very, very limited indeed, partly because there are significant power interests in modern democracies, so it   |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16   | in a crowded theatre. Would that be an example?  PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: That's right. The question is: could my interest in shouting "fire" in a crowded theatre generate a duty on anyone else to let me shout and not to interfere with me doing that and not to punish me for doing that, and the answer is: clearly not. So to specify the content of the right, the duties it involves, I have to think about what benefit I would get and what cost it would impose upon others.  LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: If any of you want to come in at any time, don't feel driven by the questions. The purpose of having the number of you together is to encourage the debate between you because you know far more about the topic certainly than I do I won't speak for Mr Jay because that would interfere with his right but I'm   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16   | rights and duties. That's just a personal preference.  That's not the way I personally would approach it, but I guess we're here, to some extent, to try to understand why free speech is important and what its importance is.  Now, there are any number of accounts of the importance of free speech. One claim it's been alluded to already is the claim: well, free speech, Mill seems to think, will deliver truth in the free marketplace of ideas. So he seems to think the world is like a huge seminar room: everybody says the thing that they want to say and sooner or later, truth comes out.  Now, that defence of free speech strikes me as very, very limited indeed, partly because there are significant power interests in modern democracies, so it just isn't the case that my speech is heard as well as  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17   | in a crowded theatre. Would that be an example?  PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: That's right. The question is: could my interest in shouting "fire" in a crowded theatre generate a duty on anyone else to let me shout and not to interfere with me doing that and not to punish me for doing that, and the answer is: clearly not. So to specify the content of the right, the duties it involves, I have to think about what benefit I would get and what cost it would impose upon others.  LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: If any of you want to come in at any time, don't feel driven by the questions. The purpose of having the number of you together is to encourage the debate between you because you know far more about the topic certainly than I do I won't speak for Mr Jay because that would interfere with his right but I'm very keen that I generate the discussion between you to   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17   | rights and duties. That's just a personal preference.  That's not the way I personally would approach it, but I guess we're here, to some extent, to try to understand why free speech is important and what its importance is.  Now, there are any number of accounts of the importance of free speech. One claim it's been alluded to already is the claim: well, free speech, Mill seems to think, will deliver truth in the free marketplace of ideas. So he seems to think the world is like a huge seminar room: everybody says the thing that they want to say and sooner or later, truth comes out.  Now, that defence of free speech strikes me as very, very limited indeed, partly because there are significant power interests in modern democracies, so it just isn't the case that my speech is heard as well as the speech of people who own vast areas of the press,  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18                                     | in a crowded theatre. Would that be an example?  PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: That's right. The question is: could my interest in shouting "fire" in a crowded theatre generate a duty on anyone else to let me shout and not to interfere with me doing that and not to punish me for doing that, and the answer is: clearly not. So to specify the content of the right, the duties it involves, I have to think about what benefit I would get and what cost it would impose upon others.  LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: If any of you want to come in at any time, don't feel driven by the questions. The purpose of having the number of you together is to encourage the debate between you because you know far more about the topic certainly than I do I won't speak for Mr Jay because that would interfere with his right but I'm very keen that I generate the discussion between you to try and distill what I can from your views and the  | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18                                     | rights and duties. That's just a personal preference.  That's not the way I personally would approach it, but I guess we're here, to some extent, to try to understand why free speech is important and what its importance is.  Now, there are any number of accounts of the importance of free speech. One claim it's been alluded to already is the claim: well, free speech, Mill seems to think, will deliver truth in the free marketplace of ideas. So he seems to think the world is like a huge seminar room: everybody says the thing that they want to say and sooner or later, truth comes out.  Now, that defence of free speech strikes me as very, very limited indeed, partly because there are significant power interests in modern democracies, so it just isn't the case that my speech is heard as well as the speech of people who own vast areas of the press, also because it isn't clear anyway that freedom of   |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18                                     | in a crowded theatre. Would that be an example?  PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: That's right. The question is: could my interest in shouting "fire" in a crowded theatre generate a duty on anyone else to let me shout and not to interfere with me doing that and not to punish me for doing that, and the answer is: clearly not. So to specify the content of the right, the duties it involves, I have to think about what benefit I would get and what cost it would impose upon others.  LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: If any of you want to come in at any time, don't feel driven by the questions. The purpose of having the number of you together is to encourage the debate between you because you know far more about the topic certainly than I do I won't speak for Mr Jay because that would interfere with his right but I'm very keen that I generate the discussion between you to try and distill what I can from your views and the slightly different windows you put upon the issue.   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19                               | rights and duties. That's just a personal preference. That's not the way I personally would approach it, but I guess we're here, to some extent, to try to understand why free speech is important and what its importance is.  Now, there are any number of accounts of the importance of free speech. One claim it's been alluded to already is the claim: well, free speech, Mill seems to think, will deliver truth in the free marketplace of ideas. So he seems to think the world is like a huge seminar room: everybody says the thing that they want to say and sooner or later, truth comes out.  Now, that defence of free speech strikes me as very, very limited indeed, partly because there are significant power interests in modern democracies, so it just isn't the case that my speech is heard as well as the speech of people who own vast areas of the press, also because it isn't clear anyway that freedom of speech will deliver truth even in a free marketplace of  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20                         | in a crowded theatre. Would that be an example?  PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: That's right. The question is: could my interest in shouting "fire" in a crowded theatre generate a duty on anyone else to let me shout and not to interfere with me doing that and not to punish me for doing that, and the answer is: clearly not. So to specify the content of the right, the duties it involves, I have to think about what benefit I would get and what cost it would impose upon others.  LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: If any of you want to come in at any time, don't feel driven by the questions. The purpose of having the number of you together is to encourage the debate between you because you know far more about the topic certainly than I do I won't speak for Mr Jay because that would interfere with his right but I'm very keen that I generate the discussion between you to try and distill what I can from your views and the slightly different windows you put upon the issue.  PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Can I say something about the   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20                         | rights and duties. That's just a personal preference. That's not the way I personally would approach it, but I guess we're here, to some extent, to try to understand why free speech is important and what its importance is.  Now, there are any number of accounts of the importance of free speech. One claim it's been alluded to already is the claim: well, free speech, Mill seems to think, will deliver truth in the free marketplace of ideas. So he seems to think the world is like a huge seminar room: everybody says the thing that they want to say and sooner or later, truth comes out.  Now, that defence of free speech strikes me as very, very limited indeed, partly because there are significant power interests in modern democracies, so it just isn't the case that my speech is heard as well as the speech of people who own vast areas of the press, also because it isn't clear anyway that freedom of speech will deliver truth even in a free marketplace of ideas, where there's rough equality of power.  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21                   | in a crowded theatre. Would that be an example?  PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: That's right. The question is: could my interest in shouting "fire" in a crowded theatre generate a duty on anyone else to let me shout and not to interfere with me doing that and not to punish me for doing that, and the answer is: clearly not. So to specify the content of the right, the duties it involves, I have to think about what benefit I would get and what cost it would impose upon others.  LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: If any of you want to come in at any time, don't feel driven by the questions. The purpose of having the number of you together is to encourage the debate between you because you know far more about the topic certainly than I do I won't speak for Mr Jay because that would interfere with his right but I'm very keen that I generate the discussion between you to try and distill what I can from your views and the slightly different windows you put upon the issue.  PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Can I say something about the qualification of the right? This is often thought of in   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21                   | rights and duties. That's just a personal preference. That's not the way I personally would approach it, but I guess we're here, to some extent, to try to understand why free speech is important and what its importance is.  Now, there are any number of accounts of the importance of free speech. One claim it's been alluded to already is the claim: well, free speech, Mill seems to think, will deliver truth in the free marketplace of ideas. So he seems to think the world is like a huge seminar room: everybody says the thing that they want to say and sooner or later, truth comes out.  Now, that defence of free speech strikes me as very, very limited indeed, partly because there are significant power interests in modern democracies, so it just isn't the case that my speech is heard as well as the speech of people who own vast areas of the press, also because it isn't clear anyway that freedom of speech will deliver truth even in a free marketplace of ideas, where there's rough equality of power.  I cited in the evidence I gave a book by Bernard  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22             | in a crowded theatre. Would that be an example?  PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: That's right. The question is: could my interest in shouting "fire" in a crowded theatre generate a duty on anyone else to let me shout and not to interfere with me doing that and not to punish me for doing that, and the answer is: clearly not. So to specify the content of the right, the duties it involves, I have to think about what benefit I would get and what cost it would impose upon others.  LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: If any of you want to come in at any time, don't feel driven by the questions. The purpose of having the number of you together is to encourage the debate between you because you know far more about the topic certainly than I do I won't speak for Mr Jay because that would interfere with his right but I'm very keen that I generate the discussion between you to try and distill what I can from your views and the slightly different windows you put upon the issue.  PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Can I say something about the qualification of the right? This is often thought of in connection with "fire" in a crowded theatre and John  | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22             | rights and duties. That's just a personal preference. That's not the way I personally would approach it, but I guess we're here, to some extent, to try to understand why free speech is important and what its importance is.  Now, there are any number of accounts of the importance of free speech. One claim it's been alluded to already is the claim: well, free speech, Mill seems to think, will deliver truth in the free marketplace of ideas. So he seems to think the world is like a huge seminar room: everybody says the thing that they want to say and sooner or later, truth comes out.  Now, that defence of free speech strikes me as very, very limited indeed, partly because there are significant power interests in modern democracies, so it just isn't the case that my speech is heard as well as the speech of people who own vast areas of the press, also because it isn't clear anyway that freedom of speech will deliver truth even in a free marketplace of ideas, where there's rough equality of power.  I cited in the evidence I gave a book by Bernard Williams called "Truth and Truthfulness", in which he  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22<br>23       | in a crowded theatre. Would that be an example?  PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: That's right. The question is: could my interest in shouting "fire" in a crowded theatre generate a duty on anyone else to let me shout and not to interfere with me doing that and not to punish me for doing that, and the answer is: clearly not. So to specify the content of the right, the duties it involves, I have to think about what benefit I would get and what cost it would impose upon others.  LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: If any of you want to come in at any time, don't feel driven by the questions. The purpose of having the number of you together is to encourage the debate between you because you know far more about the topic certainly than I do I won't speak for Mr Jay because that would interfere with his right but I'm very keen that I generate the discussion between you to try and distill what I can from your views and the slightly different windows you put upon the issue.  PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Can I say something about the qualification of the right? This is often thought of in connection with "fire" in a crowded theatre and John Stuart Mill had inciting a riot against the corn dealers   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22<br>23       | rights and duties. That's just a personal preference. That's not the way I personally would approach it, but I guess we're here, to some extent, to try to understand why free speech is important and what its importance is.  Now, there are any number of accounts of the importance of free speech. One claim it's been alluded to already is the claim: well, free speech, Mill seems to think, will deliver truth in the free marketplace of ideas. So he seems to think the world is like a huge seminar room: everybody says the thing that they want to say and sooner or later, truth comes out.  Now, that defence of free speech strikes me as very, very limited indeed, partly because there are significant power interests in modern democracies, so it just isn't the case that my speech is heard as well as the speech of people who own vast areas of the press, also because it isn't clear anyway that freedom of speech will deliver truth even in a free marketplace of ideas, where there's rough equality of power.  I cited in the evidence I gave a book by Bernard Williams called "Truth and Truthfulness", in which he says: if you look at those institutions which are most   |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22<br>23<br>24 | in a crowded theatre. Would that be an example?  PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: That's right. The question is: could my interest in shouting "fire" in a crowded theatre generate a duty on anyone else to let me shout and not to interfere with me doing that and not to punish me for doing that, and the answer is: clearly not. So to specify the content of the right, the duties it involves, I have to think about what benefit I would get and what cost it would impose upon others.  LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: If any of you want to come in at any time, don't feel driven by the questions. The purpose of having the number of you together is to encourage the debate between you because you know far more about the topic certainly than I do I won't speak for Mr Jay because that would interfere with his right but I'm very keen that I generate the discussion between you to try and distill what I can from your views and the slightly different windows you put upon the issue.  PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Can I say something about the qualification of the right? This is often thought of in connection with "fire" in a crowded theatre and John Stuart Mill had inciting a riot against the corn dealers or whatever so positive harm coming from a piece of | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22<br>23<br>24 | rights and duties. That's just a personal preference.  That's not the way I personally would approach it, but I guess we're here, to some extent, to try to understand why free speech is important and what its importance is.  Now, there are any number of accounts of the importance of free speech. One claim it's been alluded to already is the claim: well, free speech, Mill seems to think, will deliver truth in the free marketplace of ideas. So he seems to think the world is like a huge seminar room: everybody says the thing that they want to say and sooner or later, truth comes out.  Now, that defence of free speech strikes me as very, very limited indeed, partly because there are significant power interests in modern democracies, so it just isn't the case that my speech is heard as well as the speech of people who own vast areas of the press, also because it isn't clear anyway that freedom of speech will deliver truth even in a free marketplace of ideas, where there's rough equality of power.  I cited in the evidence I gave a book by Bernard Williams called "Truth and Truthfulness", in which he says: if you look at those institutions which are most closely associated with trying to discover truth, like |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22<br>23       | in a crowded theatre. Would that be an example?  PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: That's right. The question is: could my interest in shouting "fire" in a crowded theatre generate a duty on anyone else to let me shout and not to interfere with me doing that and not to punish me for doing that, and the answer is: clearly not. So to specify the content of the right, the duties it involves, I have to think about what benefit I would get and what cost it would impose upon others.  LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: If any of you want to come in at any time, don't feel driven by the questions. The purpose of having the number of you together is to encourage the debate between you because you know far more about the topic certainly than I do I won't speak for Mr Jay because that would interfere with his right but I'm very keen that I generate the discussion between you to try and distill what I can from your views and the slightly different windows you put upon the issue.  PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Can I say something about the qualification of the right? This is often thought of in connection with "fire" in a crowded theatre and John Stuart Mill had inciting a riot against the corn dealers   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22<br>23       | rights and duties. That's just a personal preference. That's not the way I personally would approach it, but I guess we're here, to some extent, to try to understand why free speech is important and what its importance is.  Now, there are any number of accounts of the importance of free speech. One claim it's been alluded to already is the claim: well, free speech, Mill seems to think, will deliver truth in the free marketplace of ideas. So he seems to think the world is like a huge seminar room: everybody says the thing that they want to say and sooner or later, truth comes out.  Now, that defence of free speech strikes me as very, very limited indeed, partly because there are significant power interests in modern democracies, so it just isn't the case that my speech is heard as well as the speech of people who own vast areas of the press, also because it isn't clear anyway that freedom of speech will deliver truth even in a free marketplace of ideas, where there's rough equality of power.  I cited in the evidence I gave a book by Bernard Williams called "Truth and Truthfulness", in which he says: if you look at those institutions which are most   |

|   | dans and the state of the state | ,  |  |
|---|--|--|--|
| 1   | there are very considerable restrictions on freedom of   | 1  | extent aren't they?  |
| 2   | speech. I don't, in my seminar, allow my students to   | 2  | Can I ask, first of all, Professor Hornsby to deal   |
| 3   | heckle one another or to shout offensive remarks at one  | 3  | with that conglomeration of points.  PROFESSOR HORNSBY: There were a considerable number and   |
| 4   | another. That's not legitimate.  | 4 5  |  |
| 5   | So in fact, the pursuit of truth is something which calls for restriction of free speech just as much as it  | "  | I haven't written them all down.   |
| 6<br>7  | calls for free speech. So that argument seems to me  | 6<br>7   | It seems to me that individual freedom of expression   |
| 8   | slack.   | 8  | of course accrues to journalists. I don't think freedom of the press could possibly be coterminous with  |
| 9   | There's an argument in terms of autonomy, which  | 9  | individual free expression because I think the public  |
| 10  | we've mentioned already, and then an argument in terms   | 10   | has an interest in the freedom of the press, which has   |
| 11  | of democracy, which has also been touched upon, but what   | 11   | nothing to do in particular with freedom of speech, and  |
| 12  | we need to think about here, if we're arguing or trying  | 12   | if one thinks that free speech is, as it were,   |
| 13  | to consider the importance of free speech, is: what is   | 13   | beneficial that's to say, in a democracy there's   |
| 14  | free speech for? Why do people want it? I think there  | 14   | a positive reason to promote it then it may be that  |
| 15  | are different answers to that, depending on whether  | 15   | one needs specifically to recognise the freedom of   |
| 16  | you're looking at the individual or the press, press   | 16   | speech of the press as opposed to individuals, and it  |
| 17  | freedom as opposed to individual freedom.  | 17   | may even be that the press has a duty, to use John's   |
| 18  | Q. May we move into the topic now of press freedom?  | 18   | word, to ensure that individual freedom of speech is   |
| 19  | LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Let's just then, as you're about to  | 19   | promoted.  |
| 20  | do that, just develop that a bit more and try and  | 20   | Q. Professor Tasioulas, what's your take on that?  |
| 21  | distinguish between the two, if you can.   | 21   | PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: I think there's always been a tendency  |
| 22  | PROFESSOR MENDUS: I don't know if this is what Jennifer was  | 22   | to think of press freedom under the rubric of individual   |
| 23  | referring to, but my thought is my free speech is just   | 23   | freedom of expression or communication. I think that's   |
| 24  | the speech to say what I think to the world. I just  | 24   | probably a mistake. The sort of reason that Professor  |
| 25  | announce my I'm not really interested, necessarily,  | 25   | Hornsby gave the subjects are different. In the one  |
|   | Page 13  |  | Page 15  |
|   |  |  |  |
| 1   | in whether anybody's listening. But if you're talking  | 1  | case, you're talking about an individual with their  |
| 2   | about freedom of the press, the press actually are   | 2  | particular sorts of interests; in the other case, you're   |
| 3   | trying, at least on the surface, to communicate.   | 3  | talking about institutional structures.  |
|   |  |  |  |
| 4   | They're not just expressing their view. They have  | 4  | Now, of course, it may be that the individual  |
| 5   | a persuasive, informative dimension to their work too,   | 4<br>5   | Now, of course, it may be that the individual interest in expression gets fulfilled in part from   |
| 5<br>6  | a persuasive, informative dimension to their work too,<br>and that's very different. But maybe that's not what   | 4<br>5<br>6  | Now, of course, it may be that the individual interest in expression gets fulfilled in part from certain sorts of institutional structures the   |
| 5<br>6<br>7   | a persuasive, informative dimension to their work too,<br>and that's very different. But maybe that's not what<br>you're thinking?   | 4<br>5<br>6<br>7   | Now, of course, it may be that the individual interest in expression gets fulfilled in part from certain sorts of institutional structures the press and that the press should be shaped   |
| 5<br>6<br>7<br>8  | a persuasive, informative dimension to their work too, and that's very different. But maybe that's not what you're thinking?  PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Yes. I mean, speech has an expressive   | 4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8  | Now, of course, it may be that the individual interest in expression gets fulfilled in part from certain sorts of institutional structures the press and that the press should be shaped accordingly, but there's a lot more going on in the   |
| 5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9   | a persuasive, informative dimension to their work too, and that's very different. But maybe that's not what you're thinking?  PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Yes. I mean, speech has an expressive dimension and it can when it's in print as well as when   | 4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9   | Now, of course, it may be that the individual interest in expression gets fulfilled in part from certain sorts of institutional structures the press and that the press should be shaped accordingly, but there's a lot more going on in the context of freedom of the press. Think about the  |
| 5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10   | a persuasive, informative dimension to their work too, and that's very different. But maybe that's not what you're thinking?  PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Yes. I mean, speech has an expressive dimension and it can when it's in print as well as when it's spoken, though it more readily is expressive, for  | 4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9   | Now, of course, it may be that the individual interest in expression gets fulfilled in part from certain sorts of institutional structures the press and that the press should be shaped accordingly, but there's a lot more going on in the context of freedom of the press. Think about the underlying interests. The underlying interests wouldn't  |
| 5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11   | a persuasive, informative dimension to their work too, and that's very different. But maybe that's not what you're thinking?  PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Yes. I mean, speech has an expressive dimension and it can when it's in print as well as when it's spoken, though it more readily is expressive, for instance, of hatred when it's spoken.  | 4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10   | Now, of course, it may be that the individual interest in expression gets fulfilled in part from certain sorts of institutional structures the press and that the press should be shaped accordingly, but there's a lot more going on in the context of freedom of the press. Think about the underlying interests. The underlying interests wouldn't necessarily be interests in expression only, but they  |
| 5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12   | a persuasive, informative dimension to their work too, and that's very different. But maybe that's not what you're thinking?  PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Yes. I mean, speech has an expressive dimension and it can when it's in print as well as when it's spoken, though it more readily is expressive, for instance, of hatred when it's spoken.  If I could just say, I was trying to distinguish  | 4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12   | Now, of course, it may be that the individual interest in expression gets fulfilled in part from certain sorts of institutional structures the press and that the press should be shaped accordingly, but there's a lot more going on in the context of freedom of the press. Think about the underlying interests. The underlying interests wouldn't necessarily be interests in expression only, but they would be interested in things like the way in which  |
| 5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13   | a persuasive, informative dimension to their work too, and that's very different. But maybe that's not what you're thinking?  PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Yes. I mean, speech has an expressive dimension and it can when it's in print as well as when it's spoken, though it more readily is expressive, for instance, of hatred when it's spoken.  If I could just say, I was trying to distinguish speech que communicative of beliefs and perhaps  | 4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13   | Now, of course, it may be that the individual interest in expression gets fulfilled in part from certain sorts of institutional structures the press and that the press should be shaped accordingly, but there's a lot more going on in the context of freedom of the press. Think about the underlying interests. The underlying interests wouldn't necessarily be interests in expression only, but they would be interested in things like the way in which a press can help curb abuses of power by government or   |
| 5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14   | a persuasive, informative dimension to their work too, and that's very different. But maybe that's not what you're thinking?  PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Yes. I mean, speech has an expressive dimension and it can when it's in print as well as when it's spoken, though it more readily is expressive, for instance, of hatred when it's spoken.  If I could just say, I was trying to distinguish speech que communicative of beliefs and perhaps knowledge and this expressive function and I think when  | 4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14   | Now, of course, it may be that the individual interest in expression gets fulfilled in part from certain sorts of institutional structures the press and that the press should be shaped accordingly, but there's a lot more going on in the context of freedom of the press. Think about the underlying interests. The underlying interests wouldn't necessarily be interests in expression only, but they would be interested in things like the way in which a press can help curb abuses of power by government or the role that it plays in a democracy, et cetera,   |
| 5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15   | a persuasive, informative dimension to their work too, and that's very different. But maybe that's not what you're thinking?  PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Yes. I mean, speech has an expressive dimension and it can when it's in print as well as when it's spoken, though it more readily is expressive, for instance, of hatred when it's spoken.  If I could just say, I was trying to distinguish speech que communicative of beliefs and perhaps knowledge and this expressive function and I think when one thinks, as Mill did, about free speech, one thinks   | 4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15   | Now, of course, it may be that the individual interest in expression gets fulfilled in part from certain sorts of institutional structures the press and that the press should be shaped accordingly, but there's a lot more going on in the context of freedom of the press. Think about the underlying interests. The underlying interests wouldn't necessarily be interests in expression only, but they would be interested in things like the way in which a press can help curb abuses of power by government or the role that it plays in a democracy, et cetera, et cetera.  |
| 5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16   | a persuasive, informative dimension to their work too, and that's very different. But maybe that's not what you're thinking?  PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Yes. I mean, speech has an expressive dimension and it can when it's in print as well as when it's spoken, though it more readily is expressive, for instance, of hatred when it's spoken.  If I could just say, I was trying to distinguish speech que communicative of beliefs and perhaps knowledge and this expressive function and I think when one thinks, as Mill did, about free speech, one thinks not of its expressive functions specifically. But   | 4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16   | Now, of course, it may be that the individual interest in expression gets fulfilled in part from certain sorts of institutional structures the press and that the press should be shaped accordingly, but there's a lot more going on in the context of freedom of the press. Think about the underlying interests. The underlying interests wouldn't necessarily be interests in expression only, but they would be interested in things like the way in which a press can help curb abuses of power by government or the role that it plays in a democracy, et cetera, et cetera.  So it's the institutional character of the press  |
| 5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16   | a persuasive, informative dimension to their work too, and that's very different. But maybe that's not what you're thinking?  PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Yes. I mean, speech has an expressive dimension and it can when it's in print as well as when it's spoken, though it more readily is expressive, for instance, of hatred when it's spoken.  If I could just say, I was trying to distinguish speech que communicative of beliefs and perhaps knowledge and this expressive function and I think when one thinks, as Mill did, about free speech, one thinks not of its expressive functions specifically. But I have to agree that I think Mill was extraordinarily   | 4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17   | Now, of course, it may be that the individual interest in expression gets fulfilled in part from certain sorts of institutional structures the press and that the press should be shaped accordingly, but there's a lot more going on in the context of freedom of the press. Think about the underlying interests. The underlying interests wouldn't necessarily be interests in expression only, but they would be interested in things like the way in which a press can help curb abuses of power by government or the role that it plays in a democracy, et cetera, et cetera.  So it's the institutional character of the press that makes it the case that you can't simply go from   |
| 5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17   | a persuasive, informative dimension to their work too, and that's very different. But maybe that's not what you're thinking?  PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Yes. I mean, speech has an expressive dimension and it can when it's in print as well as when it's spoken, though it more readily is expressive, for instance, of hatred when it's spoken.  If I could just say, I was trying to distinguish speech que communicative of beliefs and perhaps knowledge and this expressive function and I think when one thinks, as Mill did, about free speech, one thinks not of its expressive functions specifically. But I have to agree that I think Mill was extraordinarily optimistic in thinking free speech is conducive to truth  | 4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18                                     | Now, of course, it may be that the individual interest in expression gets fulfilled in part from certain sorts of institutional structures the press and that the press should be shaped accordingly, but there's a lot more going on in the context of freedom of the press. Think about the underlying interests. The underlying interests wouldn't necessarily be interests in expression only, but they would be interested in things like the way in which a press can help curb abuses of power by government or the role that it plays in a democracy, et cetera, et cetera.  So it's the institutional character of the press that makes it the case that you can't simply go from thoughts about individual interests and expression to   |
| 5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18                                     | a persuasive, informative dimension to their work too, and that's very different. But maybe that's not what you're thinking?  PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Yes. I mean, speech has an expressive dimension and it can when it's in print as well as when it's spoken, though it more readily is expressive, for instance, of hatred when it's spoken.  If I could just say, I was trying to distinguish speech que communicative of beliefs and perhaps knowledge and this expressive function and I think when one thinks, as Mill did, about free speech, one thinks not of its expressive functions specifically. But I have to agree that I think Mill was extraordinarily optimistic in thinking free speech is conducive to truth all round, but I think there's a conception of speech  | 4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18                                     | Now, of course, it may be that the individual interest in expression gets fulfilled in part from certain sorts of institutional structures the press and that the press should be shaped accordingly, but there's a lot more going on in the context of freedom of the press. Think about the underlying interests. The underlying interests wouldn't necessarily be interests in expression only, but they would be interested in things like the way in which a press can help curb abuses of power by government or the role that it plays in a democracy, et cetera, et cetera.  So it's the institutional character of the press that makes it the case that you can't simply go from thoughts about individual interests and expression to claims about freedom of the press. It's a kind of   |
| 5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20                         | a persuasive, informative dimension to their work too, and that's very different. But maybe that's not what you're thinking?  PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Yes. I mean, speech has an expressive dimension and it can when it's in print as well as when it's spoken, though it more readily is expressive, for instance, of hatred when it's spoken.  If I could just say, I was trying to distinguish speech que communicative of beliefs and perhaps knowledge and this expressive function and I think when one thinks, as Mill did, about free speech, one thinks not of its expressive functions specifically. But I have to agree that I think Mill was extraordinarily optimistic in thinking free speech is conducive to truth all round, but I think there's a conception of speech such that the hope is that via free speech, truth will   | 4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20                         | Now, of course, it may be that the individual interest in expression gets fulfilled in part from certain sorts of institutional structures the press and that the press should be shaped accordingly, but there's a lot more going on in the context of freedom of the press. Think about the underlying interests. The underlying interests wouldn't necessarily be interests in expression only, but they would be interested in things like the way in which a press can help curb abuses of power by government or the role that it plays in a democracy, et cetera, et cetera.  So it's the institutional character of the press that makes it the case that you can't simply go from thoughts about individual interests and expression to claims about freedom of the press. It's a kind of different topic, although overlapping.  |
| 5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21                   | a persuasive, informative dimension to their work too, and that's very different. But maybe that's not what you're thinking?  PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Yes. I mean, speech has an expressive dimension and it can when it's in print as well as when it's spoken, though it more readily is expressive, for instance, of hatred when it's spoken.  If I could just say, I was trying to distinguish speech que communicative of beliefs and perhaps knowledge and this expressive function and I think when one thinks, as Mill did, about free speech, one thinks not of its expressive functions specifically. But I have to agree that I think Mill was extraordinarily optimistic in thinking free speech is conducive to truth all round, but I think there's a conception of speech such that the hope is that via free speech, truth will be reached. But there's more to speech than that.   | 4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21                   | Now, of course, it may be that the individual interest in expression gets fulfilled in part from certain sorts of institutional structures the press and that the press should be shaped accordingly, but there's a lot more going on in the context of freedom of the press. Think about the underlying interests. The underlying interests wouldn't necessarily be interests in expression only, but they would be interested in things like the way in which a press can help curb abuses of power by government or the role that it plays in a democracy, et cetera, et cetera.  So it's the institutional character of the press that makes it the case that you can't simply go from thoughts about individual interests and expression to claims about freedom of the press. It's a kind of different topic, although overlapping.  Q. Is that your view?   |
| 5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22             | a persuasive, informative dimension to their work too, and that's very different. But maybe that's not what you're thinking?  PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Yes. I mean, speech has an expressive dimension and it can when it's in print as well as when it's spoken, though it more readily is expressive, for instance, of hatred when it's spoken.  If I could just say, I was trying to distinguish speech que communicative of beliefs and perhaps knowledge and this expressive function and I think when one thinks, as Mill did, about free speech, one thinks not of its expressive functions specifically. But I have to agree that I think Mill was extraordinarily optimistic in thinking free speech is conducive to truth all round, but I think there's a conception of speech such that the hope is that via free speech, truth will be reached. But there's more to speech than that.  Q. Can we move to the related but distinct area of press   | 4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22             | Now, of course, it may be that the individual interest in expression gets fulfilled in part from certain sorts of institutional structures the press and that the press should be shaped accordingly, but there's a lot more going on in the context of freedom of the press. Think about the underlying interests. The underlying interests wouldn't necessarily be interests in expression only, but they would be interested in things like the way in which a press can help curb abuses of power by government or the role that it plays in a democracy, et cetera, et cetera.  So it's the institutional character of the press that makes it the case that you can't simply go from thoughts about individual interests and expression to claims about freedom of the press. It's a kind of different topic, although overlapping.  Q. Is that your view?  PROFESSOR MENDUS: Yes, I would agree with that entirely,   |
| 5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21                   | a persuasive, informative dimension to their work too, and that's very different. But maybe that's not what you're thinking?  PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Yes. I mean, speech has an expressive dimension and it can when it's in print as well as when it's spoken, though it more readily is expressive, for instance, of hatred when it's spoken.  If I could just say, I was trying to distinguish speech que communicative of beliefs and perhaps knowledge and this expressive function and I think when one thinks, as Mill did, about free speech, one thinks not of its expressive functions specifically. But I have to agree that I think Mill was extraordinarily optimistic in thinking free speech is conducive to truth all round, but I think there's a conception of speech such that the hope is that via free speech, truth will be reached. But there's more to speech than that.  Q. Can we move to the related but distinct area of press freedom. Does individual freedom of expression imply  | 4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22<br>23       | Now, of course, it may be that the individual interest in expression gets fulfilled in part from certain sorts of institutional structures the press and that the press should be shaped accordingly, but there's a lot more going on in the context of freedom of the press. Think about the underlying interests. The underlying interests wouldn't necessarily be interests in expression only, but they would be interested in things like the way in which a press can help curb abuses of power by government or the role that it plays in a democracy, et cetera, et cetera.  So it's the institutional character of the press that makes it the case that you can't simply go from thoughts about individual interests and expression to claims about freedom of the press. It's a kind of different topic, although overlapping.  Q. Is that your view?  PROFESSOR MENDUS: Yes, I would agree with that entirely, and I think if we don't hold onto that distinction, then  |
| 5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22<br>23       | a persuasive, informative dimension to their work too, and that's very different. But maybe that's not what you're thinking?  PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Yes. I mean, speech has an expressive dimension and it can when it's in print as well as when it's spoken, though it more readily is expressive, for instance, of hatred when it's spoken.  If I could just say, I was trying to distinguish speech que communicative of beliefs and perhaps knowledge and this expressive function and I think when one thinks, as Mill did, about free speech, one thinks not of its expressive functions specifically. But I have to agree that I think Mill was extraordinarily optimistic in thinking free speech is conducive to truth all round, but I think there's a conception of speech such that the hope is that via free speech, truth will be reached. But there's more to speech than that.  Q. Can we move to the related but distinct area of press freedom. Does individual freedom of expression imply press freedom? If not, why not? And if so, are the two   | 4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22<br>23<br>24 | Now, of course, it may be that the individual interest in expression gets fulfilled in part from certain sorts of institutional structures the press and that the press should be shaped accordingly, but there's a lot more going on in the context of freedom of the press. Think about the underlying interests. The underlying interests wouldn't necessarily be interests in expression only, but they would be interested in things like the way in which a press can help curb abuses of power by government or the role that it plays in a democracy, et cetera, et cetera.  So it's the institutional character of the press that makes it the case that you can't simply go from thoughts about individual interests and expression to claims about freedom of the press. It's a kind of different topic, although overlapping.  Q. Is that your view?  PROFESSOR MENDUS: Yes, I would agree with that entirely, and I think if we don't hold onto that distinction, then there is very serious danger of endorsing in two areas |
| 5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22<br>23<br>24 | a persuasive, informative dimension to their work too, and that's very different. But maybe that's not what you're thinking?  PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Yes. I mean, speech has an expressive dimension and it can when it's in print as well as when it's spoken, though it more readily is expressive, for instance, of hatred when it's spoken.  If I could just say, I was trying to distinguish speech que communicative of beliefs and perhaps knowledge and this expressive function and I think when one thinks, as Mill did, about free speech, one thinks not of its expressive functions specifically. But I have to agree that I think Mill was extraordinarily optimistic in thinking free speech is conducive to truth all round, but I think there's a conception of speech such that the hope is that via free speech, truth will be reached. But there's more to speech than that.  Q. Can we move to the related but distinct area of press freedom. Does individual freedom of expression imply  | 4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22<br>23       | Now, of course, it may be that the individual interest in expression gets fulfilled in part from certain sorts of institutional structures the press and that the press should be shaped accordingly, but there's a lot more going on in the context of freedom of the press. Think about the underlying interests. The underlying interests wouldn't necessarily be interests in expression only, but they would be interested in things like the way in which a press can help curb abuses of power by government or the role that it plays in a democracy, et cetera, et cetera.  So it's the institutional character of the press that makes it the case that you can't simply go from thoughts about individual interests and expression to claims about freedom of the press. It's a kind of different topic, although overlapping.  Q. Is that your view?  PROFESSOR MENDUS: Yes, I would agree with that entirely, and I think if we don't hold onto that distinction, then  |

| 1  | I think that is very, very important distinction.          | 1  | They must reserve the right to do it themselves and if      |
|----|--|----|---|
| 2  | Q. There are certain other issues which the Inquiry has    | 2  | they want to be offensive, they must reserve the right      |
| 3  | touched on over it's sort of 95 days to date. Can I ask    | 3  | to be able to be offensive too, and that's what their       |
| 4  | you, please, to address those? The first is the press      | 4  | free speech rights are.                                     |
| 5  | use of the megaphone, as we've liked to describe it, the   | 5  | PROFESSOR MENDUS: Yes, absolutely, and I think there are    |
| 6  | consequence of press power, that we're not talking about   | 6  | a number of things to say there. One is that in doing       |
| 7  | one voice, and to the extent to which we are, in           | 7  | that they need perhaps to think about the extent to         |
| 8  | relation to any one organ of the press, it's an            | 8  | which they report upon the news and the extent to which     |
| 9  | extremely loud voice cf our individual voices. Do you      | 9  | they make it.   |
| 10 | think there's any deeper analysis one could make of the    | 10 | PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: Another thing to say is that there is  |
| 11 | megaphone point than that which we've attempted thus       | 11 | an asymmetry between the individual case and the case of    |
| 12 | far? Professor Hornsby, first of all.                      | 12 | the press. One of the reasons we tolerate the fairly        |
| 13 | PROFESSOR HORNSBY: It means that publications in the press | 13 | broad-ranging right of individual expression is that        |
| 14 | are peculiarly vulnerable to promoting stereotypes,        | 14 | individual's remarks are typically limited in their         |
| 15 | because it's what's heard is widely heard. If it's         | 15 | impact, if it's one individual making some offensive        |
| 16 | assumed that a member of a group is portrayed as           | 16 | remarks. But as has already been pointed out, this          |
| 17 | a typical member of that group, then attitudes at large    | 17 | megaphone effect is a kind of culture-shaping effect, so    |
| 18 | towards the group will be affected. I'm thinking           | 18 | it can't be equated with the speech of an ordinary          |
| 19 | specifically of what's said in some of the evidence        | 19 | individual. It exerts much greater influence and power      |
| 20 | submitted by Equality Now, Object, Eaves, which            | 20 | on people, how they're perceived by others, creating        |
| 21 | represent I don't read the newspapers that they            | 21 | stereotypes or creating certain assumptions in society,     |
| 22 | analyse but represent that stereotypical views of women    | 22 | and for that reason this institutional consideration        |
| 23 | are portrayed in the press, and they're certainly          | 23 | makes it the case of greater institution power. There       |
| 24 | detrimental to women.                                      | 24 | might be limitations on that form of expression that        |
| 25 | PROFESSOR MENDUS: I wonder if it's worth noting that part  | 25 | don't apply in the individual case.                         |
|    | Page 17  |    | Page 19   |
| 1  | of one of the consequences of the megaphone effect is      | 1  | LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Yes. Once you get into talking about  |
| 2  | to take up a limited amount of space and time with         | 2  | limitations, then all sorts of press interests will talk    |
| 3  | a certain sort of view or position. To give an example,    | 3  | about muzzling their freedom.                               |
| 4  | it seems to me that the more time that is spent, let's     | 4  | PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: But anyone who believes in free speech |
| 5  | say, presenting a stereotypical view of women, or          | 5  | presumably also believes that there are limits to things    |
| 6  | presenting "information" about who paid for the duck       | 6  | like: you can't defame other people.                        |
| 7  | house, the less space is available for discussion of       | 7  | LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Oh yes.                               |
| 8  | wider and more important political issues. So the          | 8  | PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: So no one is credibly going to say any |
| 9  | megaphone effect takes up space and crowds out more        | 9  | restriction on freedom of expression in itself              |
| 10 | important what seem to me to be more important             | 10 | constitutes some kind of unacceptable muzzling. So the      |
| 11 | issues. It's not a limitless resource.                     | 11 | question then becomes, in a kind of piecemeal               |
| 12 | LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: That begs the question what an       | 12 | approach careful piecemeal approach, when you start         |
| 13 | important issue is.  | 13 | to identify certain forms of restriction: what case can     |
| 14 | PROFESSOR MENDUS: I hesitated, and that's the reason,      | 14 | be made for them? But the mere fact that it's               |
| 15 | but I don't have the argument now, but I put it to         | 15 | a restriction doesn't of itself show that it's              |
| 16 | you that questions about the euro, about Afghanistan are   | 16 | a mistake, because we already accept the need for           |
| 17 | more important and more deserving of space in newspapers   | 17 | a series of restrictions.                                   |
| 18 | than questions about who cleaned the duck house and for    | 18 | PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Can I make a comment on this question of |
| 19 | what sum of money, but I absolutely take your point that   | 19 | importance and whether the press is focusing on that?       |
| 20 | there is that raises the question: who decides what's      | 20 | You suggested, I think, that it was, as it were,            |
| 21 | more important?  | 21 | a subjective matter. Who is to say what's important?        |
| 22 | LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: And the press are very firmly of the |    | But I think the megaphone effect does raise a question      |
| 23 | view that that's exactly what they do, and the fact that   | 23 | about importance, which isn't simply one that's             |
| 24 | some people may think it's more important to discuss one   | 24 | a subjective matter.  |
| 25 | thing as opposed to another is neither here nor there.     | 25 | Imagine that there's some crime that we're all              |
|    | Page 18  |    | Page 20   |

1 1 market the way that is most likely to deliver whatever concerned with which is committed once a week but it's 2 2 low level, it doesn't get an enormous amount of press value it is that we value in the free press? 3 3 attention. Then one week in five years the victim is So, I mean, in true philosophical fashion, I'm not 4 4 a celebrity and we all hear about it. So we're suddenly answering your question; I'm moving around it. But we 5 5 focused on concern with this person but no interest is do need to know: why is a free press such a good thing? 6 shown in the 500 other victims, as it were. So I think 6 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I'm very comfortable for you to 7 7 that the megaphone effect can make us think about the formulate the questions that you think the answers to 8 8 which will assist me. issue of the day and forget about issues which pervade 9 9 PROFESSOR MENDUS: Okay, this is the question. I always life but don't get reported. 10 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: There are lots of parallels or 10 tell students they mustn't do that. I always say you 11 11 examples of that very point in the context of what I've must answer the question, not the question you wish 12 12 been considering. you'd been asked. 13 PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Good. 13 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I'm very conscious, Professor, that this takes me back 40-odd years to a jurisprudential 14 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Well, particularly in relation to 14 15 interception of communications, phone hacking. 15 tutorial and I'm very concerned about it because I'm 16 PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Mm-hm. 16 bothered about only getting a beta plus. So I'd better 17 17 MR JAY: One can identify clear and distinct areas where keep myself quite quiet and allow you to develop the 18 restrictions are legitimate. Defamation has been 18 ideas. 19 19 PROFESSOR MENDUS: Okay. That's where I think difficulty mentioned. Criminal law in relation to hate crimes, 20 that has also been mentioned. But is it a sound working 20 where confusion arise or can arise quite dramatically: 21 21 the move from the free press to the free market. These presumption that unless a good justification could be 22 advanced for imposing a restriction, the free market in 22 are quite different things, so we need to think what's 23 23 terms of the freedom of the press should otherwise the value of the free press, why is it important to have 24 24 exist? Professor Tasioulas, first of all. a free press. Then we need to ask: is the free market 25 PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: I think that's, as a presumption, 25 the best way to deliver that? Page 21 Page 23 1 probably correct. I'm not sure about using the word 1 Now, suppose the answer is no -- and I think it is 2 2 "free market", but in general, as a way for the state to no. It doesn't follow that we should therefore abandon 3 proceed, it does seem to be correct that if it's 3 the free market. The free market might be important for 4 contemplating any kind of measure that restricts 4 all sorts of other reasons, but not for the instrumental 5 5 people's freedom, then the question is: what justifies reason that it delivers the aims -- the main aims and 6 restricting that freedom? 6 objectives of a free press. 7 But there is a caveat, and that is that not all 7 Q. Professor Hornsby? 8 forms of freedom are valuable. Some forms of freedom 8 PROFESSOR HORNSBY: I think it's extraordinarily important 9 are valuable in the sense they generate rights; other 9 to distinguish between the free market, in which 10 freedoms are valuable in the sense it's just 10 capitalists all believe and if it's restricted it's by 11 a worthwhile thing to be able to have the freedom to do 11 competition law, and a free market and ideas, and in --12 12 something, but not every restriction of people being I agree that the free market isn't conducive to the best 13 able to do what they want is a restriction of something 13 sort of press and that's because it would seem that in 14 that's valuable. If you think about laws against 14 a free market the press does not participate in a free 15 15 murder, you're restricting people's freedom, but the market in ideas. I think we've seen that. Financial 16 freedom to murder is in no sense valuable to anyone. 16 power ensures that one sort of idea is more likely to be 17 O. Professor Mendus? 17 promoted in the newspapers people read than another sort 18 A. Again, there's a very great tenancy in the world to 18 of idea. 19 think of freedom as an unalloyed good. So once the word 19 So it does seem to me that if one's thinking of 20 20 "freedom" comes in, we all put our hands up and vote for regulating how much ownership there is of one or another 21 it. That's a mistake for reasons that have been given 21 portion of the press, it really shouldn't be a question 22 22 more than once, but beyond that, it seems to me we need just of competition law. 23 23 to ask why we're interested in having a free press. PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: Can I make a point about the free 24 What's the value of a free press? Having answered that 24 market point and that's that it's dangerous to think of 25 25 question, we then need so ask ourselves: is a free the free market as a law of the jungle situation. Page 22 Page 24

1 1 PROFESSOR MENDUS: I have nothing against entertainment, but A free market can only exist if certain fairly stringent 2 2 I think we need to think quite carefully here because -conditions are satisfied: conditions like people having 3 3 about the sort of entertainment we're considering, roughly equivalent knowledge, the enforceability of laws 4 because -- and it's a second danger, it seems to me, in 4 relating to contract and property, and even more 5 5 broadly, probably, a certain kind of ethos or culture, thinking about press freedom -- where the press provide, 6 a certain kind of moral understanding of the people 6 on a daily basis and in a blanket form, entertainment 7 7 which takes the form of exposure of details of people's engaged in these negotiations which, if it breaks down, 8 8 private lives, that could have very serious implications can lead to disastrous effects. 9 9 for democracy, and I think some of it has been seen here So it's not as if merely talking about the free 10 10 in this very room. market -- and I agree there might be serious issues 11 11 The danger, it seems to me, is if we live in about thinking about free speech in terms of the free 12 12 a society where anybody who is a public figure or market. Free market itself, properly understood, 13 13 requires a whole lot of restrictions to be in place in politician must thereby expect to have their whole 14 14 private life exposed to public scrutiny, you may find order to function. 15 MR JAY: The public interest in a free press -- I'm sure we 15 that the wrong kinds of people are -- only the wrong 16 can all agree that there's an interest in the press as 16 kinds of people will be willing to become politicians or 17 17 public servants. a disseminator or communicator of information -- it 18 serves as a bulwark against tyranny and holds power to 18 MR JAY: Or at least some of the right types of people will 19 19 account -- but why isn't there a public interest in the be warded off. 20 free press operating as a source of entertainment for 20 PROFESSOR MENDUS: Quite a lot of the right types of people 21 21 will feel that if the price is that the medical records two reasons: that entertainment accords a direct 22 benefit -- it makes people happy -- and secondly, an 22 of their small children are to be displayed across the 23 indirect benefit, that the happy people will be buying 23 whole country, that's too high a price. 24 24 PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: I think it's hugely important to more of the newspaper which supplies their happiness and 25 25 emphasise that entertainment is something in the public enables that newspaper to continue to thrive, because Page 25 Page 27 1 otherwise that newspaper may go to the wall? Is it 1 interest, that it is a collective public good. That's 2 possible that not sufficient weight or focus is being 2 its importance, and you identified, I think, two aspects 3 directed to this entertainment function, if I can so 3 of that. One is just the intrinsic value of people 4 characterise it? First of all, Professor Hornsby. 4 being entertained, but then we have to really 5 PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Oh, I'm sure it's fine that the press 5 interrogate that question and say: well, you know, what 6 should entertain. There's a question how it should 6 are the legitimate sources of entertainment? What 7 entertain and whether one has concerns which ensure that 7 really is something that adds value to my life by 8 certain modes of entertainment have other effects than 8 getting entertained by it? We would normally think that 9 entertaining. But I do the crossword every day. It's 9 people sort of taking pleasure in the humiliation of 10 10 entertainment. I realise you're thinking of other others or the privacy of others being invaded is not 11 species of entertainment, but fine. People buy a daily 11 something that enhances their lives. Whether or not 12 newspaper or look online at one. 12 they think it does is a different matter, but whether LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But is the issue then that one has to 13 13 something makes your life better is an objective 14 be careful about whether, in entertaining, one is 14 question; it's not down to whether you think it does. 15 impacting adversely upon the legitimate rights of 15 The second argument, the instrumental argument, that 16 others? Whereas your crossword example wouldn't. 16 by entertaining people you maintain a certain industry 17 PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Sure, sure. No, indeed, and 17 and it creates jobs and wealth -- again, we think that 18 I qualified -- of course --18 there are limitations to what you can do to generate LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: No, no, I wasn't suggesting 19 19 income, to generate wealth, and amongst these 20 otherwise. 20 limitations are, very minimum, that you can't generate 21 PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Yes, that surely is the issue. Once 21 income by taking someone else's property, for example, 22 22 one's acknowledged that entertainment can be a function, but nor can you generate income by systematic invasions 23 23 one has to take examples and see what the effects are of of someone else's privacy. 24 things which purport to entertain are doing besides 24 So both of those points are valid, but they're 25 25 possibly entertaining. compatible with the restrictions. Page 26 Page 28

1 Q. Is it possible to say that the public interest in a free 1 that one first, please. 2 2 PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: I'm not sure that I buy into the press is stronger when one's dealing with issues such as 3 3 bulwark against tyranny than it is when one is dealing contrast that you're drawing --4 with issues such as entertainment? In other words, in 4 Q. Okay. 5 relation to the latter, it'll be easier to find other 5 PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: -- that's assumed there, because it 6 private interests which will be violated or capable of 6 seems to me that the law in many ways tries to shape 7 7 being violated, but more difficult to find those in people to have at least morally decent characters. For 8 8 relation to our bulwark against tyranny justification? example, through the education system, through the 9 9 various sorts of rules and requirements about public Is that a useful analysis or is it hopeless? 10 PROFESSOR MENDUS: I think it is a useful analysis. It goes 10 interaction and offensive behaviour and so forth. So 11 11 back to the question: why do we think it important to I think one thing might be you might have laws that, in 12 12 have a free press? We think it important to have a free effect, enforce a certain kind of behaviour, but there 13 press because a free press will, in many contexts, be 13 may also be laws the rationale of which is to create 14 14 our, the people's, bulwark against tyranny. The press certain kinds of attitudes, to foster a certain kind of 15 will inform us of those things which government might 15 ethos, and I think you already have that outside of the 16 not wish us to know about, and that's very important if 16 press context. 17 we are to be fully informed, democratic citizens of 17 So it wouldn't be some sort of thought that: well, 18 a democratic society. 18 this doesn't exist in the press context; should we 19 Of course, it doesn't follow that that's the only 19 introduce this in the press context? I think this is 20 thing that the press should do, nor does it follow, 20 a kind of legitimate function of law, to shape people to 21 21 actually, that if the press only did that, it would be be certain kinds of decent, law-abiding individuals who 22 as effective a bulwark against tyranny as it is if it 22 have the virtue of civility, we can broadly call it. 23 also provides entertainment. People might buy 23 That's a legitimate purpose of law, one that law 24 24 newspapers for crosswords, for Sudoku, for news about constantly, I think, engages in with respect to 25 what's on television and become informed about important 25 individuals and there could be a parallel argument about Page 29 Page 31 1 government matters in the meantime. So actually the 1 the particular issue of regulation of the press. 2 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Is there a point here about the 2 provision of entertainment is itself very important as 3 extent to which it's noticed? If most people are merely 3 part of a route to informing citizens. 4 Q. Anything you want to add to that? 4 exercising their right of free speech in the pub or 5 PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: I think I agree with that, but the 5 elsewhere, that's one thing, but -- and it's not 6 noticed. Therefore nobody does anything about it and 6 question is: how do you operationalise the idea of 7 7 one could take your education in an attempt to improve bulwark against tyranny? I mean, you could be claiming 8 8 to be operating as a bulwark against tyranny. I think the thing as a matter of generality rather than 9 9 specifically. But if you do it -- well, there's the most you can say is: well, when the press is dealing 10 10 a present case going through the Divisional Court at the with certain types of issues, there might be a greater 11 11 moment on Twitter, about the gentleman who said that he case for non-interference -- for example, political 12 12 issues -- than issues to do with celebrity and popular would blow up an airport, or if you do it on a football field, which is another very recent example, it is 13 13 culture in some ways. But it's not clear to me. 14 14 noticed and therefore more likely to generate concern or Q. I move on to the concept of an ethical press and try and 15 15 interest. Is that a fair point? approach it from this angle: that the law imposes 16 16 PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: I think it is a fair point. That's constraints on free speech, both as regards individual 17 17 right. The impact of a certain kind of speech is and press organisations but within the law, private 18 individuals exercising freedom of expression are at 18 relevant both in the individual case and the 19 liberty to speak ethically or to apply no ethical code 19 institutional case. Whether something's liable to be 20 20 to themselves whatsoever. It's a matter of personal noticed, what effects it's liable to have on other 21 21 choice. So the law creates considerable space for people's perceptions must be very relevant. 22 22 individuals to define their own morality or lack of it. MR JAY: Professor Mendus? 23 23 But should the position be the same for the press, PROFESSOR MENDUS: The question of impact I think is also --24 24 which, after all, is not an individual but a commercial the case you mention is not simply a matter of a wider 25 25 audience and impact but also of the sort of esteem in person? Can I ask maybe Professor Tasioulas to address

Page 30

| 1   | which certain people are held. So if Fred in the pub   | 1  | "responsibility". Professor Tasioulas?  |  |  |  |  |  |
|---|--|--|---|--|--|--|--|--|
| 2   | makes a comment, nobody will notice, but nobody probably   | 2  | LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: They may be different questions,  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 3   | pays a lot of attention to Fred's opinions anyway. If  | 3  | duties and responsibilities.  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 4   | someone in a position of moral or political authority  | 4  | PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: Right. There are interesting   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 5   | makes a statement about race or about gender, it isn't   | 5  | questions about what the difference might be, but I'm   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 6   | simply that there will be a wider audience for that but  | 6  | happy to go with duties. Duties I take to be  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 7   | also that the opinion comes with a greater degree of   | 7  | particularly sort of compelling reasons which, if you   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 8   | with an imprimatur, or seems to, and that itself is  | 8  | violate, either you should certainly feel guilty about  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 9   | problematic. That's why positions of responsibility in   | 9  | and others should be legitimate in blaming you or   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 10  | society are very difficult, because you have to take   | 10   | sanctioning you in some way.  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 11  | a lot of care about what you say because people pay  | 11   | I think that pretty much all the duties that  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 12  | attention to it.   | 12   | ordinary human beings have apply to the press, and then,  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 13  | PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Can I just say something about your   | 13   | in addition to that, extra duties arising from the  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 14  | question?  | 14   | special institutional role, in particular the power that  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 15  | Q. Yes.  | 15   | they possess. So they have extra duties to be careful   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 16  | PROFESSOR HORNSBY: You wanted to know whether we would   |  | about images they portray of people and so forth,   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 17  | distinguish between press ethics and individual ethics,  | 17   | precisely because, one, the point about it gets noticed,  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 18  | and when you spoke of the individual, you talked about   | 18   | but two, as Sue said, it has a certain kind of  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 19  | morality and people can define their own morality. It  | 19   | imprimatur, because it is a certain kind of position in   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 20  | does seem to me important to make a distinction between  | 20   | society to be the press. It comes with a certain kind   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 21  | morality and ethics, and in the case of the press, one   | 21   | of authority.   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 22  | might ask individual journalists what their moral  | 22   | So I think the idea that somehow there's this notion  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 23  | opinions are but if one is to see the press as an  | 23   | of legal regulation and then ethical sorts of   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 24  | institution with a role in civil life, then questions of   | 24   | considerations are somehow optional or foreign just   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 25  | its ethics and its culture aren't questions of morality  | 25   | seems extra, Inc. to me. The way we should think about  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 23  | Page 33  | 23   | Page 35   |  |  |  |  |  |
|   | 1 age 33   |  | 1 age 33  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1   | narrowly construed.  | 1  | the law is trying to implement a certain kind of  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2   | Q. Well, that's an important distinction, but can I just   | 2  | minimum, at least, of ethical standards, and we may have  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 3   | ask you to elaborate on that? What precisely is the  | 3  | then further reasons to implement even higher ethical   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 4   | difference between minority and ethics?  | 4  | standards, although the law, being a blunt instrument,  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 5   | PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Well, there's a view which I think in   | 5  | might not necessarily be the best way of going about it   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 6   | this country has been held since 1960 that what people   | 6  | but might try to help to do that sort of thing.   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 7   | do in private is up to them. That's a question of their  | 7  |   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 8   |  |  | But there is this kind of squeamishness about words   |  |  |  |  |  |
|   |  | 8  | •   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 9   | morality; it's not a question for the law. And that  |  | like "morality" and "ethics" which I think we should  |  |  |  |  |  |
|   | morality; it's not a question for the law. And that could be true, but that doesn't mean that if   | 8  | •   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 9   | morality; it's not a question for the law. And that could be true, but that doesn't mean that if a consideration is ethical, it's up to an individual.   | 8<br>9   | like "morality" and "ethics" which I think we should resist. Morality, as I understand it, is basically about the fact that we have reasons to care about and   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 9<br>10<br>11   | morality; it's not a question for the law. And that could be true, but that doesn't mean that if a consideration is ethical, it's up to an individual.  So I'm suggesting that when one introduces the idea  | 8<br>9<br>10<br>11   | like "morality" and "ethics" which I think we should resist. Morality, as I understand it, is basically about the fact that we have reasons to care about and respect other people. They're quite fundamental reasons   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 9<br>10<br>11<br>12   | morality; it's not a question for the law. And that could be true, but that doesn't mean that if a consideration is ethical, it's up to an individual.  So I'm suggesting that when one introduces the idea of morality, one is thinking of people on their own, but   | 8<br>9<br>10   | like "morality" and "ethics" which I think we should resist. Morality, as I understand it, is basically about the fact that we have reasons to care about and respect other people. They're quite fundamental reasons that extend from reasons not to torture them to reasons   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 9<br>10<br>11   | morality; it's not a question for the law. And that could be true, but that doesn't mean that if a consideration is ethical, it's up to an individual.  So I'm suggesting that when one introduces the idea of morality, one is thinking of people on their own, but when one turns to questions of ethics and in  | 8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12   | like "morality" and "ethics" which I think we should resist. Morality, as I understand it, is basically about the fact that we have reasons to care about and respect other people. They're quite fundamental reasons that extend from reasons not to torture them to reasons that help them out and assist them when they're in dire   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14   | morality; it's not a question for the law. And that could be true, but that doesn't mean that if a consideration is ethical, it's up to an individual.  So I'm suggesting that when one introduces the idea of morality, one is thinking of people on their own, but when one turns to questions of ethics and in particular ethics of the press, which is an  | 8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13   | like "morality" and "ethics" which I think we should resist. Morality, as I understand it, is basically about the fact that we have reasons to care about and respect other people. They're quite fundamental reasons that extend from reasons not to torture them to reasons that help them out and assist them when they're in dire need, for example. That's what morality's about.  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13   | morality; it's not a question for the law. And that could be true, but that doesn't mean that if a consideration is ethical, it's up to an individual.  So I'm suggesting that when one introduces the idea of morality, one is thinking of people on their own, but when one turns to questions of ethics and in particular ethics of the press, which is an institution one is actually just not concerned with  | 8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14   | like "morality" and "ethics" which I think we should resist. Morality, as I understand it, is basically about the fact that we have reasons to care about and respect other people. They're quite fundamental reasons that extend from reasons not to torture them to reasons that help them out and assist them when they're in dire need, for example. That's what morality's about.  The way we should understand the law is trying to   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16   | morality; it's not a question for the law. And that could be true, but that doesn't mean that if a consideration is ethical, it's up to an individual.  So I'm suggesting that when one introduces the idea of morality, one is thinking of people on their own, but when one turns to questions of ethics and in particular ethics of the press, which is an institution one is actually just not concerned with bits of individual behaviour and what someone might do   | 8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16   | like "morality" and "ethics" which I think we should resist. Morality, as I understand it, is basically about the fact that we have reasons to care about and respect other people. They're quite fundamental reasons that extend from reasons not to torture them to reasons that help them out and assist them when they're in dire need, for example. That's what morality's about.  The way we should understand the law is trying to give some kind of institutional force to at least some  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17   | morality; it's not a question for the law. And that could be true, but that doesn't mean that if a consideration is ethical, it's up to an individual.  So I'm suggesting that when one introduces the idea of morality, one is thinking of people on their own, but when one turns to questions of ethics and in particular ethics of the press, which is an institution one is actually just not concerned with bits of individual behaviour and what someone might do in private; one is concerned with questions of culture,   | 8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17   | like "morality" and "ethics" which I think we should resist. Morality, as I understand it, is basically about the fact that we have reasons to care about and respect other people. They're quite fundamental reasons that extend from reasons not to torture them to reasons that help them out and assist them when they're in dire need, for example. That's what morality's about.  The way we should understand the law is trying to give some kind of institutional force to at least some of these moral requirements.   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18                                     | morality; it's not a question for the law. And that could be true, but that doesn't mean that if a consideration is ethical, it's up to an individual.  So I'm suggesting that when one introduces the idea of morality, one is thinking of people on their own, but when one turns to questions of ethics and in particular ethics of the press, which is an institution one is actually just not concerned with bits of individual behaviour and what someone might do in private; one is concerned with questions of culture, which the press surely influence.   | 8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18                                     | like "morality" and "ethics" which I think we should resist. Morality, as I understand it, is basically about the fact that we have reasons to care about and respect other people. They're quite fundamental reasons that extend from reasons not to torture them to reasons that help them out and assist them when they're in dire need, for example. That's what morality's about.  The way we should understand the law is trying to give some kind of institutional force to at least some of these moral requirements.  Q. Professor Mendus?   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18                                     | morality; it's not a question for the law. And that could be true, but that doesn't mean that if a consideration is ethical, it's up to an individual.  So I'm suggesting that when one introduces the idea of morality, one is thinking of people on their own, but when one turns to questions of ethics and in particular ethics of the press, which is an institution one is actually just not concerned with bits of individual behaviour and what someone might do in private; one is concerned with questions of culture, which the press surely influence.  So I'm talking now not about the culture of the  | 8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18                                     | like "morality" and "ethics" which I think we should resist. Morality, as I understand it, is basically about the fact that we have reasons to care about and respect other people. They're quite fundamental reasons that extend from reasons not to torture them to reasons that help them out and assist them when they're in dire need, for example. That's what morality's about.  The way we should understand the law is trying to give some kind of institutional force to at least some of these moral requirements.  Q. Professor Mendus?  PROFESSOR MENDUS: It seems to me that I don't mind in this   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20                         | morality; it's not a question for the law. And that could be true, but that doesn't mean that if a consideration is ethical, it's up to an individual.  So I'm suggesting that when one introduces the idea of morality, one is thinking of people on their own, but when one turns to questions of ethics and in particular ethics of the press, which is an institution one is actually just not concerned with bits of individual behaviour and what someone might do in private; one is concerned with questions of culture, which the press surely influence.  So I'm talking now not about the culture of the press but the culture in which the press participates  | 8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20                         | like "morality" and "ethics" which I think we should resist. Morality, as I understand it, is basically about the fact that we have reasons to care about and respect other people. They're quite fundamental reasons that extend from reasons not to torture them to reasons that help them out and assist them when they're in dire need, for example. That's what morality's about.  The way we should understand the law is trying to give some kind of institutional force to at least some of these moral requirements.  Q. Professor Mendus?  PROFESSOR MENDUS: It seems to me that I don't mind in this context whether we use the word "duties" or the word  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21                   | morality; it's not a question for the law. And that could be true, but that doesn't mean that if a consideration is ethical, it's up to an individual.  So I'm suggesting that when one introduces the idea of morality, one is thinking of people on their own, but when one turns to questions of ethics and in particular ethics of the press, which is an institution one is actually just not concerned with bits of individual behaviour and what someone might do in private; one is concerned with questions of culture, which the press surely influence.  So I'm talking now not about the culture of the press but the culture in which the press participates and the kind of culture which it might be that organs of   | 8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21                   | like "morality" and "ethics" which I think we should resist. Morality, as I understand it, is basically about the fact that we have reasons to care about and respect other people. They're quite fundamental reasons that extend from reasons not to torture them to reasons that help them out and assist them when they're in dire need, for example. That's what morality's about.  The way we should understand the law is trying to give some kind of institutional force to at least some of these moral requirements.  Q. Professor Mendus?  PROFESSOR MENDUS: It seems to me that I don't mind in this context whether we use the word "duties" or the word "responsibilities", but it seems that the duties or  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22             | morality; it's not a question for the law. And that could be true, but that doesn't mean that if a consideration is ethical, it's up to an individual.  So I'm suggesting that when one introduces the idea of morality, one is thinking of people on their own, but when one turns to questions of ethics and in particular ethics of the press, which is an institution one is actually just not concerned with bits of individual behaviour and what someone might do in private; one is concerned with questions of culture, which the press surely influence.  So I'm talking now not about the culture of the press but the culture in which the press participates and the kind of culture which it might be that organs of the press promote.  | 8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22             | like "morality" and "ethics" which I think we should resist. Morality, as I understand it, is basically about the fact that we have reasons to care about and respect other people. They're quite fundamental reasons that extend from reasons not to torture them to reasons that help them out and assist them when they're in dire need, for example. That's what morality's about.  The way we should understand the law is trying to give some kind of institutional force to at least some of these moral requirements.  Q. Professor Mendus?  PROFESSOR MENDUS: It seems to me that I don't mind in this context whether we use the word "duties" or the word "responsibilities", but it seems that the duties or responsibilities of the press follow straightforwardly   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22<br>23       | morality; it's not a question for the law. And that could be true, but that doesn't mean that if a consideration is ethical, it's up to an individual.  So I'm suggesting that when one introduces the idea of morality, one is thinking of people on their own, but when one turns to questions of ethics and in particular ethics of the press, which is an institution one is actually just not concerned with bits of individual behaviour and what someone might do in private; one is concerned with questions of culture, which the press surely influence.  So I'm talking now not about the culture of the press but the culture in which the press participates and the kind of culture which it might be that organs of the press promote.  Q. Thank you. That's helpful. Can I ask you, please: what   | 8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22<br>23       | like "morality" and "ethics" which I think we should resist. Morality, as I understand it, is basically about the fact that we have reasons to care about and respect other people. They're quite fundamental reasons that extend from reasons not to torture them to reasons that help them out and assist them when they're in dire need, for example. That's what morality's about.  The way we should understand the law is trying to give some kind of institutional force to at least some of these moral requirements.  Q. Professor Mendus?  PROFESSOR MENDUS: It seems to me that I don't mind in this context whether we use the word "duties" or the word "responsibilities", but it seems that the duties or responsibilities of the press follow straightforwardly from the reasons that we have for wanting a free press.   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22<br>23<br>24 | morality; it's not a question for the law. And that could be true, but that doesn't mean that if a consideration is ethical, it's up to an individual.  So I'm suggesting that when one introduces the idea of morality, one is thinking of people on their own, but when one turns to questions of ethics and in particular ethics of the press, which is an institution one is actually just not concerned with bits of individual behaviour and what someone might do in private; one is concerned with questions of culture, which the press surely influence.  So I'm talking now not about the culture of the press but the culture in which the press participates and the kind of culture which it might be that organs of the press promote.  Q. Thank you. That's helpful. Can I ask you, please: what are the ethical duties on the press, if any? If you | 8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22<br>23<br>24 | like "morality" and "ethics" which I think we should resist. Morality, as I understand it, is basically about the fact that we have reasons to care about and respect other people. They're quite fundamental reasons that extend from reasons not to torture them to reasons that help them out and assist them when they're in dire need, for example. That's what morality's about.  The way we should understand the law is trying to give some kind of institutional force to at least some of these moral requirements.  Q. Professor Mendus?  PROFESSOR MENDUS: It seems to me that I don't mind in this context whether we use the word "duties" or the word "responsibilities", but it seems that the duties or responsibilities of the press follow straightforwardly from the reasons that we have for wanting a free press.  So if one of the main reasons for wanting a free press |  |  |  |  |  |
| 9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22<br>23       | morality; it's not a question for the law. And that could be true, but that doesn't mean that if a consideration is ethical, it's up to an individual.  So I'm suggesting that when one introduces the idea of morality, one is thinking of people on their own, but when one turns to questions of ethics and in particular ethics of the press, which is an institution one is actually just not concerned with bits of individual behaviour and what someone might do in private; one is concerned with questions of culture, which the press surely influence.  So I'm talking now not about the culture of the press but the culture in which the press participates and the kind of culture which it might be that organs of the press promote.  Q. Thank you. That's helpful. Can I ask you, please: what   | 8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22<br>23       | like "morality" and "ethics" which I think we should resist. Morality, as I understand it, is basically about the fact that we have reasons to care about and respect other people. They're quite fundamental reasons that extend from reasons not to torture them to reasons that help them out and assist them when they're in dire need, for example. That's what morality's about.  The way we should understand the law is trying to give some kind of institutional force to at least some of these moral requirements.  Q. Professor Mendus?  PROFESSOR MENDUS: It seems to me that I don't mind in this context whether we use the word "duties" or the word "responsibilities", but it seems that the duties or responsibilities of the press follow straightforwardly from the reasons that we have for wanting a free press.   |  |  |  |  |  |

| 1  | and the state of the second state of the secon | 1  | then to these who are reasonable only for what amonates   |  |  |  |  |  |
|--|--|--|---|--|--|--|--|--|
| 1  | responsibilities on the press to be accurate, honest,  | $\begin{vmatrix} 1 \\ 2 \end{vmatrix}$   | than to those who are responsible only for what emanates  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2  | open and accountable.  |  | from their own mouth or their own pen?  PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Yes. Yes. I mean, there are so many  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 3  | I think there are also responsibilities and this   | 3  | contexts in which speech is used. Professor Mendus has  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 4  | is something on which Onora O'Neill has written very   | 4 5  | referred to the seminar room, and there I take it that  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 5  | eloquently to make declarations of their own   | 6  |   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 6  | financial and other interests so that we are not left,   | 7  |   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 7  | as a citizenry, under any doubt about the financial  |  | virtue of their being a member of a group and they have   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 8  | interests which lie behind the reporting financial or  | 8  | a responsibility so to do. But the press, I take it, in   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 9  | other interests which lie behind the reporting of any  | 9  | general their words appear in print has a special   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 10   | particular story.  | 10   | responsibility.   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 11   | PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Yes, I want to mention the press'   | 12   | MR JAY: Can I try and pick up PROFESSOR MENDUS: I would agree with that. I have nothing   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 12<br>13   | special responsibility or duty in respect of legislation, all of it relatively recent, which   | 13   | to add. That seems right.   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 14   | enshrines a right to equal treatment. So it's  | 14   | Q. Can I try to pick up one theme which has run through   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 15   | legislation under the broad head of anti-discrimination.   | 15   | this Inquiry, that's the rights to privacy and the  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | _  | 16   | relevance of personal morality as opposed to personal   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 16<br>17   | It seems to me that the press given there's such legislation, the press must have a special role in  | 17   | ethics. Some people would say that it is relevant, if   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 18   |  | 18   | we have a politician, to know whether he or she is  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 19   | ensuring equal treatment, so that, for instance, it has<br>an obligation when reporting a story not to make  | 19   | indulging in personal immorality, by which I mean   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 20   | needlessly pejorative reference to a group. Where it's   | 20   | usually adultery. Some would say it's not relevant  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 21   | irrelevant to the story, the fact that someone's   | 21   | because matters of that sort, either in practice or in  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 22   | a member of a certain group shouldn't be mentioned, and  | 22   | theory, can't impinge on the way that person carry out  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 23   | so on. So that's a case where I think the press has  | 23   | their public functions. What is the correct ethical   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 24   | a special responsibility, whereas if one is telling  | 24   | approach to that question? And perhaps as a follow-up   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 25   | one's mate about the story, it doesn't matter nearly so  | 25   | question: if there is room for two competing views, why   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 23   | Page 37  |  | Page 39   |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | 1 1150 0 1   |  | 1 1150 07   |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1  | much that one should offend against the principle of   | 1  | should an ethical code differentiate between them or  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1 2  | non-pejorative reference.  | 1 2  | should an ethical code differentiate between them or rather judge between them? Why shouldn't it be left to   |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | rather judge between them? Why shouldn't it be left to the individual discretion of the editor? Maybe   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2  | non-pejorative reference.  Q. I think it may matter, but not to the same extent in an individual context?  | 2  | rather judge between them? Why shouldn't it be left to  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2 3  | non-pejorative reference.  Q. I think it may matter, but not to the same extent in an individual context?  PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Not matter so much, yes.   | 2 3  | rather judge between them? Why shouldn't it be left to the individual discretion of the editor? Maybe Professor Tasioulas first on that question.  PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: It's a difficult question. I think  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2<br>3<br>4  | non-pejorative reference.  Q. I think it may matter, but not to the same extent in an individual context?  | 2<br>3<br>4  | rather judge between them? Why shouldn't it be left to the individual discretion of the editor? Maybe Professor Tasioulas first on that question.   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7   | non-pejorative reference.  Q. I think it may matter, but not to the same extent in an individual context?  PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Not matter so much, yes.  PROFESSOR MENDUS: And presumably in that case it reflects on one's own character, so to speak, but it has very   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5   | rather judge between them? Why shouldn't it be left to the individual discretion of the editor? Maybe Professor Tasioulas first on that question.  PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: It's a difficult question. I think you could come to certain questions we think both answers are legitimate answers. You could have   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6  | non-pejorative reference.  Q. I think it may matter, but not to the same extent in an individual context?  PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Not matter so much, yes.  PROFESSOR MENDUS: And presumably in that case it reflects on one's own character, so to speak, but it has very little wider I mean, it tells me that certain people  | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6  | rather judge between them? Why shouldn't it be left to the individual discretion of the editor? Maybe Professor Tasioulas first on that question.  PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: It's a difficult question. I think you could come to certain questions we think both answers are legitimate answers. You could have a situation where when one society would say, "The  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9   | non-pejorative reference.  Q. I think it may matter, but not to the same extent in an individual context?  PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Not matter so much, yes.  PROFESSOR MENDUS: And presumably in that case it reflects on one's own character, so to speak, but it has very little wider I mean, it tells me that certain people aren't the kind of people I'd like to have dinner with,  | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9   | rather judge between them? Why shouldn't it be left to the individual discretion of the editor? Maybe Professor Tasioulas first on that question.  PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: It's a difficult question. I think you could come to certain questions we think both answers are legitimate answers. You could have a situation where when one society would say, "The way we're going to understand privacy is pretty deep   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9   | non-pejorative reference.  Q. I think it may matter, but not to the same extent in an individual context?  PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Not matter so much, yes.  PROFESSOR MENDUS: And presumably in that case it reflects on one's own character, so to speak, but it has very little wider I mean, it tells me that certain people aren't the kind of people I'd like to have dinner with, but it has very little wider influence, whereas if we're   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9   | rather judge between them? Why shouldn't it be left to the individual discretion of the editor? Maybe Professor Tasioulas first on that question.  PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: It's a difficult question. I think you could come to certain questions we think both answers are legitimate answers. You could have a situation where when one society would say, "The way we're going to understand privacy is pretty deep going and it excludes people prying into things like  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11   | non-pejorative reference.  Q. I think it may matter, but not to the same extent in an individual context?  PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Not matter so much, yes.  PROFESSOR MENDUS: And presumably in that case it reflects on one's own character, so to speak, but it has very little wider I mean, it tells me that certain people aren't the kind of people I'd like to have dinner with, but it has very little wider influence, whereas if we're thinking about the press, then it would have a much   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11   | rather judge between them? Why shouldn't it be left to the individual discretion of the editor? Maybe Professor Tasioulas first on that question.  PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: It's a difficult question. I think you could come to certain questions we think both answers are legitimate answers. You could have a situation where when one society would say, "The way we're going to understand privacy is pretty deep going and it excludes people prying into things like politicians having affairs." Other societies may say,  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12   | non-pejorative reference.  Q. I think it may matter, but not to the same extent in an individual context?  PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Not matter so much, yes.  PROFESSOR MENDUS: And presumably in that case it reflects on one's own character, so to speak, but it has very little wider I mean, it tells me that certain people aren't the kind of people I'd like to have dinner with, but it has very little wider influence, whereas if we're thinking about the press, then it would have a much wider impact.   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12   | rather judge between them? Why shouldn't it be left to the individual discretion of the editor? Maybe Professor Tasioulas first on that question.  PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: It's a difficult question. I think you could come to certain questions we think both answers are legitimate answers. You could have a situation where when one society would say, "The way we're going to understand privacy is pretty deep going and it excludes people prying into things like politicians having affairs." Other societies may say, "But look, there are these other countervailing reasons.   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13   | non-pejorative reference.  Q. I think it may matter, but not to the same extent in an individual context?  PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Not matter so much, yes.  PROFESSOR MENDUS: And presumably in that case it reflects on one's own character, so to speak, but it has very little wider I mean, it tells me that certain people aren't the kind of people I'd like to have dinner with, but it has very little wider influence, whereas if we're thinking about the press, then it would have a much wider impact.  PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Yes, I'm thinking that the legislation  | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13   | rather judge between them? Why shouldn't it be left to the individual discretion of the editor? Maybe Professor Tasioulas first on that question.  PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: It's a difficult question. I think you could come to certain questions we think both answers are legitimate answers. You could have a situation where when one society would say, "The way we're going to understand privacy is pretty deep going and it excludes people prying into things like politicians having affairs." Other societies may say, "But look, there are these other countervailing reasons. What about someone who is a moral crusading politician,   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13   | non-pejorative reference.  Q. I think it may matter, but not to the same extent in an individual context?  PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Not matter so much, yes.  PROFESSOR MENDUS: And presumably in that case it reflects on one's own character, so to speak, but it has very little wider I mean, it tells me that certain people aren't the kind of people I'd like to have dinner with, but it has very little wider influence, whereas if we're thinking about the press, then it would have a much wider impact.  PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Yes, I'm thinking that the legislation would certainly not prevent someone saying to his mate   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13   | rather judge between them? Why shouldn't it be left to the individual discretion of the editor? Maybe Professor Tasioulas first on that question.  PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: It's a difficult question. I think you could come to certain questions we think both answers are legitimate answers. You could have a situation where when one society would say, "The way we're going to understand privacy is pretty deep going and it excludes people prying into things like politicians having affairs." Other societies may say, "But look, there are these other countervailing reasons. What about someone who is a moral crusading politician, who's built his reputation on certain kinds of ideas  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15   | non-pejorative reference.  Q. I think it may matter, but not to the same extent in an individual context?  PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Not matter so much, yes.  PROFESSOR MENDUS: And presumably in that case it reflects on one's own character, so to speak, but it has very little wider I mean, it tells me that certain people aren't the kind of people I'd like to have dinner with, but it has very little wider influence, whereas if we're thinking about the press, then it would have a much wider impact.  PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Yes, I'm thinking that the legislation would certainly not prevent someone saying to his mate something which ensured that pejorative reference was   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14   | rather judge between them? Why shouldn't it be left to the individual discretion of the editor? Maybe Professor Tasioulas first on that question.  PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: It's a difficult question. I think you could come to certain questions we think both answers are legitimate answers. You could have a situation where when one society would say, "The way we're going to understand privacy is pretty deep going and it excludes people prying into things like politicians having affairs." Other societies may say, "But look, there are these other countervailing reasons. What about someone who is a moral crusading politician, who's built his reputation on certain kinds of ideas about personal morality? Shouldn't we be able to expose  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16   | non-pejorative reference.  Q. I think it may matter, but not to the same extent in an individual context?  PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Not matter so much, yes.  PROFESSOR MENDUS: And presumably in that case it reflects on one's own character, so to speak, but it has very little wider I mean, it tells me that certain people aren't the kind of people I'd like to have dinner with, but it has very little wider influence, whereas if we're thinking about the press, then it would have a much wider impact.  PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Yes, I'm thinking that the legislation would certainly not prevent someone saying to his mate something which ensured that pejorative reference was made to a group, and it would we'd be extraordinarily   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16   | rather judge between them? Why shouldn't it be left to the individual discretion of the editor? Maybe Professor Tasioulas first on that question.  PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: It's a difficult question. I think you could come to certain questions we think both answers are legitimate answers. You could have a situation where when one society would say, "The way we're going to understand privacy is pretty deep going and it excludes people prying into things like politicians having affairs." Other societies may say, "But look, there are these other countervailing reasons. What about someone who is a moral crusading politician, who's built his reputation on certain kinds of ideas about personal morality? Shouldn't we be able to expose him as a hypocrite?"   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17   | non-pejorative reference.  Q. I think it may matter, but not to the same extent in an individual context?  PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Not matter so much, yes.  PROFESSOR MENDUS: And presumably in that case it reflects on one's own character, so to speak, but it has very little wider I mean, it tells me that certain people aren't the kind of people I'd like to have dinner with, but it has very little wider influence, whereas if we're thinking about the press, then it would have a much wider impact.  PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Yes, I'm thinking that the legislation would certainly not prevent someone saying to his mate something which ensured that pejorative reference was made to a group, and it would we'd be extraordinarily restricted if there was legislation which prevented   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17   | rather judge between them? Why shouldn't it be left to the individual discretion of the editor? Maybe Professor Tasioulas first on that question.  PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: It's a difficult question. I think you could come to certain questions we think both answers are legitimate answers. You could have a situation where when one society would say, "The way we're going to understand privacy is pretty deep going and it excludes people prying into things like politicians having affairs." Other societies may say, "But look, there are these other countervailing reasons. What about someone who is a moral crusading politician, who's built his reputation on certain kinds of ideas about personal morality? Shouldn't we be able to expose him as a hypocrite?"  I'm not saying this is one such case, but this might   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18                                     | non-pejorative reference.  Q. I think it may matter, but not to the same extent in an individual context?  PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Not matter so much, yes.  PROFESSOR MENDUS: And presumably in that case it reflects on one's own character, so to speak, but it has very little wider I mean, it tells me that certain people aren't the kind of people I'd like to have dinner with, but it has very little wider influence, whereas if we're thinking about the press, then it would have a much wider impact.  PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Yes, I'm thinking that the legislation would certainly not prevent someone saying to his mate something which ensured that pejorative reference was made to a group, and it would we'd be extraordinarily restricted if there was legislation which prevented that. Nonetheless, when the press is reporting a story,   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18                                     | rather judge between them? Why shouldn't it be left to the individual discretion of the editor? Maybe Professor Tasioulas first on that question.  PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: It's a difficult question. I think you could come to certain questions we think both answers are legitimate answers. You could have a situation where when one society would say, "The way we're going to understand privacy is pretty deep going and it excludes people prying into things like politicians having affairs." Other societies may say, "But look, there are these other countervailing reasons. What about someone who is a moral crusading politician, who's built his reputation on certain kinds of ideas about personal morality? Shouldn't we be able to expose him as a hypocrite?"  I'm not saying this is one such case, but this might be such a case where you think that the abstract right  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18                                     | non-pejorative reference.  Q. I think it may matter, but not to the same extent in an individual context?  PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Not matter so much, yes.  PROFESSOR MENDUS: And presumably in that case it reflects on one's own character, so to speak, but it has very little wider I mean, it tells me that certain people aren't the kind of people I'd like to have dinner with, but it has very little wider influence, whereas if we're thinking about the press, then it would have a much wider impact.  PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Yes, I'm thinking that the legislation would certainly not prevent someone saying to his mate something which ensured that pejorative reference was made to a group, and it would we'd be extraordinarily restricted if there was legislation which prevented that. Nonetheless, when the press is reporting a story, it should not make pejorative references. That's the  | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18                                     | rather judge between them? Why shouldn't it be left to the individual discretion of the editor? Maybe Professor Tasioulas first on that question.  PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: It's a difficult question. I think you could come to certain questions we think both answers are legitimate answers. You could have a situation where when one society would say, "The way we're going to understand privacy is pretty deep going and it excludes people prying into things like politicians having affairs." Other societies may say, "But look, there are these other countervailing reasons. What about someone who is a moral crusading politician, who's built his reputation on certain kinds of ideas about personal morality? Shouldn't we be able to expose him as a hypocrite?"  I'm not saying this is one such case, but this might be such a case where you think that the abstract right to privacy doesn't actually dictate an answer, and in  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20                         | non-pejorative reference.  Q. I think it may matter, but not to the same extent in an individual context?  PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Not matter so much, yes.  PROFESSOR MENDUS: And presumably in that case it reflects on one's own character, so to speak, but it has very little wider I mean, it tells me that certain people aren't the kind of people I'd like to have dinner with, but it has very little wider influence, whereas if we're thinking about the press, then it would have a much wider impact.  PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Yes, I'm thinking that the legislation would certainly not prevent someone saying to his mate something which ensured that pejorative reference was made to a group, and it would we'd be extraordinarily restricted if there was legislation which prevented that. Nonetheless, when the press is reporting a story, it should not make pejorative references. That's the distinction I'm trying to make. And that's by verdict  | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20                         | rather judge between them? Why shouldn't it be left to the individual discretion of the editor? Maybe Professor Tasioulas first on that question.  PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: It's a difficult question. I think you could come to certain questions we think both answers are legitimate answers. You could have a situation where when one society would say, "The way we're going to understand privacy is pretty deep going and it excludes people prying into things like politicians having affairs." Other societies may say, "But look, there are these other countervailing reasons. What about someone who is a moral crusading politician, who's built his reputation on certain kinds of ideas about personal morality? Shouldn't we be able to expose him as a hypocrite?"  I'm not saying this is one such case, but this might be such a case where you think that the abstract right to privacy doesn't actually dictate an answer, and in a way we have two, in principle, eligible alternatives,  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21                   | non-pejorative reference.  Q. I think it may matter, but not to the same extent in an individual context?  PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Not matter so much, yes.  PROFESSOR MENDUS: And presumably in that case it reflects on one's own character, so to speak, but it has very little wider I mean, it tells me that certain people aren't the kind of people I'd like to have dinner with, but it has very little wider influence, whereas if we're thinking about the press, then it would have a much wider impact.  PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Yes, I'm thinking that the legislation would certainly not prevent someone saying to his mate something which ensured that pejorative reference was made to a group, and it would we'd be extraordinarily restricted if there was legislation which prevented that. Nonetheless, when the press is reporting a story, it should not make pejorative references. That's the distinction I'm trying to make. And that's by verdict of I mean, one can justify that by reference to the  | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21                   | rather judge between them? Why shouldn't it be left to the individual discretion of the editor? Maybe Professor Tasioulas first on that question.  PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: It's a difficult question. I think you could come to certain questions we think both answers are legitimate answers. You could have a situation where when one society would say, "The way we're going to understand privacy is pretty deep going and it excludes people prying into things like politicians having affairs." Other societies may say, "But look, there are these other countervailing reasons. What about someone who is a moral crusading politician, who's built his reputation on certain kinds of ideas about personal morality? Shouldn't we be able to expose him as a hypocrite?"  I'm not saying this is one such case, but this might be such a case where you think that the abstract right to privacy doesn't actually dictate an answer, and in a way we have two, in principle, eligible alternatives, and what we might then do is say that but we need to   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22             | non-pejorative reference.  Q. I think it may matter, but not to the same extent in an individual context?  PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Not matter so much, yes.  PROFESSOR MENDUS: And presumably in that case it reflects on one's own character, so to speak, but it has very little wider I mean, it tells me that certain people aren't the kind of people I'd like to have dinner with, but it has very little wider influence, whereas if we're thinking about the press, then it would have a much wider impact.  PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Yes, I'm thinking that the legislation would certainly not prevent someone saying to his mate something which ensured that pejorative reference was made to a group, and it would we'd be extraordinarily restricted if there was legislation which prevented that. Nonetheless, when the press is reporting a story, it should not make pejorative references. That's the distinction I'm trying to make. And that's by verdict of I mean, one can justify that by reference to the legislation.   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22             | rather judge between them? Why shouldn't it be left to the individual discretion of the editor? Maybe Professor Tasioulas first on that question.  PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: It's a difficult question. I think you could come to certain questions we think both answers are legitimate answers. You could have a situation where when one society would say, "The way we're going to understand privacy is pretty deep going and it excludes people prying into things like politicians having affairs." Other societies may say, "But look, there are these other countervailing reasons. What about someone who is a moral crusading politician, who's built his reputation on certain kinds of ideas about personal morality? Shouldn't we be able to expose him as a hypocrite?"  I'm not saying this is one such case, but this might be such a case where you think that the abstract right to privacy doesn't actually dictate an answer, and in a way we have two, in principle, eligible alternatives, and what we might then do is say that but we need to have something to operate on. It's not clear that we  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22<br>23       | non-pejorative reference.  Q. I think it may matter, but not to the same extent in an individual context?  PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Not matter so much, yes.  PROFESSOR MENDUS: And presumably in that case it reflects on one's own character, so to speak, but it has very little wider I mean, it tells me that certain people aren't the kind of people I'd like to have dinner with, but it has very little wider influence, whereas if we're thinking about the press, then it would have a much wider impact.  PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Yes, I'm thinking that the legislation would certainly not prevent someone saying to his mate something which ensured that pejorative reference was made to a group, and it would we'd be extraordinarily restricted if there was legislation which prevented that. Nonetheless, when the press is reporting a story, it should not make pejorative references. That's the distinction I'm trying to make. And that's by verdict of I mean, one can justify that by reference to the legislation.  LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: So there are different rules, if   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22<br>23       | rather judge between them? Why shouldn't it be left to the individual discretion of the editor? Maybe Professor Tasioulas first on that question.  PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: It's a difficult question. I think you could come to certain questions we think both answers are legitimate answers. You could have a situation where when one society would say, "The way we're going to understand privacy is pretty deep going and it excludes people prying into things like politicians having affairs." Other societies may say, "But look, there are these other countervailing reasons. What about someone who is a moral crusading politician, who's built his reputation on certain kinds of ideas about personal morality? Shouldn't we be able to expose him as a hypocrite?"  I'm not saying this is one such case, but this might be such a case where you think that the abstract right to privacy doesn't actually dictate an answer, and in a way we have two, in principle, eligible alternatives, and what we might then do is say that but we need to have something to operate on. It's not clear that we want to leave this to the discretion of editors. We  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22<br>23<br>24 | non-pejorative reference.  Q. I think it may matter, but not to the same extent in an individual context?  PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Not matter so much, yes.  PROFESSOR MENDUS: And presumably in that case it reflects on one's own character, so to speak, but it has very little wider I mean, it tells me that certain people aren't the kind of people I'd like to have dinner with, but it has very little wider influence, whereas if we're thinking about the press, then it would have a much wider impact.  PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Yes, I'm thinking that the legislation would certainly not prevent someone saying to his mate something which ensured that pejorative reference was made to a group, and it would we'd be extraordinarily restricted if there was legislation which prevented that. Nonetheless, when the press is reporting a story, it should not make pejorative references. That's the distinction I'm trying to make. And that's by verdict of I mean, one can justify that by reference to the legislation.  LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: So there are different rules, if I can use that word with some caution, that should apply  | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22<br>23<br>24 | rather judge between them? Why shouldn't it be left to the individual discretion of the editor? Maybe Professor Tasioulas first on that question.  PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: It's a difficult question. I think you could come to certain questions we think both answers are legitimate answers. You could have a situation where when one society would say, "The way we're going to understand privacy is pretty deep going and it excludes people prying into things like politicians having affairs." Other societies may say, "But look, there are these other countervailing reasons. What about someone who is a moral crusading politician, who's built his reputation on certain kinds of ideas about personal morality? Shouldn't we be able to expose him as a hypocrite?"  I'm not saying this is one such case, but this might be such a case where you think that the abstract right to privacy doesn't actually dictate an answer, and in a way we have two, in principle, eligible alternatives, and what we might then do is say that but we need to have something to operate on. It's not clear that we want to leave this to the discretion of editors. We need to have some kind of understanding of where the |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22<br>23       | non-pejorative reference.  Q. I think it may matter, but not to the same extent in an individual context?  PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Not matter so much, yes.  PROFESSOR MENDUS: And presumably in that case it reflects on one's own character, so to speak, but it has very little wider I mean, it tells me that certain people aren't the kind of people I'd like to have dinner with, but it has very little wider influence, whereas if we're thinking about the press, then it would have a much wider impact.  PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Yes, I'm thinking that the legislation would certainly not prevent someone saying to his mate something which ensured that pejorative reference was made to a group, and it would we'd be extraordinarily restricted if there was legislation which prevented that. Nonetheless, when the press is reporting a story, it should not make pejorative references. That's the distinction I'm trying to make. And that's by verdict of I mean, one can justify that by reference to the legislation.  LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: So there are different rules, if   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22<br>23       | rather judge between them? Why shouldn't it be left to the individual discretion of the editor? Maybe Professor Tasioulas first on that question.  PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: It's a difficult question. I think you could come to certain questions we think both answers are legitimate answers. You could have a situation where when one society would say, "The way we're going to understand privacy is pretty deep going and it excludes people prying into things like politicians having affairs." Other societies may say, "But look, there are these other countervailing reasons. What about someone who is a moral crusading politician, who's built his reputation on certain kinds of ideas about personal morality? Shouldn't we be able to expose him as a hypocrite?"  I'm not saying this is one such case, but this might be such a case where you think that the abstract right to privacy doesn't actually dictate an answer, and in a way we have two, in principle, eligible alternatives, and what we might then do is say that but we need to have something to operate on. It's not clear that we want to leave this to the discretion of editors. We  |  |  |  |  |  |

| certain wider public increase six of sixues. a should yet on the basis on which an editor presumably might be inclined make the decision, which is about issues shout profitability and so forth.  So what are the wider issues? Issues like: well, if we did there - if we did three- if we go gin to politicis. for specific on the sort of people who go into politicis, for effect on the sort of people who go into politicis, for effect on the sort of people who go into politicis, for effect on the sort of people who go into politicis, for effect on the sort of people who go into politicis, for example? Would it encourage a certain kind of prurient interest more generally than we want to discourage?  Those are the sort of consequential effects one would thought that clierway - I mean, Itself his about thought that clierway - I mean, Itself his about thought that clierway - I mean, Itself his about thought that clierway - I mean, Itself his about thought that clierway - I mean, Itself his about the premised on the thought that clierway - I mean, Itself his about the premised on the thought that clierway - I mean, Itself his about the premised on the way the majority of the search of the people where the provide will be degimate reasons for having fish variation.  Q. Professor Mendus?  Properties of the premain the confers, than rights to marked a lot, and now I think, how much we have the provided in the provided i |    |  |    |   |  |  |  |  |
|--|----|--|----|---|--|--|--|--|
| a opposed to the basis on which an editor presumably might be inclined make the decision, which is about issues be about profitability and so forth.  So what are the wider issues? Issues! Issues! If we did thave — if we didn't protect the privacy of politicians in this regard, would this have a chilling perfect on the sort of people who go into politics, for politicians in this regard, would this have a chilling cxample? Would re necourage a certain kind of prurient interest more generally that we want to discourage? Those are the sorts of consequental effects on would have to look at. But it would be premised on the thought that either way — I mean. I feel this about from core expansive, the rights that it confers, than rights in more expansive, the rights that it confers, than rights in most European legal systems, but that's object in the protected as private. But I ametered a lot, and now I think it doesn't matter so much, or that it's diagrems to left it matter, and the mattered a lot, and now I think it doesn't matter so much, or that it's diagrems to left it matter, and the mattered a lot, and now I think it doesn't matter so much, or that it's diagrems to left it matter, and the mattered a lot, and now I think it doesn't matter so much, or that it's diagrems to left it matter, and the mattered a lot, and now I think it doesn't matter so much, or that it's diagrems to left it matter, and the mattered a lot, and now I think it doesn't matter so much, or that it's diagrems to left it matter, and the mattered a lot, and now I think it doesn't matter so much, or that it's diagrems to left it matter, and the mattered a lot, and now I think it doesn't matter so much private life, it has been that a person's character is of a piece, so if a person is morelly disreputable in or private life, then there's every chance that he or she will be disreputable more widely. So the question that's other in a person is morelly disreputable in private life, then there's every chance that he or she will be disreputable more  | 1  | recognise that we make that decision now in the light of   | 1  | all, and that can't be right. So I now feel that we         |  |  |  |  |
| be inclined make the decision, which is about issues  about profitability and so forth.  So what are the wider issues? Issues like: well, if  be wide lawe — if we didn't protect the privacy of  politicians in this regard, well didn's have a chilling  perfect on the sort of people who go into politics, for  generally that we want to discourage?  Those are the sorts of consequential effects one would  have to look at. But it would be premised on the  thought that either way — I mean. I feel this about  American free speech. American free speech is often far  more expansive, the rights that it confers, than rights  might be legitimate reasons for having this variation.  Q. Professor Mendus?  PopPierson Mendus?  Rate deals also also also this would be premised to think that personal immorality  mutured a lot, and now I think it doesn't matter so  unch, or that it's dangerous to let it matter, and the  reason kane been alluded to already.  I we think that the kind of job you do in the office is  separated from your personality more widely. In some  page 41  we think that the kind of job you do in the office is  spanies a piece, so if a person is morally disreputable in  private life, then there's every chance that he or she  will be diverputable more widely. So the question  this provincial evidence, which is that the rea the  solid because the years of the province of the content in the proper of the private life, then there's every chance that he or she  will be diverputable more widely. So the question  the private life, then there's every chance that he or she  will be diverputable more widely. So the question  the private life, then there's every chance that he or she  will be diverputable more widely. So the question  the private life, then there's every chance that he or she  will be diverputable more widely. So the question  the private life, then there's every chance that he or she  will be diverputable more widely. So the question  to so the private life, then there's every chance that he or she  will be d |    | -  | 2  | •   |  |  |  |  |
| so both are the wider issues? Issues like: well, if 6 So what are the wider issues? Issues like: well, if 7 we did have. — if we didn't protect the privacy of 8 politicians in this regard, would this have a chilling 9 effect on the sort of people who go into politics, for 10 example? Would in encourage a certain kind of prurient 11 interest more generally that we want to discourage? 12 Those are the sorts of consequential effects one would 13 have to look at. But it would be premised on the 14 thought that either way. — I mean, I feel this about 15 American free speech. American free speech is often far 16 more expansive, the rights that it confers, than rights 16 min most European legal systems, but that's okay: there 18 might be legitimate reasons for having this variation. 19 Q. Professor Mendus? 21 mutered a lot, and now! think it doesn't matter so 22 much, or that it's dangerous to let it matter, and the 23 reasons have been alluded to already. 24 If depends in some part, I think, how much 25 believe a person's character is of a piece, and how much 26 private life, then there's every chance that he or she 27 will be disreputable more widely. So the question 28 use, it's been — in what's called viruse ethics, the 39 wife, why would we think that he's not going to cheat on 30 us, the public? 31 In persuaded for two reasons. One is just the 32 historical evidence, which is that there are luge 33 that's color be quite persuaded by that argument but 44 In not persuaded by that argument but 45 In not persuaded by the resusts on his work, why would we think that he's not going to cheat on 35 us, the public? 36 repressand and more powerful philosophical 37 us doesn't be shown and it may be that what would not be 38 statement, politician; who were philamedrers of one 39 or or another and they even, as a matter of fact, 40 thought has been that a person's character is of 41 sort of the private life. Then there's every chance that he or she 42 will be disreputable more widely. So the question 43 this fore put is if t | 3  |  | 3  |   |  |  |  |  |
| 6 So what are the wider issues? Issues like: well, if well did have – if we didn't protect the privacy of Politicians in this regard, would this have a chilling effect on the sort of people who go into politics, for cample? Would it encourage a certain kind of pratient increst more generally that we want to discourage? If prose are the surts of consequential effects one would the brought that either way – I mean, I feel this about thought that either way – I mean, I feel this about thought that either way – I mean, I feel this about the dought that either way – I mean, I feel this about the more expansive, the rights that it confers, than rights in most European legal systems, but that's often particularly that either way – I mean, I feel this about more expansive, the rights that it confers, than rights in most European legal systems, but that's okay; there might be legitimate reasons for having this variation. Poper PROFESSOR MENDUS: I used to think that personal immorality amattered a fort, and now I think it doesn't matter so much, or that it's diagerous to let it matter, and the reasons have been alluded or laredy. If depends in some part, I think, how much we believe a person's character is of a piece, and how much Page 41  we think that the kind of job you do in the office is case, it's been – in what's called viruse ethics, the thought has been that a person's character is of private life, then there's every chance that nor she will be disreptable more widely. So the question private life, then there's every chance that nor she will be disreptable more widely. So the question private life, then there's every chance that nor she will be disreptable more widely. So the question private life, then there's every chance that nor she will be disreptable more widely. So the question private life, then there's every chance that nor she will be disreptable more widely. So the question private life, then there's every chance that nor she will be disreptable more widely. So the question private life, then there's  | 4  |  | 4  |   |  |  |  |  |
| we did have — if we didn't protect the privacy of politicians in this regard, would this have a chilling perfect on the sort of people who go into politics, for example? Would it encourage a certain kind of prurient interest more generally that we want to discourage? Those are the sorts of consequential effects one would have to look at. But it would be premised on the thought that either way — I mean, I feel this about more expansive, the rights that it confers, than rights on part in most European legal systems, but that's okay; there might be legitimate reasons for having this variation. Q. Professor Mendas? Q. Professor Mendas? PROFESSOR MENDUS: I used to think that personal immorality mattered a lot, and now I think it doesn't matter so much, or that it's dangerous to lef it matter. mattered a lot, and now I think it how much we mattered a lot, and now I think it doesn't matter so much, or that it's dangerous to lef it matter. mattered a lot, and now I think it how much we mattered a lot, and now I think it how matter so much a proper son's character is of a piece, and how much have been a person's character is of a piece, and how | 5  | about profitability and so forth.                          | 5  |   |  |  |  |  |
| 9 effect on the sort of people who go into politics, or 10 example? Would it encourage a certain kind of prurient in interest more generally that we want to discourage? 11 interest more generally that we want to discourage? 12 Those are the sorts of consequential effects one would 13 have to look at. But it would be premised on the 13 more about 14 thought that either way – I mean, I feel this about 14 thought that either way – I mean, I feel this about 16 more expansive, the rights that it confers, than rights 17 in most European legal systems, but that's okay; there 18 might be legitimate reasons for having this variation. 19 Q. Professor Mendus? 19 metered a lot, and now I think it doesn't matter so 19 mech or that it's dangerous to let it matter, and the 22 mattered a lot, and now I think it doesn't matter so 22 mech, or that it's dangerous to let it matter, and the 23 reasons have been alluded to already. 24 It depends in some part, I think, how much 25 believe a person's character is of a piece, and how much 26 asses, it's been – in what's called virtue ethics, the 4 thought has been that a person's character is of a piece, so if a person is morally disreputable in 6 private life, then there's every chance that he or she will, be disreputable more widely. So the question 17 mot persuaded by that argument to with the strength of two reasons. One is just the historical evidence, which is that there are huge 11 mot persuaded by that argument to meet any the proposal to the press may 17 mot persuaded by that argument to were philanderers of one sort or another and they were, as a matter of fact, extremely good at their job but not terribly good to investigate the private lives of politicians or public 19 consideration is that to the extent that we start to 19 consideration is that to the extent that we start to 19 consideration is that to the extent that we are creating 24 avoid in which only the most braz | 6  | So what are the wider issues? Issues like: well, if        | 6  |   |  |  |  |  |
| effect on the sort of people who go into politics, for example? Would it encourage a certain kind of prurient interest more generally that we want to discourage?  12 Those are the sorts of consequential effects one would have been seen that it would be premised on the thought that either way — I mean, I feel this about thought that either way — I mean, I feel this about thought that either way — I mean, I feel this about the more type and the premised on the thought that either way — I mean, I feel this about the more type and the premised on the thought that either way — I mean, I feel this about the more type and the premised on the thought that either way — I mean, I feel this about the more type and the premised on the might be legitimate reasons for having this variation.  18 might be legitimate reasons for having this variation.  19 Q. Professor Mendus?  20 PROFESSOR MFNDTUS: I used to think that personal immorality to privacy in jeopardy, so for instance by ensuring that one is much exposed to the press and one's life is laid open, perhaps for the entire throught has been alluded to already.  21 mattered a lot, and now I think it doesn't matter so under the discourage of the press and one's life is laid open, perhaps for the entire throught has been alluded to already.  22 much, or that it's dangerous to let it matter, and the press have been alluded to already.  23 reasons have been alluded to already.  24 In depends in some part, I think, how much we plain the press of a piece, and how much page 41 to be elieve a person's character is of a piece, and how much page 42 separated from your personality more widely. In some a private matter then needs to be exposed.  25 believe a person's character is of a piece, and how much page 41 throught has been that a person's character is of a piece, so if a person is morally disreptuable in the press of a piece is morally disreptuable in the press of a piece is morally disreptuable in the press of a piece is morally disreptuable in the press of a piece is morally d | 7  | we did have if we didn't protect the privacy of            | 7  | questions about whether it was appropriate that a man       |  |  |  |  |
| to example? Would it encourage a certain kind of prurient interest more generally that we want to discourage?  Those are the sorts of consequential effects one would have to look at. But it would be premised on the thought that either way – I mean, I feel this about to thought that either way – I mean, I feel this about to thought that either way – I mean, I feel this about to thought that either way – I mean, I feel this about to thought that either way – I mean, I feel this about to more expansive, the rights that it confers, than rights to more expansive, the rights that it confers, than rights to more expansive, the rights that it confers, than rights to legitimate reasons for having this variation.  PROFESSOR MENDUS: I used to think that personal immorably to mattered a lot, and now I think it doesn't matter so much, or that it's dangerous to let it matter, and the press and one's life is laid open, perhaps for the entertainment of others. One shouldn't then be at life they to conceal such aspects of one's life as one suddenly cares to. Suddenly this is private.  The page 41 to private matter and protected as private. But a not, is a private matter and protected as private. But their right to privacy in jeopardy, so for instance by ensuring that one is much exposed to the entertainment of others. One shouldn't then be at life they to conceal such aspects of one's life as one suddenly cares to. Suddenly this is private.  The page 41 they are the presson and one's life is laid open, perhaps for the entertainment of others. One shouldn't then be at life they to conceal such as person so call side as one suddenly cares to. Suddenly this is private.  The page 41 they are they are such as a fish of private in the seams that if some and they were stated certain views, then if the private in the presson and one's life is laid open, perhaps for the entertainment of others. One shouldn't then be at life they to conceal such as person should from the seams that was a care to suddenly this is private.  The page 41 the | 8  | politicians in this regard, would this have a chilling     | 8  | who apparently was a sexual harasser should hold            |  |  |  |  |
| interest more generally that we want to discourage? Those are the sorts of consequential effects one would Those are the sorts of consequential effects one would Those are the sorts of consequential effects one would Those are the sorts of consequential effects one would Those are the sorts of consequential effects one would Those are the sorts of consequential effects one would Those are the sorts of consequential effects one would Those are the sorts of consequential effects one would Those are the sorts of consequential effects one would Those are the sorts of consequential effects one would Those are the sorts of consequential effects one would Those are the sorts of consequential effects one would Those are the sorts of consequential effects one would Those are the sorts of consequential effects one would Those are the sorts of consequential effects one would Those are the sorts of cook at. But it would the pressure of the Those are the sorts of cook at. But it would the pressure of the thing that the shot of this short or another and they washed that so the consequential effects one would the pressure of the fire and the consequential effects one would the pressure of the short of the states are the consequential effects one would the pressure of the time that the sort of the states men, politicians, who were philanderers of one states men, politicians, who were philand | 9  | effect on the sort of people who go into politics, for     | 9  | a position of great authority in which he was called        |  |  |  |  |
| Those are the sorts of consequential effects one would 13 have to look at. But it would be premised on the 14 thought that etither way — I mean, I feel this about 14 noise from the first of the should the term of the should sho | 10 | example? Would it encourage a certain kind of prurient     | 10 | upon to exercise extensive judgment, and I think that is    |  |  |  |  |
| have to look at. But it would be premised on the thought that either way — I mean, I feel this about 14 thought that either way — I mean, I feel this about 15 American free speech. American free speech is offen far 15 American free speech is offen far 16 more expansive, the rights that it confers, than rights 16 more expansive, the rights that it confers, than rights 17 in most European legal systems, but that's okay, there 18 might be legitimate reasons for having this variation. 18 might be legitimate reasons for having this variation. 18 might be legitimate reasons for having this variation. 19 Q. Professor Mendus? 19 PROFESSOR MENDUS: I used to think that personal immorality 10 matered a lot, and now I think it doesn't matter so 12 much, or that it's dangerous to let it matter, and the 12 much, or that it's dangerous to let it matter, and the 12 much, or that it's dangerous to let it matter, and the 12 much, or that it's dangerous to let it matter, and the 12 much, or that it's dangerous to let it matter, and the 12 much, or that it's dangerous to let it matter, and the 12 much, or that it's dangerous to let it matter, and the 12 much, or that it's dangerous to let it matter, and the 12 much, or that it's dangerous to let it matter, and the 12 much, or that it's dangerous to let it matter, and the 12 much, or that it's dangerous to let it matter, and the 12 much, or that it's dangerous to let it matter, and the 12 much, or that it's dangerous to let it matter, and the 12 much, or that it's dangerous to let it matter, and the 12 much, or that it's dangerous to let it matter or a piece, and how much 12 much, or that it's hand of job you do in the office is 12 separated from your personality more widely. In some 12 separated from your personality more widely. In some 13 causes, it's been — in what's called virtue ethies, the 14 thought has been that a person's character is of 15 a piece, so if a person is morally disreputable in 15 private life, then there's every chance that he or she 16 private life, then th | 11 | interest more generally that we want to discourage?        | 11 | a very, very tough call.                                    |  |  |  |  |
| thought that either way — I mean, I feel this about American free speech. American free speech is often far imore Sepansive, the rights that it confers, than rights imost European legal systems, but that's okay; there might be legitimate reasons for having this variation. PROFESSOR MENDUS: I used to think that personal immorality matered a lot, and now I think it doesn't matter so methor that it's dangerous to let it matter, and the method in a simple speak in some part, I think, how much we lelieve a person's character is of a piece, and how much believe a person's character is of a piece, and how much cases, it's been — in whaf's called virtue ethics, the we think that the kind of job you do in the office is a piece, so if a person is morally disreputable in private life, then there's every chance that he or she will be disreputable more widely. So the question that so often put is; if this politician cheats on his wife, why would we think that the snot going to cheat on us, the public? I used to be quite persuaded by that argument but life in the persuaded for two reasons. One is just the historical evidence, which is that there are huge in their partner. So there's that evidence. I more persuaded for two reasons. One is just the historical evidence, which is that there are huge their partner. So there's that evidence. I mumbers — possibly the majority — of very, very good their partner. So there's that evidence. I mumbers — possibly the majority — of very, very good their partner. So there's that evidence. I mumbers — possibly the majority — of very, very good their partner. So there's that evidence. I mumbers — possibly the majority — of very, very good their partner. So there's that evidence. I mumbers — possibly the majority — of very, very good their partner. So there's that evidence. I mumbers — possibly the majority — of very, very good their partner. So there's that evidence. I mumbers — possibly the majority — of very, very good their partner. So there's that evidence. I mumbers — possibly the major | 12 | Those are the sorts of consequential effects one would     | 12 | PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Yes, I'm inclined to think that people's |  |  |  |  |
| American free speech. American free speech is often far more expansive, the rights that it confers, than rights more expansive, the rights that it confers, than rights more expansive, the rights that it confers, than rights more expansive, the rights that it confers, than rights more expansive, the rights that it confers, than rights more widely systems, but that's days; there is might be legitimate reasons for having this variation.  20 PROFESSOM MENDUS: I used to think that personal immorality mattered a lot, and now I think it doesn't matter so under, or that it's dangerous to let it matter, and the expansive, the right to privacy in speak and this connects with questions about public officials and this connects with questions about public officials and this connects with questions about public officials and the system of the public officials and the system of the public officials and the proson and the proposed of the public officials and the proson and the proposed of the public officials and public officials and the proposed of the public officials and the public officials and the proposed of the public officials and public officials and the proposed of the public officials and public officials and the proposed of the public officials and public officials and the proposed of the public officials and public officials and the proposed of the public officials and public officia | 13 | have to look at. But it would be premised on the           | 13 | morality, whoever they are, whether public officials or     |  |  |  |  |
| more expansive, the rights that it confers, than rights in most European legal systems, but that's okay; there in most European legal systems, but that's okay; there in most European legal systems, but that's okay; there in most European legal systems, but that's okay; there in most European legal systems, but that's okay; there in most European legal systems, but that's okay; there in most European legal systems, but that's okay; there in most European legal systems, but that's okap; there is might be legitimate reasons for having this variation.  PQ PROFESSOR MENDUS: I used to think that personal immorality 20 liberty to conceal such aspects of one's life is laid open, perhaps for the entertainment of others. One shouldn't then be at liberty to conceal such aspects of one's life as one suddenly cares to. Suddenly this is private.  Page 41 liberty to conceal such aspects of one's life as one suddenly cares to. Suddenly this is private.  Page 41 liberty to conceal such aspects of one's life as one suddenly cares to. Suddenly this is private.  Page 41 liberty to conceal such aspects of one's life as one suddenly cares to. Suddenly this is private.  Page 41 liberty to conceal such aspects of one's life as one suddenly cares to. Suddenly this is private.  Page 41 liberty to conceal such aspects of one's life as one suddenly care to chose that disconceal such aspects of one's life as one suddenly care to chose as undenly care intertainment of others. One shouldn't then be at liberty to conceal such aspects of one's life as one suddenly cares to. Suddenly this is private.  Page 41 liberty to conceal such aspects of one's life as one suddenly care to suddenly this is private.  Page 41 liberty to conceal such aspects of one's life as one suddenly care to. Suddenly this is private.  Page 41 liberty to conceal such aspects of one's life as one suddenly care to suddenly this is private.  Page 43 liberty to conceal such aspects of one's life as one suddenly care to suddenly care to suddenly care to suddenly care to sudden | 14 | thought that either way I mean, I feel this about          | 14 | not, is a private matter and protected as private. But      |  |  |  |  |
| in most European legal systems, but that's okay; there might be legitimate reasons for having this variation.  Professor Mendus?  Professor Mendus?  Professor Mendus?  matered a lot, and now I think it doesn't matter so much, or that it's dangerous to let it matter, and the matter al a lot, and now I think it doesn't matter so much, or that it's dangerous to let it matter, and the matter and the matter al alot, and now I think it doesn't matter so much, or that it's dangerous to let it matter, and the matter and the legistem with the search and the legistem with the search and the legistem with the search and the legistem at the single space and the liberty to conceal such aspects of one's life as one suddenly carse to. Suddenly this is private.  Again – and this connects with questions about public officials – it seems that if someone is public officials – it seems that if someone is a representative because they've been voted for by the electorate and they've stated certain views, then if Page 43  we think that the kind of job you do in the office is separated from your personality more widely. In some cases, it's been – in what's called virtue ethics, the thought has been that a person's character is of a piece, so if a person is morally disreputable in private life, then there's every chance that he or she will be disreputable more widely. So the question that's often put is: if this politician cheats on his wife, why would we think that he's not going to cheat on us, the public?  I used to be quite persuaded by that argument but I used to be quite persuaded by that argument but I used to be quite persuaded by that argument but I used to be quite persuaded by that argument but I used to be quite persuaded by that argument but I player, without in any sense secking to obtain benefit from integer ights. Why shouldn't such a person asy, if player, without in any sense secking to obtain benefit from integer ights. Why shouldn't such a person asy, would be their portivate life by the majority – of very, very goo | 15 | American free speech. American free speech is often far    | 15 | I also think that there are things individuals can do       |  |  |  |  |
| might be legitimate reasons for having this variation. Q. Professor Mendus? PROFESSOR MENDUS: I used to think that personal immorality matered a lot, and now I think it doesn't matter so much, or that it's dangerous to let it matter, and the matered a lot, and now I think it doesn't matter so much, or that it's dangerous to let it matter, and the reasons have been alluded to already. It depends in some part, I think, how much we believe a person's character is of a piece, and how much Page 41  we think that the kind of job you do in the office is separated from your personality more widely. In some separated from your personality more widely. In some thought has been that a person's character is of a piece, so if a person is morally disreputable in private life, then there's every chance that he or she will be disreputable more widely. So the question that's often put is: if this politician cheats on his wife, why would we think that he's not going to cheat on us, the public? I used to be quite persuaded by that argument but I'm not persuaded for two reasons. One is just the historical evidence, which is that there are huge numbers – possibly the majority – of very, very good their partner. So there's that evidence. The not persuaded for two reasons. One is just the extremely good at their job but not terribly good to their partner. So there's that evidence. Historical evidence, which is that there are huge their partner. So there's that evidence. Historical evidence, which is that there are huge their partner. So there's that evidence. Historical evidence, which is that there are huge their partner. So there's that evidence. Historical revidence which is that there are huge their partner. So there's that evidence. Historical revidence which is that there are huge their partner. So there's that evidence. Historical revidence which is that there are huge their partner. So there's that evidence. Historical revidence which is that there are huge their partner. So there's that evidence. Historical revidence which i | 16 | more expansive, the rights that it confers, than rights    | 16 | which put their right to privacy in jeopardy, so for        |  |  |  |  |
| 19 Q. Professor Mendus? 20 PROFESSOR MENDUS: I used to think that personal immorality in mattered a lot, and now I think it doesn't matter so much, or that it's dangerous to let it matter, and the reasons have been alluded to already. 21 Think, how much we a person's character is of a piece, and how much Page 41  22 We think that the kind of job you do in the office is separated from your personality more widely. In some cases, it's been — in what's called virtue ethics, the thought has been that a person's character is of a piece, so if a person is morally disreputable in private life, then there's every chance that he or she will be disreputable more widely. So the question that's often put is: if this politician cheats on his wife, why would we think that he's not going to cheat on us, the public?  11 I used to be quite persuaded by that argument but I player, without in any sense seeking to obtain benefit from tor persuaded for two reasons. One is just the historical evidence, which is that there are huge this streamen, politicians, who were philanderers of one sort or another and they were, as a matter of fact, extremely good at their job but not terribly good to their partner. So there's that evidence.  20 But the second and more powerful philosophical consideration is that to the extent that we start to investigate the private lires of politicians or public investigate the private lires of politicians or public investigate the private lives of politicians or public officials. Sout public officials and others can put their right to privacy in jeopardy.  10 In mot persuaded by that argument but in player, without in any sense seeking to obtain benefit from image rights. Why shouldn't such a person say, "Well, simply because I've made money writing a book or a sing aright. Why shouldn't such a person say, "Well, simply because I've made money wr | 17 | in most European legal systems, but that's okay; there     | 17 | instance by ensuring that one is much exposed to the        |  |  |  |  |
| 19 Q. Professor Mendus? 20 PROFESSOR MENDUS: I used to think that personal immorality 20 much, or that it's dangerous to let it matter, and the 22 much, or that it's dangerous to let it matter, and the 23 reasons have been alluded to already. 24 It depends in some part, I think, how much we 25 believe a person's character is of a piece, and how much Page 41  1 we think that the kind of job you do in the office is separated from your personality more widely. In some cases, it's been — in what's called virtue ethics, the 4 thought has been that a person's character is of a piece, so if a person is morally disreputable in private life, then there's every chance that he or she will be disreputable more widely. So the question wife, why would we think that he's not going to cheat on 10 us, the public? 11 I used to be quite persuaded by that argument but 12 I'm not persuaded by that argument so much any more. 13 I'm not persuaded for two reasons. One is just the historical evidence, which is that there are huge 15 numbers — possibly the majority — of very, very good at their job but not terribly good to their partner. So there's that evidence. 20 But the second and more powerful philosophical 21 figures more generally, we may find that we are creating 24 a world in which only the most brazen and shameless are 24 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But they have voluntarily, because 1 be, they've done nothing to cinsularly done anything which ensures that they should in which only the most brazen and shameless are 24 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But they have voluntarily, because 1 be, they've done nothing to cinsularly done anything which ensures that they should in which only the most brazen and shameless are 24 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But they have voluntarily, because 4 be, they've done nothing to conceal such aspects of one shife as note of chick and are presons that it figures more generally, we may find that we are creating 24 a person and shameless are 25 more generally, we may find that we are creating 25 more generally, we may fin | 18 | might be legitimate reasons for having this variation.     | 18 | press and one's life is laid open, perhaps for the          |  |  |  |  |
| 21 mattered a lot, and now I think it doesn't matter so 22 much, or that it's dangerous to let it matter, and the 23 reasons have been alluded to already. 24 It depends in some part, I think, how much we 25 believe a person's character is of a piece, and how much 26 Page 41  1 we think that the kind of job you do in the office is 27 separated from your personality more widely. In some 28 separated from your personality more widely. In some 29 a representative because they've stated certain views, then if 20 Page 43  1 we think that the kind of job you do in the office is 21 separated from your personality more widely. In some 22 separated from your personality more widely. In some 23 cases, it's been — in what's called virtue ethics, the 24 thought has been that a person's character is of 25 a piece, so if a person is morally disreputable in 26 private life, then there's every chance that he or she 27 will be disreputable more widely. So the question 28 that's often put is: if this politician cheats on his 29 wife, why would we think that he's not going to cheat on 10 us, the public? 11 I used to be quite persuaded by that argument but 12 I'm not persuaded for two reasons. One is just the 13 historical evidence, which is that there are huge 14 satesmen, politicians, who were philanderers of one 15 sort or another and they were, as a matter of fact, 16 extremely good at their job but not terribly good to 17 the second and more powerful philosophical 28 consideration is that to the extent that we start to 29 investigate the private lives of politicians or public 20 investigate the private lives of politicians or public 21 figures more generally, we may find that we are creating 22 voluntarily done anything which ensures that they should 23 be, they've done nothing to ensure - 24 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But they have voluntarily, because   | 19 |  | 19 | entertainment of others. One shouldn't then be at           |  |  |  |  |
| much, or that it's dangerous to let it matter, and the reasons have been alluded to already.  It depends in some part, I think, how much we believe a person's character is of a piece, and how much Page 41  we think that the kind of job you do in the office is separated from your personality more widely. In some cases, it's been — in what's called virtue ethics, the thought has been that a person's character is of a piece, so if a person is morally disreputable in private life, then there's every chance that he or she will be disreputable more widely. So the question that's often put is: if this politician cheats on his wife, why would we think that he's not going to cheat on us, the public?  In not persuaded for two reasons. One is just the historical evidence, which is that there are huge sort or another and they were, as a matter of fact, extremely good at their job but not terribly good to their partner. So there's that evidence.  But the second and more powerful philosophical consideration is that to the extent that we are creating and world in which only the most brazen and shameless are called a world in which only the most brazen and shameless are   | 20 | PROFESSOR MENDUS: I used to think that personal immorality | 20 | liberty to conceal such aspects of one's life as one        |  |  |  |  |
| much, or that it's dangerous to let it matter, and the reasons have been alluded to already.  It depends in some part, I think, how much we believe a person's character is of a piece, and how much Page 41  we think that the kind of job you do in the office is separated from your personality more widely. In some cases, it's been — in what's called virtue ethics, the thought has been that a person's character is of a piece, so if a person is morally disreputable in private life, then there's every chance that he or she will be disreputable more widely. So the question that's often put is: if this politician cheats on his wife, why would we think that he's not going to cheat on us, the public?  In not persuaded for two reasons. One is just the historical evidence, which is that there are huge sort or another and they were, as a matter of fact, extremely good at their job but not terribly good to their partner. So there's that evidence.  But the second and more powerful philosophical consideration is that to the extent that we are creating and world in which only the most brazen and shameless are called a world in which only the most brazen and shameless are   | 21 | •  | 21 |   |  |  |  |  |
| 23 reasons have been alluded to already. 24 It depends in some part, I think, how much we 25 believe a person's character is of a piece, and how much 26 Page 41  1 we think that the kind of job you do in the office is 2 separated from your personality more widely. In some 3 cases, it's been in what's called virtue ethics, the 4 thought has been that a person's character is of 4 thought has been that a person's character is of 5 a piece, so if a person is morally disreputable in 6 private life, then there's every chance that he or she 7 will be disreputable more widely. So the question 8 that's often put is: if this politician cheats on his 9 wife, why would we think that he's not going to cheat on 10 us, the public? 1 I used to be quite persuaded by that argument but 12 I'm not persuaded for two reasons. One is just the 13 I'm not persuaded for two reasons. One is just the 14 historical evidence, which is that there are huge 15 numbers possibly the majority of very, very good 16 statesmen, politicians, who were philanderers of one 17 sort or another and they were, as a matter of fact, 18 extremely good at their job but not terribly good to 19 their partner. So there's that evidence. 20 But the second and more powerful philosophical 21 consideration is that to the extent that we start to 22 investment generally, we may find that we are creating 23 a world in which only the most brazen and shameless are   |    |  | 22 |   |  |  |  |  |
| 24 It depends in some part, I think, how much we believe a person's character is of a piece, and how much Page 41  1 we think that the kind of job you do in the office is separated from your personality more widely. In some asses, it's been in what's called virtue ethics, the thought has been that a person's character is of a piece, so if a person is morally disreptuable in private life, then there's every chance that he or she will be disreptuable more widely. So the question wife, why would we think that he's not going to cheat on us, the public?  1 I used to be quite persuaded by that argument but I'm not persuaded by that argument so much any more. I'm not persuaded for two reasons. One is just the historical evidence, which is that there are huge numbers possibly the majority of very, very good statesmen, politicians, who were philanderers of one their partner. So there's that evidence.  20 But the second and more powerful philosophical consideration is that to the extent that we start to investigate the private lives of politicians or public sigures more generally, we may find that we are creating a world in which only the most brazen and shameless are   |    | _  |    | -   |  |  |  |  |
| believe a person's character is of a piece, and how much Page 41  we think that the kind of job you do in the office is separated from your personality more widely. In some cases, it's been in what's called virtue ethics, the thought has been that a person's character is of a piece, so if a person is morally disreputable in private life, then there's every chance that he or she will be disreputable more widely. So the question that's often put is: if this politician cheats on his wife, why would we think that he's not going to cheat on us, the public?  I used to be quite persuaded by that argument but I mot persuaded by that argument so much any more. I'm not persuaded for two reasons. One is just the historical evidence, which is that there are huge numbers possibly the majority of very, very good statesmen, politicians, who were philanderers of one root or another and they were, as a matter of fact, extremely good at their job but not terribly good to their partner. So there's that evidence.  But the second and more powerful philosophical consideration is that to the extent that we start to investigate the private lives of politicians or public electorate and they've stated certain views, then if Page 43  their personal morality is contrary to those views, people deserve to know, and it may be that what would otherwise be a private matter then needs to be exposed. So I think privacy is important even for public officials, but public officials and others can put their right to privacy in jeopardy. LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But simple exposure to the press may not be sufficient, may it? If I take the example of a famous person who is famous only because of what he or she does, be it as an actor or a writer or a football player, without in any sense seeking to obtain benefit from image rights. Why shouldn't such a person say, "Well, simply because I've made money writing a book or acting in a film or playing football well should not be sufficient to expose any aspect of my private life's put in jeopardy onl          |    |  |    | _   |  |  |  |  |
| regge 41  we think that the kind of job you do in the office is separated from your personality more widely. In some cases, it's been in what's called virtue ethics, the thought has been that a person's character is of a piece, so if a person is morally disreputable in private life, then there's every chance that he or she that's often put is: if this politician cheats on his wife, why would we think that he's not going to cheat on us, the public?  I used to be quite persuaded by that argument but l'm not persuaded by that argument but historical evidence, which is that there are huge numbers possibly the majority of very, very good statesmen, politicians, who were philanderers of one sort or another and they were, as a matter of fact, extremely good at their job but not terribly good to their partner. So there's that evidence.  Page 43  their personal morality is contrary to those views, people deserve to know, and it may be that what would otherwise be a private matter then needs to be exposed.  So I think privacy is important even for public officials, but public officials and others can put their right to privacy in jeopardy.  LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But simple exposure to the press may not be sufficient, may it? If I take the example of a famous person who is famous only because of what he or she does, be it as an actor or a writer or a football player, without in any sense seeking to obtain benefit from image rights. Why shouldn't such a person say,  "Well, simply because I've made money writing a book or acting in a film or playing football well should not be sufficient to expose any aspect of my private life is put in jeopardy.  PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Yes. I think one's private life is put in jeopardy.  But the second and more powerful philosophical consideration is that to the extent that we start to investigate the private lives of politicians or public  |    | -  | 25 |   |  |  |  |  |
| we think that the kind of job you do in the office is separated from your personality more widely. In some cases, it's been in what's called virtue ethics, the thought has been that a person's character is of a piece, so if a person is morally disreputable in private life, then there's every chance that he or she will be disreputable more widely. So the question that's often put is: if this politician cheats on his wife, why would we think that he's not going to cheat on us, the public?  I used to be quite persuaded by that argument but I'm not persuaded by that argument so much any more. I'm not persuaded for two reasons. One is just the historical evidence, which is that there are huge numbers possibly the majority of very, very good statesmen, politicians, who were philanderers of one sort or another and they were, as a matter of fact, extremely good at their job but not terribly good to their partner. So there's that evidence.  But the second and more powerful philosophical consideration is that to the extent that we start to investigate the private lives of politicians or public figures more generally, we may find that we are creating a world in which only the most brazen and shameless are  |    |  |    |   |  |  |  |  |
| 2 separated from your personality more widely. In some 3 cases, it's been in what's called virtue ethics, the 4 thought has been that a person's character is of 5 a piece, so if a person is morally disreputable in 6 private life, then there's every chance that he or she 7 will be disreputable more widely. So the question 8 that's often put is: if this politician cheats on his 9 wife, why would we think that he's not going to cheat on 10 us, the public? 11 I used to be quite persuaded by that argument but 12 I'm not persuaded by that argument so much any more. 13 I'm not persuaded for two reasons. One is just the 14 historical evidence, which is that there are huge 15 numbers possibly the majority of very, very good 16 statesmen, politicians, who were philanderers of one 17 sort or another and they were, as a matter of fact, 18 extremely good at their job but not terribly good to 19 their partner. So there's that evidence. 20 But the second and more powerful philosophical 21 consideration is that to the extent that we start to 22 investigate the private lives of politicians or public 23 figures more generally, we may find that we are creating 24 a world in which only the most brazen and shameless are  25 people deserve to know, and it may be that what would otherwise be a private matter then needs to be exposed.  4 So I think privacy is important even for public officials and others can put their 7 right to privacy in jeopardy.  4 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But simple exposure to the press may not be sufficient, may it? If I take the example of 9 a famous person who is famous only because of what he or 10 she does, be it as an actor or a writer or a football 11 player, without in any sense seeking to obtain benefit 12 from image rights. Why shouldn't such a person say, 13 "Well, simply because I've made money writing a book or 14 acting in a film or playing football well should not be 15 sufficient, may it? If I take the example of 16 a famous person who is famous only because I've I'l from image rights. Why          |    |  |    |   |  |  |  |  |
| described thought has been that a person's character is of thought has been that a person's character is of a piece, so if a person is morally disreputable in private life, then there's every chance that he or she will be disreputable more widely. So the question that's often put is: if this politician cheats on his wife, why would we think that he's not going to cheat on us, the public?  I used to be quite persuaded by that argument but I'm not persuaded for two reasons. One is just the historical evidence, which is that there are huge numbers possibly the majority of very, very good statesmen, politicians, who were philanderers of one sort or another and they were, as a matter of fact, extremely good at their job but not terribly good to their partner. So there's that evidence.  But the second and more powerful philosophical consideration is that to the extent that we start to investigate the private lives of politicians or public appear in word in which only the most brazen and shameless are  |    | • •  |    |   |  |  |  |  |
| thought has been that a person's character is of a piece, so if a person is morally disreputable in private life, then there's every chance that he or she will be disreputable more widely. So the question that's often put is: if this politician cheats on his wife, why would we think that he's not going to cheat on us, the public?  I used to be quite persuaded by that argument but I'm not persuaded by that argument so much any more. I'm not persuaded for two reasons. One is just the historical evidence, which is that there are huge numbers possibly the majority of very, very good statesmen, politicians, who were philanderers of one sort or another and they were, as a matter of fact, extremely good at their job but not terribly good to their partner. So there's that evidence. But the second and more powerful philosophical consideration is that to the extent that we start to investigate the private lives of politicians or public a piece, so if a person is morally disreputable of officials, but public officials and others can put their right to privacy in jeopardy.  LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But simple exposure to the press may not be sufficient, may it? If take the example of a famous person who is famous only because of what he or she does, be it as an actor or a writer or a football player, without in any sense seeking to obtain benefit from image rights. Why shouldn't such a person say, "Well, simply because I've made money writing a book or acting in a film or playing football well should not be sufficient to expose any aspect of my private life"?  PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Yes. I think one's private life is put in jeopardy only by voluntary acts which ensure that one's in the public gaze in ways that one otherwise wouldn't be. People who earn large sums of money, whether because they play football are not, are likely voluntarily done anything which ensures that they should be, they've done nothing to ensure  24 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But they have voluntarily, because   |    |  |    |   |  |  |  |  |
| a piece, so if a person is morally disreputable in private life, then there's every chance that he or she will be disreputable more widely. So the question that's often put is: if this politician cheats on his wife, why would we think that he's not going to cheat on us, the public?  I used to be quite persuaded by that argument but I'm not persuaded by that argument so much any more. I'm not persuaded for two reasons. One is just the historical evidence, which is that there are huge numbers possibly the majority of very, very good statesmen, politicians, who were philanderers of one their partner. So there's that evidence. But the second and more powerful philosophical consideration is that to the extent that we start to investigate the private lives of politicians or public figures more generally, we may find that we are creating a world in which only the most brazen and shameless are  officials, but public officials and others can put their right to privacy in jeopardy.  LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But simple exposure to the press may right to privacy in jeopardy.  LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But simple exposure to the press may right to privacy in jeopardy.  LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But simple exposure to the press may that's often put is ipopardy.  LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But simple exposure to the press may that privacy in jeopardy.  LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But simple exposure to the press may to right to privacy in jeopardy.  LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But simple exposure to the press may to plant to privacy in jeopardy.  LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But they have voluntarily, because   | 3  |  |    |   |  |  |  |  |
| private life, then there's every chance that he or she will be disreputable more widely. So the question that's often put is: if this politician cheats on his wife, why would we think that he's not going to cheat on us, the public?  I used to be quite persuaded by that argument but I mot persuaded by that argument so much any more. I mot persuaded for two reasons. One is just the historical evidence, which is that there are huge numbers possibly the majority of very, very good statesmen, politicians, who were philanderers of one sextremely good at their job but not terribly good to their partner. So there's that evidence. But the second and more powerful philosophical consideration is that to the extent that we start to investigate the private lives of politicians or public given a world in which only the most brazen and shameless are  10 vife, why would we think that he's not going to cheat on you hat's often put is: if this politicians or public you hat's often put is: if this politicians or public you hat's often put is: if this politicians or public you hat's often put is: if this politicians or public you hat's often put is: if this politicians or public you hat's often put is: if this politicians or public you hat's often put is: if this politician, way it? If I take the example of you hat the example of y a famous person who is famous only because of what he or she does, be it as an actor or a writer or a football player, without in any sense seeking to obtain benefit from image rights. Why shouldn't such a person say, "Well, simply because I've made money writing a book or acting in a film or playing football well should not be sufficient to expose any aspect of my private life'? PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Yes. I think one's private life is put in jeopardy only by voluntary acts which ensure that one's in the public gaze in ways that one otherwise wouldn't be. People who earn large sums of money, whether because they play football are not, are likely voluntarily done anything which ensures that they shoul       | 4  |  | 4  |   |  |  |  |  |
| will be disreputable more widely. So the question that's often put is: if this politician cheats on his wife, why would we think that he's not going to cheat on us, the public?  I used to be quite persuaded by that argument but I mot persuaded by that argument so much any more. If mot persuaded for two reasons. One is just the historical evidence, which is that there are huge numbers possibly the majority of very, very good statesmen, politicians, who were philanderers of one sort or another and they were, as a matter of fact, extremely good at their job but not terribly good to their partner. So there's that evidence.  But the second and more powerful philosophical consideration is that to the extent that we start to investigate the private lives of politicians or public given by the may find that we are creating a world in which only the most brazen and shameless are  7 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But simple exposure to the press may not be sufficient, may it? If I take the example of a famous person who is famous only because of what he or sha does, be it as an actor or a writer or a football player, without in any sense seeking to obtain benefit from image rights. Why shouldn't such a person say, "Well, simply because I've made money writing a book or acting in a film or playing football well should not be sufficient to expose any aspect of my private life"?  PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Yes. I think one's private life is put in jeopardy only by voluntary acts which ensure that one's in the public gaze in ways that one otherwise wouldn't be. People who earn large sums of money, whether because they play football are not, are likely to be in the public gaze, but so long as they haven't voluntarily done anything which ensures that they should be, they've done nothing to ensure  LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But they have voluntarily, because  | 5  | • • •  | 5  |   |  |  |  |  |
| that's often put is: if this politician cheats on his wife, why would we think that he's not going to cheat on us, the public?  I used to be quite persuaded by that argument but I'm not persuaded by that argument so much any more. I'm not persuaded for two reasons. One is just the historical evidence, which is that there are huge numbers possibly the majority of very, very good statesmen, politicians, who were philanderers of one sort or another and they were, as a matter of fact, extremely good at their job but not terribly good to their partner. So there's that evidence.  But the second and more powerful philosophical consideration is that to the extent that we start to investigate the private lives of politicians or public figures more generally, we may find that we are creating a world in which only the most brazen and shameless are  sort death one sufficient, may it? If I take the example of a famous person who is famous only because of what he or a famous person who is famous only because of what he or a famous person who is famous only because of what he or a famous person who is famous only because of what he or a famous person who is famous only because of what he or a famous person who is famous only because of what he or a famous person who is famous only because of what he or a famous person who is famous only because of what he or a famous person who is famous only because of what he or a famous person who is famous only because of what he or a famous person who is famous only because of what he or a famous person who is famous only because of what he or a famous person who is famous only because of what he or a famous person who is famous only because of what he or a famous person who is famous only because obtain benefit from image rights. Why shouldn't such a person say, "Well, simply because I've made money writing a book or a fill player, without in any sense seeking to obtain benefit from image rights. Why shouldn'ts uch a person say, "Well, simply because I've made money writing a book       |    | ÷  |    |   |  |  |  |  |
| wife, why would we think that he's not going to cheat on us, the public?  I used to be quite persuaded by that argument but I used to be quite persuaded by that argument but I mot persuaded by that argument so much any more. I'm not persuaded for two reasons. One is just the historical evidence, which is that there are huge numbers possibly the majority of very, very good statesmen, politicians, who were philanderers of one sort or another and they were, as a matter of fact, extremely good at their job but not terribly good to their partner. So there's that evidence.  But the second and more powerful philosophical consideration is that to the extent that we start to investigate the private lives of politicians or public figures more generally, we may find that we are creating a world in which only the most brazen and shameless are  a famous person who is famous only because of what he or she does, be it as an actor or a writer or a football player, without in any sense seeking to obtain benefit from image rights. Why shouldn't such a person say, "Well, simply because I've made money writing a book or acting in a film or playing football well should not be sufficient to expose any aspect of my private life"?  PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Yes. I think one's private life is put in jeopardy only by voluntary acts which ensure that one's in the public gaze in ways that one otherwise wouldn't be. People who earn large sums of money, whether because they play football are not, are likely to be in the public gaze, but so long as they haven't voluntarily done anything which ensures that they should be, they've done nothing to ensure  24 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But they have voluntarily, because   | 7  | will be disreputable more widely. So the question          | 7  | LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But simple exposure to the press may  |  |  |  |  |
| 10 us, the public?  I used to be quite persuaded by that argument but 11 In not persuaded by that argument so much any more. 12 I'm not persuaded for two reasons. One is just the 13 historical evidence, which is that there are huge 14 historical evidence, which is that there are huge 15 numbers possibly the majority of very, very good 16 statesmen, politicians, who were philanderers of one 17 sort or another and they were, as a matter of fact, 18 extremely good at their job but not terribly good to 19 their partner. So there's that evidence. 19 But the second and more powerful philosophical 20 Description of the extent that we start to 21 investigate the private lives of politicians or public 23 figures more generally, we may find that we are creating 24 a world in which only the most brazen and shameless are  10 she does, be it as an actor or a writer or a football 11 player, without in any sense seeking to obtain benefit 12 from image rights. Why shouldn't such a person say, 12 from image rights. Why shouldn't such a person say, 13 "Well, simply because I've made money writing a book or 14 acting in a film or playing football well should not be 15 sufficient to expose any aspect of my private life"? 16 PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Yes. I think one's private life is put 17 in jeopardy only by voluntary acts which ensure that 18 one's in the public gaze in ways that one otherwise 19 wouldn't be. People who earn large sums of money, 20 whether because they play football are not, are likely 21 to be in the public gaze, but so long as they haven't 22 voluntarily done anything which ensures that they should 23 be, they've done nothing to ensure 24 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But they have voluntarily, because   | 8  | that's often put is: if this politician cheats on his      | 8  |   |  |  |  |  |
| It used to be quite persuaded by that argument but I'm not persuaded by that argument so much any more. I'm not persuaded for two reasons. One is just the historical evidence, which is that there are huge numbers possibly the majority of very, very good statesmen, politicians, who were philanderers of one sort or another and they were, as a matter of fact, extremely good at their job but not terribly good to their partner. So there's that evidence.  But the second and more powerful philosophical consideration is that to the extent that we start to investigate the private lives of politicians or public figures more generally, we may find that we are creating a world in which only the most brazen and shameless are  11 player, without in any sense seeking to obtain benefit from image rights. Why shouldn't such a person say,  Well, simply because I've made money writing a book or acting in a film or playing football well should not be sufficient to expose any aspect of my private life is put in jeopardy only by voluntary acts which ensure that one's in the public gaze in ways that one otherwise whether because they play football are not, are likely to be in the public gaze, but so long as they haven't voluntarily done anything which ensures that they should be, they've done nothing to ensure  24 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But they have voluntarily, because  | 9  | wife, why would we think that he's not going to cheat on   | 9  |   |  |  |  |  |
| I'm not persuaded by that argument so much any more. I'm not persuaded for two reasons. One is just the historical evidence, which is that there are huge numbers possibly the majority of very, very good statesmen, politicians, who were philanderers of one sort or another and they were, as a matter of fact, extremely good at their job but not terribly good to their partner. So there's that evidence.  But the second and more powerful philosophical consideration is that to the extent that we start to investigate the private lives of politicians or public figures more generally, we may find that we are creating a world in which only the most brazen and shameless are  12 from image rights. Why shouldn't such a person say, "Well, simply because I've made money writing a book or acting in a film or playing football well should not be sufficient to expose any aspect of my private life"?  PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Yes. I think one's private life is put in jeopardy only by voluntary acts which ensure that one's in the public gaze in ways that one otherwise wouldn't be. People who earn large sums of money, whether because they play football are not, are likely to be in the public gaze, but so long as they haven't voluntarily done anything which ensures that they should be, they've done nothing to ensure  24 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But they have voluntarily, because  | 10 | us, the public?  | 10 | she does, be it as an actor or a writer or a football       |  |  |  |  |
| 13 I'm not persuaded for two reasons. One is just the 14 historical evidence, which is that there are huge 15 numbers possibly the majority of very, very good 16 statesmen, politicians, who were philanderers of one 17 sort or another and they were, as a matter of fact, 18 extremely good at their job but not terribly good to 19 their partner. So there's that evidence. 19 But the second and more powerful philosophical 20 But the second and more powerful philosophical 21 consideration is that to the extent that we start to 22 investigate the private lives of politicians or public 23 figures more generally, we may find that we are creating 24 a world in which only the most brazen and shameless are 24 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But they have voluntarily, because   | 11 | I used to be quite persuaded by that argument but          | 11 |   |  |  |  |  |
| historical evidence, which is that there are huge numbers possibly the majority of very, very good statesmen, politicians, who were philanderers of one sort or another and they were, as a matter of fact, extremely good at their job but not terribly good to their partner. So there's that evidence.  But the second and more powerful philosophical consideration is that to the extent that we start to investigate the private lives of politicians or public figures more generally, we may find that we are creating a world in which only the most brazen and shameless are  14 acting in a film or playing football well should not be sufficient to expose any aspect of my private life"? PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Yes. I think one's private life is put in jeopardy only by voluntary acts which ensure that one's in the public gaze in ways that one otherwise wouldn't be. People who earn large sums of money, whether because they play football are not, are likely to be in the public gaze, but so long as they haven't voluntarily done anything which ensures that they should be, they've done nothing to ensure  LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But they have voluntarily, because  | 12 | I'm not persuaded by that argument so much any more.       | 12 | from image rights. Why shouldn't such a person say,         |  |  |  |  |
| numbers possibly the majority of very, very good statesmen, politicians, who were philanderers of one sort or another and they were, as a matter of fact, extremely good at their job but not terribly good to their partner. So there's that evidence.  But the second and more powerful philosophical consideration is that to the extent that we start to investigate the private lives of politicians or public figures more generally, we may find that we are creating a world in which only the most brazen and shameless are  sufficient to expose any aspect of my private life"?  PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Yes. I think one's private life is put in jeopardy only by voluntary acts which ensure that one's in the public gaze in ways that one otherwise wouldn't be. People who earn large sums of money, whether because they play football are not, are likely to be in the public gaze, but so long as they haven't voluntarily done anything which ensures that they should be, they've done nothing to ensure  LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But they have voluntarily, because  | 13 | I'm not persuaded for two reasons. One is just the         | 13 | "Well, simply because I've made money writing a book or     |  |  |  |  |
| statesmen, politicians, who were philanderers of one sort or another and they were, as a matter of fact, extremely good at their job but not terribly good to their partner. So there's that evidence.  But the second and more powerful philosophical consideration is that to the extent that we start to inyestigate the private lives of politicians or public figures more generally, we may find that we are creating a world in which only the most brazen and shameless are  16 PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Yes. I think one's private life is put in jeopardy only by voluntary acts which ensure that one's in the public gaze in ways that one otherwise wouldn't be. People who earn large sums of money, whether because they play football are not, are likely to be in the public gaze, but so long as they haven't voluntarily done anything which ensures that they should be, they've done nothing to ensure  LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But they have voluntarily, because  | 14 | historical evidence, which is that there are huge          | 14 | acting in a film or playing football well should not be     |  |  |  |  |
| sort or another and they were, as a matter of fact, extremely good at their job but not terribly good to their partner. So there's that evidence.  But the second and more powerful philosophical consideration is that to the extent that we start to investigate the private lives of politicians or public figures more generally, we may find that we are creating a world in which only the most brazen and shameless are  17 in jeopardy only by voluntary acts which ensure that one's in the public gaze in ways that one otherwise wouldn't be. People who earn large sums of money, whether because they play football are not, are likely to be in the public gaze, but so long as they haven't voluntarily done anything which ensures that they should be, they've done nothing to ensure  24 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But they have voluntarily, because  | 15 | numbers possibly the majority of very, very good           | 15 | sufficient to expose any aspect of my private life"?        |  |  |  |  |
| extremely good at their job but not terribly good to their partner. So there's that evidence.  But the second and more powerful philosophical consideration is that to the extent that we start to investigate the private lives of politicians or public figures more generally, we may find that we are creating a world in which only the most brazen and shameless are  18 one's in the public gaze in ways that one otherwise wouldn't be. People who earn large sums of money, whether because they play football are not, are likely to be in the public gaze, but so long as they haven't voluntarily done anything which ensures that they should be, they've done nothing to ensure 24 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But they have voluntarily, because  | 16 | statesmen, politicians, who were philanderers of one       | 16 | PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Yes. I think one's private life is put   |  |  |  |  |
| their partner. So there's that evidence.  But the second and more powerful philosophical consideration is that to the extent that we start to investigate the private lives of politicians or public figures more generally, we may find that we are creating a world in which only the most brazen and shameless are  19 wouldn't be. People who earn large sums of money, whether because they play football are not, are likely to be in the public gaze, but so long as they haven't voluntarily done anything which ensures that they should be, they've done nothing to ensure 24 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But they have voluntarily, because   | 17 | sort or another and they were, as a matter of fact,        | 17 | in jeopardy only by voluntary acts which ensure that        |  |  |  |  |
| But the second and more powerful philosophical consideration is that to the extent that we start to investigate the private lives of politicians or public ingures more generally, we may find that we are creating a world in which only the most brazen and shameless are  20 whether because they play football are not, are likely to be in the public gaze, but so long as they haven't voluntarily done anything which ensures that they should be, they've done nothing to ensure  24 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But they have voluntarily, because  | 18 | extremely good at their job but not terribly good to       | 18 | one's in the public gaze in ways that one otherwise         |  |  |  |  |
| consideration is that to the extent that we start to investigate the private lives of politicians or public ingures more generally, we may find that we are creating a world in which only the most brazen and shameless are  21 to be in the public gaze, but so long as they haven't voluntarily done anything which ensures that they should be, they've done nothing to ensure 24 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But they have voluntarily, because   | 19 | their partner. So there's that evidence.                   | 19 | wouldn't be. People who earn large sums of money,           |  |  |  |  |
| consideration is that to the extent that we start to investigate the private lives of politicians or public investigate t | 20 |  | 20 | whether because they play football are not, are likely      |  |  |  |  |
| figures more generally, we may find that we are creating a world in which only the most brazen and shameless are 24 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But they have voluntarily, because   | 21 | consideration is that to the extent that we start to       | 21 | to be in the public gaze, but so long as they haven't       |  |  |  |  |
| figures more generally, we may find that we are creating a world in which only the most brazen and shameless are 24 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But they have voluntarily, because   | 22 | investigate the private lives of politicians or public     | 22 | voluntarily done anything which ensures that they should    |  |  |  |  |
| 24 a world in which only the most brazen and shameless are 24 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But they have voluntarily, because   | 23 |  | 23 | be, they've done nothing to ensure                          |  |  |  |  |
|  | 24 |  | 24 | LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But they have voluntarily, because    |  |  |  |  |
| FF 8 F   , , , , , , , , , , , , ,   | i  |  | 25 | they've joined the football club. Do you mean they've       |  |  |  |  |

| 1  |  | 1  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| 1  | not voluntarily done something to put their private  | 1  | example of adultery would be one example. It's not the   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2  | lives into the public domain or do you mean rather more  | 2  | law's business to concern itself with discouraging that  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 3  | than that?   | 3  | sort of behaviour, even if it is immoral. Another  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 4  | PROFESSOR HORNSBY: I mean that they haven't tried to bring   | 4  | reason is that it could just be tremendously   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 5  | it about, for instance, that they earn money by virtue   | 5  | counter-productive for the law to do this because it's   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 6  | of public exposure. They haven't stated opinions   | 6  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 7  | which  | 7  | So there's always a very complicated question. Once  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 8  | LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But simply being of interest to the  | 8  | we've identified the ethical ideals we want to affirm,   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 9  | public because you've made a lot of money, whatever  | 9  | including the ethical duties, to what extent are any of  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 10   | you've done, is not sufficient in your view? Am  | 10   | them properly pursued through law and in what way? It's  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 11   | I understanding it?  | 11   | very, very difficult.  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 12   | PROFESSOR HORNSBY: In my view, it's not sufficient.  | 12   | And then the further consequence of that is it's   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 13   | PROFESSOR MENDUS: Personally I agree. I don't think it's   | 13   | never enough then to say, "Oh, well, I'm complying with  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 14   | sufficient, but I think people who do earn a lot of  | 14   | the law, therefore ethically I'm impeccable", because  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 15   | money and are in the public view have to recognise that  | 15   | the law only embodies some of these considerations and   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 16   | that is a danger. I don't think it's legitimate.   | 16   | there may be other very compelling reasons that apply to   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 17   | I very much agree. I don't think it's legitimate to  | 17   | you. That's why I think it's important to talk about   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 18   | intrude in that way, but I think it goes with the  | 18   | this notion of a culture, because a culture embodies   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 19   | territory, as they say.  | 19   | norms that go way beyond and law and beyond legal forms  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 20   | LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Well, yes. The question then   | 20   | of enforcement. There can be forms of enforcement where  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 21   | arises and I don't want to take Mr Jay out of  | 21   | you lose the esteem of your colleagues which in some   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 22   | order as to how one tries to moderate or mediate into  | ways can be more potent than getting a slap on the |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 23   | that situation and whether it's simply a question for  | 23   | from the law.  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 24   | the editor or whether it is appropriate in our society   | 24   | Q. Do you have a take on that?   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 25   | that somebody else should be able to say, "Hang on,  | 25   | PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Can I agree with that? I think it   |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Page 45  |  | Page 47  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1  | I think that's a line that you've just gone beyond   | 1  | connects with how one thinks about a right to free   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2  | unnecessarily." But Mr Jay, you take that in whatever  | 2  | speech. Because it's much discussed in connection with   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 3  | way you want. I don't want to jump ahead of you. That  | 3  | the First Amendment of the US constitution, one tends to   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 4  | turns over two pages, so don't do that.  | 4  | think of the right to free speech in legal terms, and  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 5  | MR JAY: Mm. I come back to a point that came from  | 5  | given recent legislation in this country, again, one   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 6  | Professor Tasioulas: the possible difference between   | 6  | thinks the law is ensuring that people have had this   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 7  | legal duties and ethical duties. I think what you were   | 7  | right and that it's taken away from them in certain  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 8  | hinting at or perhaps saying is that ethical duties may,   | 8  | cases.   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 9  | as it were, impose higher obligations than legal duties  | 9  | But I take it that one can think that a principle of   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 10   | and it's insufficient merely to concentrate, say, on   | 10   | free speech should be in place in many contexts not  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 11   | legal risk; one should be moving on to the issue of  | 11   | because there's a danger that anyone might be  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 12   | ethical risk. Is that a useful analysis in your view?  | 12   | criminalised by virtue of what they say but because  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 13   | PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: That's right. I think we have to  | 13   | a principle of free speech is a correct ethical  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 14   | understand law as not a kind of self-enclosed system.  | 14   | principle.   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1  |  | 15   | I think when one thinks about the freedom of the   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 15   | It's a set of norms. It's trying to achieve some   |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 16   | It's a set of norms. It's trying to achieve some valuable purposes and these purposes are appropriately  | 16   | press, one should recognise that if we think we have   |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | press, one should recognise that if we think we have<br>a right to free speech, that's not only because some   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 16   | valuable purposes and these purposes are appropriately   | 16   | -  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 16<br>17   | valuable purposes and these purposes are appropriately described as ethical purposes, generally, on a suitably   | 16<br>17   | a right to free speech, that's not only because some   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 16<br>17<br>18                                     | valuable purposes and these purposes are appropriately<br>described as ethical purposes, generally, on a suitably<br>broad understanding of what the ethical is, which is  | 16<br>17<br>18                                     | a right to free speech, that's not only because some constitutions say that we have but because we should be   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 16<br>17<br>18<br>19                               | valuable purposes and these purposes are appropriately described as ethical purposes, generally, on a suitably broad understanding of what the ethical is, which is the pursuit of whatever is of human value. But law's   | 16<br>17<br>18<br>19                               | a right to free speech, that's not only because some constitutions say that we have but because we should be free to communicate with one another. That's a good   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22             | valuable purposes and these purposes are appropriately described as ethical purposes, generally, on a suitably broad understanding of what the ethical is, which is the pursuit of whatever is of human value. But law's a particular kind of mechanism and in particular, enforceable law is a particular kind of mechanism and it might not be at all appropriate to pursue all ethical  | 16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22             | a right to free speech, that's not only because some constitutions say that we have but because we should be free to communicate with one another. That's a good thing.  PROFESSOR MENDUS: Crucially what's underlying all of this is the very clear and simple claim that rights don't  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22<br>23       | valuable purposes and these purposes are appropriately described as ethical purposes, generally, on a suitably broad understanding of what the ethical is, which is the pursuit of whatever is of human value. But law's a particular kind of mechanism and in particular, enforceable law is a particular kind of mechanism and it might not be at all appropriate to pursue all ethical considerations through law for two main reasons. One is  | 16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22<br>23       | a right to free speech, that's not only because some constitutions say that we have but because we should be free to communicate with one another. That's a good thing.  PROFESSOR MENDUS: Crucially what's underlying all of this is the very clear and simple claim that rights don't exhaust the realm of the morally good and bad, or, as  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22<br>23<br>24 | valuable purposes and these purposes are appropriately described as ethical purposes, generally, on a suitably broad understanding of what the ethical is, which is the pursuit of whatever is of human value. But law's a particular kind of mechanism and in particular, enforceable law is a particular kind of mechanism and it might not be at all appropriate to pursue all ethical considerations through law for two main reasons. One is that some of these considerations might properly fall  | 16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22<br>23<br>24 | a right to free speech, that's not only because some constitutions say that we have but because we should be free to communicate with one another. That's a good thing.  PROFESSOR MENDUS: Crucially what's underlying all of this is the very clear and simple claim that rights don't exhaust the realm of the morally good and bad, or, as one of my colleagues used to say, there are rights but   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22<br>23       | valuable purposes and these purposes are appropriately described as ethical purposes, generally, on a suitably broad understanding of what the ethical is, which is the pursuit of whatever is of human value. But law's a particular kind of mechanism and in particular, enforceable law is a particular kind of mechanism and it might not be at all appropriate to pursue all ethical considerations through law for two main reasons. One is that some of these considerations might properly fall within a sphere of kind of private domain, and the | 16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22<br>23       | a right to free speech, that's not only because some constitutions say that we have but because we should be free to communicate with one another. That's a good thing.  PROFESSOR MENDUS: Crucially what's underlying all of this is the very clear and simple claim that rights don't exhaust the realm of the morally good and bad, or, as one of my colleagues used to say, there are rights but the good man doesn't always stand on his rights, so |  |  |  |  |  |
| 16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22<br>23<br>24 | valuable purposes and these purposes are appropriately described as ethical purposes, generally, on a suitably broad understanding of what the ethical is, which is the pursuit of whatever is of human value. But law's a particular kind of mechanism and in particular, enforceable law is a particular kind of mechanism and it might not be at all appropriate to pursue all ethical considerations through law for two main reasons. One is that some of these considerations might properly fall  | 16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22<br>23<br>24 | a right to free speech, that's not only because some constitutions say that we have but because we should be free to communicate with one another. That's a good thing.  PROFESSOR MENDUS: Crucially what's underlying all of this is the very clear and simple claim that rights don't exhaust the realm of the morally good and bad, or, as one of my colleagues used to say, there are rights but   |  |  |  |  |  |

| 1  | although you have a right to certain things, sometimes      | 1   | LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Or as grey.                          |  |  |
|----|---|---|--|--|--|
| 2  | it's not appropriate and not morally good to exercise       | 2   | PROFESSOR MENDUS: As grey.                                 |  |  |
| 3  | that right. You won't be breaking the law, but you          | 3   | PROFESSOR HORNSBY: It connects directly with the megaphone |  |  |
| 4  | won't really be showing yourself up as a particularly       | 4   | effect. It would be intolerable that individual speech     |  |  |
| 5  | good person either, and that's just straightforward and     | 5   | should constantly be monitored in case they were           |  |  |
| 6  | simple, I think.  | 6   | offending in any way but that's not the only reason why    |  |  |
| 7  | LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: It becomes rather more difficult when | 7   | one cares more about press speech than individual          |  |  |
| 8  | one seeks to apply it away from the individual              | 8   | speech. It's also because a million people are hearing     |  |  |
| 9  | PROFESSOR MENDUS: It does, absolutely.                      | 9   | what's said in the printed words of the press, rather      |  |  |
| 10 | LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: to an organ such as the press.        | 10  | than the two or three who might hear an individual. If     |  |  |
| 11 | PROFESSOR MENDUS: Absolutely, and it becomes more difficult |   | there was a small wrong, it's a million fold wrong in      |  |  |
| 12 | also, of course, if one wants to codify that, because       | 12  | the press context.   |  |  |
| 13 | that doesn't allow a great deal of room for judgment and    | 13  | PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: Can I just add something? There are   |  |  |
| 14 | nuance and all this kind that is very, very                 | 14  | sort of two points at which you might think the            |  |  |
| 15 | problematic.  | 15  | institutional extra power of the press institutional       |  |  |
| 16 | So the moral philosopher stays within the realm of          | 16  | (inaudible) extra power creates more limited space.        |  |  |
| 17 | the individual in part, but political philosophy does       | 17  | One is in the right itself, so individuals may have        |  |  |
| 18 | need to extend more in the direction of the law where       | 18  | a right to express certain things that the press doesn't   |  |  |
| 19 | there are questions about where it's appropriate for the    | 19  | precisely because of the effects of the press expressing   |  |  |
| 20 | law to intervene. Now, whether the law then it's            | 20  | them being so much greater.                                |  |  |
| 21 | John Stuart Mill. Whether the law then should intervene     | Then there's the second point that I think that you |  |  |  |
| 22 | in all those cases is a different matter.                   | 22  | were raising, about: even if it's within their right to    |  |  |
| 23 | LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Is this a fair analogy and correct    | 23  | do certain things, they may be subject to further          |  |  |
| 24 | me if it isn't. I'll be getting myself into trouble.        | 24 25   | restrictions because we want to discourage them or         |  |  |
| 25 |   |   | certain further considerations we want them to be          |  |  |
|    | Page 49   | _   | Page 51  |  |  |
| 1  | grey in the middle which covers the ground where it's       | 1   | subject to because you want them to use their right in     |  |  |
| 2  | not appropriate to stand on your rights, this point that    | 2   | a certain kind of way.                                     |  |  |
| 3  | you've just made, and whereas for individuals that can      | 3   | But I certainly think the case of the racist               |  |  |
| 4  | be left grey for all time, there is at least an argument    | 4   | expression I wouldn't think that if individuals have       |  |  |
| 5  | that for an institutions as significant and as              | 5   | a right to make some sort of offensive remarks in          |  |  |
| 6  | potentially powerful as the press, that band of grey        | 6   | a private context, you should say the press also has       |  |  |
| 7  | should be narrowed so as still to leave an area of          | 7   | this right but we impose extra restrictions. I think       |  |  |
| 8  | discretion, because that's also extremely important         | 8   | the press wouldn't have that right, precisely because      |  |  |
| 9  | but within a narrower bandwidth than one could allow an     | 9   | the power of the press and the significance of its         |  |  |
| 10 | individual?   | 10  | speech as against the sort of private speech of            |  |  |
| 11 | PROFESSOR MENDUS: Yes.                                      | 11  | individuals.   |  |  |
| 12 | LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I may not have expressed that very    | 12  | LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: So it may be that this is merely     |  |  |
| 13 | well.   | 13  | a manifestation of the consequence of the megaphone,       |  |  |
| 14 | PROFESSOR MENDUS: If I understand you, then I think that    | 14  | that the bandwidth should be narrower.                     |  |  |
| 15 | that's right and I take it that it's part of what was       | 15  | PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: Correct.                              |  |  |
| 16 | what Jen was saying earlier about the difference between    | 16  | LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: The problem then becomes and again   |  |  |
| 17 | somebody in a private context, the individual who makes     | 17  | I'm moving ahead, but just keeping an eye on the overall   |  |  |
| 18 | a I don't know, a racist remark or a sexist remark,         | 18  | goal how one monitors not the available bandwidth but      |  |  |
| 19 | and that may be left in the grey area. We don't think       | 19  | the bit of bandwidth that we've just said that goes too    |  |  |
| 20 | terribly well of such people, but we aren't going to go     | 20  | far.   |  |  |
| 21 | to a court of law for all sorts of reasons. It's            | 21  | PROFESSOR HORNSBY: There's not just the megaphone effect   |  |  |
| 22 | a different matter with the institution of the press,       | 22  | but the cumulative effect.                                 |  |  |
| 23 | where there has to be where there is more authority,        | 23  | PROFESSOR MENDUS: Yes.                                     |  |  |
| 24 | more impact. If that's what you're saying, then I would     | 24  | PROFESSOR HORNSBY: I mean, if one takes a particular piece |  |  |
| 25 | agree with that, that that can't be left grey.              | 25  | of vocabulary. Imagine that a word which now we know       |  |  |
| 1  | Page 50   |   | Page 52  |  |  |

| 1  | no one uses had continued to be used and with the same   | 1  | well, the balance goes slightly in favour of freedom of   |  |  |  |  |
|--|--|--|---|--|--|--|--|
| 2  | force, and that had been done through the press,   | 2  | expression over privacy in cases of that kind.  |  |  |  |  |
| 3  | cumulatively, to all. The consequences would be  | 3  | PROFESSOR HORNSBY: I think I'm not clear what kinds of  |  |  |  |  |
| 4  | terrible.  | 4  | cases we're thinking of as being weighed in the balance,  |  |  |  |  |
| 5  | MR JAY: Can I go back to the privacy example and our   | 5  | but it seems to me it would misdescribe certain cases to  |  |  |  |  |
| 6  | celebrity footballer or whoever it matters not.  | 6  | think that it's freedom of expression that we're  |  |  |  |  |
| 7  | We're referring to a discretion with a narrow bandwidth.   | 7  | weighing against privacy. If a journalist reports   |  |  |  |  |
| 8  | It might be said that there's room for reasonable people   | 8  | a story which some individual has a right to protest  |  |  |  |  |
| 9  | to disagree as to where the notional mid-point of the  | 9  | against by virtue of their right to privacy, then it  |  |  |  |  |
| 10   | bandwidth might be, and we've heard some slight  | 10   | isn't the motive of the journalist to exercise their  |  |  |  |  |
| 11   | disagreement as to that. But should one be setting the   | 11   | right to freedom of expression. Nothing which justifies   |  |  |  |  |
| 12   | notional centre of the bandwidth at a point which  | 12   | a right to freedom of expression has any particular   |  |  |  |  |
| 13   | favours freedom of expression or at a point which  | 13   | bearing on their publishing this particular story.  |  |  |  |  |
| 14   | favours privacy, given that I think we said before that  | 14   | So it raises the question what the motive is of   |  |  |  |  |
| 15   | unless there's a clear justification for interfering   | 15   | publishing the story in a case where privacy would seem   |  |  |  |  |
| 16   | with freedom of expression, then that right, as it were,   | 16   | to have been violated, and there's a question about   |  |  |  |  |
| 17   | to the extent to which it is a right, wins out? Do you   | 17   | whether a right to privacy wins out.  |  |  |  |  |
| 18   | see the point?   | 18   | Q. I understand. I raise one final question in this way:  |  |  |  |  |
| 19   | PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: I don't think I'd want to concede to  | 19   | if but only if the culture, practices and ethics  |  |  |  |  |
| 20   | that particular point. So I think it might be the case   | 20   | of the press or a section of it are demonstrated to be  |  |  |  |  |
| 21   | that you really are confronted with a situation where  | 21   | deficient, is the correct ethical response either: one,   |  |  |  |  |
| 22   | there are just two alternative ways of specifying  | 22   | to simply enforce the law better, on the basis that the   |  |  |  |  |
| 23   | a legal requirement or a right and that require you to   | 23   | law should cover all aspects of comportment in this   |  |  |  |  |
| 24   | balance issues of privacy versus issues of freedom.  | 24   | domain; two, make new and more stringent laws; or three,  |  |  |  |  |
| 25   | Now, one of the first things to say there is that  | 25   | attempt to promote culture change through a range of  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Page 53  |  | Page 55   |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |   |  |  |  |  |
| 1  |  | 1  | measures, which would include better ethical guidelines   |  |  |  |  |
| 1  | a lot of people think that the value of privacy just is  | 1 2  | measures, which would include better ethical guidelines,  |  |  |  |  |
| 2  | the value of freedom. So it's not as if you're bringing  | 2  | a better regulatory system and overall an endeavour to  |  |  |  |  |
| 2 3  | the value of freedom. So it's not as if you're bringing in some other consideration; the idea of people being  | 2 3  | a better regulatory system and overall an endeavour to<br>enhance the culture, practice and ethics of the press?  |  |  |  |  |
| 2<br>3<br>4  | the value of freedom. So it's not as if you're bringing<br>in some other consideration; the idea of people being<br>autonomous individuals is under threat if they can't   | 2<br>3<br>4  | a better regulatory system and overall an endeavour to<br>enhance the culture, practice and ethics of the press?<br>Or is it none of those three things or a combination of   |  |  |  |  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5   | the value of freedom. So it's not as if you're bringing in some other consideration; the idea of people being autonomous individuals is under threat if they can't have a domain of privacy. So it might then just be  | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5   | a better regulatory system and overall an endeavour to enhance the culture, practice and ethics of the press?  Or is it none of those three things or a combination of two and three? What do you think, Professor Tasioulas?   |  |  |  |  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6  | the value of freedom. So it's not as if you're bringing in some other consideration; the idea of people being autonomous individuals is under threat if they can't have a domain of privacy. So it might then just be a freedom versus freedom kind of debate, but even if we  | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6  | a better regulatory system and overall an endeavour to enhance the culture, practice and ethics of the press?  Or is it none of those three things or a combination of two and three? What do you think, Professor Tasioulas?  It may be implicit in what you've said already what the  |  |  |  |  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7   | the value of freedom. So it's not as if you're bringing in some other consideration; the idea of people being autonomous individuals is under threat if they can't have a domain of privacy. So it might then just be a freedom versus freedom kind of debate, but even if we leave that aside, I don't think there's any reason to  | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7   | a better regulatory system and overall an endeavour to enhance the culture, practice and ethics of the press?  Or is it none of those three things or a combination of two and three? What do you think, Professor Tasioulas? It may be implicit in what you've said already what the answer may be.  |  |  |  |  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8  | the value of freedom. So it's not as if you're bringing in some other consideration; the idea of people being autonomous individuals is under threat if they can't have a domain of privacy. So it might then just be a freedom versus freedom kind of debate, but even if we leave that aside, I don't think there's any reason to regard freedom as a kind of privileged value that in any   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8  | a better regulatory system and overall an endeavour to enhance the culture, practice and ethics of the press?  Or is it none of those three things or a combination of two and three? What do you think, Professor Tasioulas?  It may be implicit in what you've said already what the answer may be.  LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Just be warned that if you choose the  |  |  |  |  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9   | the value of freedom. So it's not as if you're bringing in some other consideration; the idea of people being autonomous individuals is under threat if they can't have a domain of privacy. So it might then just be a freedom versus freedom kind of debate, but even if we leave that aside, I don't think there's any reason to regard freedom as a kind of privileged value that in any conflict has to win out. I just that just seems to  | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9   | a better regulatory system and overall an endeavour to enhance the culture, practice and ethics of the press?  Or is it none of those three things or a combination of two and three? What do you think, Professor Tasioulas?  It may be implicit in what you've said already what the answer may be.  LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Just be warned that if you choose the last, I'm going to ask you how.  |  |  |  |  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10   | the value of freedom. So it's not as if you're bringing in some other consideration; the idea of people being autonomous individuals is under threat if they can't have a domain of privacy. So it might then just be a freedom versus freedom kind of debate, but even if we leave that aside, I don't think there's any reason to regard freedom as a kind of privileged value that in any conflict has to win out. I just that just seems to be a piece of dogma.   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9   | a better regulatory system and overall an endeavour to enhance the culture, practice and ethics of the press?  Or is it none of those three things or a combination of two and three? What do you think, Professor Tasioulas?  It may be implicit in what you've said already what the answer may be.  LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Just be warned that if you choose the last, I'm going to ask you how.  PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: I think the initial answer is one and  |  |  |  |  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11   | the value of freedom. So it's not as if you're bringing in some other consideration; the idea of people being autonomous individuals is under threat if they can't have a domain of privacy. So it might then just be a freedom versus freedom kind of debate, but even if we leave that aside, I don't think there's any reason to regard freedom as a kind of privileged value that in any conflict has to win out. I just that just seems to be a piece of dogma.  Q. Okay. Professor Mendus?   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11   | a better regulatory system and overall an endeavour to enhance the culture, practice and ethics of the press?  Or is it none of those three things or a combination of two and three? What do you think, Professor Tasioulas?  It may be implicit in what you've said already what the answer may be.  LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Just be warned that if you choose the last, I'm going to ask you how.  PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: I think the initial answer is one and three. Of course, you should always enforce the law.   |  |  |  |  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12   | the value of freedom. So it's not as if you're bringing in some other consideration; the idea of people being autonomous individuals is under threat if they can't have a domain of privacy. So it might then just be a freedom versus freedom kind of debate, but even if we leave that aside, I don't think there's any reason to regard freedom as a kind of privileged value that in any conflict has to win out. I just that just seems to be a piece of dogma.  Q. Okay. Professor Mendus?  PROFESSOR MENDUS: I feel less clear about that. I'd like   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12   | a better regulatory system and overall an endeavour to enhance the culture, practice and ethics of the press?  Or is it none of those three things or a combination of two and three? What do you think, Professor Tasioulas?  It may be implicit in what you've said already what the answer may be.  LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Just be warned that if you choose the last, I'm going to ask you how.  PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: I think the initial answer is one and three. Of course, you should always enforce the law.  If the law's not being enforced, it should be enforced,  |  |  |  |  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13   | the value of freedom. So it's not as if you're bringing in some other consideration; the idea of people being autonomous individuals is under threat if they can't have a domain of privacy. So it might then just be a freedom versus freedom kind of debate, but even if we leave that aside, I don't think there's any reason to regard freedom as a kind of privileged value that in any conflict has to win out. I just that just seems to be a piece of dogma.  Q. Okay. Professor Mendus?  PROFESSOR MENDUS: I feel less clear about that. I'd like to introduce something that we haven't specifically   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13   | a better regulatory system and overall an endeavour to enhance the culture, practice and ethics of the press?  Or is it none of those three things or a combination of two and three? What do you think, Professor Tasioulas?  It may be implicit in what you've said already what the answer may be.  LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Just be warned that if you choose the last, I'm going to ask you how.  PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: I think the initial answer is one and three. Of course, you should always enforce the law.  If the law's not being enforced, it should be enforced, and of course you should be doing things to promote the  |  |  |  |  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14   | the value of freedom. So it's not as if you're bringing in some other consideration; the idea of people being autonomous individuals is under threat if they can't have a domain of privacy. So it might then just be a freedom versus freedom kind of debate, but even if we leave that aside, I don't think there's any reason to regard freedom as a kind of privileged value that in any conflict has to win out. I just that just seems to be a piece of dogma.  Q. Okay. Professor Mendus?  PROFESSOR MENDUS: I feel less clear about that. I'd like to introduce something that we haven't specifically alluded to here, and that is the importance of freedom  | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13   | a better regulatory system and overall an endeavour to enhance the culture, practice and ethics of the press?  Or is it none of those three things or a combination of two and three? What do you think, Professor Tasioulas?  It may be implicit in what you've said already what the answer may be.  LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Just be warned that if you choose the last, I'm going to ask you how.  PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: I think the initial answer is one and three. Of course, you should always enforce the law.  If the law's not being enforced, it should be enforced, and of course you should be doing things to promote the culture that realises values beyond those necessarily  |  |  |  |  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15   | the value of freedom. So it's not as if you're bringing in some other consideration; the idea of people being autonomous individuals is under threat if they can't have a domain of privacy. So it might then just be a freedom versus freedom kind of debate, but even if we leave that aside, I don't think there's any reason to regard freedom as a kind of privileged value that in any conflict has to win out. I just that just seems to be a piece of dogma.  Q. Okay. Professor Mendus?  PROFESSOR MENDUS: I feel less clear about that. I'd like to introduce something that we haven't specifically alluded to here, and that is the importance of freedom of speech/freedom of expression in a society such as   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14   | a better regulatory system and overall an endeavour to enhance the culture, practice and ethics of the press?  Or is it none of those three things or a combination of two and three? What do you think, Professor Tasioulas?  It may be implicit in what you've said already what the answer may be.  LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Just be warned that if you choose the last, I'm going to ask you how.  PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: I think the initial answer is one and three. Of course, you should always enforce the law.  If the law's not being enforced, it should be enforced, and of course you should be doing things to promote the culture that realises values beyond those necessarily that can be in any way enforced by the law. And then   |  |  |  |  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16   | the value of freedom. So it's not as if you're bringing in some other consideration; the idea of people being autonomous individuals is under threat if they can't have a domain of privacy. So it might then just be a freedom versus freedom kind of debate, but even if we leave that aside, I don't think there's any reason to regard freedom as a kind of privileged value that in any conflict has to win out. I just that just seems to be a piece of dogma.  Q. Okay. Professor Mendus?  PROFESSOR MENDUS: I feel less clear about that. I'd like to introduce something that we haven't specifically alluded to here, and that is the importance of freedom of speech/freedom of expression in a society such as ours, which is multicultural and where many faiths are  | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15   | a better regulatory system and overall an endeavour to enhance the culture, practice and ethics of the press?  Or is it none of those three things or a combination of two and three? What do you think, Professor Tasioulas?  It may be implicit in what you've said already what the answer may be.  LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Just be warned that if you choose the last, I'm going to ask you how.  PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: I think the initial answer is one and three. Of course, you should always enforce the law.  If the law's not being enforced, it should be enforced, and of course you should be doing things to promote the culture that realises values beyond those necessarily that can be in any way enforced by the law. And then you visit two if you realise that doing one and three by  |  |  |  |  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17   | the value of freedom. So it's not as if you're bringing in some other consideration; the idea of people being autonomous individuals is under threat if they can't have a domain of privacy. So it might then just be a freedom versus freedom kind of debate, but even if we leave that aside, I don't think there's any reason to regard freedom as a kind of privileged value that in any conflict has to win out. I just that just seems to be a piece of dogma.  Q. Okay. Professor Mendus?  PROFESSOR MENDUS: I feel less clear about that. I'd like to introduce something that we haven't specifically alluded to here, and that is the importance of freedom of speech/freedom of expression in a society such as ours, which is multicultural and where many faiths are adhered to. So there's a bit of disagreement here,   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17   | a better regulatory system and overall an endeavour to enhance the culture, practice and ethics of the press?  Or is it none of those three things or a combination of two and three? What do you think, Professor Tasioulas? It may be implicit in what you've said already what the answer may be.  LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Just be warned that if you choose the last, I'm going to ask you how.  PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: I think the initial answer is one and three. Of course, you should always enforce the law. If the law's not being enforced, it should be enforced, and of course you should be doing things to promote the culture that realises values beyond those necessarily that can be in any way enforced by the law. And then you visit two if you realise that doing one and three by themselves aren't producing the desired effect. You  |  |  |  |  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18                                     | the value of freedom. So it's not as if you're bringing in some other consideration; the idea of people being autonomous individuals is under threat if they can't have a domain of privacy. So it might then just be a freedom versus freedom kind of debate, but even if we leave that aside, I don't think there's any reason to regard freedom as a kind of privileged value that in any conflict has to win out. I just that just seems to be a piece of dogma.  Q. Okay. Professor Mendus?  PROFESSOR MENDUS: I feel less clear about that. I'd like to introduce something that we haven't specifically alluded to here, and that is the importance of freedom of speech/freedom of expression in a society such as ours, which is multicultural and where many faiths are adhered to. So there's a bit of disagreement here, but of course there will be a lot of disagreement   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18                                     | a better regulatory system and overall an endeavour to enhance the culture, practice and ethics of the press?  Or is it none of those three things or a combination of two and three? What do you think, Professor Tasioulas? It may be implicit in what you've said already what the answer may be.  LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Just be warned that if you choose the last, I'm going to ask you how.  PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: I think the initial answer is one and three. Of course, you should always enforce the law. If the law's not being enforced, it should be enforced, and of course you should be doing things to promote the culture that realises values beyond those necessarily that can be in any way enforced by the law. And then you visit two if you realise that doing one and three by themselves aren't producing the desired effect. You then can contemplate new legislation. But if it is the   |  |  |  |  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19                               | the value of freedom. So it's not as if you're bringing in some other consideration; the idea of people being autonomous individuals is under threat if they can't have a domain of privacy. So it might then just be a freedom versus freedom kind of debate, but even if we leave that aside, I don't think there's any reason to regard freedom as a kind of privileged value that in any conflict has to win out. I just that just seems to be a piece of dogma.  Q. Okay. Professor Mendus?  PROFESSOR MENDUS: I feel less clear about that. I'd like to introduce something that we haven't specifically alluded to here, and that is the importance of freedom of speech/freedom of expression in a society such as ours, which is multicultural and where many faiths are adhered to. So there's a bit of disagreement here, but of course there will be a lot of disagreement outside about religious matters, cultural matters,  | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18                                     | a better regulatory system and overall an endeavour to enhance the culture, practice and ethics of the press?  Or is it none of those three things or a combination of two and three? What do you think, Professor Tasioulas? It may be implicit in what you've said already what the answer may be.  LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Just be warned that if you choose the last, I'm going to ask you how.  PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: I think the initial answer is one and three. Of course, you should always enforce the law. If the law's not being enforced, it should be enforced, and of course you should be doing things to promote the culture that realises values beyond those necessarily that can be in any way enforced by the law. And then you visit two if you realise that doing one and three by themselves aren't producing the desired effect. You then can contemplate new legislation. But if it is the case that the law as it exists hasn't been properly   |  |  |  |  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20                         | the value of freedom. So it's not as if you're bringing in some other consideration; the idea of people being autonomous individuals is under threat if they can't have a domain of privacy. So it might then just be a freedom versus freedom kind of debate, but even if we leave that aside, I don't think there's any reason to regard freedom as a kind of privileged value that in any conflict has to win out. I just that just seems to be a piece of dogma.  Q. Okay. Professor Mendus?  PROFESSOR MENDUS: I feel less clear about that. I'd like to introduce something that we haven't specifically alluded to here, and that is the importance of freedom of speech/freedom of expression in a society such as ours, which is multicultural and where many faiths are adhered to. So there's a bit of disagreement here, but of course there will be a lot of disagreement outside about religious matters, cultural matters, ethical matters, about the role of women in society, and   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20                         | a better regulatory system and overall an endeavour to enhance the culture, practice and ethics of the press?  Or is it none of those three things or a combination of two and three? What do you think, Professor Tasioulas? It may be implicit in what you've said already what the answer may be.  LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Just be warned that if you choose the last, I'm going to ask you how.  PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: I think the initial answer is one and three. Of course, you should always enforce the law. If the law's not being enforced, it should be enforced, and of course you should be doing things to promote the culture that realises values beyond those necessarily that can be in any way enforced by the law. And then you visit two if you realise that doing one and three by themselves aren't producing the desired effect. You then can contemplate new legislation. But if it is the case that the law as it exists hasn't been properly enforced, then that would be the first step, and to do  |  |  |  |  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21                   | the value of freedom. So it's not as if you're bringing in some other consideration; the idea of people being autonomous individuals is under threat if they can't have a domain of privacy. So it might then just be a freedom versus freedom kind of debate, but even if we leave that aside, I don't think there's any reason to regard freedom as a kind of privileged value that in any conflict has to win out. I just that just seems to be a piece of dogma.  Q. Okay. Professor Mendus?  PROFESSOR MENDUS: I feel less clear about that. I'd like to introduce something that we haven't specifically alluded to here, and that is the importance of freedom of speech/freedom of expression in a society such as ours, which is multicultural and where many faiths are adhered to. So there's a bit of disagreement here, but of course there will be a lot of disagreement outside about religious matters, cultural matters, ethical matters, about the role of women in society, and it seems to me that in a liberal democratic state which   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21                   | a better regulatory system and overall an endeavour to enhance the culture, practice and ethics of the press?  Or is it none of those three things or a combination of two and three? What do you think, Professor Tasioulas? It may be implicit in what you've said already what the answer may be.  LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Just be warned that if you choose the last, I'm going to ask you how.  PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: I think the initial answer is one and three. Of course, you should always enforce the law. If the law's not being enforced, it should be enforced, and of course you should be doing things to promote the culture that realises values beyond those necessarily that can be in any way enforced by the law. And then you visit two if you realise that doing one and three by themselves aren't producing the desired effect. You then can contemplate new legislation. But if it is the case that the law as it exists hasn't been properly enforced, then that would be the first step, and to do the third thing as well. You should always be doing  |  |  |  |  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22             | the value of freedom. So it's not as if you're bringing in some other consideration; the idea of people being autonomous individuals is under threat if they can't have a domain of privacy. So it might then just be a freedom versus freedom kind of debate, but even if we leave that aside, I don't think there's any reason to regard freedom as a kind of privileged value that in any conflict has to win out. I just that just seems to be a piece of dogma.  Q. Okay. Professor Mendus?  PROFESSOR MENDUS: I feel less clear about that. I'd like to introduce something that we haven't specifically alluded to here, and that is the importance of freedom of speech/freedom of expression in a society such as ours, which is multicultural and where many faiths are adhered to. So there's a bit of disagreement here, but of course there will be a lot of disagreement outside about religious matters, cultural matters, ethical matters, about the role of women in society, and it seems to me that in a liberal democratic state which is characterised by diversity and conflict, then there  | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22             | a better regulatory system and overall an endeavour to enhance the culture, practice and ethics of the press?  Or is it none of those three things or a combination of two and three? What do you think, Professor Tasioulas? It may be implicit in what you've said already what the answer may be.  LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Just be warned that if you choose the last, I'm going to ask you how.  PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: I think the initial answer is one and three. Of course, you should always enforce the law. If the law's not being enforced, it should be enforced, and of course you should be doing things to promote the culture that realises values beyond those necessarily that can be in any way enforced by the law. And then you visit two if you realise that doing one and three by themselves aren't producing the desired effect. You then can contemplate new legislation. But if it is the case that the law as it exists hasn't been properly enforced, then that would be the first step, and to do the third thing as well. You should always be doing that.  |  |  |  |  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22<br>23       | the value of freedom. So it's not as if you're bringing in some other consideration; the idea of people being autonomous individuals is under threat if they can't have a domain of privacy. So it might then just be a freedom versus freedom kind of debate, but even if we leave that aside, I don't think there's any reason to regard freedom as a kind of privileged value that in any conflict has to win out. I just that just seems to be a piece of dogma.  Q. Okay. Professor Mendus?  PROFESSOR MENDUS: I feel less clear about that. I'd like to introduce something that we haven't specifically alluded to here, and that is the importance of freedom of speech/freedom of expression in a society such as ours, which is multicultural and where many faiths are adhered to. So there's a bit of disagreement here, but of course there will be a lot of disagreement outside about religious matters, cultural matters, ethical matters, about the role of women in society, and it seems to me that in a liberal democratic state which is characterised by diversity and conflict, then there is an argument for I think freedom weighs quite                | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22<br>23       | a better regulatory system and overall an endeavour to enhance the culture, practice and ethics of the press?  Or is it none of those three things or a combination of two and three? What do you think, Professor Tasioulas? It may be implicit in what you've said already what the answer may be.  LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Just be warned that if you choose the last, I'm going to ask you how.  PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: I think the initial answer is one and three. Of course, you should always enforce the law. If the law's not being enforced, it should be enforced, and of course you should be doing things to promote the culture that realises values beyond those necessarily that can be in any way enforced by the law. And then you visit two if you realise that doing one and three by themselves aren't producing the desired effect. You then can contemplate new legislation. But if it is the case that the law as it exists hasn't been properly enforced, then that would be the first step, and to do the third thing as well. You should always be doing that.  LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: It's not necessarily easy to do that  |  |  |  |  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22<br>23<br>24 | the value of freedom. So it's not as if you're bringing in some other consideration; the idea of people being autonomous individuals is under threat if they can't have a domain of privacy. So it might then just be a freedom versus freedom kind of debate, but even if we leave that aside, I don't think there's any reason to regard freedom as a kind of privileged value that in any conflict has to win out. I just that just seems to be a piece of dogma.  Q. Okay. Professor Mendus?  PROFESSOR MENDUS: I feel less clear about that. I'd like to introduce something that we haven't specifically alluded to here, and that is the importance of freedom of speech/freedom of expression in a society such as ours, which is multicultural and where many faiths are adhered to. So there's a bit of disagreement here, but of course there will be a lot of disagreement outside about religious matters, cultural matters, ethical matters, about the role of women in society, and it seems to me that in a liberal democratic state which is characterised by diversity and conflict, then there is an argument for I think freedom weighs quite heavily there. | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22<br>23<br>24 | a better regulatory system and overall an endeavour to enhance the culture, practice and ethics of the press?  Or is it none of those three things or a combination of two and three? What do you think, Professor Tasioulas? It may be implicit in what you've said already what the answer may be.  LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Just be warned that if you choose the last, I'm going to ask you how.  PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: I think the initial answer is one and three. Of course, you should always enforce the law. If the law's not being enforced, it should be enforced, and of course you should be doing things to promote the culture that realises values beyond those necessarily that can be in any way enforced by the law. And then you visit two if you realise that doing one and three by themselves aren't producing the desired effect. You then can contemplate new legislation. But if it is the case that the law as it exists hasn't been properly enforced, then that would be the first step, and to do the third thing as well. You should always be doing that.  LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: It's not necessarily easy to do that because, for reasons which I'm sure you'll understand, |  |  |  |  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22<br>23       | the value of freedom. So it's not as if you're bringing in some other consideration; the idea of people being autonomous individuals is under threat if they can't have a domain of privacy. So it might then just be a freedom versus freedom kind of debate, but even if we leave that aside, I don't think there's any reason to regard freedom as a kind of privileged value that in any conflict has to win out. I just that just seems to be a piece of dogma.  Q. Okay. Professor Mendus?  PROFESSOR MENDUS: I feel less clear about that. I'd like to introduce something that we haven't specifically alluded to here, and that is the importance of freedom of speech/freedom of expression in a society such as ours, which is multicultural and where many faiths are adhered to. So there's a bit of disagreement here, but of course there will be a lot of disagreement outside about religious matters, cultural matters, ethical matters, about the role of women in society, and it seems to me that in a liberal democratic state which is characterised by diversity and conflict, then there is an argument for I think freedom weighs quite                | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22<br>23       | a better regulatory system and overall an endeavour to enhance the culture, practice and ethics of the press?  Or is it none of those three things or a combination of two and three? What do you think, Professor Tasioulas? It may be implicit in what you've said already what the answer may be.  LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Just be warned that if you choose the last, I'm going to ask you how.  PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: I think the initial answer is one and three. Of course, you should always enforce the law. If the law's not being enforced, it should be enforced, and of course you should be doing things to promote the culture that realises values beyond those necessarily that can be in any way enforced by the law. And then you visit two if you realise that doing one and three by themselves aren't producing the desired effect. You then can contemplate new legislation. But if it is the case that the law as it exists hasn't been properly enforced, then that would be the first step, and to do the third thing as well. You should always be doing that.  LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: It's not necessarily easy to do that  |  |  |  |  |

| 1  | complain, it requires the investigative tools to be  | 1  | PROFESSOR MENDUS: Yes.   |  |  |  |  |  |
|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| 2  | available, it requires the resource to be directed   | 2  | LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I'd be very interested if I take   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 3  | towards it, and it would be a poor society, would it   | 3  | something away, removed from this to know to what  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 4  | not, where we said, "Well, everything's all right unless   | 4  | extent the law in relation to exceeding the speed limit  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 5  | the police catch you."   | 5  | has been the enforcement has been changed by the   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 6  | PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: No, absolutely, and that's why three  | 6  | abandonment of those police officers with speed guns   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 7  | has a kind of priority, because the law really should  | 7 that could catch you whatever you were and the creation                        |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 8  | operate as a backstop measure where things go dreadfully   | 8  | of speed cameras, where everybody can see as soon as the   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 9  | wrong, and ideally what you want is to have a situation  | 9  | lines appear on the road that they'd better slow down,   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 10   | where people have been habituated to complying with  | 10   | and one visibly sees brakes go on and then people speed  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 11   | certain standards that make it the case that just in   | 11   | up past it. So there are real questions about law  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 12   | virtue of their professional ethos, they won't be in   | 12   | enforcement and that affects people's view of speeding.  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 13   | danger of violating the law. So one and three are  | 13   | PROFESSOR MENDUS: Of course, of course. But insofar as the   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 14   | actually intimately related.   | 14   | question is how do we effect a culture change, it could  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 15   | PROFESSOR MENDUS: Well, I agree that ideally the law is  | 15   | be that part of the answer to that question is   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 16   | a backstop, but I suppose one reason you're here is  | 16   | by changes in the law. The decriminalisation of  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 17   | because it's not an ideal world and the backstop hasn't  | 17   | homosexuality served, over the medium to long-term, to   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 18   | really been as effective as it might.  | 18   | change the culture. If you ask why the culture changed,  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 19   | LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But it may never.  | 19   | the change in the law is a very significant feature  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 20   | PROFESSOR MENDUS: It may never.  | 20   | there. It wouldn't always be the case, but there are   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 21   | LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: And I'm not sure that an ideal would   | 21   | instances that can be cited.   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 22   | have it different because the idea that you have the   | 22   | LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: So if I now move on to the question  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 23   | authorities looking over everything to pick up every   | 23   | that I said you'd be asked if any of you chose the   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 24   | breach suggests a society which I'm not sure that we   | 24   | last that is the third. Do you have a view, from   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 25   | would necessarily enjoy.   | 25   | a philosophical perspective, of the way in which one can   |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Page 57  |  | Page 59  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1  | PROFESSOR MENDUS: Okay, that's the sort of Benthamite world  | 1  | narrow the grey matter, as I've put it, in a way that  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2  | where everything is exposed to the public gaze and   | 2  | satisfies the public but doesn't harm the rights that  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 3  | nobody can want that. I suppose my compromise, in  | 3  | we've been talking about all morning unduly or   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 4  | a way, perhaps, is to go for three, but to say: well,  | 4  | inappropriately and so preserves the right of the press  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 5  | surely guidelines, codes of ethics, changes to the   | 5  | to be offensive, for people to be offended by what the   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 6  | regulatory system, these are it's not exactly more   | 6  | press does but their ability to hold us to account? How  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 7  | stringent law but it is moving in that direction. It's   | 7  | can one best achieve that end? I appreciate I'm not  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 8  | moving away from just self-regulation.   | 8  | asking you to give me the answer to my Inquiry in the  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 9  | PROFESSOR HORNSBY: In answer to the question I think I'm   | 9  | - · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 10   | 1  |  | back of the book, but for those who have thought about   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 10   | inclined to say "all of the above", as it were, but  | 10   | back of the book, but for those who have thought about it from your perspective, I'd be interested if you have   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 11   | inclined to say "all of the above", as it were, but<br>well, one should have more enforcement of whatever codes  | 10<br>11   | it from your perspective, I'd be interested if you have  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | inclined to say "all of the above", as it were, but well, one should have more enforcement of whatever codes or laws are in place, and it does seem as though  |  | it from your perspective, I'd be interested if you have anything to offer on the subject.  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 11   | well, one should have more enforcement of whatever codes   | 11   | it from your perspective, I'd be interested if you have anything to offer on the subject.  PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: I don't know. I think, you know, we  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 11<br>12   | well, one should have more enforcement of whatever codes<br>or laws are in place, and it does seem as though   | 11<br>12   | it from your perspective, I'd be interested if you have anything to offer on the subject.  PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: I don't know. I think, you know, we can almost only speak as amateurs, but what I would say  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 11<br>12<br>13   | well, one should have more enforcement of whatever codes<br>or laws are in place, and it does seem as though<br>a culture change is needed and that more stringency in   | 11<br>12<br>13   | it from your perspective, I'd be interested if you have anything to offer on the subject.  PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: I don't know. I think, you know, we  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 11<br>12<br>13<br>14   | well, one should have more enforcement of whatever codes or laws are in place, and it does seem as though a culture change is needed and that more stringency in the code or more definition in the code in certain areas  | 11<br>12<br>13<br>14   | it from your perspective, I'd be interested if you have anything to offer on the subject.  PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: I don't know. I think, you know, we can almost only speak as amateurs, but what I would say is: in a way, it's problematic to talk about someone trying to achieve this effect. The sort of culture  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15   | well, one should have more enforcement of whatever codes or laws are in place, and it does seem as though a culture change is needed and that more stringency in the code or more definition in the code in certain areas would help that. But I'm afraid there are practical  | 11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15   | it from your perspective, I'd be interested if you have anything to offer on the subject.  PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: I don't know. I think, you know, we can almost only speak as amateurs, but what I would say is: in a way, it's problematic to talk about someone   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16   | well, one should have more enforcement of whatever codes or laws are in place, and it does seem as though a culture change is needed and that more stringency in the code or more definition in the code in certain areas would help that. But I'm afraid there are practical questions which I just can't answer. I just don't know   | 11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16   | it from your perspective, I'd be interested if you have anything to offer on the subject.  PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: I don't know. I think, you know, we can almost only speak as amateurs, but what I would say is: in a way, it's problematic to talk about someone trying to achieve this effect. The sort of culture we're talking about is one for which we're all   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17   | well, one should have more enforcement of whatever codes or laws are in place, and it does seem as though a culture change is needed and that more stringency in the code or more definition in the code in certain areas would help that. But I'm afraid there are practical questions which I just can't answer. I just don't know how it could have come about that there wasn't  | 11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17   | it from your perspective, I'd be interested if you have anything to offer on the subject.  PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: I don't know. I think, you know, we can almost only speak as amateurs, but what I would say is: in a way, it's problematic to talk about someone trying to achieve this effect. The sort of culture we're talking about is one for which we're all responsible. It's not just legislators or people in the   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18                                     | well, one should have more enforcement of whatever codes or laws are in place, and it does seem as though a culture change is needed and that more stringency in the code or more definition in the code in certain areas would help that. But I'm afraid there are practical questions which I just can't answer. I just don't know how it could have come about that there wasn't enforcement in a case where very obviously there should  | 11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18                                     | it from your perspective, I'd be interested if you have anything to offer on the subject.  PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: I don't know. I think, you know, we can almost only speak as amateurs, but what I would say is: in a way, it's problematic to talk about someone trying to achieve this effect. The sort of culture we're talking about is one for which we're all responsible. It's not just legislators or people in the media; it's also individuals as consumers of what's in  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19                               | well, one should have more enforcement of whatever codes or laws are in place, and it does seem as though a culture change is needed and that more stringency in the code or more definition in the code in certain areas would help that. But I'm afraid there are practical questions which I just can't answer. I just don't know how it could have come about that there wasn't enforcement in a case where very obviously there should have been, and it's not only the press as an institution   | 11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19                               | it from your perspective, I'd be interested if you have anything to offer on the subject.  PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: I don't know. I think, you know, we can almost only speak as amateurs, but what I would say is: in a way, it's problematic to talk about someone trying to achieve this effect. The sort of culture we're talking about is one for which we're all responsible. It's not just legislators or people in the media; it's also individuals as consumers of what's in the media. It's how people talk to their children, it's  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20                         | well, one should have more enforcement of whatever codes or laws are in place, and it does seem as though a culture change is needed and that more stringency in the code or more definition in the code in certain areas would help that. But I'm afraid there are practical questions which I just can't answer. I just don't know how it could have come about that there wasn't enforcement in a case where very obviously there should have been, and it's not only the press as an institution which I take is to be blamed for that.  | 11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20                         | it from your perspective, I'd be interested if you have anything to offer on the subject.  PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: I don't know. I think, you know, we can almost only speak as amateurs, but what I would say is: in a way, it's problematic to talk about someone trying to achieve this effect. The sort of culture we're talking about is one for which we're all responsible. It's not just legislators or people in the media; it's also individuals as consumers of what's in the media. It's how people talk to their children, it's what they get them interested in. It's how they set  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21                   | well, one should have more enforcement of whatever codes or laws are in place, and it does seem as though a culture change is needed and that more stringency in the code or more definition in the code in certain areas would help that. But I'm afraid there are practical questions which I just can't answer. I just don't know how it could have come about that there wasn't enforcement in a case where very obviously there should have been, and it's not only the press as an institution which I take is to be blamed for that.  PROFESSOR MENDUS: And the law itself is a very powerful   | 11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21                   | it from your perspective, I'd be interested if you have anything to offer on the subject.  PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: I don't know. I think, you know, we can almost only speak as amateurs, but what I would say is: in a way, it's problematic to talk about someone trying to achieve this effect. The sort of culture we're talking about is one for which we're all responsible. It's not just legislators or people in the media; it's also individuals as consumers of what's in the media. It's how people talk to their children, it's what they get them interested in. It's how they set certain ethical boundaries in their own lives and so   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22             | well, one should have more enforcement of whatever codes or laws are in place, and it does seem as though a culture change is needed and that more stringency in the code or more definition in the code in certain areas would help that. But I'm afraid there are practical questions which I just can't answer. I just don't know how it could have come about that there wasn't enforcement in a case where very obviously there should have been, and it's not only the press as an institution which I take is to be blamed for that.  PROFESSOR MENDUS: And the law itself is a very powerful means of changing culture, or can be. Has been in the   | 11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22             | it from your perspective, I'd be interested if you have anything to offer on the subject.  PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: I don't know. I think, you know, we can almost only speak as amateurs, but what I would say is: in a way, it's problematic to talk about someone trying to achieve this effect. The sort of culture we're talking about is one for which we're all responsible. It's not just legislators or people in the media; it's also individuals as consumers of what's in the media. It's how people talk to their children, it's what they get them interested in. It's how they set certain ethical boundaries in their own lives and so forth.  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22<br>23       | well, one should have more enforcement of whatever codes or laws are in place, and it does seem as though a culture change is needed and that more stringency in the code or more definition in the code in certain areas would help that. But I'm afraid there are practical questions which I just can't answer. I just don't know how it could have come about that there wasn't enforcement in a case where very obviously there should have been, and it's not only the press as an institution which I take is to be blamed for that.  PROFESSOR MENDUS: And the law itself is a very powerful means of changing culture, or can be. Has been in the past.   | 11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22<br>23       | it from your perspective, I'd be interested if you have anything to offer on the subject.  PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: I don't know. I think, you know, we can almost only speak as amateurs, but what I would say is: in a way, it's problematic to talk about someone trying to achieve this effect. The sort of culture we're talking about is one for which we're all responsible. It's not just legislators or people in the media; it's also individuals as consumers of what's in the media. It's how people talk to their children, it's what they get them interested in. It's how they set certain ethical boundaries in their own lives and so forth.  So we're talking about how you create a culture   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22<br>23<br>24 | well, one should have more enforcement of whatever codes or laws are in place, and it does seem as though a culture change is needed and that more stringency in the code or more definition in the code in certain areas would help that. But I'm afraid there are practical questions which I just can't answer. I just don't know how it could have come about that there wasn't enforcement in a case where very obviously there should have been, and it's not only the press as an institution which I take is to be blamed for that.  PROFESSOR MENDUS: And the law itself is a very powerful means of changing culture, or can be. Has been in the past.  LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Only if it is enforced or capable of | 11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22<br>23<br>24 | it from your perspective, I'd be interested if you have anything to offer on the subject.  PROFESSOR TASIOULAS: I don't know. I think, you know, we can almost only speak as amateurs, but what I would say is: in a way, it's problematic to talk about someone trying to achieve this effect. The sort of culture we're talking about is one for which we're all responsible. It's not just legislators or people in the media; it's also individuals as consumers of what's in the media. It's how people talk to their children, it's what they get them interested in. It's how they set certain ethical boundaries in their own lives and so forth.  So we're talking about how you create a culture where people spontaneously act in accordance with |  |  |  |  |  |

1 1 That's -- so of course, it's their judgment whether you know, there is a law against murder but I would hope 2 2 that most people -- the reason they don't murder is not a story is published, but it also ought to be under 3 3 because of the law but because of inculcated certain their control how information which leads to a story is 4 4 standards, and you want that to be the case in other garnered, and they, it seems to me, have responsibility 5 5 areas as well. for ensuring that not they alone know what codes the 6 In the case of the media, there are powerful 6 press is governed by but also that the journalists 7 7 countervailing forces with respect to profit-making should know them and that it should be assumed that 8 8 which create powerful incentives to go against and there's some oversight from the editor. 9 undermine the sorts of values ideally we would like to 9 MR JAY: I think that was extremely helpful. Thank you very 10 10 see this culture manifesting, and I simply have an much. 11 11 amateur-ish view, which follows the view of others, that LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Thank you very much. I'm very 12 self-regulation by the media doesn't seem to be working. 12 conscious that the three of you have put a lot into 13 It's been something that's been attempted over recent 13 writing and have come along as well. I repeat my thanks 14 14 to you. I'm equally conscious that this sort of decades and it's continuously seen to fail, and that 15 15 dialogue is not necessarily the best way to get the some sort of statutory basis is probably going to be 16 necessary, but what that is I would leave to experts. 16 nuanced views that you wish to express, which is why 17 PROFESSOR MENDUS: I think in the most general terms, it 17 we've done them in the way that we have, but we have 18 seems to me that the incentive structure has to be 18 your written views. 19 19 changed so that -- at the moment, as John said, one of If, in the light of the discussion we've had, there 20 the problems is that there are serious, serious 20 is anything you want to add to what you've said or 21 21 express differently -- the transcript will be available profit-making incentives for the press which act against 22 what it seems to me is the main purpose of a free press 22 online so you'll be able to see it, but if there is, 23 from our point of view, which is to provide information. 23 please do not hesitate in just dropping a note. That's 24 24 So the provision of information is why you want a free not a requirement; it's only if you want to in the light 25 25 press but that's not the motivation that the press of your reflective thoughts. Thank you all very much Page 61 Page 63 necessarily has. There's motivation there to make 1 1 for coming. 2 2 profit, which is fine, but if the making of profit is We'll take a break. 3 3 something which actually cuts against, conflicts with (11.41 am) 4 the provision of appropriate information, then there are 4 (A short break) 5 ways -- through guidelines, regulatory systems and so 5 (11.47 am) 6 on -- of dealing with that which are such as to change 6 MR JAY: The next witness is Dr Rowan Cruft, please. 7 7 the incentive structure to ensure that those vast DR ROWAN CRUFT (affirmed) 8 profits cannot be made in that way, so there would be 8 Questions by MR JAY 9 monitoring of those areas. But I'm really out of my 9 MR JAY: Thank you, Dr Cruft. The starting point for your 10 depth now. 10 evidence is the 9-page submission that you kindly 11 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: It may be unfair. 11 provided us. It's under tab 47 of the bundle. PROFESSOR MENDUS: To be honest, you're just getting my view LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Thank you very much and thank you 12 12 13 13 very much for the effort that you've put into preparing 14 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But actually, it's not -- two of you 14 this submission. 15 15 have said that, and I understand that, but you are A. Thank you. 16 looking at the problem through a very different window 16 Q. You're a senior lecturer in philosophy at the University 17 from the background of your experience. 17 of Stirling. Can you tell us first of all what your 18 PROFESSOR MENDUS: Yes. 18 main research and philosophical interests are? 19 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: So nobody will hold you to task for 19 A. Yes. My main interests are in the nature of rights and 20 anything you say. They will all hold me to task for 20 duties and the justification of rights and duties, 21 whatever I say. I take your views precisely with the 21 thinking about the relationship between different sorts 22 22 caveat that you've expressed them. of rights and duties, so property rights or human rights 23 PROFESSOR HORNSBY: Another comment, if I'm allowed to, from 23 or contractual rights. 24 an amateur: it does seem to me that it's important that 24 Q. Thank you. With the first three witnesses we looked at 25 25 a number of concepts: the difference between freedom of editors should be seen as in charge, ethically speaking. Page 62 Page 64

6

- 1 expression and the public interest in a free press.
- 2 A. Yes.

9

- 3 Q. From your perspective, what are the equivalences between
- 4 and differences in freedom of expression on the one hand
- 5 and freedom of the press on the other?
- A. Okay. I think, as I said in the written statement, I'm 6
- 7 attracted to the view that freedom of the press is one
- 8 very important aspect of freedom of thought and
  - expression in general, and there's an important value to
- 10 a society with freedom of thought and expression.
- 11 I think it helps constitute a public realm to which --
- 12 in which we all have roughly equal status, so it's
- 13 a realm in which anyone can have their say about public
- 14 matters. And I suppose the thought underlying this is
- 15 if you try to imagine a society where we all have
- 16 freedom of thought and expression but there's no free
- 17 press -- the press is very constrained -- I think we'd
- 18 think: well, that isn't really a society with full
- 19 freedom of individual thought and expression.
- 20 I can say more about this if you like?
- 21 Q. Yes.
- 22 A. A related issue, I think, is if we do see freedom of the
- 23 press as important -- if we think, for example, that
- 24 newspapers have a right to freedom of expression, it's
- 25 not going to be grounded in the same way as individual
  - Page 65

- 1 cheat on my partner, not to lie to my friends.
- 2 A liberal society doesn't enforce those duties through
  - law or in other ways.
- 4 I think some of the ethical duties of the press
- 5 might be like this and others might not be, but the bare
  - fact that they have ethical duties to readers, to
- 7 subjects of stories and to a range of other actors, it
- 8 doesn't immediately follow that regulation is
- 9 appropriate, though I think some regulation is.
- 10 Q. How do we differentiate between --
- 11 A. Indeed.
- O. -- the circumstances? I owe an ethical duty not to lie 12
- 13 to my friend, but the press may owe an ethical duty to
- 14 propound accurate stories.
- 15 A. Yes.
- 16 Q. It owes a duty to its readers not to be inaccurate.
- 17 A. Yes.
- 18 Q. If there's a duty to the readers not to be inaccurate,
- 19 that may or may not carry with it a duty in the state,
- 20 through a regulator, to ensure that accuracy is
- 21 maintained and inaccuracy is stamped out. How does one
- 22 go about --
- LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Or put it another way, how are you 23
- 24 going to draw the line?
- 25 A. Indeed.

## Page 67

- 1 rights to freedom of expression. So an individual right
- 2 to freedom of expression, in my view, is justified by
- 3 the individual's interest in being able to take part in
- 4 the public sphere and newspaper's interests, insofar as
- 5 they have them, or corporate entities like that, those
- 6 don't have the same moral status; they have a derivative
- 7 status.

8

- So even if -- I'm open about this -- even if the
- 9 press does have a very important right to freedom of
- 10 expression, you have to remember that it's justified by what is does for individuals by constituting a public
- 11
- 12 sphere in which all individuals can take part.
- 13 Q. You mentioned earlier a relationship between rights and 14 duties. We can debate that theoretically -- I doubt
- 15 that's going to be helpful, though. Do you see the
- 16 press having any ethical duties in their public role and
- 17 if so, why and what?
- 18 A. Yes, I certainly do. I think before I go on to talk
- 19 about that, I'd like to add that even though they have
- 20 ethical duties, it doesn't follow that regulation must
- 21 enforce those duties. It might do in some cases, it
- 22 might not. But I think we need to remember that in 23 a liberal society -- one of the things that makes us
- 24 a libel society is the view that ethical duties don't
- 25 always have to be enforced. So I have a duty not to
  - Page 66

- LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: You've created the line; now how are
- 2 you going to draw it?
- 3 A. Indeed. I think it's very hard to draw, I'm afraid.
- 4 I think there are some things -- which is perhaps why
- 5 we're here. There are some things I can say about this.
- One is that the distinction between the public and the 6
- 7 private might be one useful way to draw it, and I think
- 8 I said in my written submission that I think there's 9 room for a lot more work, philosophical work, on when
- 10 something's an appropriately public matter and when it's
- 11 a private matter. But I have quite clear intuitions 12
- about some cases. I don't know quite what line
- 13 underlies them but here's an example.
- 14 Say interest in the health of a politician's child.
- 15 In many contexts, I think that might be considered
- 16 a private matter that shouldn't be a matter for --
- 17 shouldn't enter the public sphere. Perhaps not in every
- 18 context, but in many contexts it should be. Contexts
- 19 where it could enter the public sphere might be cases
- 20 where revealing this health issue would reveal hypocrisy
- 21 on the part of a politician or is relevant to particular
- 22 policies a politician is pursuing, but perhaps
- 23 unhelpfully for you, I think it's rather hard to draw
- 24 a clear line.
- 25 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Yes.

9

- 1 MR JAY: It may be hard to do so, but what are the
- 2 principles which might draw one to finding where the
- 3 line is? Carry on with the example you've given or
- choose a different example, if you're more comfortable 4
- 5 with that.
- 6 A. Let me think. I think in terms of principle, I think
- 7 the three things I mentioned towards the start of the
- 8 written submission seem to me the -- well, helpful
- 9 guiding principles, even though I don't think they draw
- 10 us a very definite line.
- 11 So one is in idea is that a liberal public sphere,
- 12 one in which every member -- everyone in the community
- 13 can take a part is just a very good thing in itself.
- 14 It's useful partly for the results it creates but it's
- 15 also a good in itself that we all have the status of
- 16 being able to take part in the liberal public sphere and 17
- it seems the press plays a role in that. People who are
- 18 insufficiently articulate or insufficiently confident to
- 19 take place in the public speech, the press can give them
- 20 a voice. But there are also some very well-known
- 21 instrumental benefits of the press. So it's a very
- 22 important check on political power and other forms of
- 23 power. It's an importance also of education and an
- 24 important means of enabling democratic decision-making.
- 25 I suppose I think these principles give us some --
  - Page 69

2 magistrates or other ways of doing of doing it, and

could have lay juries or you could have lay judges or

- 3 I think it's very difficult to determine -- a lot will
- 4 depend on the context and the history and what we
- 5 consider most symbolically important in our society to
- 6 work out which way of doing it is most important and is
- 7 going to work best.
- 8 Q. Thank you. The public interest in a free press, it is
  - clear, in your view, should be balanced or limited by
- 10 other rights and other interests.
- 11 A. Yes.
- 12 Q. But what is the algorithm for doing that?
- 13 A. There is none, I'm afraid. That's -- I think, in a way,
- 14 that's the point I was trying to make a minute ago.
- 15 There isn't algorithm for getting from principles to
- 16 particular institutions.
- 17 I think something we could bear in mind is the
- 18 particular symbolic importance of particular principles
- 19 that we already have. So take the principle that
- 20 journalists shouldn't be compelled to reveal their
- 21 sources. I'm tentative for the reason I mentioned
- 22 before, but speaking tentatively, it seems to me that we
- 23 might think: well, in the UK, this is a principle that
- 24 we all think of as very central to our liberal society
- 25 and perhaps if we lived in a different society, we
  - Page 71

1 they point towards some policies. They point towards

- 2 having a diverse press and they also point towards,
- 3 I think, not having too much of a limit on press
- 4 freedom.
- 5 I'm wary of saving more, I have to say. Can I say
- 6 more about why I'm being tentative? I'd quite like to.
- 7 O. Yes.
- 8 A. It's partly just personal -- my own research is on the
- 9 philosophical foundations of the principles not the
- 10 institutions, but I think there is also an interesting
- 11 philosophical point here, which is that I think the
- 12 route from a foundational principle to a particular
- 13 institutional way of realising that principle is not at
- 14 all direct. I think there will be different ways of
- 15 realising different underlying principles and a lot will
- 16 depend on the context.
- 17 An example from a different area might be something
- 18 like lay participation in criminal trials. So
- 19 I think -- and here I've been influence by my colleague 20 Anthony Duff's work, and his view is that the criminal
- 21 trials should be seen as a situation where you hold the
- 22 defendant answerable to the public at large. I like 23 that view of a trial, and then the thought is: how do we
- 24 make the institutions of trial represent the public at
- 25 large? And there are various ways of doing it. You
  - Page 70

- should be more willing to limit that principle than we 1
- 2 should in the UK because of its historic importance. So
- 3 that might be one of the contextual factors that would
- 4 make a difference to where and how we decide to
- 5 implement the underlying principles.
- 6 Q. May I take that one example?
- 7 A. Sure.
- 8 Q. Under clause 14 of the existing Editors' Code practice,

9

- 10 "Journalists have a moral obligation to protect
- confidential sources of information." 11
- 12 A. Yes.
- 13 Q. Is that helpful language without more? By reference to
- 14 a moral obligation, is that an absolute moral
- 15 obligation? Is it a qualified moral obligation? How
- 16 would we begin to analyse that?
- 17 A. That's a good question. I think -- two things strike me
- 18 about it immediately. One is that if it's a moral
- 19 obligation, as I said earlier, it doesn't follow that
- 20 it's therefore a legal obligation, or even that it
- 21 should be a legal obligation, although for the reasons I

particular provision, I think maybe it should be.

- 22 was saying about the symbolic important of that
- 24 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Well, there are exceptions.
- 25 A. Yes, of course. Of course, sorry. That was the second Page 72

18 (Pages 69 to 72)

1 1 enforcing, at least encouraging compliance on the other. thing that I was going to say, which is that saying 2 2 something is a moral obligation and that it should be A. Yes. 3 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But can you assist me in relation to restricted in law doesn't imply it's exceptionless, and 3 4 4 the issues that are likely to have to be considered when I think there are very, very few moral obligations that 5 5 are exceptionless. Possibly the obligation not to making that journey, and also as to the type of 6 torture. Very few indeed, actually, though the cases 6 structure that is best placed to making the appropriate 7 7 for exceptions will depend on the importance of the balance, having regard to all those considerations? 8 8 particular obligation. A. Yes. Yes. I can say a little. I have to confess 9 9 And I think it's also important to really that if I don't know if it will assist you very much, I'm 10 10 you do see in as an exception case where a violation of afraid, but I can say a little. 11 11 an obligation is justified -- if you see it as genuinely LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Don't worry about that. It's not 12 like that, rather than a case where the obligation has 12 stopped anyone else in the last nine months. 13 just vanished, then you're still going to need to 13 A. The little I can say is that my own view is that because 14 14 redress an explanation and things like this to the of the importance of a free press and the cultural 15 15 importance of thinking we live in a nation with a free person whose obligation you're violating. 16 MR JAY: Couched in those terms, the moral obligation to 16 press, moving too quickly to something that looks like 17 17 protect confidential sources, one may be forgiven for legal enforcement of these duties would be worrying, and 18 thinking: well, that is an absolute obligation. Maybe 18 it seems to me that -- I've seen some of the proposals 19 19 not? It's not made expressly subject to any other around, so things like have self-regulation with 20 competing rights, privileges or --20 a statutory backstop. I've seen some of these 21 21 A. No, that's right. proposals. I mean, I think things like that could 22 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But as a matter of law, there are 22 strike the right balance and to do so -- I think the 23 circumstances in which the law will require a journalist 23 thing I'd want to stress would be the importance of 24 24 to reveal a source. The journalist then, of course, making it clear that this kind of regulation involves 25 always has a choice: either to reveal the source in 25 answerability to the public. It seems to me that's Page 73 Page 75 1 accordance with the law or not to, but then face the 1 perhaps the thing that struck me as following most 2 2 consequences of failing to comply with the order of the directly from the principles I outlined, that the press 3 3 plays this very important role in constituting a public court. 4 A. Yes. There might sometimes be cases where the morally 4 sphere and because of that, it should be answerable to 5 5 appropriate thing to do is not to reveal and then to be the public for that role. 6 6 punished for it. I think that could be right sometimes So if you're going for something like the statutory 7 but not always. I suspect with that one, it will depend 7 backstop to self-regulation idea --8 on the powerful interests at stake. The kind of 8 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Or underpinning, rather than --9 examples philosophers tend to get drawn into are things 9 A. Sorry, yes. 10 10 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: If that's what you meant. like: suppose the existence of an entire city is at 11 11 A. Yes. I assume it is. I think you need to make it clear stake and it's going to be destroyed. I'm wary of being 12 12 drawn into those kind of examples. I think they can that it's answerability here to the public. So in my view, that involves lay involvement at some level, 13 13 mislead us. 14 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: That's the torture example. 14 either in the body that assesses self-regulatory 15 A. Indeed. I think they can be misleading and can be 15 mechanisms or somewhere else. 16 misused and people can too readily think: well, we're in 16 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Or it may be inimical to the concept 17 17 one of these extreme circumstances so let's not worry of the word "self", that it is actually to be by the 18 about violating the right. I think we have to be very, 18 public. 19 very careful about thinking of those sorts of cases. 19 A. Yes. Though I suppose -- something I'd add is it 20 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: You said a few moments ago that the 20 shouldn't only be by the public. I would be suspicious 21 21 link is not direct. of something that was too adversarial, in the sense that 22 A. Yes. 22 you have the regulators by the public and then you have 23 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I understand that, because there is 23 the press and the two were separate. I think one of the 24 no direct correlation between the right or duty on the 24 problems with that model is it can lead the press to 25 25 one hand and the potential mechanism for if not think: "Well, they set the moral limits, that is a sort Page 74 Page 76

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1 of separate issue for them, and we'll just live within 2 them." I think part of what we want to do is to 3 encourage the press to see their ethical moral duties as 4 part of their own professional conduct, and I know most 5 members of the press do; I'm not saying they don't. 6 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: No, no, it's much more important than 7 that. You couldn't just have the public, not least 8 because of the risk that the press would say, "Well, 9 that's what these individuals think. We don't agree and 10 we're just going to ignore it." 11 A. No, indeed, indeed. I just wanted to stress I think it 12 needs to involve both parties. It needs to involve 13 people from inside the press as well as from the public, 14 but it needs to be visibly answerable to the public. 15 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: And independent, in the sense that 16 people should not -- or do you think it doesn't matter 17 whether, as it were -- the phrase that's been used in 18 the Inquiry -- they're marking their own homework? 19 A. Yes, I think that would be -- that would be problematic. 20 On the other hand, I think you'd want -- my sense is you 21 want at least some of them in there to stop it seeming 22 too adversarial, but you also want the public in there 23 and you want it to be visibly independent of government 24 and the state as well. 25 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I agree with that. Page 77 MR JAY: In terms of the sort of principles which would 1 2 underlie a system of press regulation, you describe 3 these on page 5 of your report, our page 00882. 4 A. Okay. 5 Q. The second paragraph. 6 A. Yes. 7 Q. "Matters such as requiring media to accompany stories 8 with details of payments made to or received from 9 members of the public in return for publishing the story 10 ... requiring editors' and proprietors' political and 11 financial interests to be registered publicly ..." 12 Those sound like arguably very sensible, pragmatic 13 solutions but what's the philosophical underpinning for 14 those solutions? 15 A. I think the philosophical underpinning is the thought 16 that the press is one of the main determinants of the

formal structure of the public sphere, the sphere in

government. So the thought is: the kind of things we

require other public bodies to fulfil, maybe we should

which we all can have our say about how we live

But I'd like to add two qualifiers, if I may.

A. One is simply the same qualifier about tentativeness, Page 78

together, and in this way it's not that unlike

think about extending them to the press.

the same thought that I don't think you can take the philosophical principles and crank a handle and get out a policy proposal from it. I think a lot depends on the particular symbolic importance of thinking we live in a free society and I think we have to bear that in mind.

The second qualifier is that you might think some of these requirements are things we do place on publicly funded bodies but the press aren't publicly funded, they're privately funded, and I won't want to suggest nationalisation of the press. So I think there's an interesting tension there, actually, between their status as private and as public and that has to be borne in mind when looking at these proposals.

- Q. Their status as private bodies does not, of course, mean that they should be free from all regulation.
- 16 A. Of course not.
- Q. It's a question of balance. It might be said that if
  the press acts in the public interest and in that sense
  it's a public body, one of the principles which should
  therefore apply to it is the principle of
  accountability, and from that you can derive the
- specific subprinciples which we can see in the second
- paragraph on page 5. Is that a fair analysis?
- A. That is a fair analysis, but there's a "but", I'm
   afraid, as well. It's a fair analysis but I don't think
   Page 79

we can draw these lines very sharply, so I think there

will be private businesses that don't have as overtly

a public role as the press where we might also think
 they play a sort of public role. You might think large

5 supermarkets are like this, just because they make

a very big difference to the kind of public sphere we occupy, and I don't think they need to be subject to

8 exactly the same public requirements as the government.
9 I think's more of a sort of continuum, I would want

I think's more of a sort of continuum, I would want to suggest, than a sharp line where you say, "These are public bodies and these aren't", and the press falls sort of near that line and it is a public body but -yeah.

Q. Another pragmatic idea -- you advance this in the third paragraph, halfway along:

"One possible change to support greater respect for current law would be to increase the legal responsibilities of proprietors, editors and directors for the actions of their employees ..."

That would have knock-on advantages, but what's the philosophical principle underlying that?

A. This is one of those cases where it seemed pretty clear to me that there are ethical duties here that aren't being respected. Whether we should use law to enforce them -- here I'm suggesting we do -- again, I think we

Page 80

20 (Pages 77 to 80)

Q. Certainly.

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

3 moment is the sense that directors and managers are not 4 very willing to identify with the thing they direct or 5 manage and that this might be one way of increasing that 6 identification so that you feel genuine shame if your 7 body -- by "your body", I mean your corporate entity for 8 which you manage -- if that does something wrong, even 9 if it wasn't your fault in an individual sense. 10 So that's the purpose of the suggestion, and I would 11 want to add to it that idea that it's one of those cases 12 where we have a clear ethical duty. Should we have 13 a legal duty here? Perhaps; perhaps not. I think we 14 have to think about the knock-on effects of it and 15 that's something where someone with legal expertise to 16 follow that through should come in. 17 Q. May we turn to another important area, such as a code of 18 conduct. 19 A. I was thinking -- sorry, just one more point on that, 20 that last thing, which just occurred to me. I'm not 21 sure this is actually so relevant to you, but I think 22 it's worth mentioning, is I think the level of pay for 23 directors is relevant to this too. I think if you think 24 of people in charge of large organisations as people who 25 you have to recruit through a huge amount of pay, then Page 81 1 you're not recruiting them for the intrinsic good of 2 being part of this organisation and doing it for its own 3 sake, and so I think there's a sort of tension in 4 society, evidenced both by that and by the need to give 5 directors more legal responsibility for what they do. 6 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I'd be very grateful if you didn't 7 draw me into the topic of directors' pay. 8 A. That's why I thought it may not be the relevant thing 9 10 MR JAY: Okay. Code of conduct. You deal with this in the 11 general context, as it were, under question 8 and then 12 more specifically in relation to the current code --13 A. Yes. 14 Q. -- in section 9, but we're going to dwell a bit on 15 section 9 or question 9. Could I ask you, please, 16 though -- question 8, your page 7, our page 00884 --17 A. Yes certainly. 18 Q. -- to develop the point that you're making there, 19 please? 20 A. Okay. There were two paragraphs to question 8 and the 21 first paragraph just restates what I see as the 22 fundamental principles underlying the importance of 23 freedom of the press. So on the one hand the press' 24 role in constituting a public sphere in which we can 25 take part as equals; on the other hand, importance of

Page 82

need to be tentative. But the thought was that there

seems to be -- one of the cultural difficulties at the

- 1 constraining power and enabling democratic 2 decision-making. 3 Then in the second paragraph, I talk about media 4 organisations being answerable to a public body because 5 of their role in shaping the public sphere and I suggest 6 that we shouldn't take this as a very demanding role. 7 We're not saying the press' sole role is to enable 8 democratic decision-making, is to hold the government to 9 account. I think that would be much too demanding and 10 it overlooks that first thing I said, which is that the 11 press just creates a public sphere, it's part of the 12 creation of that, and we want it to be a free public 13 sphere, so we don't want to say the press has to do X 14 and has to do Y, but nonetheless we want to make sure it 15 doesn't undermine or distort the instrumental ends that 16 it could achieve, such as holding government to account 17 or enabling democratic decision-making. 18 So the idea here is that we shouldn't censor --19 censure the press -- hold them to account or criticise 20 them for failing to promote democracy but if they 21 distort or pervert democratic decision-making then we 22 could rightly, I think, hold them to account for that 23 because of their very important role in enabling such 24 decision-making. LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: You then have to define what you mean Page 83
- 1 by "distort" and "pervert", which actually carries with 2 it an enormous value judgment.
- 4 tempted just to say "indeed" and duck the difficult 5 issue and leave that respectfully for you, but I don't 6 know, and I think -- let me think. I suppose the idea 7 I had in mind by "promoting" would be things like 8 a press that took it on itself to explicitly outline the 9 different parties' policies and to help readers work out 10 which one they would go for, and I certainly don't think 11 we need to see the press as doing that.

A. Indeed. No, indeed, indeed. As a philosopher, I'm

Distorting or perverting? I suppose lying about a central party policy might be one sort of case like that. Central political party policy. Misleading the public about a crime committed by a central politician might be another case. But these would have to be cases of sort of knowingly misleading. I'm not saying if you suspect this that you should be criticised for following up your suspicions but that sort of thing. MR JAY: The code of practice as currently constituted makes

- 20
- 21 it clear that the press must take care not to publish
- 22 inaccurate, misleading or distorted information.
- 23 A. Yes, yes.
- 24 Q. I think we can agree about that. But then the press is
- 25 free to be partisan.

Page 84

1

2

3

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

- 1 **A. Yes.**
- 2 Q. So being partisan might, according to some, be liable to
- distort or pervert the democratic process. But the
- 4 press is nonetheless free to do that. Do you see
- 5 a difficulty there?
- 6 A. Yes, yes, yes, yes, I do. I think this relates to
- 7 the point I mentioned about the diversity of the press.
- 8 If the press is going to play this role of giving
- 9 a voice to people in the public sphere, then it's
- 10 important it can represent the diversity in the public
- 11 sphere.
- 12 It's not clear -- well, it's clear to me that that
- 13 shouldn't require that every newspaper has to cover the
- 14 broad range of party political opinions or anything like
- 15 that, but you might think it does support making sure
- that there's not a monopoly of opinion, that all the
- 17 press speak with one voice.
- 18 Q. So one would need other levers aside from the code to
- ensure a plural press?
- $20\,$   $\,$  A. I think so. I think so. That was my sense, looking at
- 21 the code, that it's not there to create a diverse press.
- 22 That's for someone else -- some other aspect of
- 23 (inaudible).
- Q. You look at a number of specific points on the code
- under which 9.

## Page 85

- 13(2) only required journalists to declare financial
- 2 interests to their editors and not even to readers, if
- 3 you're -- I think there's something there which says
- 4 that.
- 5 Q. Mm.
- 6 A. That seems really insufficient.
- 7 Q. That's where they're writing about shares or securities
- 8 and whose performance they know.
- 9 **A. Yes.**
- 10 Q. So it's the specific context of financial journalism.
- 11 A. No, indeed. That's specifically financial journalism.
- 12 That just struck me -- for political interests -- yes,
- 13 I'm not sure. I think it depends whether a requirement
- could be found that was workable without being too
- 15 restrictive, and you're right, we certainly wouldn't
- 16 want to require -- we wouldn't want to limit the press
- 17 so that it couldn't be partisan so long as we have
- a sufficiently diverse press, I think.
- Q. One important point you make in the third paragraph, yousay:
- 21 "Although several aspects of the code cover duties
- 22 owed to readers, the idea that ethical behaviour by the
- 23 press involves treating readers respectfully could be
- 24 made nor explicit."
- The first point I suppose one could ask you about is

## Page 87

## 1 A. Mm-hm.

- 2 Q. This is on your page 8, our page 00885. You say:
- 3 "First of all, the code could do more to require
- 4 proprietors, editors and journalist to declare their
- 5 financial and also their political interests and to
- 6 declare these to readers as well as editors."
- 7 I don't think the code does anything to require
- 8 proprietors, editors and journalist to do that.
- 9 A. That's right.
- 10 Q. Is there not, in this context though, a significant
- difference between financial interests -- and here we
- mean the financial interests of the proprietors -- and
- the political interests? Because if we were to require
- proprietors to declare their political interests,
- 15 wouldn't we be interfering with their freedom to be
- 16 partisan?
- 17 A. Mm. I think by declaring political interests, what
- 18 I had in mind was something like a declaration that this
- 19 newspaper is going to support this party, if it is, and
- these sorts of things. I mean, newspapers often do that
- 21 anyway, but -- but that was the sort of thing -- I'm not
- sure whether there's a sharp distinction here between
- 23 financial and political interests. I certainly felt the
- code could do a lot more to require declarations of
- 25 financial interests. I was quite surprised that section
  - Page 86

- 1 why the concept of respect is so important?
- 2 A. Yes
- 3 Q. And secondly, why limit it to readers? Why not anybody
- 4 who might be adversely affected by the lack of respect?
- 5 A. Yes. I don't think it should be limited to readers,
- 6 actually. I think it was -- I was thinking about
- 7 readers in that paragraph of the submission and I was
- 8 thinking about section 1, which is the point I think
- 9 where they talk about respect for the truth, and it
- seemed to me that could be thought of as respect partly
- 11 for readers.
- But why respect? That's a good question. My sense
- is that that is the concept that -- that that is the
- 14 fundamental moral concept here that goes along with
- duties. You respect people -- when you respect people,
- 16 you're doing your duty to them. I wanted to use that
- 17 concept partly for reasons I think I mentioned earlier
- in the written submission and partly because I think
- 19 that's interestingly distinct, though related, from the
- $20 \qquad \hbox{concept of harm. I think sometimes you can harm people} \\$
- 21 while respecting people. Sometimes respecting people
- $22\,$   $\,$  requires you to harm them. You have to tell them
- unpleasant truths, these sorts of things.
   So I wanted to make it clear that the duties we're
  - thinking about -- ethical duties of newspapers -- is not

Page 88

1 that whenever they're harming someone, there's a duty 1 to focus on include the kind you're drawing attention 2 that's been violated and that when you have people whose 2 to, where it's a benefit of knowing the truth about 3 3 interests or wellbeing are going to be interestingly in something, even if that actually makes my life get worse 4 4 conflict, you have a conflict, therefore, of duties. in the sense of my subjective feelings. 5 5 Sometimes you can respect someone and that still I just wanted to draw attention to that partly in 6 involves harming them. 6 order to stress that I think sometimes where it looks 7 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Yes, but there has to be 7 like there's a tension between respect for readers and 8 a countervailing benefit, if it is true respect. So if 8 respect for subjects of stories that's not necessarily 9 I take your example of the bad news: a doctor tells 9 true. Have I got time to just say a moment about that? 10 10 MR JAY: Mm. a patient that he or she is suffering from a serious 11 11 illness. Well, there's a corresponding right in the A. So I think I had in mind the following thoughts. 12 patient to know --12 Suppose that most of us are interested in some grubby 13 A. Indeed, yes. 13 detail of some politician's private life. In some 14 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: -- about their health. 14 sense, you might think that's therefore a matter of 15 A. Yes, that's right. No, that is right, and I think 15 public interest but I think that would be wrong. You 16 that's definitely -- I believe that, but I think we then 16 might also think that what we have to do here is, on the 17 17 need to notice that the benefit we're talking about here one hand, balance respect for the politician's privacy 18 might not be benefit in any obvious sense of wellbeing 18 with respect for what everyone -- everyone wanting to 19 19 or happiness. So I might benefit by learning I only know it. And I just wanted to try and make clear that 20 have nine months to live, but even if that makes me much 20 I think the bare fact we want to know it, it doesn't 21 21 more miserable, even if I would have had a happier final mean it's really in our interests or going to benefit 22 nine months by not knowing it, I still think I benefit, 22 us. I think if we thought about it in a quiet moment --23 23 but I think it's a rather morally loaded conception of do we want to be the kind of people who know this grubby 24 24 benefit there. It is not necessarily -detail? Sometimes we do. Sometimes it's relevant and 25 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Well, it's one of the things that has 25 necessary to their ability to pursue their duties, but Page 89 Page 91 gone through the ethical considerations of doctors, 1 1 if it's simply knowing it for its own sake as a matter 2 2 whereas years and years ago the medical view was of nosiness, I'm not sure we would all think we really 3 different --3 want that and therefore I'm not sure it's really in our A. Yes, yes. 4 interests and therefore I'm not sure it's really LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: -- as to what should be explained. 5 a matter of balancing the readers' interests against the 6 6 politician's interests. The reader doesn't really have 7 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: The whole concept of informed consent 7 an interest. 8 has developed --8 That's not to say the press shouldn't be allowed to 9 9 A. Yes, yes, yes. publish that. They probably should in a liberal 10 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: -- over recent years and indeed got 10 society. I think it depends on the case. But I don't 11 legal ramifications associated with it. 11 think it has to be seen as a matter of conflicting 12 A. Yes, yes. 12 interests. 13 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But there has to be something on the 13 MR JAY: Thank you. You made some observations about the 14 other side. If there's nothing on the other side --14 public interest exception in the code. 15 A. Yes. 15 A. Yes, yes. 16 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: -- then there is no counterbalance. 16 Q. A couple of points. We can see from the code that --A. Yes, no, no, I completely agree, I completely agree. 17 17 and this is dealing with the asterisked -- main 18 I think the reason I'm stressing this is out of 18 provisions in the code --19 an attempt to avoid the kind of muddled thinking which 19 A. Yes. 20 20 I -- where I think you think: "This is going to make Q. -- where the exceptions are to the clauses which are 21 this person happier so I have a duty to do it, or this 21 asterisked, but there's said to a public interest in 22 22. is going to make this person have a life that is worse freedom of expression itself. 23 23 in simply subjective terms of how it feels, and A. Yes. 24 therefore it counts as something I have a duty not to 24 Q. What's your view about that consideration, apart from 25 do." It seems to me that the kind of benefits we want 25 its apparently tautologous or circular nature? Page 90 Page 92

- A. Yes, I think it's true and maybe that's because it 2 doesn't tell us much. I had a worry about it, which was 3 the fact that freedom of expression is in the public 4 interest -- and it clearly is -- it doesn't follow that 5 every instance of expression is in the public interest, 6 as I'm sure you're all aware.
- 7 I should be clear -- there clearly are cases where 8 expression should be limited, cases such as incitement 9 to violence or slander or bad advertising, misleading 10 advertising might be another, and so I thought it perhaps didn't really add very much to say there's 12 a public interest in freedom of expression in itself and 13 would be misleading if it was taken to suggest that that 14 sort of licences every expression.

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

- 15 Q. Can I ask you to explain the point you're making in the 16 penultimate paragraph about distinction in degrees of 17 normativity?
  - A. Yeah. This was just from my own reading of the code. It looked as if there were only two degrees of normativity in the code. Either you had a star and exceptions could be made on public interest grounds for exceptional cases where you can violate the code's requirements or it didn't have a star and no exceptions could be made.
- 25 I thought if you ignore all the detail and just Page 93

- 1 which you may not, if you want to add in ignore to what
- 2 you've said, you're very welcome to do so.
- 3 A. Okay, thank you.
- LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I'm very grateful to you for the time 4
- 5 that you've given the Inquiry.
- 6 A. Thank you for inviting me. Thank you.
- 7 MR JAY: Would you wish to rise for two minutes?
- 8 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Certainly.
- 9 (12.30 pm)
- 10 (A short break)
- 11 (12.32 pm)

14

- 12 MR JAY: Sir, the next witness is Professor Megone. Tab 49.
- LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Thank you. 13
  - PROFESSOR CHRISTOPHER BRUCE MEGONE (sworn)
- 15 Questions by MR JAY
- 16 MR JAY: Please take a seat. First of all, your full name?
- 17 A. Christopher Bruce Megone.
- 18 Q. Thank you. You've kindly provided us with a witness
- 19 statement, which runs to 14 pages, I think. Can I ask
- 20 you, please, to confirm the truth of that statement?
- 21 A. Yes.
- 22 Q. You are professor of interdisciplinary applied ethics at
- 23 the University of Leeds?
- 24 A. Yes.
- 25 Q. Could you tell us at least what your main research and Page 95
- 1 think: is it helpful to have a code with those two
- 2 degrees of normativity -- it probably is quite helpful
- 3 to have something simply like that, not to have too much
- 4 complexity. I suggested in my written statement that
- 5 a characterisation of the values that should underpin
- 6 journalism might be helpful too, but I don't think we
- 7 should go to the point of saying: here's best practice
- 8 in journalism, here's the best kind of journalism, we
- 9 should insist on that all the time. I think that would
- 10 go against the reasons for having a liberal public
- 11 sphere that I mentioned at the start which underpins the 12
  - importance of a free press.
- 13 But I think having just made it two degrees of 14 normativity and a list of values seemed to me that that 15 might get the right sort of helpful -- helpful 16 distinctions.
- 17 MR JAY: Thank you. That's very helpful, Dr Cruft. Those
- 18 are all the questions I have for you.
- 19 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: It is helpful. I'm very conscious,
- 20 as I said to your predecessors, that asking people to
- 21 come and talk about these concepts off the top of their
- 22 head is quite difficult and may mean that when you
- 23 reflect on what you've said that, you've not quite
- 24 expressed yourself as you may have wished. So if, as
- 25 you reflect upon it, if you wish to reflect upon it,
  - Page 94

- 1 philosophical interests are?
- 2 A. So my more theoretical interests are in Plato and
- 3 Aristotle's moral and political philosophy, and
- 4 neo-Aristotelian views of moral psychology -- that's
- 5 about rationality, desire and value -- and then I write
- 6 on medical ethics and business ethics principally.
- 7 Q. So interdisciplinary applied ethics -- between which
- 8 disciplines are we looking at?
- 9 A. So in my teaching, particularly, I work with colleagues
- 10 in engineering, biosciences, medicine, dentistry, so
- 11 right -- a whole range of areas.
- 12 Q. Thank you. The public interest, first of all, in a free
- 13 press -- in other words, a press free from censorship,
- 14 I suppose. How do you go about analysing that
- 15 statement?
- 16 A. So in line with what I said in the witness statement,
- 17 I think that public interest in a free press is
- 18 primarily an interest in a press which serves two
- 19 particular functions equivalent to the common good: one,
  - the function of informing -- providing information for
- 21 the public about a range of issues for them to make
- 22 choices about their lives and the kind of community that
- 23 they live in -- and secondly, the function of holding to
- 24 account those in positions of office, whether it be
- 25 political or commercial or cultural, who serve the

Page 96

3

1 public.

2 So provision of information, and through that 3 provision of information, also holding people to

4 account.

- 5 Q. So in order to serve those public interests, as you say,
- 6 the press will need to carry out its work with accuracy
- 7 and rigour; is that right?
- 8 A. Yes, that's right.
- 9 Q. To what extent should the society as a whole, or
- 10 a regulator within it, be able or free to impinge on the
- 11 freedoms of the press, as you describe them?
- 12 A. So I think that, as you say, there's a whole range of
- 13 things that in order to fulfil those functions properly, 14 the press needs to adhere to. You've mentioned
- 15 impartiality, recognising its own potential conflicts of
- 16 interest, avoidance of bias, truthfulness, making good
- 17 judgments about what's important to bring to the
- 18 attention of the public and what isn't, amongst a whole
- 19 range of stories that may prevail on a daily basis, and
- 20 then a number of constraints that they may have to
- 21
- adhere to which might be viewed as other parts of the 22 public interest or the rights of individuals concerning
- 23 matters of privacy, confidentiality and the like, which,
- 24 even though there's a public interest in bringing
- 25 information to people, may constrain that information Page 97
- 1 being brought for -- yeah, and those are rights of
- 2 individuals and they also pertain to things like
- 3 security, judicial process and so on, a number of other
- 4 factors, which could be impinged if certain information
- 5 is brought out at inappropriate times and so on.
- 6 Q. You mentioned impartiality, Professor Megone. Under the
- 7 code, the press is free to be partisan, presumably
- 8 because society has made a judgment that the "rights of
- 9 the press" are more important in terms of being able to
- 10 be partisan than other rights in being impartial. How
- 11 do you see that working?
- 12 A. Yes. I suppose the press is -- I've talked about it
- 13 presenting information. I suppose the press both
- 14 presents information and presents opinion, and in the 15 presentation of opinion, we accept that at least certain
- 16 parts of the press are entitled to partiality. There's
- 17 obviously some part of the media or press which is
- 18 subject to constraints where they must be more
- 19 impartial, present two sides of the coin on every case.
- 20 So when it comes to opinion, we allow for partiality but
- 21 then it's important for those organisations to present
- 22 both opinion and facts, that they make clear when
  - they're doing which. So you read the news sections and
- 24 you expect those not to be clouded by partiality.
- 25 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But that's not entirely

Page 98

- straightforward, is it? Because I could present a set
- 2 of facts which are facts but which I have chosen very
  - carefully to reflect an opinion which may not entirely
- 4 be in any sense balanced.
- 5 A. No, absolutely. I think that's -- I think it's
- 6 particularly in areas -- I was thinking about this
- 7 beforehand. For example, in the reporting of this
- 8 Inquiry, media organisations themselves have interest
- 9 because they're reporting about other media
- 10 organisations and they may choose to select facts which
- 11 present their competitors in a certain light. That
- 12 could be seen as the interests of their own organisation
- 13 colouring how they're presenting the facts. It may be
- 14 seen as the political outlook of the organisation -- so
- 15 commercial interests, for the first, political outlook
- 16 by the second -- and I think that's where it's
  - important, where you're attempting to present the news
- 18 and give your readership information about what's going
- 19 on, that the opinion side of the newspaper shouldn't
- 20 intervene.

17

- 21 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Yes, well, I understand. As I say
- 22 though, the problem is that there isn't a bright line
- 23 between fact and comment.
- 24 A. No, no, no. I mean, I accept that, that there's grey
- 25 areas in this. I'm afraid ethics is full of grey areas.

Page 99

- LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Yes. 1
- 2 A. But I still think nonetheless you can -- you know which
- 3 bit of the newspaper is the comment section and you know
- 4 which bit is the --
- 5 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Although the code actually creates
- 6 its own bright line, the requirement to distinguish.
- 7 A. Yes. Yes; yeah.
- 8 MR JAY: You make it clear that freedom of the press is not
- 9 the same as freedom of expression, although there may be
- 10 points of contact between them yes.
- 11 Q. Can I ask you to develop the point that freedom of the
- 12 press can, in certain circumstances, inhibit freedom of
- 13 expression?

15

- 14 A. Well, I was thinking there particularly about the
  - opinion side of things, actually, so the extent to
- 16 which -- I mean, even the heavyweight newspapers now
- 17 have a lot more opinion columns than they used to. But
- 18 even though you're presenting a number of opinions in
- 19 the newspaper, there's only a small number of people who
- 20 get to write for those newspapers and therefore if the
- 21 main -- and there are a small number of newspapers.
- 22 Now, if those newspapers' ownership is restricted, the
- 23 way in which freedom of expression might be inhibited is
- 24 that some people might not actually have access to this.
- 25 So although opinions are being presented, there are Page 100

25 (Pages 97 to 100)

question 7.

2 2 excluded, either because of the ownership structure of A. Mm-hm. 3 the press or the ownership structures and the editorial 3 Q. You itemise some of these: 4 4 structures taken together. "(a) Obligations to readers and consumers of 5 So you need a diversity in the press as well as 5 accuracy, rigour, honesty and truthfulness." 6 freedom in order to maintain genuine variety of 6 And then (b): 7 7 expression or to ensure that the whole range of opinions "Similar obligations follow to those who are 8 8 is reflected. reported on, whether as stories or images, whether as 9 9 Q. But is the issue this: that if the press isn't primarily or secondary parties." 10 10 sufficiently plural, not sufficiently diverse, it means A. Mm-hm. 11 11 that certain opinions will not be expressed? Q. Then there are obligations not to interfere with private 12 A. Yes. 12 rights 13 Q. But the mere fact that the press expresses opinion, can 13 A. Mm. 14 that crowd out other opinions or is there, in effect, an 14 Q. In terms of the crucial issue of balance, you go on to 15 infinite number of opinions? We're not talking about 15 say there isn't a simple algorithm for resolving 16 a commodity which is finite in number and therefore 16 conflicts. But what are the general principles which 17 there is no objection to the press expressing arguably 17 are in play, resolving conflicts in this domain? 18 limited opinions with a loud voice? 18 A. Well, you have how important the information you're 19 A. I think that -- I don't think actually there's -- in 19 wishing to present is, and the importance will -- the 20 print, there are an infinite number of things that 20 public good has a range of -- it might be important to 21 people could say. I think on most important questions 21 making decisions -- politician decisions about 22 there's probably a limited number of reasonable things 22 education, health, welfare, so on. It could be 23 that people could say. It's more a question of: are the 23 important for preservation of security, and you're 24 24 structures of the press, as well as being free, balancing that against the fact that in some of these 25 sufficiently diverse to ensure that the reasonable 25 obligations there are kind of side constraints, so about Page 101 Page 103 1 things that could be said are represented? 1 what you may do to children and so on. Some of these 2 So to take ethical matters, for example -- I mean, 2 obligations are not side constraints but requirements 3 I think that there is more discussion of medical ethics 3 that in presenting that information, you do so in tender 4 in the newspapers but I think sometimes certain types of 4 ways. 5 opinions on key ethical issues are not so well 5 Going back to the last point -- liberty, freedom and 6 represented as others. 6 responsibility -- it's not licensed. Freedom is not Q. Thank you. Ethical duties of the press in their public 7 7 licensed, and that's the way in which all these 8 role. It's under question 7, slightly out of sequence. 8 responsibilities bear on how you exercise your freedom. 9 Is it inconsistent or consistent with the notion of 9 So you have those guiding aims of the media that I set 10 a free press that the press should nonetheless owe 10 out at the beginning -- holding people accountable and 11 presenting information -- serving those roles and then 11 ethical obligations? 12 A. No, no, I think that's -- I mean, I think freedom and 12 these constraints of two sorts. 13 13 responsibility are not incompatible notions. What Q. When you refer to the importance of information, 14 14 I suppose I'm -- principally behind the notion of obviously the more important the information is, the 15 15 freedom in my account is freedom from censorship, from less restriction upon the dissemination of it you would 16 authorities coming in and telling the press what they 16 like to impose? 17 may or may not say with respect to output, but they may 17 A. Yes. 18 nonetheless have a number of responsibilities they need 18 Q. That's obvious. 19 to respect in producing those outputs. I think 19 A. Yes. 20 that's -- yeah -- very important. No, I don't see them 20 Q. But may there be a distinction then between what the 21 21 press does in terms of its core function, which is to as inconsistent. 22 Q. Yes. The sort of responsibilities you have in mind, on 22 contribute to the public good in a democratic society, 23 the -- your document doesn't have internal numbering. 23 and some of the other functions of the press, which may 24 It's our page 00913, but on the second page of the 24 be to entertain? 25 section, which is dealing with responsibilities, it's 25 A. Yes, exactly. Page 102 Page 104

1

certain types of opinion which are systematically

- 1 Q. But if you're talking about entertainment, then you're
- 2 more likely to be looking at possible constraints?
- 3 A. Exactly.
- 4 Q. Because other people's rights may come in and of course,
- 5 the nature of the information is, by definition, less
- 6 important.
- 7 A. Absolutely, yes. I suppose what I'd say, just going to
- 8 that -- I mean, it's difficult to -- I mean, one has in
- 9 mind these general principles but elaborating and
- 10 fleshing them out is a very much a case-by-case matter,
- 11 on a sort of casuistical approach, helps people to come
- 12 to appreciate what counts as significant and what counts
- 13 as less significant and so on, and that's partly why
- 14 I think one can have these codes but for them to be
- 15 lived codes, people have to think through what these
- 16 slightly abstract notions mean and that is, as I say,
- 17 partly casuistic and experience, and therefore
- 18 developing sort of a kind of practical wisdom in that
- 19
- 20 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But you've had to do that in the
- 21 other work you've done, I notice in relation to your
- 22 work with accountants.
- 23 A. Yes.
- 24 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: So that's thought the practical
- 25 implications through to a very different type of

Page 105

- and you're excluding the possibility of the casuistical
- 2 reasoning and you're building up a corpus of caselaw, if 3
  - you like, from experience, on the other.
- 4 Do you have a view as to whether the existing
- 5 Editors' Code, without looking at the detail of it,
- 6 strikes the right balance between those two competing
- 7 objectives?
- 8 A. Yeah, I don't -- I think it it's -- my -- yes, I think
- 9 the concern -- I have some concern about the code but
- 10 not particularly about it going into too much detail
- 11 and -- or too little. I think it's clear enough in that
- 12 sort of way. I suppose I felt that for me, it's
- 13 a problem -- when I read it through, its problem was
- 14 that it reads primarily as a list of prohibitions with
- 15 a slightly hand-waving reference to the public interest.
- 16 If I was a practising journalist, I would find it
- 17 difficult to see how the whole thing hung together in
- 18 terms of my professional -- in terms of developing good
- 19 judgment as a professional journalist.
  - Q. We should come back to that because that's a very
- 21 important point.
- 22 A. Yes.

20

- 23 Q. I need to pick up some other points before we get there,
- 24 as it were. Question 4. I looked at ethical duties,
- 25 question 7, out of sequence but at question 4, you make Page 107

- 1 endeavour.
- 2 A. Yes. Well, I suppose I'd say the thing that was more
- 3 analogous would be the -- also with the engineers, where
- 4 there was -- I worked with the engineers and the Royal
- 5 Academy of Engineering came up with a statement of four
- 6 ethical principles which were quite abstract, and what
- 7 we did with them was produce a guide to those principles
- 8 which was a set of case studies to try and make them
- 9 lived for practising engineers.
- 10 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I think I knew about the accountants.
- 11 A. Yes, that's right. That's the one I sent through
  - because that was very much about emphasising the
- 13 importance of culture in organisations, and part of
- 14 developing that culture is allowing people to think
- 15 these things through on a case-by-case basis and discuss
- 16 them.

12

- 17 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I'm only proving I've read it.
- 18 A. Sorry.
- 19 MR JAY: I suppose the difficulty with a code is that
- 20 there's always a tension between setting out principles
- 21 at a high level of generality, which people will
- 22 naturally understand, on the one hand, and setting out
- 23 too much detail on the other, because if you set out too
- 24 much detail, you know from experience you run into
- 25 difficulty because individual cases may be more subtle
  - Page 106

- 1 some points there about maximising the overall public
- 2 interest and the dangers, for example, in concentrating
- 3 ownership in a small number of individuals. Can I ask
- 4 you, please, to develop the points you make under this
- 5 heading, Professor Megone?
- 6 A. Right. It's an issue we've already touched on about the
- 7 concentration of a small number of journalists -- of
- 8 owners and editors may have an effect on the opinion
- 9 side of a press' activity and the range of opinion that
- 10 might be presented. There's also questions with respect
- 11 to ownership about -- possibly about the commitment of 12 the owners to the society in which they live, and
- 13 therefore their -- so if you have foreign owners, it
- 14 might be the case that they have less of a commitment to
- 15 a common good in that society. They have less interest 16
- in it. They don't live in that society; they live 17 somewhere else. The pressing nature of the common good
- 18 in that society may seem less important than perhaps
- 19 commercial interests and so on. At least it's something
- 20 that if one were the foreign owner, one would have to be
- 22 Even with respect to presentation of facts of your
- 23 information, I think a range of media organisations
- 24 serves as one of the ways -- one of the checks on that.

So competing newspapers can actually serve to qualify,

Page 108

21

1 correct and so on the factual information that is 2 presented by showing that one newspaper has missed out 3 crucial things and so on and so forth. 4

So I think in various ways, competition between the media in both representation of views and with respect to facts is enhanced by diversity.

- Q. Thank you. You also refer to relationships between members of a free press and public figures and the sort of issues and problems which might arise there.
- 10 A. Yes.

5

6

7

8

9

25

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

18

21

- 11 Q. Could I ask you, please, to expand on that? Top of our 12 page 00909.
- 13 A. Well, I suppose that the press is presenting information 14 to the public. There are lots of people who, for 15 different reasons, have an interest in conveying their 16 information and in some cases their views, their 17 opinions to the public. So there will be politicians, 18 business people, perhaps senior people in other 19 positions of influence and organisations, maybe cultural 20 organisations, who want to get certain information 21 across to the public and are competing for space with 22 the media. So they will have an interest in having 23 certain kinds of relationships to ensure that that 24 information gets across, and I think journalists have an
- Page 109 1 them crucial conduits to getting at certain kinds of 2 information that they want to get at. But clearly, 3 unless you're careful, these potentially valuable, 4 mutually valuable relationships can be distorted in

interest in that as well because it helps them -- gives

certain ways, so that on the one hand the journalist might be encouraged to think that they, by their -- the people who are their conduits, that they should present information in certain sorts of ways that are more amenable to those people, and on the other hand, it could be the case that those people are in positions which could affect the media organisation's own operation and they may be encouraged to think that if

14 a better press, you know. 15 So it's a natural relationship to have between 16 politicians, business and the like and the media, but 17 it's one that can be -- needs to be handled with great

they do that in certain sorts of ways they will get

19 Q. Mm. That leads on to question 5. You were asked for 20 your views on the extent to which the overall public interest is currently well served, both in principle and 22 in practice. You make an interesting point in the

23 paragraph beginning: 24 "In my view, the press itself at present assumes too 25

quickly that freedom of the press is sufficient to Page 110

1 guarantee the press serves its distinctive role in 2 contributing to the public interest."

3 That argument is or has been advanced on occasion

4 before us, but can I ask you, please, to explain your

5 think the press' assumption is too swift?

6 A. I suppose if you go back to the PCC code of ethics, it 7

has -- although I don't think it has a very satisfactory

8 account of the public interest, it explicitly states

9 that freedom of expression is itself part of the public

10 interest, and I think that it's -- and that, the public 11

interest, qualifies a number of the constraints that are

12 placed on the media in that code, and I think a kind of 13 slippage can happen in which this freedom of expression

14 is seen to be the primary public interest the public has

15 in the press, and then that can then seem as liable to

16 trump many of the other side constraints.

17 O. Mm.

18 A. So -- and if one's a journalist and one values being

19 allowed to write what one thinks is important, yes,

20 by -- there's a kind of, as I say, a natural slippage in

21 which this freedom of expression can be seen to be the

22 dominating aspect of one's code.

23 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Should it be rebalanced? And if so,

24

A. Well, it's -- yes, I think it should. I mean -- so when 25 Page 111

1 I read the code I was a little -- properly, you know,

2 thinking about it for this -- particularly for this

3 Inquiry -- I read it more cursorily for teaching

4 students -- it is striking that there are parts of that

5 code which explicitly rather strongly regulate against,

6 prohibit some sorts of activities which have clearly

7 been going on, as has come before this Inquiry, and

8 I think that what needs to be done is that the people

9 who are -- the journalists and editors and media

10 organisation owners whose activities fall under this

11 code need to think through more carefully how those

12 different parts of the code bear on one another.

13 So it isn't -- it's partly having a clearer sense, 14

a broader sense of the public interest and understanding 15 the -- how free expression contributes to serving that

16 public interest, it isn't itself the whole of the public

17 interest, and then it's secondly recognising that

18 although the public interest in providing information

19 and holding people to account is very important, there

20 are these very serious other constraints and they do

21 need to be taken very seriously, and that freedom of

22 expression doesn't dominate.

23 So, well -- and how -- well, as I say, I think that 24 part of the problem must be the culture of the 25 organisations. It must be that in the -- I mean, to

3

11

1 take the phone hacking which has come before you. My 2 amateur suspicion is there must have been people in 3 organisations where this was going on who were aware of 4 it and must have been concerned but didn't raise their 5 voices. One can think of this happening in other 6 organisations, in hospitals and so on, where things have 7 been going on and whistle-blowing doesn't happen in this 8 culture.

So I think there must be with a cultural issue about

the capacity of people to raise concerns about when they think that certain things are being done which shouldn't be done, even though that would prevent certain things being freely expressed. So I think it's very much about this code becoming much more a lived code in organisations and an open culture in which people can express their concerns. And the editors, of course -- I've said something about the responsibility of editors and so on and part of the structural things you might do -- LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But is it simply the responsibility of editors? You said, in the course of that answer that what needs to be done is that the people who are -- the journalists, the editors, the proprietors, they need to get to grips with it, but is this something that also ought to happen externally or should it just be left to

- deal with complaints; it would also perhaps be an annual
- 2 kind of corporate governance report which would
  - encourage the development of an appropriate culture. So
- 4 it's a kind of reporting mechanism designed to focus on
- 5 character enhancement rather than complaints.
- 6 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: In relation to the development of the
- 7 code, we heard from Ofcom last week that actually they
- 8 consider it unimaginable -- I think that was the word
- 9 that Mr Richards used -- that, as it were, those in the
- business at the time should sit on these bodies, that it
  - had to be done independently, perhaps with people who
- had been in the bodies but not currently serving. Do
- 13 you have -- is there an ethical or a philosophical --
- 14 A. Well, I suppose from my -- it touches on the
- interdisciplinary nature of my work.
- 16 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: That's why you're here, Professor.
- 17 A. Yes. I think that in this area, if you just had someone
- 18 like me as an ethicist, for example -- what I found in
- other works, say in engineering ethics, is I lack the
- 20 experience of what it is like being that kind of person.
- I am unaware of the pressures they're under, and so
- 22 I think you would need, as you've suggested, people who
- 23 are experienced in the media -- perhaps, as you suggest,
- 24 not current but people who are sufficiently close, so
- 25 recent members of the media -- to know -- to not have --
  - Page 115

1 them to do?

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

9

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

2 A. Again I think there should be a reporting process to an

Page 113

- 3 external organisation but I think the purpose of that
- $4 \qquad \text{reporting should not -- at the moment, it seems as if} \\$
- 5 the Press Complaints Commission is primarily tasked with
- 6 dealing with post hoc complaints and allowing people
- 7 then to have an answer or to have remedies. So there
- 8 might be something which is addressed -- a process of
  - reporting which was designed to focus on the character
- and culture of the organisations.

  So the suggestion I had, which

So the suggestion I had, which is a bit like goes on -- the corporate governance reporting that goes on in business -- I think the corporate governance reporting in business could be better done, but I think that there could be something -- a report which the editor drew up each year which looked at the processes and the behaviours of the organisation against the objectives -- the moral objectives of that organisation to promote the public interest, and that would report to an auditor or an ombudsman, both about the structures and about the outputs or the effects of those structures on the behaviours of the organisation.

So it would be -- yes, there would be a focus on the internal thing but you'd have a reporting mechanism.

But the reporting mechanism wouldn't just be designed to Page 114 1 to have views about how culture and practice can be

2 enhanced which are not -- you know, philosophers, we're

3 often criticised for being -- I won't say cloud cuckoo

4 land but in an --

- 5 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: An ivory tower.
- 6 A. At a remove, yes. So my work is enhanced if I'm doing
- 7 it together with people who can qualify and inform what
- 8 I am saying by detailed knowledge of what it's like to
- 9 be -- yeah. But maybe, as you say -- no.
- 10 MR JAY: You had a number of specific points to make about
- the code. Indeed, these will be valuable points, given
- 12 your interdisciplinary experience. You can draw on
- 13 codes from analogous or otherwise areas. But one point
- you made is the code appears to be full of prohibitions
- and that's a defect. Why is that a defect?
- 16 A. As I say, I think it encourages a view of ethic as
- 17 coming into the picture when things are being done
- wrong, going wrong, and then encourages the view that
- 19 the complaints commission -- the press -- I forget the
- 20 name -- that you go to it to register a complaint,
- 21 rather than the purpose of a code as something like to
- develop good professional judgment, when ethics is a key
- part of good professional judgment, as well as, of
- course, experience of assessment of facts and so on and
- so forth.

6

20

1

So I think you need a code which has a more -expresses in a more positive way the positive contribution that the press plays to the common good, contributes to the common good, and then the restraints on the ways in which you may behave in pursuing that public good, and I think the role of those constraints then becomes a bit more intelligible if you're clear about the public good, the importance of what you're doing, and the extent to which those constraints may sometimes be overridden becomes more intelligible, if you're clear about the good.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1

2

3

4

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

So, yeah, those are the principle concerns. In ethics, we have a positive connotation as well as a negative one and if there's a kind of over-arching understanding from the code rather than a kind of piecemeal set of "don't to this, don't do that" ...

- Q. In terms of positive contribution, would you be including within that a public interest in freedom of expression itself and what else, in any event, would you be including?
- A. I'd want to explain the role of freedom of expression in terms of its importance in contributing to the two over-arching goods that I have claimed. So freedom of expression's important because the press has this role of presenting information to enable us to make choices Page 117

- 1 A. That's somewhat more emphasis on certain aspirational
- 2 things. So if you take the accuracy section of the
  - code, the press must state they're not printing
- 4 inaccurate or distorted information, I suppose that one
- 5 could place that more positively, that the aspiration to
  - present the facts, to present the truth impartially --
- 7 I can't do it off the top of the my head, but I think
- 8 there would be a way of stating that in a more
- 9 aspiration role as a sort of high calling to accuracy
- 10 and rigour.

11 So some of it would be on the emphasis on aspiration 12 to honesty, truth, rigour, not just mentioning all the

- 13 things you mustn't do in pursuing those things. So
- 14 getting a sense of, yeah, positive attributes of --
- 15 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: To provide the context better to
- 16 assist to justify the negatives.
- 17 A. Yes. Yes.
- LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Yes. 18
- 19 MR JAY: Thank you. Finally, the other factors, aside from
  - the code, which might create the right sort of culture,
- 21 could you summarise those for us, please?
- 22 A. Yes. So this is in the -- yes. So issues about
- 23 leadership. That, from this other work in other
- 24 organisations, seems tremendously important.
- 25 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: And this is the accountants? Page 119
- about all aspects of our life. What that means is we don't want -- powerful organisations must not be in a position to stop certain information getting to us, whether it's government or business or -- and secondly,
- 5 on that side, freedom of expression is important in
- 6 allowing a diverse set of opinions to be presented.
- 7 There's the opinion and fact side. Then freedom of
- 8 expression is important in order to allow us to hold
  - people accountable. So there mustn't be people who can stop certain things getting out because if those things
  - were to get out, it would be bad for them and the responsibilities they have to us.
  - So that's the way I would say it comes in. It's understood as a mean, as serving an instrumental role in the service of these -- this greater good.
  - Q. How would the code be framed so as to foster the right sort of culture you were referring to? It's not just a culture which understands the proper contours of freedom of expression but it's a culture which is beneficial in a whole range of other respects. Because
- 21 one sees that in, well, a whole host of professional 22
- codes. Quite a lot of the code is about inculcating 23 correct behaviour and correct judgments but if that's
- 24 important for journalism, editorial practice, how would
- 25 the code be drafted so as to do that?

- A. Yes, it is, absolutely. I talked about an open culture,
- 2 which I think does need unpacking, but that would
- 3 include opportunities for discussion of difficult
- 4 issues, perhaps a confidential something to whom people
- 5 could turn within an organisation if they had concerns
- 6 for advice as to how they would pursue those concerns,
- 7 proper whistle-blowing procedures. I mean those are
- 8 rather negative. Rewards for positive behaviour.
- 9 I think we have a list of ten, but the most important we
- 10 would say are leadership issues.
- 11 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: And what you don't think is
- 12 necessarily the answer is simply training? 13 A. Well, yes. We want to say that with some care. There
- 14 are certain types of ethics training which are not very
- 15 effective, and they won't work just by themselves. You
- 16 can't just send people off for an afternoon -- and we've
- 17 had this reported to us in a range of other contexts:
- 18 don't just send people off for an afternoon and expect
- 19 ethics training to change, because they'll go back to an
  - office where there's a certain kind of culture and
- 20
- 21 accepted norms, and the accepted norms will dominate
- 22 anything they might have thought about in that afternoon
- 23 behaviourally, so there's kind of a psychological claim
- 24 incorporated in that.
- 25 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Yes, it's not just a question of Page 120

1 ticking the box: had the ethics training, therefore 2 that's done; now I can go back to doing what I do. 3 A. Exactly. However, we would say that ethics training 4 incorporated within or additional to these other things, 5 so, for example, bringing -- some people like 6 a philosopher and potentially another journalist working 7 together and going through some challenging case studies 8 within an organisation which is taking these things 9 seriously can enhance and aid people because you do need 10 time to reflect on these challenges and often in the 11 day-to-day hubbub of working life you don't have that 12 time, so as a kind of enhancement but it has to be with 13 these other things, leadership and so on. LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Thank you. 14 15 MR JAY: Those are all the points I had arising out of 16 Professor Megone's evidence. 17 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Professor Megone, thank you very much 18 indeed. You said it's quite difficult to think of 19 things off the top of your head and I entirely recognise 20 that. I think the most important material that you 21 provided us with is extremely valuable. Your oral 22 elaboration assists, but if there's anything you do want 23 to add in the light of questions you've been asked or 24 you've thought of, please don't hesitate. 25 A. Thank you very much. Page 121 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Thank you very much for coming. 1 2 2.15 pm. 3 (1.15 pm)4 (The luncheon adjournment) 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Page 122

|                                    |                                    |                                 |                                   |                                    |                            | rage 12.                            |
|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------------------|
|                                    | acting 44:14                       | <b>allow</b> 13:2 23:17         | applied 95:22                     | 116:24                             | 76:7                       | <b>beyond</b> 7:23 9:15             |
| A                                  | acting 44:14<br>actions 80:19      | 49:13 50:9                      | 96:7                              | assist 23:8 36:13                  | bad 48:23 89:9             | 22:22 46:1                          |
| abandon 24:2                       | activities 112:6                   | 98:20 118:8                     |                                   |                                    | 93:9 118:11                |                                     |
| abandonment                        | 112:10                             |                                 | <b>apply</b> 19:25<br>30:19 35:12 | 75:3,9 119:16<br>assists 121:22    | balance 1:12               | 47:19,19 56:14<br><b>bias</b> 97:16 |
| 59:6                               |                                    | <b>allowed</b> 11:10 62:23 92:8 | 38:24 47:16                       | assists 121:22<br>associated 12:24 |                            |                                     |
| ability 60:6                       | activity 108:9                     |                                 |                                   |                                    | 53:24 55:1,4               | big 80:6                            |
| 91:25                              | actor 44:10                        | 111:19                          | 49:8 79:20                        | 90:11                              | 75:7,22 79:17              | biosciences                         |
| <b>able</b> 19:3 22:11             | actors 67:7                        | <b>allowing</b> 106:14          | appreciate 60:7                   | <b>assume</b> 76:11                | 91:17 103:14               | 96:10                               |
| 22:13 40:15                        | acts 44:17 79:18                   | 114:6 118:6                     | 105:12                            | <b>assumed</b> 17:16               | 107:6                      | Birkbeck 2:13                       |
| 45:25 63:22                        | add 30:4 39:13                     | alluded 12:8                    | approach 1:21                     | 31:5 63:7                          | balanced 71:9              | <b>bit</b> 13:20 52:19              |
| 66:3 69:16                         | 51:13 63:20                        | 41:23 54:14                     | 12:3 20:12,12                     | assumes 5:24                       | 99:4                       | 54:17 82:14                         |
| 97:10 98:9                         | 66:19 76:19                        | alongside 1:8                   | 30:15 39:24                       | 110:24                             | balancing 92:5             | 100:3,4 114:11                      |
| absolute 5:18,20                   | 78:23 81:11                        | alternative 53:22               | 105:11                            | assuming 7:12                      | 103:24                     | 117:7                               |
| 5:23,25 6:1,2,5                    | 93:11 95:1                         | alternatives                    | appropriate 43:7                  | assumption                         | <b>band</b> 50:6           | bits 34:16                          |
| 6:14,18 7:3,4,6                    | 121:23                             | 40:20                           | 45:24 46:22                       | 111:5                              | <b>bandwidth</b> 50:9      | black 49:25                         |
| 7:8 8:22,24 9:3                    | addition 35:13<br>additional 121:4 | amateur 62:24<br>113:2          | 49:2,19 50:2<br>62:4 67:9 74:5    | assumptions                        | 52:14,18,19                | blamed 58:20                        |
| 72:14 73:18                        |                                    | - '                             |                                   | 19:21                              | 53:7,10,12                 | blaming 35:9                        |
| absolutely 7:12                    | address 17:4                       | amateurs 60:13                  | 75:6 115:3                        | asterisked 92:17                   | bare 67:5 91:20            | blanket 27:6                        |
| 18:19 19:5                         | 30:25                              | amateur-ish                     | appropriately                     | 92:21                              | basically 36:9             | blow 32:12                          |
| 49:9,11 57:6                       | addressed 114:8                    | 61:11                           | 46:16 68:10                       | asymmetry                          | basis 27:6 41:3            | blunt 36:4 47:6                     |
| 99:5 105:7                         | adds 28:7                          | amenable 110:9                  | area 3:14 5:5                     | 19:11                              | 55:22 61:15                | board 11:18                         |
| 120:1                              | adhere 97:14,21                    | Amendment                       | 14:22 49:25                       | attempt 32:7                       | 97:19 106:15               | bodies 78:21                        |
| abstract 6:11                      | adhered 54:17                      | 48:3                            | 50:7,19 70:17                     | 55:25 90:19                        | bear 1:17 71:17            | 79:8,14 80:11                       |
| 40:18 105:16                       | adjournment                        | American 41:15                  | 81:17 115:17                      | attempted 17:11                    | 79:5 104:8                 | 115:10,12                           |
| 106:6                              | 122:4<br>adultery 39:20            | 41:15<br><b>amount</b> 18:2     | areas 3:7,9,18<br>12:17 16:24     | 61:13                              | 112:12                     | <b>body</b> 76:14 79:19             |
| abuse 7:10                         | •                                  | 21:2 81:25                      |                                   | attempting<br>99:17                | bearing 55:13              | 80:12 81:7,7                        |
| <b>abuses</b> 16:13                | 47:1                               |                                 | 21:17 58:14                       |                                    | bears 5:15                 | 83:4                                |
| academic 3:7                       | advance 80:14                      | <b>analogous</b> 106:3          | 61:5 62:9                         | attention 21:3                     | becoming 113:14            | bomb 6:22                           |
| 39:6                               | advanced 11:23                     | 116:13                          | 96:11 99:6,25                     | 33:3,12 91:1,5                     | beginning                  | book 12:21 44:13                    |
| Academy 106:5                      | 21:22 111:3                        | analogy 49:23                   | 99:25 116:13                      | 97:18                              | 104:10 110:23              | 60:9                                |
| accept 20:16                       | advantages                         | analyse 1:6                     | arguably 78:12                    | attitudes 17:17<br>31:14           | begs 18:12                 | borne 79:12                         |
| 98:15 99:24                        | 80:20                              | 17:22 72:16                     | 101:17                            |                                    | behave 117:5               | bothered 23:16                      |
| accepted 120:21                    | adversarial                        | analysing 96:14                 | arguing 13:12                     | attracted 65:7                     | <b>behaviour</b> 31:10     | boundaries                          |
| 120:21                             | 76:21 77:22                        | analysis 17:10                  | argument 13:7,9                   | attributes                         | 31:12 34:16                | 60:21                               |
| access 100:24                      | <b>adversely</b> 26:15 88:4        | 29:9,10 46:12                   | 13:10 18:15                       | 119:14                             | 47:3 87:22<br>118:23 120:8 | box 121:1<br>brakes 59:10           |
| accompany 78:7                     |                                    | 79:23,24,25                     | 28:15,15 31:25                    | audience 32:25<br>33:6             |                            |                                     |
| accorded 7:22                      | <b>advertising</b> 93:9 93:10      | angle 30:15                     | 42:11,12 50:4<br>54:23 111:3      | auditor 114:19                     | behaviourally<br>120:23    | brazen 42:24<br>breach 57:24        |
| accords 25:21                      | advice 120:6                       | announce 13:25<br>annual 115:1  |                                   | authorities 57:23                  | behaviours                 | break 64:2,4                        |
| account 9:8,18                     | affairs 40:11                      | answer 10:7                     | arguments 4:9<br>arises 45:21     | 102:16                             | 114:17,22                  | 95:10                               |
| 9:19 25:19                         | affect 110:11                      | 23:11 24:1                      | arising 6:19                      | authority 33:4                     | beings 35:12               | breaking 49:3                       |
| 60:6 83:9,16                       | affirm 47:8                        | 40:19 56:7,10                   | 35:13 121:15                      | 35:21 43:9                         | beliefs 14:13              | breaks 25:7                         |
| 83:19,22 96:24                     | affirmed 2:8,9                     | 58:9,16 59:15                   | Aristotle's 96:3                  | 50:23                              | believe 2:21 8:10          |                                     |
| 97:4 102:15                        |                                    |                                 |                                   |                                    |                            | bright 99:22                        |
| 111:8 112:19                       | 2:10 64:7<br><b>Afghanistan</b>    | 60:8 113:21<br>114:7 120:12     | Article 5:20,20<br>5:21.21        | autonomous<br>7:20 54:4            | 24:10 41:25<br>89:16       | 100:6<br><b>bring</b> 45:4 97:17    |
| accountability                     | 18:16                              | answerability                   | articulate 69:18                  | autonomy 7:23                      | believes 20:4,5            | bring 43.4 97.17<br>bringing 54:2   |
| 79:21                              | afraid 58:15 68:3                  | 75:25 76:12                     | aside 54:7 85:18                  | 8:9,16 13:9                        | beneficial 15:13           | 97:24 121:5                         |
| accountable 37:2                   | 71:13 75:10                        | answerable                      | 119:19                            | available 18:7                     | 118:20                     | brings 1:23                         |
| 104:10 118:9                       | 79:25 99:25                        | 70:22 76:4                      | asked 23:12                       | 52:18 57:2                         | benefit 10:9               | broad 37:15                         |
| accountants                        | afternoon                          | 77:14 83:4                      | 59:23 110:19                      | 63:21                              | 25:22,23 44:11             | 46:18 85:14                         |
| 105:22 106:10                      | 120:16,18,22                       | answered 22:24                  | 121:23                            | avoid 90:19                        | 89:8,17,18,19              | broader 112:14                      |
| 119:25                             | ago 71:14 74:20                    | answering 23:4                  | asking 60:8                       | avoidance 97:16                    | 89:22,24 91:2              | broadly 25:5                        |
| accounts 12:6                      | 90:2                               | answering 25.4<br>answers 13:15 | 94:20                             | aware 93:6                         | 91:21                      | 31:22                               |
| accrues 7:20                       | agree 8:4,6 14:17                  | 23:7 40:7,7                     | aspect 44:15                      | 108:21 113:3                       | benefits 69:21             | broad-ranging                       |
| 15:7                               | 16:22 24:12                        | Anthony 70:20                   | 65:8 85:22                        | 100.21 110.5                       | 90:25                      | 19:13                               |
| accuracy 67:20                     | 25:10,16 30:5                      | anti-discrimin                  | 111:22                            | B                                  | Benthamite 58:1            | brought 98:1,5                      |
| 97:6 103:5                         | 39:12 45:13,17                     | 37:15                           | aspects 28:2                      | <b>b</b> 103:6                     | Bernard 12:21              | <b>Bruce</b> 95:14,17               |
| 119:2,9                            | 47:25 50:25                        | anybody 27:12                   | 43:20 55:23                       | back 6:13 23:14                    | best 23:25 24:12           | building 107:2                      |
| accurate 37:1                      | 57:15 77:9,25                      | 88:3                            | 87:21 118:1                       | 29:11 46:5                         | 36:5 60:7                  | built 40:14                         |
| 67:14                              | 84:24 90:17,17                     | anybody's 14:1                  | aspiration 119:5                  | 53:5 60:9                          | 63:15 71:7                 | bulwark 25:18                       |
| <b>achieve</b> 46:15 60:7,15 83:16 | ahead 46:3 52:17                   | anyway 12:18                    | 119:9,11                          | 104:5 107:20                       | 75:6 94:7,8                | 29:3,8,14,22                        |
| achieved 1:13                      | aid 121:9                          | 33:3 86:21                      | aspirational                      | 111:6 120:19                       | beta 23:16                 | 30:7,8                              |
| acknowledged                       | aims 24:5,5                        | apart 9:22 92:24                | 119:1                             | 121:2                              | better 23:16               | <b>bundle</b> 64:11                 |
| 26:22                              | 104:9                              | apparently 43:8                 | asserting 5:4                     | background                         | 28:13 55:22                | burden 9:19,22                      |
| act 4:23 8:9 11:2                  | airport 32:12                      | 92:25                           | asserts 5:7                       | 6:10 62:17                         | 56:1,2 59:9                | business 47:2                       |
| 11:4 60:24                         | algorithm 71:12                    | appear 39:9 59:9                | assesses 76:14                    | <b>backstop</b> 57:8,16            | 110:14 114:14              | 96:6 109:18                         |
| 61:21                              | 71:15 103:15                       | appears 116:14                  | assessment                        | 57:17 75:20                        | 119:15                     | 110:16 114:13                       |
| 01.21                              | 1                                  |                                 | ĺ                                 |                                    |                            |                                     |
|                                    |                                    | •                               | •                                 | <u>-</u>                           | <b>=</b>                   | -                                   |

| -                                   |                            |                                     |                                 |                                  |                                     | Page 124                           |
|-------------------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
|                                     | İ                          | İ                                   | İ                               | İ                                | l                                   | İ                                  |
| 114:14 115:10                       | caution 38:24              | characterise                        | close 115:24                    | 8:14,16 108:11                   | 90:7                                | considerable                       |
| 118:4                               | caveat 22:7                | 26:4                                | closely 12:24                   | 108:14                           | conception 14:19                    | 13:1 15:4                          |
| businesses 80:2                     | 62:22                      | characterised                       | cloud 116:3                     | committed 21:1                   | 89:23                               | 30:21                              |
| buy 26:11 29:23                     | celebrity 21:4             | 9:2 54:22                           | clouded 98:24                   | 84:15                            | concepts 1:7,8                      | consideration                      |
| 31:2                                | 30:12 53:6                 | characters 31:7                     | club 44:25                      | commodity                        | 3:4,16 4:4                          | 6:16,20 19:22                      |
| <b>buying</b> 25:23                 | censor 83:18               | charge 62:25                        | code 1:24,25                    | 101:16                           | 14:25 64:25                         | 34:10 42:21                        |
| <u> </u>                            | censorship 96:13<br>102:15 | 81:24<br><b>cheat</b> 42:9 67:1     | 30:19 40:1                      | <b>common</b> 96:19<br>108:15,17 | 94:21<br><b>concern</b> 21:5        | 54:3 92:24<br>considerations       |
| cack-handed                         | censure 83:19              | cheats 42:8                         | 58:14,14 72:8<br>81:17 82:10,12 | 117:3,4                          | 32:14 47:2                          | 1:21 6:8 9:1,8                     |
| 2:22                                | central 71:24              | check 69:22                         | 84:20 85:18,21                  | communicate                      | 107:9,9                             | 35:24 46:23,24                     |
| call 31:22 43:11                    | 84:13,14,15                | checks 108:24                       | 85:24 86:3,7                    | 14:3 48:19                       | concerned 21:1                      | 47:15 51:25                        |
| called 12:22 42:3                   | centre 53:12               | child 68:14                         | 86:24 87:21                     | communication                    | 23:15 34:15,17                      | 75:7 90:1                          |
| 43:9                                | certain 4:24 5:4           | children 27:22                      | 92:14,16,18                     | 8:19 15:23                       | 113:4                               | considered 68:15                   |
| calling 119:9                       | 5:19,20 16:6               | 60:19 104:1                         | 93:18,20 94:1                   | communications                   | concerning                          | 75:4                               |
| calls 13:6,7                        | 17:2 18:3                  | chilling 41:8                       | 98:7 100:5                      | 21:15                            | 97:22                               | considering 1:16                   |
| cameras 59:8                        | 19:21 20:13                | choice 30:21                        | 106:19 107:5,9                  | communicative                    | concerns 26:7                       | 21:12 27:3                         |
| capable 11:23                       | 25:1,5,6 26:8              | 73:25                               | 111:6,12,22                     | 8:3 14:13                        | 113:10,16                           | consistent 102:9                   |
| 29:6 58:24                          | 28:16 30:10                | choices 96:22                       | 112:1,5,11,12                   | communicator                     | 117:12 120:5,6                      | constantly 31:24                   |
| capacity 113:10                     | 31:12,14,14,21             | 117:25                              | 113:14,14                       | 25:17                            | conditions 25:2,2                   | 51:5                               |
| capitalists 24:10                   | 32:17 33:1                 | <b>choose</b> 56:8 69:4             | 115:7 116:11                    | community                        | conducive 14:18                     | constitute 65:11                   |
| care 33:11 36:10                    | 35:18,19,20                | 99:10                               | 116:14,21                       | 69:12 96:22                      | 24:12                               | constituted                        |
| 84:21 110:18                        | 36:1 37:22                 | <b>chose</b> 59:23                  | 117:1,15                        | compatible                       | conduct 1:24                        | 84:20                              |
| 120:13                              | 38:8 40:6,14               | chosen 99:2                         | 118:16,22,25                    | 28:25                            | 77:4 81:18                          | constitutes 20:10                  |
| careful 20:12                       | 41:2,10 43:25              | Christopher                         | 119:3,20                        | compelled 71:20                  | 82:10                               | constituting                       |
| 26:14 35:15                         | 47:6 48:7 49:1             | 95:14,17                            | codes 58:5,11                   | <b>compelling</b> 6:4            | conduits 110:1,7                    | 66:11 76:3<br>82:24                |
| 74:19 110:3                         | 51:18,23,25                | circular 92:25                      | 63:5 105:14,15                  | 35:7 47:16                       | confers 41:16                       |                                    |
| carefully 27:2                      | 52:2 55:5<br>57:11 58:14   | <b>circumstances</b> 6:20 9:1 67:12 | 116:13 118:22<br>code's 93:22   | <b>competing</b> 3:1 6:8,16 8:25 | confess 75:8<br>confident 69:18     | constitution 48:3<br>constitutions |
| 99:3 112:11 <b>cares</b> 43:21 51:7 | 60:21,25 61:3              | 73:23 74:17                         | codify 49:12                    | 39:25 73:20                      | confidential                        | 48:18                              |
| carries 84:1                        | 98:4,15 99:11              | 100:12                              | coin 98:19                      | 107:6 108:25                     | 72:11 73:17                         | constrain 97:25                    |
| carry 4:7,7 39:22                   | 100:12 101:1               | cited 12:21 59:21                   | colleague 70:19                 | 109:21                           | 120:4                               | constrained                        |
| 67:19 69:3                          | 101:11 102:4               | citizenry 37:7                      | colleagues 47:21                | competition                      | confidentiality                     | 65:17                              |
| 97:6                                | 109:20,23                  | citizens 7:20                       | 48:24 96:9                      | 24:11,22 109:4                   | 1:11 97:23                          | constraining                       |
| case 11:14 12:16                    | 110:1,5,8,13               | 29:17 30:3                          | collective 28:1                 | competitors                      | confirm 95:20                       | 83:1                               |
| 16:1,2,17                           | 113:11,12                  | 36:25                               | College 2:13                    | 99:11                            | <b>conflict</b> 54:9,22             | constraints                        |
| 19:11,11,23,25                      | 118:3,10 119:1             | <b>city</b> 74:10                   | colouring 99:13                 | complain 57:1                    | 89:4,4                              | 30:16 97:20                        |
| 20:13 30:11                         | 120:14,20                  | civil 33:24                         | <b>columns</b> 100:17           | complaint                        | conflicting 92:11                   | 98:18 103:25                       |
| 32:10,18,19,24                      | certainly 8:6              | civility 31:22                      | combination                     | 116:20                           | conflicts 62:3                      | 104:2,12 105:2                     |
| 33:21 37:23                         | 10:15 17:23                | claim 5:5,7 12:7                    | 56:4                            | complaints                       | 97:15 103:16                        | 111:11,16                          |
| 38:6 40:17,18                       | 35:8 38:14                 | 12:8 48:22                          | come 7:7 10:11                  | 114:5,6 115:1                    | 103:17                              | 112:20 117:6,9                     |
| 43:6 51:5 52:3                      | 52:3 66:18                 | 120:23                              | 40:6 46:5                       | 115:5 116:19                     | confronted                          | construed 34:1                     |
| 53:20 55:15                         | 78:24 82:17                | claimed 117:23                      | 58:17 63:13                     | completely 90:17                 | 53:21                               | consumers 60:18                    |
| 56:19 57:11                         | 84:10 86:23<br>87:15 95:8  | claiming 30:7<br>claims 4:11        | 81:16 94:21<br>105:4,11         | 90:17<br><b>complexity</b> 94:4  | confusion 23:20<br>conglomeration   | 103:4<br><b>contact</b> 100:10     |
| 58:18 59:20<br>61:4 6 73:10         | cetera 16:14,15            | 16:19                               | 105:4,11                        | compliance 75:1                  | 15:3                                | contain 2:18                       |
| 61:4,6 73:10<br>73:12 84:13,16      | cf 17:9                    | Clarence 43:6                       | 113:1                           | complicated                      | connection 3:11                     | contemplate                        |
| 92:10 98:19                         | challenges                 | clause 72:8                         | comes 12:12                     | 47:7                             | 10:22 48:2                          | 56:18                              |
| 106:8 108:14                        | 121:10                     | clauses 92:20                       | 22:20 33:7                      | comply 74:2                      | connects 43:22                      | contemplating                      |
| 110:10 121:7                        | challenging                | cleaned 18:18                       | 35:20 98:20                     | complying 47:13                  | 48:1 51:3                           | 22:4                               |
| caselaw 107:2                       | 121:7                      | clear 5:25 12:18                    | 118:13                          | 57:10                            | connotation                         | content 10:8                       |
| cases 7:7,11 42:3                   | chance 42:6                | 21:17 30:13                         | comfortable                     | comportment                      | 117:13                              | <b>context</b> 3:4,24              |
| 43:4 48:8                           | change 55:25               | 40:22 48:22                         | 23:6 69:4                       | 55:23                            | conscious 23:13                     | 16:9 21:11                         |
| 49:22 55:2,4,5                      | 58:13 59:14,18             | 53:15 54:12                         | coming 2:24                     | compromise                       | 63:12,14 94:19                      | 31:16,18,19                        |
| 66:21 68:12,19                      | 59:19 62:6                 | 55:3 68:11,24                       | 10:24 64:1                      | 58:3                             | consensus 5:11                      | 36:20 38:4                         |
| 73:6 74:4,19                        | 80:16 120:19               | 71:9 75:24                          | 102:16 116:17                   | conceal 43:20                    | consent 90:7                        | 50:17 51:12                        |
| 80:22 81:11                         | <b>changed</b> 59:5,18     | 76:11 80:22                         | 122:1                           | concede 6:6                      | consequence                         | 52:6 68:18                         |
| 84:16 93:7,8                        | 61:19                      | 81:12 84:21                         | comment 11:24                   | 53:19                            | 17:6 47:12                          | 70:16 71:4                         |
| 93:22 106:25                        | <b>changes</b> 58:5 59:16  | 85:12,12 88:24                      | 11:25 20:18                     | concentrate<br>46:10             | 52:13                               | 82:11 86:10<br>87:10 119:15        |
| 109:16                              | changing 58:22             | 91:19 93:7<br>98:22 100:8           | 33:2 62:23<br>99:23 100:3       |                                  | <b>consequences</b> 7:9,9 18:1 53:3 | contexts 29:13                     |
| case-by-case<br>105:10 106:15       | character 16:16            | 107:11 117:7                        | commercial                      | concentrating<br>108:2           | 74:2                                | 39:4 48:10                         |
| casuistic 105:17                    | 38:7 41:25                 | 117:11                              | 30:24 96:25                     | concentration                    | consequential                       | 68:15,18,18                        |
| casuistical                         | 42:4 114:9                 | clearer 112:13                      | 99:15 108:19                    | 108:7                            | 41:12                               | 120:17                             |
| 105:11 107:1                        | 115:5                      | clearly 10:7 12:1                   | commission                      | <b>concept</b> 30:14             | consider 2:3                        | contextual 72:3                    |
| catch 57:5 59:7                     | characterisation           | 93:4,7 110:2                        | 114:5 116:19                    | 76:16 88:1,13                    | 13:13 71:5                          | continue 25:25                     |
| caused 11:15                        | 94:5                       | 112:6                               | commitment                      | 88:14,17,20                      | 115:8                               | continued 53:1                     |
|                                     |                            |                                     |                                 |                                  |                                     |                                    |
| L                                   |                            |                                     |                                 |                                  |                                     |                                    |

|                             |                   |                       |                                 |                              |                         | Page 125             |
|-----------------------------|-------------------|-----------------------|---------------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------|
|                             | Ī                 |                       | İ                               | Ī                            |                         | İ                    |
| continuously                | 113:16,21         | 120:20                | defame 20:6                     | 9:18                         | disagree 53:9           | 56:13,16,21          |
| 61:14                       | 116:24            | culture-shaping       | defeated 6:20                   | detrimental                  | disagreement            | 70:25 71:2,2,6       |
| continuum 80:9              | courses 3:10      | 19:17                 | defect 116:15,15                | 17:24                        | 53:11 54:17,18          | 71:12 82:2           |
| contours 118:18             | court 32:10       | cumulative            | defence 12:13                   | develop 13:20                | disastrous 25:8         | 84:11 88:16          |
| contract 25:4               | 50:21 74:3        | 52:22                 | defendant 70:22                 | 23:17 82:18                  | disciplines 96:8        | 98:23 116:6          |
| contractual                 | courts 12:25      | cumulatively          | deficient 55:21                 | 100:11 108:4                 | discourage 41:11        | 117:9 121:2          |
| 64:23                       | cover 55:23       | 53:3                  | define 30:22                    | 116:22                       | 51:24                   | domain 45:2          |
| contrary 44:1               | 85:13 87:21       | <b>curb</b> 16:13     | 33:19 83:25                     | developed 90:8               | discouraging            | 46:25 54:5           |
| contrast 31:3               | covers 50:1       | currency 4:11         | <b>definite</b> 69:10           | developing                   | 47:2                    | 55:24 103:17         |
| contribute                  | crank 79:2        | current 80:17         | definitely 89:16                | 105:18 106:14                | discourse 4:6 5:3       | dominate 112:22      |
| 104:22                      | create 31:13      | 82:12 115:24          | definition 58:14                | 107:18                       | discover 12:24          | 120:21               |
|                             |                   | currently 84:20       | 105:5                           |                              |                         |                      |
| contributes                 | 60:23 61:8        | •                     |                                 | development 8:8              | discretion 40:3         | dominating           |
| 112:15 117:4                | 85:21 119:20      | 110:21 115:12         | <b>degree</b> 33:7              | 115:3,6                      | 40:23 50:8              | 111:22               |
| contributing                | created 68:1      | cursorily 112:3       | degrees 93:16,19                | dialogue 63:15               | 53:7                    | doubt 37:7 66:14     |
| 111:2 117:22                | creates 28:17     | <b>cuts</b> 62:3      | 94:2,13                         | dictate 40:19                | discuss 18:24           | <b>Dr</b> 64:6,7,9   |
| contribution                | 30:21 51:16       |                       | <b>deliver</b> 4:20 12:9        | difference 5:17              | 106:15                  | 94:17                |
| 117:3,17                    | 69:14 83:11       | D                     | 12:19 23:1,25                   | 11:19 34:4                   | discussed 48:2          | drafted 118:25       |
| control 63:3                | 100:5             | daily 26:11 27:6      | delivers 24:5                   | 35:5 46:6                    | discussion 10:17        | dramatically         |
| Convention 5:19             | creating 19:20    | 97:19                 | demanding 83:6                  | 50:16 64:25                  | 18:7 63:19              | 23:20                |
| 11:1                        | 19:21 42:23       | danger 16:24          | 83:9                            | 72:4 80:6                    | 102:3 120:3             | draw 67:24 68:2      |
| conveying                   | creation 59:7     | 27:4,11 45:16         | democracies                     | 86:11                        | displayed 27:22         | 68:3,7,23 69:2       |
| 109:15                      | 83:12             | 48:11 57:13           | 12:15                           | differences 65:4             | disreputable            | 69:9 80:1 82:7       |
| core 104:21                 | credibly 20:8     | dangerous 24:24       | democracy 7:15                  | different 1:19,20            | 42:5,7                  | 91:5 116:12          |
| corn 10:23                  | crime 20:25       | 41:22                 | 7:22,24 8:13                    | 1:21 5:10                    | dissemination           | drawing 31:3         |
| corporate 66:5              | 84:15             | dangers 108:2         | 8:17 13:11                      | 10:19 13:15                  | 104:15                  | 91:1                 |
| 81:7 114:12,13              | crimes 21:19      | data 2:4              | 15:13 16:14                     | 14:6 15:25                   | disseminator            | drawn 74:9,12        |
| 115:2                       | criminal 11:3     | data 2.4<br>date 17:3 | 27:9 83:20                      | 16:20,25 23:22               | 25:17                   | dreadfully 57:8      |
| corpus 107:2                | 21:19 70:18,20    | day 21:8 26:9         | democratic                      | 28:12 35:2                   | distance 43:2           | drew 114:15          |
| correct 8:10 22:1           | criminalised      | days 17:3             | 29:17,18 54:21                  | 38:23 49:22                  | distill 10:18           | driven 10:12         |
| 22:3 39:23                  | 48:12             |                       | 69:24 83:1,8                    | 50:22 57:22                  | distinct 7:15           | drives 1:5           |
| 48:13 49:23                 | criticise 83:19   | day-to-day            | 83:17,21 85:3                   | 62:16 64:21                  | 14:22 21:17             | dropping 63:23       |
|                             | criticised 1:15   | 121:11                | 104:22                          |                              | 88:19                   |                      |
| 52:15 55:21<br>109:1 118:23 | 84:18 116:3       | deal 4:7,8 7:6        | demonstrated                    | 69:4 70:14,15<br>70:17 71:25 | distinction 16:23       | duck 18:6,18<br>84:4 |
|                             |                   | 15:2 49:13            | 55:20                           |                              |                         | Duff's 70:20         |
| 118:23                      | crossword 26:9    | 82:10 115:1           |                                 | 84:9 90:3                    | 17:1 33:20              |                      |
| correlation                 | 26:16             | dealers 10:23         | dentistry 96:10                 | 105:25 109:15                | 34:2 38:20              | duties 6:15 9:6,7    |
| 74:24                       | crosswords        | dealing 29:2,3        | depend 70:16                    | 112:12                       | 68:6 86:22              | 9:17 10:8            |
| correlative 5:8             | 29:24             | 30:9 62:6             | 71:4 73:7 74:7                  | differentiate                | 93:16 104:20            | 11:20 12:2           |
| 11:20                       | crowd 101:14      | 92:17 102:25          | depending 13:15                 | 4:12 40:1                    | distinctions            | 34:24 35:3,6,6       |
| corresponding               | crowded 10:2,4    | 114:6                 | depends 41:24                   | 67:10                        | 94:16                   | 35:11,13,15          |
| 89:11                       | 10:22 11:14       | debase 4:11           | 79:3 87:13                      | differently 16:25            | distinctive 111:1       | 36:20,21 46:7        |
| cost 10:10                  | crowds 18:9       | debate 2:19           | 92:10                           | 63:21                        | distinguish 4:5         | 46:7,8,9 47:9        |
| costs 4:25                  | crucial 103:14    | 10:14 12:1            | <b>depth</b> 62:10              | difficult 2:23               | 6:13 7:1 13:21          | 64:20,20,22          |
| coterminous                 | 109:3 110:1       | 54:6 66:14            | derivative 66:6                 | 8:15 29:7                    | 14:12 24:9              | 66:14,16,20,21       |
| 14:25 15:8                  | Crucially 48:21   | decades 61:14         | derive 79:21                    | 33:10 40:5                   | 33:17 100:6             | 66:24 67:2,4,6       |
| Couched 73:16               | Cruft 64:6,7,9    | decent 31:7,21        | describe 17:5                   | 47:11 49:7,11                | distinguishing          | 75:17 77:3           |
| counterbalance              | 94:17             | decide 72:4           | 78:2 97:11                      | 71:3 84:4                    | 4:3                     | 80:23 87:21          |
| 90:16                       | crusading 40:13   | decides 18:20         | described 46:17                 | 94:22 105:8                  | distort 83:15,21        | 88:15,24,25          |
| countervailing              | cuckoo 116:3      | decision 41:1,4       | deserve 44:2                    | 107:17 120:3                 | 84:1 85:3               | 89:4 91:25           |
| 40:12 61:7                  | cultural 54:19    | decisions 103:21      | deserving 18:17                 | 121:18                       | distorted 84:22         | 102:7 107:24         |
| 89:8                        | 75:14 81:2        | 103:21                | designed 114:9                  | difficulties 81:2            | 110:4 119:4             | duty 4:20,23,24      |
| counter-produ               | 96:25 109:19      | decision-making       | 114:25 115:4                    | difficulty 23:19             | Distorting 84:12        | 5:1,8,13,15          |
| 47:5                        | 113:9             | 69:24 83:2,8          | desire 96:5                     | 85:5 106:19,25               | diverse 70:2            | 6:18 9:14 10:5       |
| country 11:3                | culture 1:18 25:5 | 83:17,21,24           | desired 56:17                   | dimension 14:5,9             | 85:21 87:18             | 15:17 34:25          |
| 27:23 34:6                  | 30:13 33:25       | declaration           | destroy 6:23                    | dinner 38:9                  | 101:10,25               | 37:12 43:3           |
| 48:5                        | 34:17,19,20,21    | 86:18                 | destroy 6.23<br>destroyed 74:11 | dire 36:13                   | 118:6                   | 66:25 67:12,13       |
| counts 90:24                | 47:18,18 55:19    | declarations          | detail 1:7 91:13                | direct 11:13                 | diversity 54:22         | 67:16,18,19          |
| 105:12,12                   | 55:25 56:3,14     | 37:5 86:24            | 91:24 93:25                     | 25:21 70:14                  | 85:7,10 101:5           | 74:24 81:12,13       |
| couple 92:16                | 58:13,22 59:14    |                       | 106:23,24                       | 74:21,24 81:4                | 109:6                   | 88:16 89:1           |
| course 5:18 11:9            | 59:18,18 60:15    | declare 86:4,6,14     | 106:23,24                       | directed 26:3                | <b>Divisional</b> 32:10 | 90:21,24             |
|                             | ,                 | 87:1                  |                                 |                              |                         |                      |
| 15:7 16:4                   | 60:23 61:10       | declaring 86:17       | detailed 116:8                  | 57:2                         | doctor 89:9             | dwell 82:14          |
| 26:18 29:19                 | 106:13,14         | decriminalisati       | details 27:7 78:8               | direction 49:18              | doctors 90:1            |                      |
| 49:12 54:18                 | 112:24 113:8      | 59:16                 | determinants                    | 58:7                         | document                |                      |
| 56:11,13 59:13              | 113:15 114:10     | <b>deep</b> 40:9      | 78:16                           | directly 8:15                | 102:23                  | eager 4:8            |
| 59:13 63:1                  | 115:3 116:1       | deeper 17:10          | determine 5:22                  | 51:3 76:2                    | dogma 54:10             | earlier 9:2 50:16    |
| 72:25,25 73:24              | 118:17,18,19      | Defamation            | 71:3                            | directors 80:18              | doing 10:6,7            | 66:13 72:19          |
| 79:14,16 105:4              | 119:20 120:1      | 21:18                 | determining                     | 81:3,23 82:5,7               | 19:6 26:24              | 88:17                |
|                             | Ī                 | i                     | I                               | Ī                            | 1                       | Ī                    |
|                             | J                 |                       |                                 |                              | _                       | 1                    |

|                                     |                                  |                                      |                                   |                                   |                               | Page 126  |
|-------------------------------------|----------------------------------|--------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------|---|
|                                     | I                                | I                                    | I                                 | I                                 | I                             |   |
| earn 44:19 45:5                     | encourage 10:13                  | 26:9,14,25                           | euro 18:16                        | expected 1:24                     | 15:1 17:7 19:7                | <b>field</b> 32:13                                |
| 45:14                               | 41:10 77:3                       | 28:16                                | European 5:19                     | experience 62:17                  | 19:8 32:3 38:3                | figure 27:12                                      |
| easier 29:5                         | 115:3                            | entertainment                        | 11:1 41:17                        | 105:17 106:24                     | 42:21 47:9                    | <b>figures</b> 42:23                              |
| easy 56:23                          | encouraged                       | 25:20,21 26:3                        | event 117:19                      | 107:3 115:20                      | 53:17 59:4                    | 109:8   |
| Eaves 17:20<br>editor 40:3 41:3     | 110:6,12                         | 26:8,10,11,22                        | <b>everybody</b> 12:11 59:8       | 116:12,24                         | 97:9 100:15<br>110:20 117:9   | film 44:14  |
| 45:24 63:8                          | encourages<br>116:16,18          | 27:1,3,6,25<br>28:6 29:4,23          | everything's                      | experienced<br>115:23             | external 114:3                | <b>final</b> 55:18 89:21 <b>Finally</b> 119:19    |
| 114:15                              | encouraging                      | 30:2 43:19                           | 57:4                              | expertise 81:15                   | external 114.3                | financial 24:15                                   |
| editorial 101:3                     | 75:1                             | 105:1                                | evidence 2:3                      | experts 61:16                     | 113:25                        | 37:6,7,8 78:11                                    |
| 118:24                              | endeavour 56:2                   | entire 74:10                         | 12:21 17:19                       | explain 93:15                     | extra 35:13,15                | 86:5,11,12,23                                     |
| editors 1:25                        | 106:1                            | entirely 16:22                       | 42:14,19 64:10                    | 111:4 117:21                      | 35:25 51:15,16                | 86:25 87:1,10                                     |
| 40:23 62:25                         | endorsing 16:24                  | 98:25 99:3                           | 121:16                            | explained 90:5                    | 52:7                          | 87:11   |
| 72:8 78:10                          | ends 83:15                       | 121:19                               | evidenced 82:4                    | explanation                       | extraordinarily               | find 12:25 27:14                                  |
| 80:18 86:4,6,8                      | enforce 31:12                    | entities 66:5                        | exactly 18:23                     | 73:14                             | 14:17 24:8                    | 29:5,7 42:23                                      |
| 87:2 107:5                          | 55:22 56:11                      | entitled 98:16                       | 58:6 80:8                         | explicit 87:24                    | 38:16                         | 107:16  |
| 108:8 112:9                         | 66:21 67:2                       | entity 81:7                          | 104:25 105:3                      | explicitly 84:8                   | extreme 74:17                 | finding 69:2                                      |
| 113:16,17,21                        | 80:24                            | <b>equal</b> 37:14,18                | 121:3                             | 111:8 112:5                       | extremely 17:9                | <b>fine</b> 26:5,11 62:2                          |
| 113:23                              | enforceability                   | 65:12                                | <b>example</b> 4:14 6:3           | expose 40:15                      | 42:18 50:8                    | <b>finite</b> 101:16                              |
| education 31:8                      | 25:3                             | equality 12:20                       | 6:22 9:25 10:2                    | 44:15                             | 63:9 121:21                   | fire 10:1,4,22                                    |
| 32:7 69:23                          | enforceable                      | 17:20                                | 18:3 26:16                        | exposed 27:14                     | <b>eye</b> 52:17              | firmly 18:22                                      |
| 103:22                              | 46:21                            | equally 63:14                        | 28:21 30:11                       | 43:17 44:3                        | F                             | first 2:5 3:6,8,22                                |
| effect 11:13,14                     | enforced 56:12                   | equals 82:25                         | 31:8 32:13                        | 58:2                              |                               | 4:1 7:14,17<br>8:23 15:2 17:4                     |
| 18:1,9 19:17<br>19:17 20:22         | 56:12,15,20,25<br>58:24,25 66:25 | equated 19:18                        | 36:14 41:10<br>44:8 47:1,1        | <b>exposure</b> 27:7<br>44:7 45:6 | face 74:1                     | 8:23 15:2 17:4<br>17:12 21:24                     |
| 21:7 31:12                          | enforcement                      | equivalences<br>65:3                 | 53:5 65:23                        | express 51:18                     | fact 2:18 13:5                | 26:4 31:1 40:4                                    |
| 41:9 51:4                           | 47:20,20 58:11                   | equivalent 25:3                      | 68:13 69:3,4                      | 63:16,21                          | 18:23 20:14<br>36:10 37:21    | 48:3 53:25  |
| 52:21,22 56:17                      | 58:18 59:5,12                    | 96:19                                | 70:17 72:6                        | 113:16                            | 42:17 67:6                    | 56:20 64:17,24                                    |
| 59:14 60:15                         | 75:17                            | establish 3:22                       | 74:14 89:9                        | expressed 50:12                   | 91:20 93:3                    | 82:21 83:10                                       |
| 101:14 108:8                        | enforcing 75:1                   | esteem 32:25                         | 99:7 102:2                        | 62:22 94:24                       | 99:23 101:13                  | 86:3 87:25  |
| effective 2:2                       | engage 7:11                      | 47:21                                | 108:2 115:18                      | 101:11 113:13                     | 103:24 118:7                  | 95:16 96:12                                       |
| 29:22 57:18                         | engaged 25:7                     | et 16:14,15                          | 121:5                             | expresses 101:13                  | factors 72:3 98:4             | 99:15   |
| 120:15                              | engages 31:24                    | ethic 116:16                         | examples 9:25                     | 117:2                             | 119:19                        | <b>fit</b> 3:2                                    |
| effects 25:8 26:8                   | engineering                      | <b>ethical</b> 1:16,21               | 21:11 26:23                       | expressing 11:11                  | facts 98:22 99:2              | <b>five</b> 21:3                                  |
| 26:23 32:20                         | 96:10 106:5                      | 30:14,19 34:10                       | 74:9,12                           | 14:4 51:19                        | 99:2,10,13                    | fleshing 105:10                                   |
| 41:12 51:19                         | 115:19                           | 34:24 35:23                          | exceeding 59:4                    | 101:17                            | 108:22 109:6                  | focus 1:23 26:2                                   |
| 81:14 114:21                        | engineers 106:3                  | 36:2,3 39:23                         | exception 73:10                   | expression 1:12                   | 116:24 119:6                  | 91:1 114:9,23                                     |
| effort 64:13                        | 106:4,9                          | 40:1 46:7,8,12                       | 92:14                             | 3:25 7:17 11:6                    | factual 109:1                 | 115:4   |
| <b>either</b> 35:8 39:21 41:14 49:5 | <b>enhance</b> 56:3 121:9        | 46:17,18,22<br>47:8,9 48:13          | exceptional<br>93:22              | 11:10 14:23<br>15:6,9,23 16:5     | fail 61:14                    | focused 21:5<br>focusing 20:19                    |
| 55:21 73:25                         | enhanced 109:6                   | 54:20 55:21                          | exceptionless                     | 16:11,18 19:13                    | <b>failing</b> 74:2           | fold 51:11  |
| 76:14 93:20                         | 116:2,6                          | 56:1 60:21                           | 73:3,5                            | 19:24 20:9                        | 83:20<br><b>fair</b> 32:15,16 | follow 4:17 8:15                                  |
| 101:2                               | enhancement                      | 66:16,20,24                          | exceptions 72:24                  | 30:18 52:4                        | 49:23 79:23,24                | 24:2 29:19,20                                     |
| elaborate 34:3                      | 115:5 121:12                     | 67:4,6,12,13                         | 73:7 92:20                        | 53:13,16 54:15                    | 79:25                         | 36:22 66:20                                       |
| elaborating                         | enhances 28:11                   | 77:3 80:23                           | 93:21,23                          | 55:2,6,11,12                      | fairly 19:12 25:1             | 67:8 72:19  |
| 105:9                               | enjoy 57:25                      | 81:12 87:22                          | excluded 101:2                    | 65:1,4,9,10,16                    | <b>faiths</b> 54:16           | 81:16 93:4  |
| elaboration                         | enormous 21:2                    | 88:25 90:1                           | excludes 40:10                    | 65:19,24 66:1                     | fall 46:24 112:10             | 103:7   |
| 121:22                              | 49:25 84:2                       | 102:2,5,7,11                         | excluding 107:1                   | 66:2,10 92:22                     | <b>falls</b> 80:11            | following 76:1                                    |
| electorate 43:25                    | enshrines 37:14                  | 106:6 107:24                         | exercise 2:25                     | 93:3,5,8,12,14                    | <b>familiar</b> 3:5 5:17      | 84:18 91:11                                       |
| eligible 40:20                      | ensure 15:18                     | 115:13                               | 43:10 49:2                        | 100:9,13,23                       | <b>famous</b> 6:22 44:9       | follows 5:5 61:11                                 |
| eloquently 37:5                     | 26:7 39:6                        | ethically 30:19                      | 55:10 104:8                       | 101:7 111:9,13                    | 44:9                          | follow-up 39:24                                   |
| else's 28:21,23                     | 44:17,23 62:7                    | 47:14 62:25                          | exercising 30:18                  | 111:21 112:15                     | far 2:19 9:11                 | football 32:12                                    |
| emanates 39:1                       | 67:20 85:19                      | ethicist 115:18                      | 32:4                              | 112:22 117:19                     | 10:14 17:12                   | 44:10,14,20,25                                    |
| embodied 6:9<br>embodies 47:15      | 101:7,25<br>109:23               | <b>ethics</b> 1:18 33:17 33:17,21,25 | exerts 19:19<br>exhaust 48:23     | 117:21 118:5,8<br>118:19          | 40:25 41:15                   | <b>footballer</b> 53:6<br><b>force</b> 36:16 53:2 |
| 47:18                               | ensured 38:15                    | 34:4,13,14                           | exiaust 48:23<br>exist 4:21 21:24 | expression's                      | 52:20<br><b>fashion</b> 23:3  | forces 61:7                                       |
| emphasis 119:1                      | ensures 24:16                    | 36:8 39:17                           | 25:1 31:18                        | 117:24                            | fault 81:9                    | foreign 35:24                                     |
| 119:11                              | 44:22                            | 42:3 55:19                           | existence 5:13                    | expressive 14:8                   | favour 55:1                   | 108:13,20   |
| emphasise 27:25                     | ensuring 37:18                   | 56:3 58:5                            | 74:10                             | 14:10,14,16                       | favours 53:13,14              | forget 21:8                                       |
| emphasising                         | 43:17 48:6                       | 95:22 96:6,6,7                       | existing 72:8                     | expressly 73:19                   | <b>feature</b> 59:19          | 116:19  |
| 106:12                              | 63:5                             | 99:25 102:3                          | 107:4                             | extend 9:10                       | feel 10:12 11:15              | forgiven 73:17                                    |
| employees 80:19                     | enter 68:17,19                   | 111:6 115:19                         | exists 56:19                      | 36:12 49:18                       | 27:21 35:8                    | <b>form</b> 19:24 27:6                            |
| enable 83:7                         | entertain 26:6,7                 | 116:22 117:13                        | expand 8:5                        | extending 78:22                   | 41:14 43:1                    | 27:7  |
| 117:25                              | 26:24 104:24                     | 120:14,19                            | 109:11                            | extends 40:25                     | 54:12 81:6                    | <b>formal</b> 78:17                               |
| enables 25:25                       | entertained 28:4                 | 121:1,3                              | expansive 41:16                   | extensive 8:14,18                 | feelings 91:4                 | forms 4:6 20:13                                   |
| enabling 69:24                      | 28:8                             | ethos 25:5 31:15                     | expect 27:13                      | 43:10                             | feels 90:23                   | 22:8,8 47:19                                      |
| 83:1,17,23                          | entertaining                     | 57:12                                | 98:24 120:18                      | <b>extent</b> 9:16 12:4           | <b>felt</b> 86:23 107:12      | 47:20 69:22                                       |
|                                     | I                                | I                                    | I                                 | I                                 | I                             | 1   |

| formulate 23:7     | 54:2,6,6,8,14             | getting 6:10         | 114:12,13               | harasser 43:8    | Hornsby 2:6,8        | immorality                      |
|--------------------|---------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------|------------------|----------------------|---------------------------------|
| formulation        | 54:23 55:1,6              | 23:16 28:8           | 114.12,13               | hard 68:3,23     | 2:12 3:8,9 7:18      | 39:19 41:20                     |
| 11:24              |                           | 47:22 49:24          |                         | 69:1             | 7:19 10:20           |                                 |
| forth 31:10        | 55:11,12 64:25            |                      | governed 63:6           | harm 10:24       |                      | <b>impact</b> 19:15 32:17,23,25 |
| 35:16 41:5         | 65:4,5,7,8,10             | 62:12 71:15          | government              | 11:13 60:2       | 14:8 15:2,4,25       | 38:12 50:24                     |
|                    | 65:16,19,22,24            | 110:1 118:3,10       | 16:13 29:15             |                  | 17:12,13 20:18       |                                 |
| 60:22 109:3        | 66:1,2,9 70:4             | 119:14               | 30:1 77:23              | 88:20,20,22      | 21:13,16 24:7        | impacting 26:15                 |
| 116:25             | 82:23 86:15               | give 18:3 36:16      | 78:20 80:8              | harming 89:1,6   | 24:8 26:4,5,17       | impartial 98:10                 |
| foster 31:14       | 92:22 93:3,12             | 60:8 69:19,25        | 83:8,16 118:4           | hate 3:11 21:19  | 26:21 33:13,16       | 98:19                           |
| 118:16             | 100:8,9,11,12             | 82:4 99:18           | governments 8:1         | hatred 11:2,15   | 34:5 37:11           | impartiality                    |
| <b>found</b> 87:14 | 100:23 101:6              | given 22:21          | grateful 2:17           | 14:11            | 38:5,13 39:3         | 97:15 98:6                      |
| 115:18             | 102:12,15,15              | 37:16 48:5           | 82:6 95:4               | head 37:15 94:22 | 43:12 44:16          | impartially                     |
| foundational       | 104:5,6,8                 | 53:14 69:3           | great 4:7,8 22:18       | 119:7 121:19     | 45:4,12 47:25        | 119:6                           |
| 70:12              | 110:25 111:9              | 95:5 116:11          | 43:9 49:13              | heading 108:5    | 51:3 52:21,24        | impeccable                      |
| foundations 70:9   | 111:13,21                 | gives 109:25         | 110:17                  | health 68:14,20  | 55:3 58:9            | 47:14                           |
| four 106:5         | 112:21 117:18             | giving 9:20 85:8     | greater 19:19,23        | 89:14 103:22     | 62:23                | impinge 39:22                   |
| framed 118:16      | 117:21,23                 | <b>go</b> 16:17 26:1 | 30:10 33:7              | hear 21:4 51:10  | hospitals 113:6      | 97:10                           |
| Fred 33:1          | 118:5,7,19                | 35:6 41:9            | 51:20 80:16             | heard 3:23 11:8  | host 118:21          | impinged 98:4                   |
| Fred's 33:3        | freedoms 3:24             | 42:25 47:19          | 118:15                  | 12:16 17:15,15   | house 18:7,18        | implement 36:1                  |
| free 1:5,6 3:11    | 22:10 97:11               | 50:20 53:5           | <b>grey</b> 50:1,4,6,19 | 53:10 115:7      | <b>hubbub</b> 121:11 | 36:3 72:5                       |
| 3:25 6:11 7:15     | freely 113:13             | 57:8 58:4            | 50:25 51:1,2            | hearing 51:8     | huge 12:11 42:14     | implemented                     |
| 7:17,21 8:3,7      | <b>friend</b> 67:13       | 59:10 61:8           | 60:1 99:24,25           | hears 11:7       | 81:25                | 6:12 8:1                        |
| 8:14,14,18,19      | friends 67:1              | 66:18 67:22          | grips 113:24            | heavily 54:24    | hugely 27:24         | implications                    |
| 8:19,21 9:11       | <b>fulfil</b> 78:21 97:13 | 84:10 94:7,10        | ground 50:1             | heavyweight      | 60:25                | 27:8 105:25                     |
| 9:12,13,24         | fulfilled 5:6 16:5        | 96:14 103:14         | grounded 9:25           | 100:16           | human 3:20 5:19      | implicit 8:20                   |
| 11:5,7,9,18        | full 65:18 95:16          | 111:6 116:20         | 65:25                   | heckle 13:3      | 35:12 46:19          | 56:6                            |
| 12:5,7,8,9,13      | 99:25 116:14              | 120:19 121:2         | grounds 93:21           | held 33:1 34:6   | 64:22                | implies 5:12                    |
| 12:19 13:6,7       | fully 1:13 29:17          | goal 52:18           | group 17:16,17          | help 16:13 36:6  | humiliation 28:9     | <b>imply</b> 14:23 73:3         |
| 13:13,14,23        | 36:25                     | goes 9:14 29:10      | 17:18 37:20,22          | 36:13 58:15      | hung 107:17          | importance 1:5                  |
| 14:15,18,20        | function 14:14            | 40:25 45:18          | 38:16 39:7              | 84:9             | hypocrisy 68:20      | 8:7 12:5,7                      |
| 15:9,12 19:4       | 25:14 26:3,22             | 52:19 55:1           | groups 11:13,15         | helpful 11:20    | hypocrite 40:16      | 13:13 20:19,23                  |
| 20:4 21:22         | 31:20 96:20,23            | 88:14 114:11         | grubby 91:12,23         | 34:23 63:9       |                      | 28:2 54:14                      |
| 22:2,23,24,25      | 104:21                    | 114:12               | guarantee 111:1         | 66:15 69:8       | I                    | 69:23 71:18                     |
| 23:2,5,21,21       | functions 14:16           | going 6:13 10:1      | guess 12:4              | 72:13 94:1,2,6   | idea 5:13 24:16      | 72:2 73:7                       |
| 23:23,24,24        | 39:23 96:19               | 16:8 20:8            | <b>guide</b> 106:7      | 94:15,15,17,19   | 24:18 30:6           | 75:14,15,23                     |
| 24:3,3,6,9,11      | 97:13 104:23              | 32:10 36:5           | guidelines 56:1         | helps 65:11      | 34:11 35:22          | 79:4 82:22,25                   |
| 24:12,14,14,23     | fundamental               | 40:9,10 42:9         | 58:5 62:5               | 105:11 109:25    | 54:3 57:22           | 94:12 103:19                    |
| 24:25 25:1,9       | 36:11 82:22               | 50:20 56:9           | guiding 69:9            | hesitate 63:23   | 69:11 76:7           | 104:13 106:13                   |
| 25:11,11,12,15     | 88:14                     | 61:15 65:25          | 104:9                   | 121:24           | 80:14 81:11          | 117:8,22                        |
| 25:20 29:1,12      | <b>funded</b> 79:8,8,9    | 66:15 67:24          | guilty 35:8             | hesitated 18:14  | 83:18 84:6           | important 1:7,13                |
| 29:12,13 30:16     | further 36:3              | 68:2 71:7 73:1       | <b>guns</b> 59:6        | high 27:23       | 87:22                | 1:16 3:4 4:12                   |
| 32:4 36:23,24      | 47:12 51:23,25            | 73:13 74:11          |                         | 106:21 119:9     | ideal 57:17,21       | 4:16 12:5 17:1                  |
| 41:15,15 48:1      |                           | 76:6 77:10           | H                       | higher 36:3 46:9 | ideally 57:9,15      | 18:8,10,10,13                   |
| 48:4,10,13,17      | G                         | 82:14 85:8           | habituated 57:10        | Hill 43:6        | 61:9                 | 18:17,21,24                     |
| 48:19 61:22,24     | garnered 63:4             | 86:19 89:3           | hacking 21:15           | hinting 46:8     | ideals 47:8          | 20:21 23:23                     |
| 65:1,16 71:8       | gaze 44:18,21             | 90:20,22 91:21       | 113:1                   | historic 72:2    | ideas 11:9 12:10     | 24:3,8 27:24                    |
| 75:14,15 79:5      | 58:2                      | 99:18 104:5          | halfway 80:15           | historical 42:14 | 12:20 23:18          | 29:11,12,16,25                  |
| 79:15 83:12        | gender 3:12 33:5          | 105:7 107:10         | hand 5:22,23            | history 71:4     | 24:11,15 40:14       | 30:2 33:20                      |
| 84:25 85:4         | general 1:25              | 112:7 113:3,7        | 65:4 74:25              | hoc 114:6        | identification       | 34:2 44:4                       |
| 94:12 96:12,13     | 22:2 39:9                 | 116:18 121:7         | 77:20 82:23,25          | hold 16:23 43:8  | 81:6                 | 47:17 50:8                      |
| 96:17 97:10        | 61:17 65:9                | good 5:24 7:5        | 91:17 106:22            | 60:6 62:19,20    | identified 28:2      | 60:25 62:24                     |
| 98:7 101:24        | 82:11 103:16              | 11:22 21:13,21       | 110:5,9                 | 70:21 83:8,19    | 47:8                 | 65:8,9,23 66:9                  |
| 102:10 109:8       | 105:9                     | 22:19 23:5           | handle 79:2             | 83:22 118:8      | identify 20:13       | 69:22,24 71:5                   |
| 112:15             | generality 32:8           | 28:1 42:15,18        | handled 110:17          | holding 83:16    | 21:17 81:4           | 71:6 72:22                      |
| freedom 1:12       | 106:21                    | 42:18 48:19,23       | hands 22:20             | 96:23 97:3       | <b>ignore</b> 77:10  | 73:9 76:3 77:6                  |
| 3:25 7:16,17       | generally 5:3             | 48:25 49:2,5         | hand-waving             | 104:10 112:19    | 93:25 95:1           | 81:17 83:23                     |
| 12:18 13:1,17      | 41:11 42:23               | 69:13,15 72:17       | 107:15                  | holds 25:18      | illness 89:11        | 85:10 87:19                     |
| 13:17,18 14:2      | 46:17                     | 82:1 88:12           | Hang 45:25              | homework 77:18   | image 44:12          | 88:1 97:17                      |
| 14:23,23,24        | generate 10:5,17          | 96:19 97:16          | happen 111:13           | homosexuality    | images 35:16         | 98:9,21 99:17                   |
| 15:6,7,10,11       | 22:9 28:18,19             | 103:20 104:22        | 113:7,25                | 59:17            | 103:8                | 101:21 102:20                   |
| 15:15,18,22,23     | 28:20,22 32:14            | 107:18 108:15        | happening 113:5         | honest 37:1      | imagine 20:25        | 103:18,20,23                    |
| 16:9,19 20:3,9     | generated 6:15            | 108:17 116:22        | happier 89:21           | 62:12            | 52:25 65:15          | 104:14 105:6                    |
| 21:23 22:5,6,8     | 9:6                       | 116:23 117:3,4       | 90:21                   | honesty 103:5    | immediately          | 107:21 108:18                   |
| 22:8,11,15,16      | gentleman 32:11           | 117:6,8,11           | happiness 25:24         | 119:12           | 67:8 72:18           | 111:19 112:19                   |
| 22:19,20 27:5      | genuine 81:6              | 118:15               | 89:19                   | hope 2:25 14:20  | Immigration          | 117:24 118:5,8                  |
| 30:18 48:15        | 101:6                     | goods 117:23         | happy 25:22,23          | 61:1             | 11:3                 | 118:24 119:24                   |
| 53:13,16,24        | genuinely 73:11           | governance           | 35:6                    | hopeless 29:9    | immoral 47:3         | 120:9 121:20                    |
|                    | ~ *                       |                      |                         | _                |                      |                                 |
| <u> </u>           |                           |                      |                         |                  |                      |                                 |

|  |  |  |  |  |   | Page 128  |
|--|--|--|--|--|---|---|
|  | İ  | Ī  | İ  | l  | İ   | Ī   |
| impose 4:23 9:17   | 65:19,25 66:1  | 19:22 32:19  | 71:10 74:8   | J  | 13:19 18:12,22  | 91:1,23 94:8  |
| 9:19 10:10   | 81:9 106:25  | 35:14 36:16  | 78:11 86:5,11  | <b>Jay</b> 2:5,11,12 3:6   | 20:1,7 21:10  | 96:22 103:25  |
| 11:5 46:9 52:7   | individuals 7:20   | 51:15,15 70:13   | 86:12,13,14,17   | 3:13,17 7:14   | 21:14 23:6,13   | 105:18 111:12   |
| 104:16   | 8:8 11:15  | institutions   | 86:23,25 87:2  | 10:15 11:17  | 26:13,19 32:2   | 111:20 115:2,4  |
| imposes 4:24   | 15:16 30:18,22   | 12:23 50:5   | 87:12 89:3   | 21:17 25:15  | 35:2 38:23  | 115:20 117:14   |
| 30:15  | 31:21,25 43:15   | 70:10,24 71:16   | 91:21 92:4,5,6   | 27:18 32:22  | 44:7,24 45:8  | 117:15 120:20   |
| imposing 5:1   | 50:3 51:17   | instrument 36:4  | 92:12 96:1,2   | 39:11 45:21  | 45:20 49:7,10   | 120:23 121:12   |
| 21:22  | 52:4,11 54:4   | 47:6   | 97:5 99:12,15  | 46:2,5 53:5  | 49:23 50:12   | kindly 64:10  |
| imprimatur 33:8  | 60:18 66:11,12   | instrumental   | 108:19   | 63:9 64:6,8,9  | 51:1 52:12,16   | 95:18   |
| 35:19  | 77:9 97:22   | 24:4 28:15   | interfere 10:6,16  | 69:1 73:16   | 56:8,23 57:19   | kinds 27:15,16  |
| improve 2:2 32:7   | 98:2 108:3   | 69:21 83:15  | 11:22 103:11   | 78:1 82:10   | 57:21 58:24   | 31:14,21 40:14  |
| inaccuracy   | individual's   | 118:14   | interfering 53:15  | 84:20 91:10  | 59:2,22 62:11   | 55:3 109:23   |
| 67:21  | 19:14 66:3   | insufficient   | 86:15  | 92:13 94:17  | 62:14,19 63:11  | 110:1   |
| inaccurate 67:16   | indulging 39:19  | 46:10 87:6   | internal 102:23  | 95:7,12,15,16  | 64:12 67:23   | knew 106:10   |
| 67:18 84:22  | industry 28:16   | insufficiently   | 114:24   | 100:8 106:19   | 68:1,25 72:24   | knock-on 80:20  |
| 119:4  | infinite 101:15  | 69:18,18   | international  | 116:10 119:19  | 73:22 74:14,20  | 81:14   |
| inappropriate  | 101:20   | intelligible 117:7   | 3:21   |  | 74:23 75:3,11   | know 10:14,25   |
| 98:5   | influence 19:19  | 117:10   | interrogate 28:5   | 121:15   | 76:8,10,16  | 13:22 23:5  |
| inappropriately  | 34:18 38:10  | interaction  | intervene 49:20  | Jen 50:16  | 77:6,15,25  | 28:5 29:16  |
| 60:4   | 70:19 109:19   | 31:10  | 49:21 99:20  | Jennifer 2:8   | 82:6 83:25  | 33:16 39:18   |
| inaudible 51:16  | inform 29:15   | interception   | intimately 57:14   | 13:22  | 89:7,14,25  | 44:2 50:18  |
| 85:23  | 116:7  | 21:15  | intolerable 51:4   | jeopardy 43:16   | 90:5,7,10,13  | 52:25 58:16   |
| incentive 61:18  | information 8:11   | interdisciplinary  | intrinsic 28:3   | 44:6,17  | 90:16 94:19   | 59:3 60:12,12   |
| 62:7   | 18:6 25:17   | 95:22 96:7   | 82:1   | <b>job</b> 42:1,18   | 95:4,8,13   | 61:1 63:5,7   |
| incentives 61:8  | 61:23,24 62:4  | 115:15 116:12  | introduce 31:19  | <b>jobs</b> 28:17  | 98:25 99:21   | 68:12 75:9  |
| 61:21  | 63:3 72:11   | interest 1:4,8,9   | 54:13  | John 2:10 10:22  | 100:1,5 105:20  | 77:4 84:6 87:8  |
| incitement 93:8  | 84:22 96:20  | 3:7,14,18 4:14   | introduces 34:11   | 49:21 54:25  | 105:24 106:10   | 89:12 91:19,20  |
| inciting 10:23   | 97:2,3,25,25   | 4:16,16,22,22  | intrude 45:18  | 61:19  | 105:24 100:10   | 91:23 100:2,3   |
| inclined 41:4  | 98:4,13,14   | 5:4,6 8:13 9:11  | intuitions 68:11   | John's 15:17   | 113:20 115:6  | 106:24 110:14   |
| 43:12 54:25  | 99:18 103:18   | 9:12,14,16   | invaded 28:10  | joined 44:25   | 115:16 116:5  | 112:1 115:25  |
| 58:10  | 104:3,11,13,14   | 10:4 11:19   | invasions 28:22  | journalism   | 119:15,18,25  | 112.1 113.23  |
| include 56:1 91:1  | , , ,  |  |  | 87:10,11 94:6  |   | knowing 89:22   |
| 120:3  | 105:5 108:23   | 15:10 16:5   | investigate 42:22  | 94:8,8 118:24  | 120:11,25   | 91:2 92:1   |
| including 1:9  | 109:1,13,16,20<br>109:24 110:2,8   | 21:5 25:15,16<br>25:19 28:1  | investigative<br>57:1  | journalist 55:7  | 121:14,17<br>122:1  |   |
|  |  | /3'19 /8'1   | 1 7/1  |  |   |   |
|  |  |  |  | 55:10 73:23,24   |   | knowingly 84:17   |
| 47:9 117:18,20   | 112:18 117:25  | 29:1 32:15   | inviting 95:6  | 86:4,8 107:16  | justification   | knowledge 14:14   |
| 47:9 117:18,20 <b>income</b> 28:19,21  | 112:18 117:25<br>118:3 119:4   | 29:1 32:15<br>41:2,11 45:8   | inviting 95:6<br>involve 77:12,12  |  | justification<br>11:23 21:21  | <b>knowledge</b> 14:14 25:3 116:8   |
| 47:9 117:18,20 <b>income</b> 28:19,21 28:22  | 112:18 117:25<br>118:3 119:4<br>informative 8:3  | 29:1 32:15<br>41:2,11 45:8<br>65:1 66:3  | inviting 95:6<br>involve 77:12,12<br>involved 1:14   | 86:4,8 107:16  | justification<br>11:23 21:21<br>29:8 53:15  | knowledge 14:14   |
| 47:9 117:18,20<br>income 28:19,21<br>28:22<br>incompatible   | 112:18 117:25<br>118:3 119:4<br><b>informative</b> 8:3<br>14:5   | 29:1 32:15<br>41:2,11 45:8<br>65:1 66:3<br>68:14 71:8  | inviting 95:6<br>involve 77:12,12<br>involved 1:14<br>involvement  | 86:4,8 107:16<br>107:19 110:5  | justification<br>11:23 21:21<br>29:8 53:15<br>64:20   | knowledge 14:14<br>25:3 116:8<br>knows 6:22   |
| 47:9 117:18,20<br>income 28:19,21<br>28:22<br>incompatible<br>102:13   | 112:18 117:25<br>118:3 119:4<br>informative 8:3<br>14:5<br>informed 7:25   | 29:1 32:15<br>41:2,11 45:8<br>65:1 66:3<br>68:14 71:8<br>79:18 91:15   | inviting 95:6<br>involve 77:12,12<br>involved 1:14<br>involvement<br>76:13   | 86:4,8 107:16<br>107:19 110:5<br>111:18 121:6  | justification<br>11:23 21:21<br>29:8 53:15<br>64:20<br>justified 7:12,13  | knowledge 14:14<br>25:3 116:8<br>knows 6:22   |
| 47:9 117:18,20<br>income 28:19,21<br>28:22<br>incompatible<br>102:13<br>inconsistent   | 112:18 117:25<br>118:3 119:4<br>informative 8:3<br>14:5<br>informed 7:25<br>8:1,12,13,16   | 29:1 32:15<br>41:2,11 45:8<br>65:1 66:3<br>68:14 71:8<br>79:18 91:15<br>92:7,14,21   | inviting 95:6<br>involve 77:12,12<br>involved 1:14<br>involvement<br>76:13<br>involves 10:9  | 86:4,8 107:16<br>107:19 110:5<br>111:18 121:6<br><b>journalists</b> 15:7   | justification<br>11:23 21:21<br>29:8 53:15<br>64:20<br>justified 7:12,13<br>66:2,10 73:11   | knowledge 14:14<br>25:3 116:8<br>knows 6:22<br>L<br>lack 30:22 88:4   |
| 47:9 117:18,20<br>income 28:19,21<br>28:22<br>incompatible<br>102:13<br>inconsistent<br>102:9,21   | 112:18 117:25<br>118:3 119:4<br>informative 8:3<br>14:5<br>informed 7:25<br>8:1,12,13,16<br>29:17,25 36:25   | 29:1 32:15<br>41:2,11 45:8<br>65:1 66:3<br>68:14 71:8<br>79:18 91:15<br>92:7,14,21<br>93:4,5,12,21   | inviting 95:6<br>involve 77:12,12<br>involved 1:14<br>involvement<br>76:13<br>involves 10:9<br>75:24 76:13   | 86:4,8 107:16<br>107:19 110:5<br>111:18 121:6<br><b>journalists</b> 15:7<br>33:22 63:6   | justification<br>11:23 21:21<br>29:8 53:15<br>64:20<br>justified 7:12,13<br>66:2,10 73:11<br>justifies 1:5 22:5   | knowledge 14:14<br>25:3 116:8<br>knows 6:22<br>   |
| 47:9 117:18,20<br>income 28:19,21<br>28:22<br>incompatible<br>102:13<br>inconsistent<br>102:9,21<br>incorporated   | 112:18 117:25<br>118:3 119:4<br>informative 8:3<br>14:5<br>informed 7:25<br>8:1,12,13,16<br>29:17,25 36:25<br>90:7   | 29:1 32:15<br>41:2,11 45:8<br>65:1 66:3<br>68:14 71:8<br>79:18 91:15<br>92:7,14,21<br>93:4,5,12,21<br>96:12,17,18  | inviting 95:6<br>involve 77:12,12<br>involved 1:14<br>involvement<br>76:13<br>involves 10:9<br>75:24 76:13<br>87:23 89:6   | 86:4,8 107:16<br>107:19 110:5<br>111:18 121:6<br><b>journalists</b> 15:7<br>33:22 63:6<br>71:20 72:10  | justification<br>11:23 21:21<br>29:8 53:15<br>64:20<br>justified 7:12,13<br>66:2,10 73:11<br>justifies 1:5 22:5<br>55:11  | knowledge 14:14<br>25:3 116:8<br>knows 6:22<br>L<br>lack 30:22 88:4<br>115:19<br>laid 43:18   |
| 47:9 117:18,20<br>income 28:19,21<br>28:22<br>incompatible<br>102:13<br>inconsistent<br>102:9,21<br>incorporated<br>120:24 121:4   | 112:18 117:25<br>118:3 119:4<br>informative 8:3<br>14:5<br>informed 7:25<br>8:1,12,13,16<br>29:17,25 36:25<br>90:7<br>informing 30:3   | 29:1 32:15<br>41:2,11 45:8<br>65:1 66:3<br>68:14 71:8<br>79:18 91:15<br>92:7,14,21<br>93:4,5,12,21<br>96:12,17,18<br>97:16,22,24   | inviting 95:6<br>involve 77:12,12<br>involved 1:14<br>involvement<br>76:13<br>involves 10:9<br>75:24 76:13<br>87:23 89:6<br>irrelevant 37:21   | 86:4,8 107:16<br>107:19 110:5<br>111:18 121:6<br><b>journalists</b> 15:7<br>33:22 63:6<br>71:20 72:10<br>87:1 108:7  | justification<br>11:23 21:21<br>29:8 53:15<br>64:20<br>justified 7:12,13<br>66:2,10 73:11<br>justifies 1:5 22:5<br>55:11<br>justify 38:21   | knowledge 14:14<br>25:3 116:8<br>knows 6:22<br>L<br>lack 30:22 88:4<br>115:19<br>laid 43:18<br>land 116:4   |
| 47:9 117:18,20 income 28:19,21 28:22 incompatible 102:13 inconsistent 102:9,21 incorporated 120:24 121:4 increase 80:17  | 112:18 117:25<br>118:3 119:4<br>informative 8:3<br>14:5<br>informed 7:25<br>8:1,12,13,16<br>29:17,25 36:25<br>90:7<br>informing 30:3<br>96:20  | 29:1 32:15<br>41:2,11 45:8<br>65:1 66:3<br>68:14 71:8<br>79:18 91:15<br>92:7,14,21<br>93:4,5,12,21<br>96:12,17,18<br>97:16,22,24<br>99:8 107:15  | inviting 95:6<br>involve 77:12,12<br>involved 1:14<br>involvement<br>76:13<br>involves 10:9<br>75:24 76:13<br>87:23 89:6<br>irrelevant 37:21<br>issue 6:10,24,25   | 86:4,8 107:16<br>107:19 110:5<br>111:18 121:6<br><b>journalists</b> 15:7<br>33:22 63:6<br>71:20 72:10<br>87:1 108:7<br>109:24 112:9  | justification<br>11:23 21:21<br>29:8 53:15<br>64:20<br>justified 7:12,13<br>66:2,10 73:11<br>justifies 1:5 22:5<br>55:11  | knowledge 14:14<br>25:3 116:8<br>knows 6:22<br>L<br>lack 30:22 88:4<br>115:19<br>laid 43:18<br>land 116:4<br>language 3:10  |
| 47:9 117:18,20 income 28:19,21 28:22 incompatible 102:13 inconsistent 102:9,21 incorporated 120:24 121:4 increase 80:17 increasing 81:5  | 112:18 117:25<br>118:3 119:4<br>informative 8:3<br>14:5<br>informed 7:25<br>8:1,12,13,16<br>29:17,25 36:25<br>90:7<br>informing 30:3<br>96:20<br>inhibit 100:12  | 29:1 32:15<br>41:2,11 45:8<br>65:1 66:3<br>68:14 71:8<br>79:18 91:15<br>92:7,14,21<br>93:4,5,12,21<br>96:12,17,18<br>97:16,22,24<br>99:8 107:15<br>108:2,15  | inviting 95:6<br>involve 77:12,12<br>involved 1:14<br>involvement<br>76:13<br>involves 10:9<br>75:24 76:13<br>87:23 89:6<br>irrelevant 37:21<br>issue 6:10,24,25<br>10:19 18:13  | 86:4,8 107:16<br>107:19 110:5<br>111:18 121:6<br><b>journalists</b> 15:7<br>33:22 63:6<br>71:20 72:10<br>87:1 108:7<br>109:24 112:9<br>113:23  | justification 11:23 21:21 29:8 53:15 64:20 justified 7:12,13 66:2,10 73:11 justifies 1:5 22:5 55:11 justify 38:21 119:16  | knowledge 14:14<br>25:3 116:8<br>knows 6:22<br>L<br>lack 30:22 88:4<br>115:19<br>laid 43:18<br>land 116:4<br>language 3:10<br>4:12 72:13  |
| 47:9 117:18,20 income 28:19,21 28:22 incompatible 102:13 inconsistent 102:9,21 incorporated 120:24 121:4 increase 80:17 increasing 81:5 inculcated 61:3  | 112:18 117:25<br>118:3 119:4<br>informative 8:3<br>14:5<br>informed 7:25<br>8:1,12,13,16<br>29:17,25 36:25<br>90:7<br>informing 30:3<br>96:20<br>inhibit 100:12<br>inhibited 100:23  | 29:1 32:15<br>41:2,11 45:8<br>65:1 66:3<br>68:14 71:8<br>79:18 91:15<br>92:7,14,21<br>93:4,5,12,21<br>96:12,17,18<br>97:16,22,24<br>99:8 107:15<br>108:2,15<br>109:15,22,25  | inviting 95:6<br>involve 77:12,12<br>involved 1:14<br>involvement<br>76:13<br>involves 10:9<br>75:24 76:13<br>87:23 89:6<br>irrelevant 37:21<br>issue 6:10,24,25<br>10:19 18:13<br>21:8 26:13,21   | 86:4,8 107:16<br>107:19 110:5<br>111:18 121:6<br>journalists 15:7<br>33:22 63:6<br>71:20 72:10<br>87:1 108:7<br>109:24 112:9<br>113:23<br>journey 75:5   | justification 11:23 21:21 29:8 53:15 64:20 justified 7:12,13 66:2,10 73:11 justifies 1:5 22:5 55:11 justify 38:21 119:16  K   | knowledge 14:14<br>25:3 116:8<br>knows 6:22<br>L<br>lack 30:22 88:4<br>115:19<br>laid 43:18<br>land 116:4<br>language 3:10<br>4:12 72:13<br>large 17:17   |
| 47:9 117:18,20 income 28:19,21 28:22 incompatible 102:13 inconsistent 102:9,21 incorporated 120:24 121:4 increase 80:17 increasing 81:5 inculcated 61:3 inculcating  | 112:18 117:25<br>118:3 119:4<br>informative 8:3<br>14:5<br>informed 7:25<br>8:1,12,13,16<br>29:17,25 36:25<br>90:7<br>informing 30:3<br>96:20<br>inhibit 100:12<br>inhibited 100:23<br>inimical 76:16  | 29:1 32:15<br>41:2,11 45:8<br>65:1 66:3<br>68:14 71:8<br>79:18 91:15<br>92:7,14,21<br>93:4,5,12,21<br>96:12,17,18<br>97:16,22,24<br>99:8 107:15<br>108:2,15<br>109:15,22,25<br>110:21 111:2,8  | inviting 95:6<br>involve 77:12,12<br>involved 1:14<br>involvement<br>76:13<br>involves 10:9<br>75:24 76:13<br>87:23 89:6<br>irrelevant 37:21<br>issue 6:10,24,25<br>10:19 18:13<br>21:8 26:13,21<br>32:1 46:11   | 86:4,8 107:16<br>107:19 110:5<br>111:18 121:6<br>journalists 15:7<br>33:22 63:6<br>71:20 72:10<br>87:1 108:7<br>109:24 112:9<br>113:23<br>journey 75:5<br>judge 40:2   | justification 11:23 21:21 29:8 53:15 64:20 justified 7:12,13 66:2,10 73:11 justifies 1:5 22:5 55:11 justify 38:21 119:16  K keen 10:17  | knowledge 14:14<br>25:3 116:8<br>knows 6:22<br>L<br>lack 30:22 88:4<br>115:19<br>laid 43:18<br>land 116:4<br>language 3:10<br>4:12 72:13<br>large 17:17<br>44:19 70:22,25   |
| 47:9 117:18,20 income 28:19,21 28:22 incompatible 102:13 inconsistent 102:9,21 incorporated 120:24 121:4 increase 80:17 increasing 81:5 inculcated 61:3 inculcating 118:22   | 112:18 117:25<br>118:3 119:4<br>informative 8:3<br>14:5<br>informed 7:25<br>8:1,12,13,16<br>29:17,25 36:25<br>90:7<br>informing 30:3<br>96:20<br>inhibit 100:12<br>inhibited 100:23<br>inimical 76:16<br>initial 56:10   | 29:1 32:15<br>41:2,11 45:8<br>65:1 66:3<br>68:14 71:8<br>79:18 91:15<br>92:7,14,21<br>93:4,5,12,21<br>96:12,17,18<br>97:16,22,24<br>99:8 107:15<br>108:2,15<br>109:15,22,25<br>110:21 111:2,8<br>111:10,11,14  | inviting 95:6<br>involve 77:12,12<br>involved 1:14<br>involvement<br>76:13<br>involves 10:9<br>75:24 76:13<br>87:23 89:6<br>irrelevant 37:21<br>issue 6:10,24,25<br>10:19 18:13<br>21:8 26:13,21<br>32:1 46:11<br>65:22 68:20  | 86:4,8 107:16<br>107:19 110:5<br>111:18 121:6<br>journalists 15:7<br>33:22 63:6<br>71:20 72:10<br>87:1 108:7<br>109:24 112:9<br>113:23<br>journey 75:5<br>judge 40:2<br>judges 71:1  | justification 11:23 21:21 29:8 53:15 64:20 justified 7:12,13 66:2,10 73:11 justifies 1:5 22:5 55:11 justify 38:21 119:16  K keen 10:17 keep 9:25 23:17  | knowledge 14:14 25:3 116:8 knows 6:22  L lack 30:22 88:4 115:19 laid 43:18 land 116:4 language 3:10 4:12 72:13 large 17:17 44:19 70:22,25 80:4 81:24  |
| 47:9 117:18,20 income 28:19,21 28:22 incompatible 102:13 inconsistent 102:9,21 incorporated 120:24 121:4 increase 80:17 increasing 81:5 inculcated 61:3 inculcating 118:22 independent   | 112:18 117:25<br>118:3 119:4<br>informative 8:3<br>14:5<br>informed 7:25<br>8:1,12,13,16<br>29:17,25 36:25<br>90:7<br>informing 30:3<br>96:20<br>inhibit 100:12<br>inhibited 100:23<br>inimical 76:16<br>initial 56:10<br>Inquiry 1:4,6,15   | 29:1 32:15<br>41:2,11 45:8<br>65:1 66:3<br>68:14 71:8<br>79:18 91:15<br>92:7,14,21<br>93:4,5,12,21<br>96:12,17,18<br>97:16,22,24<br>99:8 107:15<br>108:2,15<br>109:15,22,25<br>110:21 111:2,8<br>111:10,11,14<br>112:14,16,17  | inviting 95:6<br>involve 77:12,12<br>involved 1:14<br>involvement<br>76:13<br>involves 10:9<br>75:24 76:13<br>87:23 89:6<br>irrelevant 37:21<br>issue 6:10,24,25<br>10:19 18:13<br>21:8 26:13,21<br>32:1 46:11<br>65:22 68:20<br>77:1 84:5   | 86:4,8 107:16<br>107:19 110:5<br>111:18 121:6<br>journalists 15:7<br>33:22 63:6<br>71:20 72:10<br>87:1 108:7<br>109:24 112:9<br>113:23<br>journey 75:5<br>judge 40:2<br>judges 71:1<br>judgment 43:10  | justification 11:23 21:21 29:8 53:15 64:20 justified 7:12,13 66:2,10 73:11 justifies 1:5 22:5 55:11 justify 38:21 119:16  K keen 10:17 keep 9:25 23:17 keeping 52:17  | knowledge 14:14 25:3 116:8 knows 6:22  L lack 30:22 88:4 115:19 laid 43:18 land 116:4 language 3:10 4:12 72:13 large 17:17 44:19 70:22,25 80:4 81:24 law 3:21 5:17 6:9  |
| 47:9 117:18,20 income 28:19,21 28:22 incompatible 102:13 inconsistent 102:9,21 incorporated 120:24 121:4 increase 80:17 increasing 81:5 inculcated 61:3 inculcating 118:22 independent 77:15,23  | 112:18 117:25<br>118:3 119:4<br>informative 8:3<br>14:5<br>informed 7:25<br>8:1,12,13,16<br>29:17,25 36:25<br>90:7<br>informing 30:3<br>96:20<br>inhibit 100:12<br>inhibited 100:23<br>inimical 76:16<br>initial 56:10<br>Inquiry 1:4,6,15<br>2:17 17:2  | 29:1 32:15<br>41:2,11 45:8<br>65:1 66:3<br>68:14 71:8<br>79:18 91:15<br>92:7,14,21<br>93:4,5,12,21<br>96:12,17,18<br>97:16,22,24<br>99:8 107:15<br>108:2,15<br>109:15,22,25<br>110:21 111:2,8<br>111:10,11,14<br>112:14,16,17<br>112:18 114:19   | inviting 95:6<br>involve 77:12,12<br>involved 1:14<br>involvement<br>76:13<br>involves 10:9<br>75:24 76:13<br>87:23 89:6<br>irrelevant 37:21<br>issue 6:10,24,25<br>10:19 18:13<br>21:8 26:13,21<br>32:1 46:11<br>65:22 68:20<br>77:1 84:5<br>101:9 103:14   | 86:4,8 107:16<br>107:19 110:5<br>111:18 121:6<br>journalists 15:7<br>33:22 63:6<br>71:20 72:10<br>87:1 108:7<br>109:24 112:9<br>113:23<br>journey 75:5<br>judge 40:2<br>judges 71:1<br>judgment 43:10<br>49:13 63:1<br>84:2 98:8<br>107:19 116:22  | justification 11:23 21:21 29:8 53:15 64:20 justified 7:12,13 66:2,10 73:11 justifies 1:5 22:5 55:11 justify 38:21 119:16  K keen 10:17 keep 9:25 23:17 keeping 52:17 key 102:5 116:22   | knowledge 14:14 25:3 116:8 knows 6:22  L lack 30:22 88:4 115:19 laid 43:18 land 116:4 language 3:10 4:12 72:13 large 17:17 44:19 70:22,25 80:4 81:24 law 3:21 5:17 6:9 6:12 7:5,5,7   |
| 47:9 117:18,20 income 28:19,21 28:22 incompatible 102:13 inconsistent 102:9,21 incorporated 120:24 121:4 increase 80:17 increasing 81:5 inculcated 61:3 inculcating 118:22 independent 77:15,23 independently  | 112:18 117:25<br>118:3 119:4<br>informative 8:3<br>14:5<br>informed 7:25<br>8:1,12,13,16<br>29:17,25 36:25<br>90:7<br>informing 30:3<br>96:20<br>inhibit 100:12<br>inhibited 100:23<br>inimical 76:16<br>initial 56:10<br>Inquiry 1:4,6,15<br>2:17 17:2<br>39:15 60:8  | 29:1 32:15<br>41:2,11 45:8<br>65:1 66:3<br>68:14 71:8<br>79:18 91:15<br>92:7,14,21<br>93:4,5,12,21<br>96:12,17,18<br>97:16,22,24<br>99:8 107:15<br>108:2,15<br>109:15,22,25<br>110:21 111:2,8<br>111:10,11,14<br>112:14,16,17<br>112:18 114:19<br>117:18   | inviting 95:6<br>involve 77:12,12<br>involved 1:14<br>involvement<br>76:13<br>involves 10:9<br>75:24 76:13<br>87:23 89:6<br>irrelevant 37:21<br>issue 6:10,24,25<br>10:19 18:13<br>21:8 26:13,21<br>32:1 46:11<br>65:22 68:20<br>77:1 84:5<br>101:9 103:14<br>108:6 113:9  | 86:4,8 107:16<br>107:19 110:5<br>111:18 121:6<br>journalists 15:7<br>33:22 63:6<br>71:20 72:10<br>87:1 108:7<br>109:24 112:9<br>113:23<br>journey 75:5<br>judge 40:2<br>judges 71:1<br>judgment 43:10<br>49:13 63:1<br>84:2 98:8   | justification 11:23 21:21 29:8 53:15 64:20 justified 7:12,13 66:2,10 73:11 justifies 1:5 22:5 55:11 justify 38:21 119:16  K keen 10:17 keep 9:25 23:17 keeping 52:17 key 102:5 116:22 kind 4:10 5:11  | knowledge 14:14 25:3 116:8 knows 6:22  L lack 30:22 88:4 115:19 laid 43:18 land 116:4 language 3:10 4:12 72:13 large 17:17 44:19 70:22,25 80:4 81:24 law 3:21 5:17 6:9 6:12 7:5,5,7 12:25 21:19   |
| 47:9 117:18,20 income 28:19,21 28:22 incompatible 102:13 inconsistent 102:9,21 incorporated 120:24 121:4 increase 80:17 increasing 81:5 inculcated 61:3 inculcating 118:22 independent 77:15,23 independently 115:11   | 112:18 117:25<br>118:3 119:4<br>informative 8:3<br>14:5<br>informed 7:25<br>8:1,12,13,16<br>29:17,25 36:25<br>90:7<br>informing 30:3<br>96:20<br>inhibit 100:12<br>inhibited 100:23<br>inimical 76:16<br>initial 56:10<br>Inquiry 1:4,6,15<br>2:17 17:2<br>39:15 60:8<br>77:18 95:5  | 29:1 32:15<br>41:2,11 45:8<br>65:1 66:3<br>68:14 71:8<br>79:18 91:15<br>92:7,14,21<br>93:4,5,12,21<br>96:12,17,18<br>97:16,22,24<br>99:8 107:15<br>108:2,15<br>109:15,22,25<br>110:21 111:2,8<br>111:10,11,14<br>112:14,16,17<br>112:18 114:19<br>117:18<br>interested 13:25   | inviting 95:6<br>involve 77:12,12<br>involved 1:14<br>involvement<br>76:13<br>involves 10:9<br>75:24 76:13<br>87:23 89:6<br>irrelevant 37:21<br>issue 6:10,24,25<br>10:19 18:13<br>21:8 26:13,21<br>32:1 46:11<br>65:22 68:20<br>77:1 84:5<br>101:9 103:14<br>108:6 113:9<br>issues 1:16 2:4   | 86:4,8 107:16<br>107:19 110:5<br>111:18 121:6<br>journalists 15:7<br>33:22 63:6<br>71:20 72:10<br>87:1 108:7<br>109:24 112:9<br>113:23<br>journey 75:5<br>judge 40:2<br>judges 71:1<br>judgment 43:10<br>49:13 63:1<br>84:2 98:8<br>107:19 116:22  | justification 11:23 21:21 29:8 53:15 64:20 justified 7:12,13 66:2,10 73:11 justifies 1:5 22:5 55:11 justify 38:21 119:16  K keen 10:17 keep 9:25 23:17 keeping 52:17 key 102:5 116:22 kind 4:10 5:11 5:16 16:19   | knowledge 14:14 25:3 116:8 knows 6:22  L lack 30:22 88:4 115:19 laid 43:18 land 116:4 language 3:10 4:12 72:13 large 17:17 44:19 70:22,25 80:4 81:24 law 3:21 5:17 6:9 6:12 7:5,5,7 12:25 21:19 24:11,22,25   |
| 47:9 117:18,20 income 28:19,21 28:22 incompatible 102:13 inconsistent 102:9,21 incorporated 120:24 121:4 increase 80:17 increasing 81:5 inculcated 61:3 inculcating 118:22 independent 77:15,23 independently 115:11 indirect 25:23  | 112:18 117:25<br>118:3 119:4<br>informative 8:3<br>14:5<br>informed 7:25<br>8:1,12,13,16<br>29:17,25 36:25<br>90:7<br>informing 30:3<br>96:20<br>inhibit 100:12<br>inhibited 100:23<br>inimical 76:16<br>initial 56:10<br>Inquiry 1:4,6,15<br>2:17 17:2<br>39:15 60:8<br>77:18 95:5<br>99:8 112:3,7  | 29:1 32:15 41:2,11 45:8 65:1 66:3 68:14 71:8 79:18 91:15 92:7,14,21 93:4,5,12,21 96:12,17,18 97:16,22,24 99:8 107:15 108:2,15 109:15,22,25 110:21 111:2,8 111:10,11,14 112:14,16,17 112:18 114:19 117:18 interested 13:25 16:12 22:23  | inviting 95:6 involve 77:12,12 involved 1:14 involvement 76:13 involves 10:9 75:24 76:13 87:23 89:6 irrelevant 37:21 issue 6:10,24,25 10:19 18:13 21:8 26:13,21 32:1 46:11 65:22 68:20 77:1 84:5 101:9 103:14 108:6 113:9 issues 1:16 2:4 3:10,20 17:2   | 86:4,8 107:16<br>107:19 110:5<br>111:18 121:6<br>journalists 15:7<br>33:22 63:6<br>71:20 72:10<br>87:1 108:7<br>109:24 112:9<br>113:23<br>journey 75:5<br>judge 40:2<br>judges 71:1<br>judgment 43:10<br>49:13 63:1<br>84:2 98:8<br>107:19 116:22<br>116:23  | justification 11:23 21:21 29:8 53:15 64:20 justified 7:12,13 66:2,10 73:11 justifies 1:5 22:5 55:11 justify 38:21 119:16  K keen 10:17 keep 9:25 23:17 keeping 52:17 key 102:5 116:22 kind 4:10 5:11 5:16 16:19 19:17 20:10,11  | knowledge 14:14 25:3 116:8 knows 6:22  L lack 30:22 88:4 115:19 laid 43:18 land 116:4 language 3:10 4:12 72:13 large 17:17 44:19 70:22,25 80:4 81:24 law 3:21 5:17 6:9 6:12 7:5,5,7 12:25 21:19 24:11,22,25 30:15,17,21   |
| 47:9 117:18,20 income 28:19,21 28:22 incompatible 102:13 inconsistent 102:9,21 incorporated 120:24 121:4 increase 80:17 increasing 81:5 inculcated 61:3 inculcating 118:22 independent 77:15,23 independently 115:11 indirect 25:23 individual 1:9,12  | 112:18 117:25<br>118:3 119:4<br>informative 8:3<br>14:5<br>informed 7:25<br>8:1,12,13,16<br>29:17,25 36:25<br>90:7<br>informing 30:3<br>96:20<br>inhibit 100:12<br>inhibited 100:23<br>inimical 76:16<br>initial 56:10<br>Inquiry 1:4,6,15<br>2:17 17:2<br>39:15 60:8<br>77:18 95:5<br>99:8 112:3,7<br>inside 77:13  | 29:1 32:15 41:2,11 45:8 65:1 66:3 68:14 71:8 79:18 91:15 92:7,14,21 93:4,5,12,21 96:12,17,18 97:16,22,24 99:8 107:15 108:2,15 109:15,22,25 110:21 111:2,8 111:10,11,14 112:14,16,17 112:18 114:19 117:18 interested 13:25 16:12 22:23 59:2 60:10,20  | inviting 95:6 involve 77:12,12 involved 1:14 involvement 76:13 involves 10:9 75:24 76:13 87:23 89:6 irrelevant 37:21 issue 6:10,24,25 10:19 18:13 21:8 26:13,21 32:1 46:11 65:22 68:20 77:1 84:5 101:9 103:14 108:6 113:9 issues 1:16 2:4 3:10,20 17:2 18:8,11 21:8  | 86:4,8 107:16<br>107:19 110:5<br>111:18 121:6<br>journalists 15:7<br>33:22 63:6<br>71:20 72:10<br>87:1 108:7<br>109:24 112:9<br>113:23<br>journey 75:5<br>judge 40:2<br>judges 71:1<br>judgment 43:10<br>49:13 63:1<br>84:2 98:8<br>107:19 116:22<br>116:23<br>judgments 97:17   | justification 11:23 21:21 29:8 53:15 64:20 justified 7:12,13 66:2,10 73:11 justifies 1:5 22:5 55:11 justify 38:21 119:16  K keen 10:17 keep 9:25 23:17 keeping 52:17 key 102:5 116:22 kind 4:10 5:11 5:16 16:19 19:17 20:10,11 22:4 25:5,6  | knowledge 14:14 25:3 116:8 knows 6:22  L lack 30:22 88:4 115:19 laid 43:18 land 116:4 language 3:10 4:12 72:13 large 17:17 44:19 70:22,25 80:4 81:24 law 3:21 5:17 6:9 6:12 7:5,5,7 12:25 21:19 24:11,22,25 30:15,17,21 31:6,20,23,23   |
| 47:9 117:18,20 income 28:19,21 28:22 incompatible 102:13 inconsistent 102:9,21 incorporated 120:24 121:4 increase 80:17 increasing 81:5 inculcated 61:3 inculcating 118:22 independent 77:15,23 independently 115:11 indirect 25:23 individual 1:9,12 7:17,23 8:21   | 112:18 117:25<br>118:3 119:4<br>informative 8:3<br>14:5<br>informed 7:25<br>8:1,12,13,16<br>29:17,25 36:25<br>90:7<br>informing 30:3<br>96:20<br>inhibit 100:12<br>inhibited 100:23<br>inimical 76:16<br>initial 56:10<br>Inquiry 1:4,6,15<br>2:17 17:2<br>39:15 60:8<br>77:18 95:5<br>99:8 112:3,7<br>inside 77:13<br>insist 94:9   | 29:1 32:15 41:2,11 45:8 65:1 66:3 68:14 71:8 79:18 91:15 92:7,14,21 93:4,5,12,21 96:12,17,18 97:16,22,24 99:8 107:15 108:2,15 109:15,22,25 110:21 111:2,8 111:10,11,14 112:14,16,17 112:18 114:19 117:18 interested 13:25 16:12 22:23 59:2 60:10,20 91:12  | inviting 95:6 involve 77:12,12 involved 1:14 involvement 76:13 involves 10:9 75:24 76:13 87:23 89:6 irrelevant 37:21 issue 6:10,24,25 10:19 18:13 21:8 26:13,21 32:1 46:11 65:22 68:20 77:1 84:5 101:9 103:14 108:6 113:9 issues 1:16 2:4 3:10,20 17:2 18:8,11 21:8 25:10 29:2,4   | 86:4,8 107:16<br>107:19 110:5<br>111:18 121:6<br>journalists 15:7<br>33:22 63:6<br>71:20 72:10<br>87:1 108:7<br>109:24 112:9<br>113:23<br>journey 75:5<br>judge 40:2<br>judges 71:1<br>judgment 43:10<br>49:13 63:1<br>84:2 98:8<br>107:19 116:22<br>116:23<br>judgments 97:17<br>118:23   | justification 11:23 21:21 29:8 53:15 64:20 justified 7:12,13 66:2,10 73:11 justifies 1:5 22:5 55:11 justify 38:21 119:16  K keen 10:17 keep 9:25 23:17 keeping 52:17 key 102:5 116:22 kind 4:10 5:11 5:16 16:19 19:17 20:10,11 22:4 25:5,6 31:12,14,20  | knowledge 14:14 25:3 116:8 knows 6:22  L lack 30:22 88:4 115:19 laid 43:18 land 116:4 language 3:10 4:12 72:13 large 17:17 44:19 70:22,25 80:4 81:24 law 3:21 5:17 6:9 6:12 7:5,5,7 12:25 21:19 24:11,22,25 30:15,17,21 31:6,20,23,23 34:8 36:1,4,15  |
| 47:9 117:18,20 income 28:19,21 28:22 incompatible 102:13 inconsistent 102:9,21 incorporated 120:24 121:4 increase 80:17 increasing 81:5 inculcated 61:3 inculcating 118:22 independent 77:15,23 independently 115:11 indirect 25:23 individual 1:9,12 7:17,23 8:21 11:18,22 13:16  | 112:18 117:25<br>118:3 119:4<br>informative 8:3<br>14:5<br>informed 7:25<br>8:1,12,13,16<br>29:17,25 36:25<br>90:7<br>informing 30:3<br>96:20<br>inhibit 100:12<br>inhibited 100:23<br>inimical 76:16<br>initial 56:10<br>Inquiry 1:4,6,15<br>2:17 17:2<br>39:15 60:8<br>77:18 95:5<br>99:8 112:3,7<br>inside 77:13<br>insist 94:9<br>insofar 9:16   | 29:1 32:15 41:2,11 45:8 65:1 66:3 68:14 71:8 79:18 91:15 92:7,14,21 93:4,5,12,21 96:12,17,18 97:16,22,24 99:8 107:15 108:2,15 109:15,22,25 110:21 111:2,8 111:10,11,14 112:14,16,17 112:18 114:19 117:18 interested 13:25 16:12 22:23 59:2 60:10,20 91:12 interesting 9:4,4  | inviting 95:6 involve 77:12,12 involved 1:14 involvement 76:13 involves 10:9 75:24 76:13 87:23 89:6 irrelevant 37:21 issue 6:10,24,25 10:19 18:13 21:8 26:13,21 32:1 46:11 65:22 68:20 77:1 84:5 101:9 103:14 108:6 113:9 issues 1:16 2:4 3:10,20 17:2 18:8,11 21:8 25:10 29:2,4 30:10,12,12   | 86:4,8 107:16<br>107:19 110:5<br>111:18 121:6<br>journalists 15:7<br>33:22 63:6<br>71:20 72:10<br>87:1 108:7<br>109:24 112:9<br>113:23<br>journey 75:5<br>judge 40:2<br>judges 71:1<br>judgment 43:10<br>49:13 63:1<br>84:2 98:8<br>107:19 116:22<br>116:23<br>judgments 97:17<br>118:23<br>judicial 98:3  | justification 11:23 21:21 29:8 53:15 64:20 justified 7:12,13 66:2,10 73:11 justifies 1:5 22:5 55:11 justify 38:21 119:16  K keen 10:17 keep 9:25 23:17 keeping 52:17 key 102:5 116:22 kind 4:10 5:11 5:16 16:19 19:17 20:10,11 22:4 25:5,6 31:12,14,20 32:17 34:21  | knowledge 14:14 25:3 116:8 knows 6:22  L lack 30:22 88:4 115:19 laid 43:18 land 116:4 language 3:10 4:12 72:13 large 17:17 44:19 70:22,25 80:4 81:24 law 3:21 5:17 6:9 6:12 7:5,5,7 12:25 21:19 24:11,22,25 30:15,17,21 31:6,20,23,23 34:8 36:1,4,15 46:14,21,23  |
| 47:9 117:18,20 income 28:19,21 28:22 incompatible 102:13 inconsistent 102:9,21 incorporated 120:24 121:4 increase 80:17 increasing 81:5 inculcated 61:3 inculcating 118:22 independent 77:15,23 independently 115:11 indirect 25:23 individual 1:9,12 7:17,23 8:21 11:18,22 13:16 13:17 14:23  | 112:18 117:25<br>118:3 119:4<br>informative 8:3<br>14:5<br>informed 7:25<br>8:1,12,13,16<br>29:17,25 36:25<br>90:7<br>informing 30:3<br>96:20<br>inhibit 100:12<br>inhibited 100:23<br>inimical 76:16<br>initial 56:10<br>Inquiry 1:4,6,15<br>2:17 17:2<br>39:15 60:8<br>77:18 95:5<br>99:8 112:3,7<br>inside 77:13<br>insist 94:9<br>insofar 9:16<br>59:13 66:4   | 29:1 32:15 41:2,11 45:8 65:1 66:3 68:14 71:8 79:18 91:15 92:7,14,21 93:4,5,12,21 96:12,17,18 97:16,22,24 99:8 107:15 108:2,15 109:15,22,25 110:21 111:2,8 111:10,11,14 112:14,16,17 112:18 114:19 117:18 interested 13:25 16:12 22:23 59:2 60:10,20 91:12 interesting 9:4,4 35:4 70:10   | inviting 95:6 involve 77:12,12 involved 1:14 involvement 76:13 involves 10:9 75:24 76:13 87:23 89:6 irrelevant 37:21 issue 6:10,24,25 10:19 18:13 21:8 26:13,21 32:1 46:11 65:22 68:20 77:1 84:5 101:9 103:14 108:6 113:9 issues 1:16 2:4 3:10,20 17:2 18:8,11 21:8 25:10 29:2,4 30:10,12,12 41:2,4,6,6  | 86:4,8 107:16<br>107:19 110:5<br>111:18 121:6<br>journalists 15:7<br>33:22 63:6<br>71:20 72:10<br>87:1 108:7<br>109:24 112:9<br>113:23<br>journey 75:5<br>judge 40:2<br>judges 71:1<br>judgment 43:10<br>49:13 63:1<br>84:2 98:8<br>107:19 116:22<br>116:23<br>judgments 97:17<br>118:23<br>judicial 98:3<br>July 1:1  | justification 11:23 21:21 29:8 53:15 64:20 justified 7:12,13 66:2,10 73:11 justifies 1:5 22:5 55:11 justify 38:21 119:16  K keen 10:17 keep 9:25 23:17 keeping 52:17 key 102:5 116:22 kind 4:10 5:11 5:16 16:19 19:17 20:10,11 22:4 25:5,6 31:12,14,20 32:17 34:21 35:18,19,20  | knowledge 14:14 25:3 116:8 knows 6:22  L lack 30:22 88:4 115:19 laid 43:18 land 116:4 language 3:10 4:12 72:13 large 17:17 44:19 70:22,25 80:4 81:24 law 3:21 5:17 6:9 6:12 7:5,5,7 12:25 21:19 24:11,22,25 30:15,17,21 31:6,20,23,23 34:8 36:1,4,15 46:14,21,23 47:5,10,14,15  |
| 47:9 117:18,20 income 28:19,21 28:22 incompatible 102:13 inconsistent 102:9,21 incorporated 120:24 121:4 increase 80:17 increasing 81:5 inculcated 61:3 inculcating 118:22 independent 77:15,23 independently 115:11 indirect 25:23 individual 1:9,12 7:17,23 8:21 11:18,22 13:16 13:17 14:23 15:6,9,18,22   | 112:18 117:25<br>118:3 119:4<br>informative 8:3<br>14:5<br>informed 7:25<br>8:1,12,13,16<br>29:17,25 36:25<br>90:7<br>informing 30:3<br>96:20<br>inhibit 100:12<br>inhibited 100:23<br>inimical 76:16<br>initial 56:10<br>Inquiry 1:4,6,15<br>2:17 17:2<br>39:15 60:8<br>77:18 95:5<br>99:8 112:3,7<br>inside 77:13<br>insist 94:9<br>insofar 9:16<br>59:13 66:4<br>instance 14:11   | 29:1 32:15 41:2,11 45:8 65:1 66:3 68:14 71:8 79:18 91:15 92:7,14,21 93:4,5,12,21 96:12,17,18 97:16,22,24 99:8 107:15 108:2,15 109:15,22,25 110:21 111:2,8 111:10,11,14 112:14,16,17 112:18 114:19 117:18 interested 13:25 16:12 22:23 59:2 60:10,20 91:12 interesting 9:4,4 35:4 70:10 79:11 110:22  | inviting 95:6 involve 77:12,12 involved 1:14 involvement 76:13 involves 10:9 75:24 76:13 87:23 89:6 irrelevant 37:21 issue 6:10,24,25 10:19 18:13 21:8 26:13,21 32:1 46:11 65:22 68:20 77:1 84:5 101:9 103:14 108:6 113:9 issues 1:16 2:4 3:10,20 17:2 18:8,11 21:8 25:10 29:2,4 30:10,12,12 41:2,4,6,6 53:24,24 75:4  | 86:4,8 107:16<br>107:19 110:5<br>111:18 121:6<br>journalists 15:7<br>33:22 63:6<br>71:20 72:10<br>87:1 108:7<br>109:24 112:9<br>113:23<br>journey 75:5<br>judge 40:2<br>judges 71:1<br>judgment 43:10<br>49:13 63:1<br>84:2 98:8<br>107:19 116:22<br>116:23<br>judgments 97:17<br>118:23<br>judicial 98:3<br>July 1:1<br>jump 46:3   | justification 11:23 21:21 29:8 53:15 64:20 justified 7:12,13 66:2,10 73:11 justifies 1:5 22:5 55:11 justify 38:21 119:16  K keen 10:17 keep 9:25 23:17 keeping 52:17 key 102:5 116:22 kind 4:10 5:11 5:16 16:19 19:17 20:10,11 22:4 25:5,6 31:12,14,20 32:17 34:21 35:18,19,20 36:1,7,16 38:9   | knowledge 14:14 25:3 116:8 knows 6:22  L lack 30:22 88:4 115:19 laid 43:18 land 116:4 language 3:10 4:12 72:13 large 17:17 44:19 70:22,25 80:4 81:24 law 3:21 5:17 6:9 6:12 7:5,5,7 12:25 21:19 24:11,22,25 30:15,17,21 31:6,20,23,23 34:8 36:1,4,15 46:14,21,23 47:5,10,14,15 47:19,23 48:6  |
| 47:9 117:18,20 income 28:19,21 28:22 incompatible 102:13 inconsistent 102:9,21 incorporated 120:24 121:4 increase 80:17 increasing 81:5 inculcated 61:3 inculcating 118:22 independent 77:15,23 independently 115:11 indirect 25:23 individual 1:9,12 7:17,23 8:21 11:18,22 13:16 13:17 14:23 15:6,9,18,22 16:1,4,18 17:9  | 112:18 117:25<br>118:3 119:4<br>informative 8:3<br>14:5<br>informed 7:25<br>8:1,12,13,16<br>29:17,25 36:25<br>90:7<br>informing 30:3<br>96:20<br>inhibit 100:12<br>inhibited 100:23<br>inimical 76:16<br>initial 56:10<br>Inquiry 1:4,6,15<br>2:17 17:2<br>39:15 60:8<br>77:18 95:5<br>99:8 112:3,7<br>inside 77:13<br>insist 94:9<br>insofar 9:16<br>59:13 66:4<br>instance 14:11<br>37:18 43:17  | 29:1 32:15 41:2,11 45:8 65:1 66:3 68:14 71:8 79:18 91:15 92:7,14,21 93:4,5,12,21 96:12,17,18 97:16,22,24 99:8 107:15 108:2,15 109:15,22,25 110:21 111:2,8 111:10,11,14 112:14,16,17 112:18 114:19 117:18 interested 13:25 16:12 22:23 59:2 60:10,20 91:12 interesting 9:4,4 35:4 70:10 79:11 110:22 interestingly  | inviting 95:6 involve 77:12,12 involved 1:14 involvement 76:13 involves 10:9 75:24 76:13 87:23 89:6 irrelevant 37:21 issue 6:10,24,25 10:19 18:13 21:8 26:13,21 32:1 46:11 65:22 68:20 77:1 84:5 101:9 103:14 108:6 113:9 issues 1:16 2:4 3:10,20 17:2 18:8,11 21:8 25:10 29:2,4 30:10,12,12 41:2,4,6,6 53:24,24 75:4 96:21 102:5  | 86:4,8 107:16<br>107:19 110:5<br>111:18 121:6<br>journalists 15:7<br>33:22 63:6<br>71:20 72:10<br>87:1 108:7<br>109:24 112:9<br>113:23<br>journey 75:5<br>judge 40:2<br>judges 71:1<br>judgment 43:10<br>49:13 63:1<br>84:2 98:8<br>107:19 116:22<br>116:23<br>judgments 97:17<br>118:23<br>judicial 98:3<br>July 1:1<br>jump 46:3<br>jungle 24:25   | justification 11:23 21:21 29:8 53:15 64:20 justified 7:12,13 66:2,10 73:11 justifies 1:5 22:5 55:11 justify 38:21 119:16  K keen 10:17 keep 9:25 23:17 keeping 52:17 key 102:5 116:22 kind 4:10 5:11 5:16 16:19 19:17 20:10,11 22:4 25:5,6 31:12,14,20 32:17 34:21 35:18,19,20 36:1,7,16 38:9 40:24 41:10   | knowledge 14:14 25:3 116:8 knows 6:22  L lack 30:22 88:4 115:19 laid 43:18 land 116:4 language 3:10 4:12 72:13 large 17:17 44:19 70:22,25 80:4 81:24 law 3:21 5:17 6:9 6:12 7:5,5,7 12:25 21:19 24:11,22,25 30:15,17,21 31:6,20,23,23 34:8 36:1,4,15 46:14,21,23 47:5,10,14,15 47:19,23 48:6 49:3,18,20,20  |
| 47:9 117:18,20 income 28:19,21 28:22 incompatible 102:13 inconsistent 102:9,21 incorporated 120:24 121:4 increase 80:17 increasing 81:5 inculcated 61:3 inculcating 118:22 independent 77:15,23 independently 115:11 indirect 25:23 individual 1:9,12 7:17,23 8:21 11:18,22 13:16 13:17 14:23 15:6,9,18,22 16:1,4,18 17:9 19:11,13,15,19   | 112:18 117:25<br>118:3 119:4<br>informative 8:3<br>14:5<br>informed 7:25<br>8:1,12,13,16<br>29:17,25 36:25<br>90:7<br>informing 30:3<br>96:20<br>inhibit 100:12<br>inhibited 100:23<br>inimical 76:16<br>initial 56:10<br>Inquiry 1:4,6,15<br>2:17 17:2<br>39:15 60:8<br>77:18 95:5<br>99:8 112:3,7<br>inside 77:13<br>insist 94:9<br>insofar 9:16<br>59:13 66:4<br>instance 14:11<br>37:18 43:17<br>45:5 93:5   | 29:1 32:15 41:2,11 45:8 65:1 66:3 68:14 71:8 79:18 91:15 92:7,14,21 93:4,5,12,21 96:12,17,18 97:16,22,24 99:8 107:15 108:2,15 109:15,22,25 110:21 111:2,8 111:10,11,14 112:14,16,17 112:18 114:19 117:18 interested 13:25 16:12 22:23 59:2 60:10,20 91:12 interesting 9:4,4 35:4 70:10 79:11 110:22 interestingly 88:19 89:3   | inviting 95:6 involve 77:12,12 involved 1:14 involvement 76:13 involves 10:9 75:24 76:13 87:23 89:6 irrelevant 37:21 issue 6:10,24,25 10:19 18:13 21:8 26:13,21 32:1 46:11 65:22 68:20 77:1 84:5 101:9 103:14 108:6 113:9 issues 1:16 2:4 3:10,20 17:2 18:8,11 21:8 25:10 29:2,4 30:10,12,12 41:2,4,6,6 53:24,24 75:4 96:21 102:5 109:9 119:22   | 86:4,8 107:16<br>107:19 110:5<br>111:18 121:6<br>journalists 15:7<br>33:22 63:6<br>71:20 72:10<br>87:1 108:7<br>109:24 112:9<br>113:23<br>journey 75:5<br>judge 40:2<br>judges 71:1<br>judgment 43:10<br>49:13 63:1<br>84:2 98:8<br>107:19 116:22<br>116:23<br>judgments 97:17<br>118:23<br>judicial 98:3<br>July 1:1<br>jump 46:3<br>jungle 24:25<br>juridical 4:3<br>juries 71:1   | justification 11:23 21:21 29:8 53:15 64:20 justified 7:12,13 66:2,10 73:11 justifies 1:5 22:5 55:11 justify 38:21 119:16  K keen 10:17 keep 9:25 23:17 keeping 52:17 key 102:5 116:22 kind 4:10 5:11 5:16 16:19 19:17 20:10,11 22:4 25:5,6 31:12,14,20 32:17 34:21 35:18,19,20 36:1,7,16 38:9 40:24 41:10 42:1 46:14,20   | knowledge 14:14 25:3 116:8 knows 6:22  L lack 30:22 88:4 115:19 laid 43:18 land 116:4 language 3:10 4:12 72:13 large 17:17 44:19 70:22,25 80:4 81:24 law 3:21 5:17 6:9 6:12 7:5,5,7 12:25 21:19 24:11,22,25 30:15,17,21 31:6,20,23,23 34:8 36:1,4,15 46:14,21,23 47:5,10,14,15 47:19,23 48:6 49:3,18,20,20 49:21 50:21  |
| 47:9 117:18,20 income 28:19,21 28:22 incompatible 102:13 inconsistent 102:9,21 incorporated 120:24 121:4 increase 80:17 increasing 81:5 inculcated 61:3 inculcating 118:22 independent 77:15,23 independently 115:11 indirect 25:23 individual 1:9,12 7:17,23 8:21 11:18,22 13:16 13:17 14:23 15:6,9,18,22 16:1,4,18 17:9 19:11,13,15,19 19:25 30:16,24  | 112:18 117:25<br>118:3 119:4<br>informative 8:3<br>14:5<br>informed 7:25<br>8:1,12,13,16<br>29:17,25 36:25<br>90:7<br>informing 30:3<br>96:20<br>inhibit 100:12<br>inhibited 100:23<br>inimical 76:16<br>initial 56:10<br>Inquiry 1:4,6,15<br>2:17 17:2<br>39:15 60:8<br>77:18 95:5<br>99:8 112:3,7<br>inside 77:13<br>insist 94:9<br>insofar 9:16<br>59:13 66:4<br>instance 14:11<br>37:18 43:17<br>45:5 93:5<br>instances 59:21  | 29:1 32:15 41:2,11 45:8 65:1 66:3 68:14 71:8 79:18 91:15 92:7,14,21 93:4,5,12,21 96:12,17,18 97:16,22,24 99:8 107:15 108:2,15 109:15,22,25 110:21 111:2,8 111:10,11,14 112:14,16,17 112:18 114:19 117:18 interested 13:25 16:12 22:23 59:2 60:10,20 91:12 interesting 9:4,4 35:4 70:10 79:11 110:22 interestingly 88:19 89:3 interests 1:11,20   | inviting 95:6 involve 77:12,12 involved 1:14 involvement 76:13 involves 10:9 75:24 76:13 87:23 89:6 irrelevant 37:21 issue 6:10,24,25 10:19 18:13 21:8 26:13,21 32:1 46:11 65:22 68:20 77:1 84:5 101:9 103:14 108:6 113:9 issues 1:16 2:4 3:10,20 17:2 18:8,11 21:8 25:10 29:2,4 30:10,12,12 41:2,4,6,6 53:24,24 75:4 96:21 102:5 109:9 119:22 120:4,10                                      | 86:4,8 107:16<br>107:19 110:5<br>111:18 121:6<br>journalists 15:7<br>33:22 63:6<br>71:20 72:10<br>87:1 108:7<br>109:24 112:9<br>113:23<br>journey 75:5<br>judge 40:2<br>judges 71:1<br>judgment 43:10<br>49:13 63:1<br>84:2 98:8<br>107:19 116:22<br>116:23<br>judgments 97:17<br>118:23<br>judicial 98:3<br>July 1:1<br>jump 46:3<br>jungle 24:25<br>juridical 4:3  | justification 11:23 21:21 29:8 53:15 64:20 justified 7:12,13 66:2,10 73:11 justifies 1:5 22:5 55:11 justify 38:21 119:16  K keen 10:17 keep 9:25 23:17 keeping 52:17 key 102:5 116:22 kind 4:10 5:11 5:16 16:19 19:17 20:10,11 22:4 25:5,6 31:12,14,20 32:17 34:21 35:18,19,20 36:1,7,16 38:9 40:24 41:10   | knowledge 14:14 25:3 116:8 knows 6:22  L lack 30:22 88:4 115:19 laid 43:18 land 116:4 language 3:10 4:12 72:13 large 17:17 44:19 70:22,25 80:4 81:24 law 3:21 5:17 6:9 6:12 7:5,5,7 12:25 21:19 24:11,22,25 30:15,17,21 31:6,20,23,23 34:8 36:1,4,15 46:14,21,23 47:5,10,14,15 47:19,23 48:6 49:3,18,20,20 49:21 50:21  |
| 47:9 117:18,20 income 28:19,21 28:22 incompatible 102:13 inconsistent 102:9,21 incorporated 120:24 121:4 increase 80:17 increasing 81:5 inculcated 61:3 inculcating 118:22 independent 77:15,23 independently 115:11 indirect 25:23 individual 1:9,12 7:17,23 8:21 11:18,22 13:16 13:17 14:23 15:6,9,18,22 16:1,4,18 17:9 19:11,13,15,19 19:25 30:16,24 32:18 33:17,18   | 112:18 117:25<br>118:3 119:4<br>informative 8:3<br>14:5<br>informed 7:25<br>8:1,12,13,16<br>29:17,25 36:25<br>90:7<br>informing 30:3<br>96:20<br>inhibit 100:12<br>inhibited 100:23<br>inimical 76:16<br>initial 56:10<br>Inquiry 1:4,6,15<br>2:17 17:2<br>39:15 60:8<br>77:18 95:5<br>99:8 112:3,7<br>inside 77:13<br>insist 94:9<br>insofar 9:16<br>59:13 66:4<br>instance 14:11<br>37:18 43:17<br>45:5 93:5<br>instances 59:21<br>institution 19:23                               | 29:1 32:15 41:2,11 45:8 65:1 66:3 68:14 71:8 79:18 91:15 92:7,14,21 93:4,5,12,21 96:12,17,18 97:16,22,24 99:8 107:15 108:2,15 109:15,22,25 110:21 111:2,8 111:10,11,14 112:14,16,17 112:18 114:19 117:18 interested 13:25 16:12 22:23 59:2 60:10,20 91:12 interesting 9:4,4 35:4 70:10 79:11 110:22 interestingly 88:19 89:3 interests 1:11,20 3:1,24 12:15  | inviting 95:6 involve 77:12,12 involved 1:14 involvement 76:13 involves 10:9 75:24 76:13 87:23 89:6 irrelevant 37:21 issue 6:10,24,25 10:19 18:13 21:8 26:13,21 32:1 46:11 65:22 68:20 77:1 84:5 101:9 103:14 108:6 113:9 issues 1:16 2:4 3:10,20 17:2 18:8,11 21:8 25:10 29:2,4 30:10,12,12 41:2,4,6,6 53:24,24 75:4 96:21 102:5 109:9 119:22 120:4,10 itemise 103:3                        | 86:4,8 107:16<br>107:19 110:5<br>111:18 121:6<br>journalists 15:7<br>33:22 63:6<br>71:20 72:10<br>87:1 108:7<br>109:24 112:9<br>113:23<br>journey 75:5<br>judge 40:2<br>judges 71:1<br>judgment 43:10<br>49:13 63:1<br>84:2 98:8<br>107:19 116:22<br>116:23<br>judgments 97:17<br>118:23<br>judicial 98:3<br>July 1:1<br>jump 46:3<br>jungle 24:25<br>juridical 4:3<br>jurisprudence   | justification 11:23 21:21 29:8 53:15 64:20 justified 7:12,13 66:2,10 73:11 justifies 1:5 22:5 55:11 justify 38:21 119:16  K keen 10:17 keep 9:25 23:17 keeping 52:17 key 102:5 116:22 kind 4:10 5:11 5:16 16:19 19:17 20:10,11 22:4 25:5,6 31:12,14,20 32:17 34:21 35:18,19,20 36:1,7,16 38:9 40:24 41:10 42:1 46:14,20 46:21,25 47:6 49:14 52:2                          | knowledge 14:14 25:3 116:8 knows 6:22  L lack 30:22 88:4 115:19 laid 43:18 land 116:4 language 3:10 4:12 72:13 large 17:17 44:19 70:22,25 80:4 81:24 law 3:21 5:17 6:9 6:12 7:5,5,7 12:25 21:19 24:11,22,25 30:15,17,21 31:6,20,23,23 34:8 36:1,4,15 46:14,21,23 47:5,10,14,15 47:19,23 48:6 49:3,18,20,20 49:21 50:21 55:22,23 56:11 56:15,19,25                                     |
| 47:9 117:18,20 income 28:19,21 28:22 incompatible 102:13 inconsistent 102:9,21 incorporated 120:24 121:4 increase 80:17 increasing 81:5 inculcated 61:3 inculcating 118:22 independent 77:15,23 independent 77:15,23 independent 15:11 indirect 25:23 individual 1:9,12 7:17,23 8:21 11:18,22 13:16 13:17 14:23 15:6,9,18,22 16:1,4,18 17:9 19:11,13,15,19 19:25 30:16,24 32:18 33:17,18 33:22 34:10,16                                  | 112:18 117:25<br>118:3 119:4<br>informative 8:3<br>14:5<br>informed 7:25<br>8:1,12,13,16<br>29:17,25 36:25<br>90:7<br>informing 30:3<br>96:20<br>inhibit 100:12<br>inhibited 100:23<br>inimical 76:16<br>initial 56:10<br>Inquiry 1:4,6,15<br>2:17 17:2<br>39:15 60:8<br>77:18 95:5<br>99:8 112:3,7<br>inside 77:13<br>insist 94:9<br>insofar 9:16<br>59:13 66:4<br>instance 14:11<br>37:18 43:17<br>45:5 93:5<br>instances 59:21<br>institution 19:23<br>33:24 34:15                | 29:1 32:15 41:2,11 45:8 65:1 66:3 68:14 71:8 79:18 91:15 92:7,14,21 93:4,5,12,21 96:12,17,18 97:16,22,24 99:8 107:15 108:2,15 109:15,22,25 110:21 111:2,8 111:10,11,14 112:14,16,17 112:18 114:19 117:18 interested 13:25 16:12 22:23 59:2 60:10,20 91:12 interesting 9:4,4 35:4 70:10 79:11 110:22 interestingly 88:19 89:3 interests 1:11,20 3:1,24 12:15 16:2,10,10,11                          | inviting 95:6 involve 77:12,12 involved 1:14 involvement 76:13 involves 10:9 75:24 76:13 87:23 89:6 irrelevant 37:21 issue 6:10,24,25 10:19 18:13 21:8 26:13,21 32:1 46:11 65:22 68:20 77:1 84:5 101:9 103:14 108:6 113:9 issues 1:16 2:4 3:10,20 17:2 18:8,11 21:8 25:10 29:2,4 30:10,12,12 41:2,4,6,6 53:24,24 75:4 96:21 102:5 109:9 119:22 120:4,10 itemise 103:3 items 16:25            | 86:4,8 107:16<br>107:19 110:5<br>111:18 121:6<br>journalists 15:7<br>33:22 63:6<br>71:20 72:10<br>87:1 108:7<br>109:24 112:9<br>113:23<br>journey 75:5<br>judge 40:2<br>judges 71:1<br>judgment 43:10<br>49:13 63:1<br>84:2 98:8<br>107:19 116:22<br>116:23<br>judgments 97:17<br>118:23<br>judicial 98:3<br>July 1:1<br>jump 46:3<br>jungle 24:25<br>juridical 4:3<br>juries 71:1<br>jurisprudence<br>2:16  | justification 11:23 21:21 29:8 53:15 64:20 justified 7:12,13 66:2,10 73:11 justifies 1:5 22:5 55:11 justify 38:21 119:16  K keen 10:17 keep 9:25 23:17 keeping 52:17 key 102:5 116:22 kind 4:10 5:11 5:16 16:19 19:17 20:10,11 22:4 25:5,6 31:12,14,20 32:17 34:21 35:18,19,20 36:1,7,16 38:9 40:24 41:10 42:1 46:14,20 46:21,25 47:6                                     | knowledge 14:14 25:3 116:8 knows 6:22  L lack 30:22 88:4 115:19 laid 43:18 land 116:4 language 3:10 4:12 72:13 large 17:17 44:19 70:22,25 80:4 81:24 law 3:21 5:17 6:9 6:12 7:5,5,7 12:25 21:19 24:11,22,25 30:15,17,21 31:6,20,23,23 34:8 36:1,4,15 46:14,21,23 47:5,10,14,15 47:19,23 48:6 49:3,18,20,20 49:21 50:21 55:22,23 56:11   |
| 47:9 117:18,20 income 28:19,21 28:22 incompatible 102:13 inconsistent 102:9,21 incorporated 120:24 121:4 increase 80:17 increasing 81:5 inculcated 61:3 inculcating 118:22 independent 77:15,23 independent 77:15,23 independent 15:11 indirect 25:23 individual 1:9,12 7:17,23 8:21 11:18,22 13:16 13:17 14:23 15:6,9,18,22 16:1,4,18 17:9 19:11,13,15,19 19:25 30:16,24 32:18 33:17,18 33:22 34:10,16 38:4 40:3 49:8                   | 112:18 117:25<br>118:3 119:4<br>informative 8:3<br>14:5<br>informed 7:25<br>8:1,12,13,16<br>29:17,25 36:25<br>90:7<br>informing 30:3<br>96:20<br>inhibit 100:12<br>inhibited 100:23<br>inimical 76:16<br>initial 56:10<br>Inquiry 1:4,6,15<br>2:17 17:2<br>39:15 60:8<br>77:18 95:5<br>99:8 112:3,7<br>inside 77:13<br>insist 94:9<br>insofar 9:16<br>59:13 66:4<br>instance 14:11<br>37:18 43:17<br>45:5 93:5<br>instances 59:21<br>institution 19:23<br>33:24 34:15<br>50:22 58:19 | 29:1 32:15 41:2,11 45:8 65:1 66:3 68:14 71:8 79:18 91:15 92:7,14,21 93:4,5,12,21 96:12,17,18 97:16,22,24 99:8 107:15 108:2,15 109:15,22,25 110:21 111:2,8 111:10,11,14 112:14,16,17 112:18 114:19 117:18 interested 13:25 16:12 22:23 59:2 60:10,20 91:12 interesting 9:4,4 35:4 70:10 79:11 110:22 interestingly 88:19 89:3 interests 1:11,20 3:1,24 12:15 16:2,10,10,11 16:18 20:2               | inviting 95:6 involve 77:12,12 involved 1:14 involvement 76:13 involves 10:9 75:24 76:13 87:23 89:6 irrelevant 37:21 issue 6:10,24,25 10:19 18:13 21:8 26:13,21 32:1 46:11 65:22 68:20 77:1 84:5 101:9 103:14 108:6 113:9 issues 1:16 2:4 3:10,20 17:2 18:8,11 21:8 25:10 29:2,4 30:10,12,12 41:2,4,6,6 53:24,24 75:4 96:21 102:5 109:9 119:22 120:4,10 itemise 103:3 items 16:25 it'll 29:5 | 86:4,8 107:16<br>107:19 110:5<br>111:18 121:6<br>journalists 15:7<br>33:22 63:6<br>71:20 72:10<br>87:1 108:7<br>109:24 112:9<br>113:23<br>journey 75:5<br>judge 40:2<br>judges 71:1<br>judgment 43:10<br>49:13 63:1<br>84:2 98:8<br>107:19 116:22<br>116:23<br>judgments 97:17<br>118:23<br>judicial 98:3<br>July 1:1<br>jump 46:3<br>jungle 24:25<br>juridical 4:3<br>juries 71:1<br>jurisprudence<br>2:16<br>jurisprudential<br>23:14                                      | justification 11:23 21:21 29:8 53:15 64:20 justified 7:12,13 66:2,10 73:11 justifies 1:5 22:5 55:11 justify 38:21 119:16  K keen 10:17 keep 9:25 23:17 keeping 52:17 key 102:5 116:22 kind 4:10 5:11 5:16 16:19 19:17 20:10,11 22:4 25:5,6 31:12,14,20 32:17 34:21 35:18,19,20 36:1,7,16 38:9 40:24 41:10 42:1 46:14,20 46:21,25 47:6 49:14 52:2                          | knowledge 14:14 25:3 116:8 knows 6:22  L lack 30:22 88:4 115:19 laid 43:18 land 116:4 language 3:10 4:12 72:13 large 17:17 44:19 70:22,25 80:4 81:24 law 3:21 5:17 6:9 6:12 7:5,5,7 12:25 21:19 24:11,22,25 30:15,17,21 31:6,20,23,23 34:8 36:1,4,15 46:14,21,23 47:5,10,14,15 47:19,23 48:6 49:3,18,20,20 49:21 50:21 55:22,23 56:11 56:15,19,25                                     |
| 47:9 117:18,20 income 28:19,21 28:22 incompatible 102:13 inconsistent 102:9,21 incorporated 120:24 121:4 increase 80:17 increasing 81:5 inculcated 61:3 inculcating 118:22 independent 77:15,23 independent 77:15,23 independently 115:11 indirect 25:23 individual 1:9,12 7:17,23 8:21 11:18,22 13:16 13:17 14:23 15:6,9,18,22 16:1,4,18 17:9 19:11,13,15,19 19:25 30:16,24 32:18 33:17,18 33:22 34:10,16 38:4 40:3 49:8 49:17 50:10,17 | 112:18 117:25 118:3 119:4 informative 8:3 14:5 informed 7:25 8:1,12,13,16 29:17,25 36:25 90:7 informing 30:3 96:20 inhibit 100:12 inhibited 100:23 inimical 76:16 initial 56:10 Inquiry 1:4,6,15 2:17 17:2 39:15 60:8 77:18 95:5 99:8 112:3,7 inside 77:13 insist 94:9 insofar 9:16 59:13 66:4 instance 14:11 37:18 43:17 45:5 93:5 instances 59:21 institution 19:23 33:24 34:15 50:22 58:19 institutional 7:4  | 29:1 32:15 41:2,11 45:8 65:1 66:3 68:14 71:8 79:18 91:15 92:7,14,21 93:4,5,12,21 96:12,17,18 97:16,22,24 99:8 107:15 108:2,15 109:15,22,25 110:21 111:2,8 111:10,11,14 112:14,16,17 112:18 114:19 117:18 interested 13:25 16:12 22:23 59:2 60:10,20 91:12 interesting 9:4,4 35:4 70:10 79:11 110:22 interestingly 88:19 89:3 interests 1:11,20 3:1,24 12:15 16:2,10,10,11 16:18 20:2 29:6 37:6,8,9 | inviting 95:6 involve 77:12,12 involved 1:14 involvement 76:13 involves 10:9 75:24 76:13 87:23 89:6 irrelevant 37:21 issue 6:10,24,25 10:19 18:13 21:8 26:13,21 32:1 46:11 65:22 68:20 77:1 84:5 101:9 103:14 108:6 113:9 issues 1:16 2:4 3:10,20 17:2 18:8,11 21:8 25:10 29:2,4 30:10,12,12 41:2,4,6,6 53:24,24 75:4 96:21 102:5 109:9 119:22 120:4,10 itemise 103:3 items 16:25            | 86:4,8 107:16<br>107:19 110:5<br>111:18 121:6<br>journalists 15:7<br>33:22 63:6<br>71:20 72:10<br>87:1 108:7<br>109:24 112:9<br>113:23<br>journey 75:5<br>judge 40:2<br>judges 71:1<br>judgment 43:10<br>49:13 63:1<br>84:2 98:8<br>107:19 116:22<br>116:23<br>judgments 97:17<br>118:23<br>judicial 98:3<br>July 1:1<br>jump 46:3<br>jungle 24:25<br>juridical 4:3<br>juries 71:1<br>jurisprudence<br>2:16<br>jurisprudential<br>23:14<br>Justice 1:3 2:7                   | justification 11:23 21:21 29:8 53:15 64:20 justified 7:12,13 66:2,10 73:11 justifies 1:5 22:5 55:11 justify 38:21 119:16  K keen 10:17 keep 9:25 23:17 keeping 52:17 key 102:5 116:22 kind 4:10 5:11 5:16 16:19 19:17 20:10,11 22:4 25:5,6 31:12,14,20 32:17 34:21 35:18,19,20 36:1,7,16 38:9 40:24 41:10 42:1 46:14,20 46:21,25 47:6 49:14 52:2 54:6,8 55:2              | knowledge 14:14 25:3 116:8 knows 6:22  L lack 30:22 88:4 115:19 laid 43:18 land 116:4 language 3:10 4:12 72:13 large 17:17 44:19 70:22,25 80:4 81:24 law 3:21 5:17 6:9 6:12 7:5,5,7 12:25 21:19 24:11,22,25 30:15,17,21 31:6,20,23,23 34:8 36:1,4,15 46:14,21,23 47:5,10,14,15 47:19,23 48:6 49:3,18,20,20 49:21 50:21 55:22,23 56:11 56:15,19,25 57:7,13,15                          |
| 47:9 117:18,20 income 28:19,21 28:22 incompatible 102:13 inconsistent 102:9,21 incorporated 120:24 121:4 increase 80:17 increasing 81:5 inculcated 61:3 inculcating 118:22 independent 77:15,23 independent 77:15,23 independent 15:11 indirect 25:23 individual 1:9,12 7:17,23 8:21 11:18,22 13:16 13:17 14:23 15:6,9,18,22 16:1,4,18 17:9 19:11,13,15,19 19:25 30:16,24 32:18 33:17,18 33:22 34:10,16 38:4 40:3 49:8                   | 112:18 117:25<br>118:3 119:4<br>informative 8:3<br>14:5<br>informed 7:25<br>8:1,12,13,16<br>29:17,25 36:25<br>90:7<br>informing 30:3<br>96:20<br>inhibit 100:12<br>inhibited 100:23<br>inimical 76:16<br>initial 56:10<br>Inquiry 1:4,6,15<br>2:17 17:2<br>39:15 60:8<br>77:18 95:5<br>99:8 112:3,7<br>inside 77:13<br>insist 94:9<br>insofar 9:16<br>59:13 66:4<br>instance 14:11<br>37:18 43:17<br>45:5 93:5<br>instances 59:21<br>institution 19:23<br>33:24 34:15<br>50:22 58:19 | 29:1 32:15 41:2,11 45:8 65:1 66:3 68:14 71:8 79:18 91:15 92:7,14,21 93:4,5,12,21 96:12,17,18 97:16,22,24 99:8 107:15 108:2,15 109:15,22,25 110:21 111:2,8 111:10,11,14 112:14,16,17 112:18 114:19 117:18 interested 13:25 16:12 22:23 59:2 60:10,20 91:12 interesting 9:4,4 35:4 70:10 79:11 110:22 interestingly 88:19 89:3 interests 1:11,20 3:1,24 12:15 16:2,10,10,11 16:18 20:2               | inviting 95:6 involve 77:12,12 involved 1:14 involvement 76:13 involves 10:9 75:24 76:13 87:23 89:6 irrelevant 37:21 issue 6:10,24,25 10:19 18:13 21:8 26:13,21 32:1 46:11 65:22 68:20 77:1 84:5 101:9 103:14 108:6 113:9 issues 1:16 2:4 3:10,20 17:2 18:8,11 21:8 25:10 29:2,4 30:10,12,12 41:2,4,6,6 53:24,24 75:4 96:21 102:5 109:9 119:22 120:4,10 itemise 103:3 items 16:25 it'll 29:5 | 86:4,8 107:16<br>107:19 110:5<br>111:18 121:6<br>journalists 15:7<br>33:22 63:6<br>71:20 72:10<br>87:1 108:7<br>109:24 112:9<br>113:23<br>journey 75:5<br>judge 40:2<br>judges 71:1<br>judgment 43:10<br>49:13 63:1<br>84:2 98:8<br>107:19 116:22<br>116:23<br>judgments 97:17<br>118:23<br>judicial 98:3<br>July 1:1<br>jump 46:3<br>jungle 24:25<br>juridical 4:3<br>juries 71:1<br>jurisprudence<br>2:16<br>jurisprudential<br>23:14<br>Justice 1:3 2:7<br>2:23 6:21 9:22 | justification 11:23 21:21 29:8 53:15 64:20 justified 7:12,13 66:2,10 73:11 justifies 1:5 22:5 55:11 justify 38:21 119:16  K keen 10:17 keep 9:25 23:17 keeping 52:17 key 102:5 116:22 kind 4:10 5:11 5:16 16:19 19:17 20:10,11 22:4 25:5,6 31:12,14,20 32:17 34:21 35:18,19,20 36:1,7,16 38:9 40:24 41:10 42:1 46:14,20 46:21,25 47:6 49:14 52:2 54:6,8 55:2 57:7 74:8,12 | knowledge 14:14 25:3 116:8 knows 6:22  L lack 30:22 88:4 115:19 laid 43:18 land 116:4 language 3:10 4:12 72:13 large 17:17 44:19 70:22,25 80:4 81:24 law 3:21 5:17 6:9 6:12 7:5,5,7 12:25 21:19 24:11,22,25 30:15,17,21 31:6,20,23,23 34:8 36:1,4,15 46:14,21,23 47:5,10,14,15 47:19,23 48:6 49:3,18,20,20 49:21 50:21 55:22,23 56:11 56:15,19,25 57:7,13,15 58:7,21 59:4             |
| 47:9 117:18,20 income 28:19,21 28:22 incompatible 102:13 inconsistent 102:9,21 incorporated 120:24 121:4 increase 80:17 increasing 81:5 inculcated 61:3 inculcating 118:22 independent 77:15,23 independent 77:15,23 independently 115:11 indirect 25:23 individual 1:9,12 7:17,23 8:21 11:18,22 13:16 13:17 14:23 15:6,9,18,22 16:1,4,18 17:9 19:11,13,15,19 19:25 30:16,24 32:18 33:17,18 33:22 34:10,16 38:4 40:3 49:8 49:17 50:10,17 | 112:18 117:25 118:3 119:4 informative 8:3 14:5 informed 7:25 8:1,12,13,16 29:17,25 36:25 90:7 informing 30:3 96:20 inhibit 100:12 inhibited 100:23 inimical 76:16 initial 56:10 Inquiry 1:4,6,15 2:17 17:2 39:15 60:8 77:18 95:5 99:8 112:3,7 inside 77:13 insist 94:9 insofar 9:16 59:13 66:4 instance 14:11 37:18 43:17 45:5 93:5 instances 59:21 institution 19:23 33:24 34:15 50:22 58:19 institutional 7:4  | 29:1 32:15 41:2,11 45:8 65:1 66:3 68:14 71:8 79:18 91:15 92:7,14,21 93:4,5,12,21 96:12,17,18 97:16,22,24 99:8 107:15 108:2,15 109:15,22,25 110:21 111:2,8 111:10,11,14 112:14,16,17 112:18 114:19 117:18 interested 13:25 16:12 22:23 59:2 60:10,20 91:12 interesting 9:4,4 35:4 70:10 79:11 110:22 interestingly 88:19 89:3 interests 1:11,20 3:1,24 12:15 16:2,10,10,11 16:18 20:2 29:6 37:6,8,9 | inviting 95:6 involve 77:12,12 involved 1:14 involvement 76:13 involves 10:9 75:24 76:13 87:23 89:6 irrelevant 37:21 issue 6:10,24,25 10:19 18:13 21:8 26:13,21 32:1 46:11 65:22 68:20 77:1 84:5 101:9 103:14 108:6 113:9 issues 1:16 2:4 3:10,20 17:2 18:8,11 21:8 25:10 29:2,4 30:10,12,12 41:2,4,6,6 53:24,24 75:4 96:21 102:5 109:9 119:22 120:4,10 itemise 103:3 items 16:25 it'll 29:5 | 86:4,8 107:16<br>107:19 110:5<br>111:18 121:6<br>journalists 15:7<br>33:22 63:6<br>71:20 72:10<br>87:1 108:7<br>109:24 112:9<br>113:23<br>journey 75:5<br>judge 40:2<br>judges 71:1<br>judgment 43:10<br>49:13 63:1<br>84:2 98:8<br>107:19 116:22<br>116:23<br>judgments 97:17<br>118:23<br>judicial 98:3<br>July 1:1<br>jump 46:3<br>jungle 24:25<br>juridical 4:3<br>juries 71:1<br>jurisprudence<br>2:16<br>jurisprudential<br>23:14<br>Justice 1:3 2:7                   | justification 11:23 21:21 29:8 53:15 64:20 justified 7:12,13 66:2,10 73:11 justifies 1:5 22:5 55:11 justify 38:21 119:16  | knowledge 14:14 25:3 116:8 knows 6:22  L lack 30:22 88:4 115:19 laid 43:18 land 116:4 language 3:10 4:12 72:13 large 17:17 44:19 70:22,25 80:4 81:24 law 3:21 5:17 6:9 6:12 7:5,5,7 12:25 21:19 24:11,22,25 30:15,17,21 31:6,20,23,23 34:8 36:1,4,15 46:14,21,23 47:5,10,14,15 47:19,23 48:6 49:3,18,20,20 49:21 50:21 55:22,23 56:11 56:15,19,25 57:7,13,15 58:7,21 59:4 59:11,16,19 |

|                                    |  |                              |                   |                             |                            | Page 129                              |
|------------------------------------|--|------------------------------|-------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------------------|
|                                    | 1                                      | I                            | I                 | I                           | I                          | I                                     |
| 73:3,22,23                         | 59:2,22 62:11                          | link 74:21                   | 113:20 115:6      | 77:16 91:14                 | 39:7 69:12                 | 111:17                                |
| 74:1 80:17,24                      | 62:14,19 63:11                         | <b>list</b> 94:14 107:14     | 115:16 116:5      | 92:1,5,11                   | members 77:5               | Mm-hm 21:16                           |
| laws 22:14 25:3                    | 64:12 67:23                            | 120:9                        | 119:15,18,25      | 105:10                      | 78:9 109:8                 | 86:1 103:2,10                         |
| 31:11,13 55:24                     | 68:1,25 72:24                          | listen 9:13,20               | 120:11,25         | mattered 41:21              | 115:25                     | model 76:24                           |
| 58:12                              | 73:22 74:14,20                         | listening 14:1               | 121:14,17         | matters 30:1                | men 3:2                    | moderate 45:22                        |
| law's 46:19 47:2                   | 74:23 75:3,11                          | little 38:8,10               | 122:1             | 39:21 53:6                  | Mendus 2:6,9,14            | modern 3:14                           |
| 56:12                              | 76:8,10,16                             | 75:8,10,13                   | lose 10:1 47:21   | 54:19,19,20                 | 3:13,14 8:4,6              | 12:15                                 |
| law-abiding                        | 77:6,15,25                             | 107:11 112:1                 | lot 16:8 25:13    | 65:14 78:7                  | 11:25 13:22                | modes 26:8                            |
| 31:21                              | 82:6 83:25                             | live 27:11 75:15             | 27:20 33:3,11     | 97:23 102:2                 | 16:22 17:25                | moment 32:11                          |
| lay 70:18 71:1,1                   | 89:7,14,25                             | 77:1 78:18                   | 41:21 45:9,14     | mature 7:15                 | 18:14 19:5                 | 61:19 81:3                            |
| 76:13                              | 90:5,7,10,13                           | 79:4 89:20                   | 54:1,18 63:12     | maximising                  | 22:17 23:9,19              | 91:9,22 114:4                         |
| lead 25:8 76:24                    | 90:16 94:19                            | 96:23 108:12                 | 68:9 70:15        | 108:1                       | 27:1,20 29:10              | moments 74:20                         |
| leadership                         | 95:4,8,13                              | 108:16,16                    | 71:3 79:3         | mean 8:24 14:8              | 32:22,23 36:18             | Monday 1:1                            |
| 119:23 120:10                      | 98:25 99:21                            | lived 71:25                  | 86:24 100:17      | 23:3 30:7 34:9              | 36:19 38:6                 | money 18:19                           |
| 121:13                             | 100:1,5 105:20                         | 105:15 106:9                 | 118:22            | 38:8,21 39:3                | 39:4,12 41:19              | 44:13,19 45:5                         |
| leading 9:12                       | 105:24 106:10                          | 113:14                       | lots 21:10 109:14 | 39:19 41:14                 | 41:20 45:13                | 45:9,15                               |
| leads 4:10 63:3                    | 106:17 111:23                          | lives 27:8 28:11             | loud 17:9 101:18  | 44:25 45:2,4                | 48:21 49:9,11              | monitored 51:5                        |
| 110:19                             | 113:20 115:6                           | 42:22 45:2                   | low 21:2          | 52:24 75:21                 | 50:11,14 51:2              | monitoring 62:9                       |
| learning 89:19                     | 115:16 116:5                           | 60:21 96:22                  | luncheon 122:4    | 79:14 81:7                  | 52:23 54:11,12             | monitors 52:18                        |
| leave 40:23 50:7                   | 119:15,18,25                           | loaded 89:23                 | lying 84:12       | 83:25 86:12,20              | 57:15,20 58:1              | monopoly 85:16                        |
| 54:7 61:16                         | 120:11,25                              | London 2:13                  | Jing 07.12        | 91:21 94:22                 | 58:21 59:1,13              | months 75:12                          |
| 84:5                               | 120:11,23                              | long 44:21 87:17             | M                 | 99:24 100:16                | 61:17 62:12,18             | 89:20,22                              |
| lecturer 64:16                     | 121:14,17                              | long-term 59:17              |                   | 102:2,12 105:8              | mention 32:24              | moral 3:18 4:3                        |
| Leeds 95:23                        | lexicon 3:22                           | look 7:8,8 12:23             | magistrates 71:2  | 102:2,12 103:8              | 37:11                      | 5:14 25:6 33:4                        |
| left 37:6 40:2                     | liable 32:19,20                        | 26:12 40:12                  | main 3:7,9,14,18  | 111:25 112:25               | mentioned 4:4              | 33:22 36:17                           |
| 50:4,19,25                         | 85:2 111:15                            | 41:13 85:24                  | 7:14 24:5         | 111:25 112:25               | 13:10 21:19,20             | 40:13 49:16                           |
| 113:25                             | libel 66:24                            | looked 64:24                 | 36:24 46:23       | means 2:19                  | 37:22 66:13                | 66:6 72:10,14                         |
|                                    |  |                              | 61:22 64:18,19    |                             |                            | · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · |
| <b>legal</b> 3:19 6:2,5 6:21 35:23 | liberal 54:21<br>66:23 67:2            | 93:19 107:24<br>114:16       | 78:16 92:17       | 17:13 58:22<br>69:24 101:10 | 69:7 71:21<br>85:7 88:17   | 72:14,15,18                           |
| 41:17 46:7,9                       |  |                              | 95:25 100:21      | 118:1                       | 94:11 97:14                | 73:2,4,16<br>76:25 77:3               |
|                                    | 69:11,16 71:24<br>92:9 94:10           | looking 13:16<br>57:23 62:16 | maintain 28:16    |                             | 98:6                       |                                       |
| 46:11 47:19                        |  |                              | 101:6             | meant 76:10                 |                            | 88:14 96:3,4                          |
| 48:4 53:23                         | <b>liberty</b> 30:19<br>43:20 104:5    | 79:13 85:20<br>96:8 105:2    | maintained        | measure 22:4<br>57:8        | mentioning<br>81:22 119:12 | 114:18                                |
| 72:20,21 75:17                     | licences 93:14                         | 107:5                        | 67:21             | measures 56:1               | mere 20:14                 | morality 6:10<br>7:2 30:22            |
| 80:17 81:13,15<br>82:5 90:11       |  | looks 75:16 91:6             | majority 42:15    | measures 50:1<br>mechanism  | 101:13                     |                                       |
|                                    | licensed 104:6,7<br>lie 37:8,9 67:1,12 | LORD 1:3 2:7                 | making 19:15      |                             |                            | 33:19,19,21,25                        |
| legislation 2:4                    |  |                              | 62:2 75:5,6,24    | 46:20,21 74:25              | merely 25:9 32:3           | 34:8,12 36:8,9                        |
| 37:13,15,17                        | life 4:17,18 21:9                      | 2:23 6:21 9:22               | 82:18 85:15       | 114:24,25                   | 46:10 52:12                | 39:16 40:15                           |
| 38:13,17,22                        | 27:14 28:7,13                          | 10:11 13:19                  | 93:15 97:16       | 115:4                       | middle 50:1                | 43:3,13 44:1                          |
| 48:5 56:18                         | 33:24 42:6,25                          | 18:12,22 20:1                | 103:21            | mechanisms                  | mid-point 53:9             | morality's 36:14                      |
| legislators 60:17                  | 43:18,20 44:15                         | 20:7 21:10,14                | man 43:7 48:25    | 76:15                       | Mill 10:23 12:9            | morally 6:6 31:7                      |
| legitimate 13:4                    | 44:16 90:22                            | 23:6,13 26:13                | manage 81:5,8     | media 60:18,19              | 14:15,17 49:21             | 42:5 48:23                            |
| 21:18 26:15                        | 91:3,13 118:1                          | 26:19 32:2                   | managers 81:3     | 61:6,12 78:7                | million 51:8,11            | 49:2 74:4                             |
| 28:6 31:20,23                      | 121:11                                 | 35:2 38:23                   | manifestation     | 83:3 98:17                  | mind 1:17 3:9              | 89:23                                 |
| 35:9 40:7                          | light 41:1 63:19                       | 44:7,24 45:8                 | 52:13             | 99:8,9 104:9                | 36:19 71:17                | morning 60:3                          |
| 41:18 45:16,17                     | 63:24 99:11                            | 45:20 49:7,10                | manifesting       | 108:23 109:5                | 79:5,13 84:7               | motivation 61:25                      |
| LESLEY 2:9                         | 105:19 121:23                          | 49:23 50:12                  | 61:10             | 109:22 110:11               | 86:18 91:11                | 62:1                                  |
| let's 13:19 18:4                   | liked 17:5                             | 51:1 52:12,16                | market 21:22      | 110:16 111:12               | 102:22 105:9               | motive 55:10,14                       |
| 74:17                              | limit 59:4 70:3                        | 56:8,23 57:19                | 22:2 23:1,21      | 112:9 115:23                | minds 8:2                  | mouth 39:2                            |
| level 6:11 21:2                    | 72:1 87:16                             | 57:21 58:24                  | 23:24 24:3,3,9    | 115:25                      | minimum 28:20              | move 5:3 7:14                         |
| 76:13 81:22                        | 88:3                                   | 59:2,22 62:11                | 24:11,12,14,15    | mediate 45:22               | 36:2                       | 8:12 13:18                            |
| 106:21                             | limitations 19:24                      | 62:14,19 63:11               | 24:24,25 25:1     | medical 27:21               | minority 34:4              | 14:22 23:21                           |
| levers 85:18                       | 20:2 28:18,20                          | 64:12 67:23                  | 25:10,12,12       | 90:2 96:6                   | minute 71:14               | 30:14 59:22                           |
| <b>LEVESON</b> 1:3                 | limited 12:14                          | 68:1,25 72:24                | marketplace       | 102:3                       | minutes 95:7               | moving 23:4                           |
| 2:7,23 6:21                        | 18:2 19:14                             | 73:22 74:14,20               | 11:8 12:10,19     | <b>medicine</b> 96:10       | misdescribe 55:5           | 46:11 52:17                           |
| 9:22 10:11                         | 51:16 71:9                             | 74:23 75:3,11                | marking 77:18     | medium 59:17                | miserable 89:21            | 58:7,8 75:16                          |
| 13:19 18:12,22                     | 88:5 93:8                              | 76:8,10,16                   | mate 37:25 38:14  | megaphone 17:5              | mislead 74:13              | muddled 90:19                         |
| 20:1,7 21:10                       | 101:18,22                              | 77:6,15,25                   | material 121:20   | 17:11 18:1,9                | misleading 74:15           | multicultural                         |
| 21:14 23:6,13                      | limitless 18:11                        | 82:6 83:25                   | matter 7:2 20:21  | 19:17 20:22                 | 84:14,17,22                | 54:16                                 |
| 26:13,19 32:2                      | limits 8:19 20:5                       | 89:7,14,25                   | 20:24 28:12       | 21:7 51:3                   | 93:9,13                    | murder 22:15,16                       |
| 35:2 38:23                         | 76:25                                  | 90:5,7,10,13                 | 30:20 32:8,24     | 52:13,21                    | missed 109:2               | 61:1,2                                |
| 44:7,24 45:8                       | line 46:1 67:24                        | 90:16 94:19                  | 37:25 38:3,5      | <b>Megone</b> 95:12,14      | mistake 15:24              | mustn't 23:10                         |
| 45:20 49:7,10                      | 68:1,12,24                             | 95:4,8,13                    | 41:21,22 42:17    | 95:17 98:6                  | 20:16 22:21                | 118:9 119:13                          |
| 49:23 50:12                        | 69:3,10 80:10                          | 98:25 99:21                  | 43:14 44:3        | 108:5 121:17                | misused 74:16              | mutually 110:4                        |
| 51:1 52:12,16                      | 80:12 96:16                            | 100:1,5 105:20               | 49:22 50:22       | Megone's 121:16             | <b>Mm</b> 46:5 86:17       | <b>muzzling</b> 20:3,10               |
| 56:8,23 57:19                      | 99:22 100:6                            | 105:24 106:10                | 60:1 68:10,11     | member 17:16                | 87:5 91:10                 |                                       |
| 57:21 58:24                        | lines 59:9 80:1                        | 106:17 111:23                | 68:16,16 73:22    | 17:17 37:22                 | 103:13 110:19              | N                                     |
|                                    | <u> </u>                               | l<br>                        | l<br>             | <u> </u>                    | <u> </u>                   | l<br>                                 |
|                                    |  |                              |                   |                             |                            |                                       |

|                     |                         |                     |                  |                  |                  | Page 130           |
|---------------------|-------------------------|---------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|--------------------|
|                     | Í                       | Ī                   | İ                | İ                | Ī                |                    |
| name 95:16          | 3:2 25:24,25            | 73:15,16,18         | 99:19 100:15     | owe 67:12,13     | 84:9 103:9       | 116:7 118:9,9      |
| 116:20              | 26:1,12 85:13           | obligations 46:9    | 100:17 101:1     | 102:10           | partisan 84:25   | 120:4,16,18        |
| narrow 53:7         | 86:19 99:19             | 73:4 102:11         | 101:13 108:8,9   | owed 87:22       | 85:2 86:16       | 121:5,9            |
| 60:1                | 100:3,19 109:2          | 103:4,7,11,25       | 118:7            | owes 67:16       | 87:17 98:7,10    | people's 22:5,15   |
| narrowed 50:7       | newspapers              | 104:2               | opinions 2:20,21 | owner 108:20     | partly 12:14     | 27:7 29:14         |
| narrower 50:9       | 17:21 18:17             | observations        | 11:11 33:3,23    | owners 108:8,12  | 69:14 70:8       | 32:21 43:12        |
| 52:14               | 24:17 29:24             | 92:13               | 45:6 85:14       | 108:13 112:10    | 88:10,17,18      | 59:12 105:4        |
| narrowly 34:1       | 38:25 65:24             | <b>obtain</b> 44:11 | 100:18,25        | ownership 24:20  | 91:5 105:13,17   | perceived 19:20    |
| nation 75:15        | 86:20 88:25             | obvious 89:18       | 101:7,11,14,15   | 100:22 101:2,3   | 112:13           | perceptions        |
| nationalisation     | 100:16,20,21            | 104:18              | 101:18 102:5     | 108:3,11         | partner 42:19    | 32:21              |
| 79:10               | 100:22 102:4            | obviously 58:18     | 109:17 118:6     | O'Neill 37:4     | 67:1             | performance        |
| natural 110:15      | 108:25                  | 98:17 104:14        | opportunities    |                  | parts 97:21      | 87:8               |
| 111:20              | newspaper's             | occasion 111:3      | 120:3            | P                | 98:16 112:4,12   | person 21:5        |
| naturally 106:22    | 66:4                    | occasionally        | opposed 13:17    | page 78:3,3      | party 84:13,14   | 30:25 39:22        |
| <b>nature</b> 64:19 | nine 75:12 89:20        | 1:15                | 15:16 18:25      | 79:23 82:16,16   | 85:14 86:19      | 42:5 44:9,12       |
| 92:25 105:5         | 89:22                   | occasions 1:3       | 39:16 41:3       | 86:2,2 102:24    | patient 89:10,12 | 49:5 73:15         |
| 108:17 115:15       | non-interference        | occupy 80:7         | optimistic 14:18 | 102:24 109:12    | pay 33:11 81:22  | 90:21,22           |
| near 80:12          | 30:11                   | occurred 81:20      | optional 35:24   | pages 46:4 95:19 | 81:25 82:7       | 115:20             |
| nearly 37:25        | non-pejorative          | Ofcom 115:7         | oral 121:21      | <b>paid</b> 18:6 | payments 78:8    | personal 4:22      |
| necessarily         | 38:2                    | offend 38:1         | order 9:7 25:14  | paragraph 78:5   | <b>pays</b> 33:3 | 12:2 30:20         |
| 13:25 16:11         | non-values 4:14         | offended 60:5       | 45:22 74:2       | 79:23 80:15      | <b>PCC</b> 111:6 | 39:16,16,19        |
| 36:5 56:14,23       | normally 28:8           | offending 51:6      | 91:6 97:5,13     | 82:21 83:3       | peculiarly 17:14 | 40:15 41:20        |
| 57:25 62:1          | normativity             | offensive 13:3      | 101:6 118:8      | 87:19 88:7       | pejorative 37:20 | 43:2 44:1 70:8     |
| 63:15 89:24         | 93:17,20 94:2           | 19:2,3,15           | ordinary 19:18   | 93:16 110:23     | 38:15,19         | personality 42:2   |
| 91:8 120:12         | 94:14                   | 31:10 52:5          | 35:12            | paragraphs       | pen 39:2         | personally 12:3    |
| necessary 2:1       | norms 46:15             | 60:5                | organ 17:8 49:10 | 82:20            | penultimate      | 45:13              |
| 61:16 91:25         | 47:19 120:21            | offer 60:11         | organisation     | parallel 31:25   | 93:16            | person's 41:25     |
| need 4:5 7:24 9:7   | 120:21                  | office 42:1 96:24   | 82:2 99:12,14    | parallels 21:10  | people 4:8 5:1,3 | 42:4               |
| 13:12 19:7          | nosiness 92:2           | 120:20              | 112:10 114:3     | part 4:25 16:5   | 6:24 7:10,22     | perspective 3:3    |
| 20:16 22:22,25      | note 63:23              | officers 59:6       | 114:17,18,22     | 17:25 30:3       | 7:24 8:9 11:10   | 59:25 60:10        |
| 23:5,22,24          | notice 33:2 89:17       | officials 43:13,23  | 120:5 121:8      | 41:24 49:17      | 11:13 12:17      | 65:3               |
| 27:2 36:14          | 105:21                  | 44:5,5              | organisations    | 50:15 59:15      | 13:14 18:24      | persuaded 42:11    |
| 40:21,24 49:18      | noticed 32:3,6,14       | <b>Oh</b> 20:7 26:5 | 30:17 81:24      | 66:3,12 68:21    | 19:20 20:6       | 42:12,13           |
| 66:22 73:13         | 32:20 35:17             | 47:13               | 83:4 98:21       | 69:13,16 77:2    | 22:12 24:17      | persuasive 14:5    |
| 76:11 80:7          | noting 17:25            | okay 23:9,19        | 99:8,10 106:13   | 77:4 82:2,25     | 25:2,6,22,23     | pertain 98:2       |
| 81:1 82:4           | <b>notion</b> 35:22     | 31:4 41:17          | 108:23 109:19    | 83:11 98:17      | 26:11 27:15,16   | pervade 21:8       |
| 84:11 85:18         | 47:18 102:9,14          | 54:11 58:1          | 109:20 112:25    | 106:13 111:9     | 27:18,20 28:3    | pervert 83:21      |
| 89:17 97:6          | <b>notional</b> 53:9,12 | 65:6 78:4           | 113:3,6,15       | 112:24 113:18    | 28:9,16 29:23    | 84:1 85:3          |
| 101:5 102:18        | <b>notions</b> 102:13   | 82:10,20 95:3       | 114:10 118:2     | 116:23           | 31:7,20 32:3     | perverting 84:12   |
| 107:23 112:11       | 105:16                  | ombudsman           | 119:24           | partiality 98:16 | 33:1,11,19       | philanderers       |
| 112:21 113:23       | nuance 49:14            | 114:20              | organisation's   | 98:20,24         | 34:6,12 35:16    | 42:16              |
| 115:22 117:1        | nuanced 63:16           | once 20:1 21:1      | 110:11           | participate      | 36:11 38:8,9     | philosopher        |
| 120:2 121:9         | <b>number</b> 10:13     | 22:19,22 26:21      | organs 34:21     | 24:14            | 39:17 40:10      | 49:16 84:3         |
| needed 58:13        | 12:6 15:4 19:6          | 47:7                | ought 16:25 63:2 | participates     | 41:9 44:2,19     | 121:6              |
| needlessly 37:20    | 64:25 85:24             | one's 24:19         | 113:25           | 34:20            | 45:14 48:6       | philosophers       |
| needs 7:22 15:15    | 97:20 98:3              | 26:22 29:2          | outline 84:8     | participating    | 50:20 51:8       | 5:11 9:13 74:9     |
| 44:3 77:12,12       | 100:18,19,21            | 37:25 38:7          | outlined 76:2    | 2:24             | 53:8 54:1,3      | 116:2              |
| 77:14 97:14         | 101:15,16,20            | 43:18,20 44:16      | outlook 99:14,15 | participation    | 57:10 59:10      | philosophical      |
| 110:17 112:8        | 101:22 102:18           | 44:18 111:18        | output 102:17    | 70:18            | 60:5,17,19,24    | 6:24,25 9:21       |
| 113:22              | 108:3,7 111:11          | 111:22              | outputs 102:19   | particular 1:25  | 61:2 69:17       | 23:3 42:20         |
| negative 117:14     | 116:10                  | online 26:12        | 114:21           | 15:11 16:2       | 74:16 77:13,16   | 59:25 64:18        |
| 120:8               | numbering               | 63:22               | outside 31:15    | 32:1 34:14       | 81:24,24 85:9    | 68:9 70:9,11       |
| negatives 119:16    | 102:23                  | <b>Onora</b> 37:4   | 54:19            | 35:14 37:10      | 88:15,15,20,21   | 78:13,15 79:2      |
| negotiations        | numbers 42:15           | open 37:2 43:18     | overall 52:17    | 46:20,20,21      | 88:21 89:2       | 80:21 96:1         |
| 25:7                | l                       | 66:8 113:15         | 56:2 108:1       | 52:24 53:20      | 91:23 94:20      | 115:13             |
| neither 18:25       | 0                       | 120:1               | 110:20           | 55:12,13 68:21   | 97:3,25 100:19   | philosophy 2:12    |
| neo-Aristotelian    | <b>Object</b> 17:20     | operate 40:22       | overlapping      | 70:12 71:16,18   | 100:24 101:21    | 2:14 3:9,12,15     |
| 96:4                | objection 101:17        | 57:8                | 16:20            | 71:18 72:23      | 101:23 104:10    | 3:19 49:17         |
| never 6:15,19       | objective 28:13         | operating 25:20     | overlooks 83:10  | 73:8 79:4        | 105:11,15        | 64:16 96:3         |
| 8:25 47:13          | objectives 24:6         | 30:8                | overridden 6:7   | 96:19            | 106:14,21        | <b>phone</b> 21:15 |
| 57:19,20            | 107:7 114:17            | operation 110:12    | 6:16 8:25        | particularly     | 109:14,18,18     | 113:1              |
| new 55:24 56:18     | 114:18                  | operationalise      | 117:10           | 21:14 35:7       | 110:7,9,10       | phrase 12:1        |
| news 19:8 29:24     | obligation 37:19        | 30:6                | oversight 63:8   | 43:5 49:4 96:9   | 112:8,19 113:2   | 77:17              |
| 89:9 98:23          | 72:10,14,15,15          | opinion 33:7        | overtly 80:2     | 99:6 100:14      | 113:10,15,22     | pick 39:11,14      |
| 99:17               | 72:19,20,21             | 85:16 98:14,15      | over-arching     | 107:10 112:2     | 114:6 115:11     | 57:23 107:23       |
| newspaper 1:20      | 73:2,5,8,11,12          | 98:20,22 99:3       | 117:14,23        | parties 77:12    | 115:22,24        | picture 116:17     |
| 1                   | 1                       | l                   | I                | I                | l                |                    |
| •                   |                         |                     |                  |                  |                  |                    |

|   |                                   |                                  |                                  |   |                               | Page 131                              |
|---|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|---|-------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
|   | Ī                                 | Ī                                | Ī                                | Ī                                       | Ī                             |                                       |
| piece 10:24                                     | 78:10 84:14                       | practice 39:21                   | 35:12,20 36:22                   | 71:23 72:1                              | professor 2:8,9               | 118:18 120:7                          |
| 41:25 42:5                                      | 85:14 86:5,13                     | 56:3 72:8                        | 36:23,24 37:1                    | 79:20 80:21                             | 2:10,12,12,13                 | properly 6:2                          |
| 52:24 54:10                                     | 86:14,17,23                       | 84:20 94:7                       | 37:11,16,17,23                   | 110:21 117:12                           | 2:14,15,15 3:8                | 25:12 46:24                           |
| piecemeal 20:11                                 | 87:12 96:3,25                     | 110:22 116:1                     | 38:11,18 39:8                    | principles 69:2,9                       | 3:9,13,14,18                  | 47:10 56:19                           |
| 20:12 117:16                                    | 99:14,15                          | 118:24                           | 43:18 44:7                       | 69:25 70:9,15                           | 4:1 5:9,24 6:25               | 97:13 112:1                           |
| pieces 11:16                                    | politician 27:13                  | practices 1:18                   | 48:16 49:10                      | 71:15,18 72:5                           | 7:18,19 8:4,6                 | property 25:4                         |
| <b>place</b> 2:25 11:4 25:13 48:10              | 39:18 40:13<br>42:8 68:21,22      | 55:19                            | 50:6,22 51:7,9<br>51:12,15,18,19 | 76:2 78:1 79:2<br>79:19 82:22           | 8:22,24 10:3<br>10:20 11:25   | 28:21 64:22                           |
| 58:12 69:19                                     | 84:15 103:21                      | <b>practising</b> 106:9 107:16   | 52:6,8,9 53:2                    | 103:16 105:9                            | 13:22 14:8                    | proposal 79:3<br>proposals 75:18      |
| 79:7 119:5                                      | politicians 27:16                 | pragmatic 78:12                  | 55:20 56:3                       | 106:6,7,20                              | 15:2,4,20,21                  | 75:21 79:13                           |
| placed 75:6                                     | 40:11 41:8                        | 80:14                            | 58:19 60:4,6                     | print 14:9 39:9                         | 15:24 16:22                   | propound 67:14                        |
| 111:12  | 42:16,22                          | precisely 34:3                   | 61:21,22,25,25                   | 101:20                                  | 17:12,13,25                   | proprietors                           |
| <b>Plato</b> 96:2                               | 109:17 110:16                     | 35:17 51:19                      | 63:6 65:1,5,7                    | printed 51:9                            | 18:14 19:5,10                 | 78:10 80:18                           |
| play 44:20 80:4                                 | politician's                      | 52:8 62:21                       | 65:17,17,23                      | printing 119:3                          | 20:4,8,18                     | 86:4,8,12,14                          |
| 85:8 103:17                                     | 68:14 91:13,17                    | predecessors                     | 66:9,16 67:4                     | priority 57:7                           | 21:13,16,24,25                | 113:23                                |
| played 1:24                                     | 92:6                              | 94:20                            | 67:13 69:17,19                   | privacy 1:11                            | 22:17 23:9,13                 | protect 41:7                          |
| player 44:11                                    | politics 41:9                     | preference 12:2                  | 69:21 70:2,3                     | 28:10,23 39:15                          | 23:19 24:7,8                  | 72:10 73:17                           |
| playing 44:14                                   | 42:25                             | prejudicial 3:24                 | 71:8 75:14,16                    | 40:9,19,25                              | 24:23 26:4,5                  | protected 43:14                       |
| plays 16:14                                     | poor 57:3                         | premised 41:13                   | 76:2,23,24                       | 41:7 43:16                              | 26:17,21 27:1                 | protection 1:10                       |
| 69:17 76:3                                      | popular 30:12                     | prepared 42:25                   | 77:3,5,8,13                      | 44:4,6 53:5,14                          | 27:20,24 29:10                | 2:4                                   |
| 117:3   | pornography                       | preparing 64:13                  | 78:2,16,22                       | 53:24 54:1,5                            | 30:5,25 31:2,5                | protest 55:8                          |
| please 2:6 3:6,22                               | 3:11                              | present 4:9 7:6                  | 79:8,10,18                       | 55:2,7,9,15,17                          | 32:16,22,23                   | provide 27:5                          |
| 17:4 31:1<br>34:23 63:23                        | portion 24:21<br>portray 35:16    | 32:10 98:19,21<br>99:1,11,17     | 80:3,11 82:23<br>82:23 83:7,11   | 91:17 97:23<br><b>private</b> 1:10 27:8 | 33:13,16 34:5<br>35:1,4 36:18 | 61:23 119:15<br><b>provided</b> 64:11 |
| 64:6 82:15,19                                   | portrayed 17:16                   | 103:19 110:7                     | 83:13,19 84:8                    | 27:14 29:6                              | 36:19 37:11                   | 95:18 121:21                          |
| 95:16,20 108:4                                  | 17:23                             | 110:24 119:6,6                   | 84:11,21,24                      | 30:17 34:7,17                           | 38:5,6,13 39:3                | provides 29:23                        |
| 109:11 111:4                                    | position 8:9 18:3                 | presentation                     | 85:4,7,8,17,19                   | 42:6,22 43:14                           | 39:4,12 40:4,5                | providing 96:20                       |
| 119:21 121:24                                   | 30:23 33:4                        | 98:15 108:22                     | 85:21 87:16,18                   | 43:14,21 44:3                           | 41:19,20 43:12                | 112:18                                |
| pleasure 28:9                                   | 35:19 43:5,9                      | presented                        | 87:23 92:8                       | 44:15,16 45:1                           | 44:16 45:4,12                 | <b>proving</b> 106:17                 |
| plural 85:19                                    | 118:3                             | 100:25 108:10                    | 94:12 96:13,13                   | 46:25 50:17                             | 45:13 46:6,13                 | provision 30:2                        |
| 101:10  | positions 33:9                    | 109:2 118:6                      | 96:17,18 97:6                    | 52:6,10 68:7                            | 47:25 48:21                   | 61:24 62:4                            |
| plurality 2:4                                   | 96:24 109:19                      | presenting 18:5                  | 97:11,14 98:7                    | 68:11,16 79:12                          | 49:9,11 50:11                 | 72:23 97:2,3                          |
| <b>plus</b> 23:16                               | 110:10                            | 18:6 98:13                       | 98:9,12,13,16                    | 79:14 80:2                              | 50:14 51:2,3                  | provisions 92:18                      |
| <b>pm</b> 95:9,11                               | positive 10:24                    | 99:13 100:18                     | 98:17 100:8,12                   | 91:13 103:11                            | 51:13 52:15,21                | prurient 41:10                        |
| 122:2,3   | 15:14 117:2,2                     | 104:3,11                         | 101:3,5,9,13                     | privately 79:9                          | 52:23,24 53:19                | prying 40:10                          |
| point 17:11                                     | 117:13,17                         | 109:13 117:25                    | 101:17,24                        | privileged 54:8                         | 54:11,12 55:3                 | psychological                         |
| 18:19 21:11                                     | 119:14 120:8                      | presents 98:14<br>98:14          | 102:7,10,10,16                   | privileges 73:20                        | 56:5,10 57:6                  | 120:23<br><b>psychology</b> 96:4      |
| 24:23,24 32:2<br>32:15,16 35:17                 | positively 119:5<br>possess 35:15 | preservation                     | 104:21,23<br>108:9 109:8,13      | <b>probably</b> 15:24 22:1 25:5 33:2    | 57:15,20 58:1<br>58:9,21 59:1 | pub 32:4 33:1                         |
| 46:5 50:2                                       | possibility 107:1                 | 103:23                           | 110:14,24,25                     | 61:15 92:9                              | 59:13 60:12                   | public 1:4,8,9                        |
| 51:21 53:12,13                                  | possible 5:9                      | preserve 4:18                    | 111:1,5,15                       | 94:2 101:22                             | 61:17 62:12,18                | 15:9 25:15,19                         |
| 53:18,20 61:23                                  |                                   | preserves 60:4                   | 114:5 116:19                     | problem 52:16                           | 62:23 95:12,14                | 27:12,14,17,25                        |
| 64:9 70:1,1,2                                   | 29:1 46:6                         | preserving 4:17                  | 117:3,24 119:3                   | 62:16 99:22                             | 95:22 98:6                    | 28:1 29:1 31:9                        |
| 70:11 71:14                                     | 80:16 105:2                       | press 1:6,18,19                  | pressing 108:17                  | 107:13,13                               | 108:5 115:16                  | 39:23 41:2                            |
| 81:19 82:18                                     | possibly 15:8                     | 7:16 8:14                        | pressures 115:21                 | 112:24                                  | 121:16,17                     | 42:10,22,25                           |
| 85:7 87:19,25                                   | 26:25 42:15                       | 12:17 13:16,16                   | presumably 20:5                  | problematic                             | professors 2:6                | 43:3,13,23                            |
| 88:8 93:15                                      | 73:5 108:11                       | 13:18 14:2,2                     | 38:6 41:3 98:7                   | 33:9 43:5                               | profit 62:2,2                 | 44:4,5,18,21                          |
| 94:7 100:11                                     | post 114:6                        | 14:22,24 15:8                    | presumption                      | 49:15 60:14                             | profitability                 | 45:2,6,9,15                           |
| 104:5 107:21                                    | potent 47:22                      | 15:10,16,17,22                   | 21:21,25                         | 77:19                                   | 41:5                          | 58:2 60:2 65:1                        |
| 110:22 116:13                                   | potential 74:25                   | 16:7,7,9,13,16                   | pretty 35:11 40:9                | problems 5:2                            | profits 62:8                  | 65:11,13 66:4                         |
| <b>pointed</b> 19:16<br><b>points</b> 1:22 15:3 | 97:15<br><b>potentially</b> 1:14  | 16:19 17:4,6,8<br>17:13,23 18:22 | 80:22<br><b>prevail</b> 97:19    | 61:20 76:24<br>109:9                    | profit-making<br>61:7,21      | 66:11,16 68:6<br>68:10,17,19          |
| 28:24 51:14                                     | 50:6 110:3                        | 17:13,23 18:22                   | prevan 97:19<br>prevent 38:14    | procedures                              | prohibit 112:6                | 69:11,16,19                           |
| 85:24 92:16                                     | 121:6                             | 21:2,23 22:23                    | 113:12                           | 120:7                                   | prohibitions                  | 70:22,24 71:8                         |
| 100:10 107:23                                   | power 12:15,20                    | 22:24 23:2,5                     | prevented 38:17                  | proceed 22:3                            | 107:14 116:14                 | 75:25 76:3,5                          |
| 108:1,4 116:10                                  | 16:13 17:6                        | 23:21,23,24                      | price 27:21,23                   | process 85:3                            | proliferation                 | 76:12,18,20,22                        |
| 116:11 121:15                                   | 19:19,23 24:16                    | 24:6,13,14,21                    | primarily 96:18                  | 98:3 114:2,8                            | 4:10                          | 77:7,13,14,22                         |
| police 57:5 59:6                                | 25:18 35:14                       | 25:15,16,20                      | 103:9 107:14                     | processes 114:16                        | promote 15:14                 | 78:9,17,21                            |
| policies 68:22                                  | 51:15,16 52:9                     | 26:5 27:5,5                      | 114:5                            | produce 106:7                           | 34:22 55:25                   | 79:12,18,19                           |
| 70:1 84:9                                       | 69:22,23 83:1                     | 29:2,12,13,13                    | primary 111:14                   | producing 56:17                         | 56:13 83:20                   | 80:3,4,6,8,11                         |
| <b>policy</b> 79:3 84:13                        | powerful 42:20                    | 29:14,20,21                      | principally 96:6                 | 102:19                                  | 114:18                        | 80:12 82:24                           |
| 84:14   | 50:6 58:21                        | 30:9,14,17,23                    | 102:14                           | professional                            | promoted 15:19                | 83:4,5,11,12                          |
| political 2:14                                  | 61:6,8 74:8                       | 31:16,18,19                      | principle 38:1                   | 57:12 77:4                              | 24:17                         | 84:15 85:9,10                         |
| 3:15 4:6 18:8                                   | 118:2                             | 32:1 33:17,21                    | 40:20 48:9,13                    | 107:18,19                               | promoting 17:14               | 91:15 92:14,21                        |
| 30:11 33:4<br>49:17 69:22                       | practical 58:15<br>105:18,24      | 33:23 34:14,18                   | 48:14 69:6                       | 116:22,23<br>118:21                     | 84:7                          | 93:3,5,12,21<br>94:10 96:12,17        |
| 47.17 07.22                                     | 103.10,24                         | 34:20,20,22,24                   | 70:12,13 71:19                   | 110.21                                  | proper 11:4                   | 74.10 70.12,17                        |
|   | •                                 | •                                | •                                | •                                       | •                             | •                                     |

|                              |                   |                   |                   |                             |                            | Page 132                          |
|------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------------|
|                              | İ                 |                   | İ                 | İ                           | İ                          | Ī                                 |
| 96:21 97:1,5                 | 22:5,25 23:4,9    | 107:13 112:1,3    | 37:20 38:2,15     | 103:8 120:17                | 37:12,24 39:8              | 97:7,8 106:11                     |
| 97:18,22,24                  | 23:11,11 24:21    | reader 92:6       | 38:21 72:13       | reporting 37:8,9            | 39:10 63:4                 | 107:6 108:6                       |
| 102:7 103:20                 | 26:6 28:5,14      | readers 67:6,16   | 107:15            | 37:19 38:18                 | 82:5 102:13                | 118:16 119:20                     |
| 104:22 107:15                | 29:11 30:6        | 67:18 84:9        | references 38:19  | 99:7,9 114:2,4              | 104:6 113:17               | rightly 83:22                     |
| 108:1 109:8,14               | 32:23 33:14       | 86:6 87:2,22      | referred 39:5     | 114:9,12,13,24              | 113:20                     | rights 3:20,24                    |
| 109:17,21                    | 34:7,8 39:24      | 87:23 88:3,5,7    | referring 13:23   | 114:25 115:4                | responsible                | 4:2,10,11,12                      |
| 110:20 111:2,8               | 39:25 40:4,5      | 88:11 91:7        | 53:7 118:17       | reports 55:7                | 38:25 39:1                 |                                   |
|                              | ,                 |                   |                   |                             |                            | 5:3,9,18,19,19                    |
| 111:9,10,14,14               | 42:7 45:20,23     | 92:5 103:4        | reflect 94:23,25  | represent 17:21             | 60:17                      | 5:20,25 6:1,1                     |
| 112:14,16,16                 | 47:7 55:14,16     | readership 99:18  | 94:25 99:3        | 17:22 70:24                 | restates 82:21             | 6:11,14,14,15                     |
| 112:18 114:19                | 55:18 58:9        | readily 5:4 14:10 | 121:10            | 85:10                       | restraints 117:4           | 7:5,6 11:19,22                    |
| 117:6,8,18                   | 59:14,15,22       | 74:16             | reflected 101:8   | representation              | restricted 24:10           | 12:2 19:4 22:9                    |
| publications                 | 72:17 79:17       | reading 93:18     | reflective 63:25  | 109:5                       | 38:17 73:3                 | 26:15 39:15                       |
| 17:13                        | 82:11,15,16,20    | reads 107:14      | reflects 38:6     | representative              | 100:22                     | 41:16,16 44:12                    |
| publicly 78:11               | 88:12 101:23      | real 59:11        | regard 41:8 54:8  | 43:24                       | restricting 22:6           | 48:22,24,25                       |
| 79:7,8                       | 102:8 103:1       | realise 26:10     | 75:7              | represented                 | 22:15                      | 50:2 60:2                         |
| publish 84:21                | 107:24,25,25      | 56:16             | regards 30:16     | 102:1,6                     | restriction 13:6           | 64:19,20,22,22                    |
| 92:9                         | 110:19 120:25     | realises 56:14    | register 116:20   | reputation 40:14            | 20:9,13,15                 | 64:22,23 66:1                     |
| published 63:2               | questions 2:11    | realising 70:13   | registered 78:11  | require 53:23               | 21:22 22:12,13             | 66:13 71:10                       |
| publishing 38:25             | 7:1,23 10:12      | 70:15             | regulate 112:5    | 73:23 78:21                 | 104:15                     | 73:20 97:22                       |
| 55:13,15 78:9                | 18:16,18 23:7     | really 13:25      | regulating 24:20  | 85:13 86:3,7                | restrictions 11:5          | 98:1,8,10                         |
|                              |                   |                   |                   |                             | 13:1 20:17                 |                                   |
| <b>punish</b> 10:6           | 33:24,25 34:13    | 24:21 28:4,7      | regulation 32:1   | 86:13,24 87:16              |                            | 103:12 105:4                      |
| punished 74:6                | 34:17 35:2,5      | 49:4 53:21        | 35:23 66:20       | required 87:1               | 21:18 25:13                | rigour 97:7                       |
| punishment 3:20              | 40:6 43:7,22      | 57:7,18 62:9      | 67:8,9 75:24      | requirement                 | 28:25 51:24                | 103:5 119:10                      |
| purport 26:24                | 49:19 58:16       | 65:18 73:9        | 78:2 79:15        | 53:23 63:24                 | 52:7                       | 119:12                            |
| purpose 10:12                | 59:11 64:8        | 87:6 91:21        | regulator 67:20   | 87:13 100:6                 | restrictive 87:15          | riot 10:23 11:14                  |
| 31:23 61:22                  | 94:18 95:15       | 92:2,3,4,6        | 97:10             | requirements                | restricts 22:4             | rise 95:7                         |
| 81:10 114:3                  | 101:21 108:10     | 93:11             | regulators 76:22  | 31:9 36:17                  | results 69:14              | risk 46:11,12                     |
| 116:21                       | 121:23            | realm 48:23       | regulatory 56:2   | 79:7 80:8                   | retain 43:2                | 77:8                              |
| purposes 6:2,5               | quickly 75:16     | 49:16 65:11,13    | 58:6 62:5         | 93:23 104:2                 | return 78:9                | road 59:9                         |
| 46:16,16,17                  | 110:25            | reason 5:16       | related 14:22     | requires 25:13              | reveal 68:20               | role 1:23 16:14                   |
| pursue 46:22                 | quiet 23:17       | 15:14,24 18:14    | 57:14 65:22       | 56:25 57:1,2                | 71:20 73:24,25             | 33:24 35:14                       |
| 91:25 120:6                  | 91:22             | 19:22 24:5        | 88:19             | 88:22                       | 74:5                       | 37:17 54:20                       |
| pursued 47:10                | quite 2:23 4:15   | 47:4 51:6 54:7    | relates 85:6      | requiring 78:7              | revealing 68:20            | 66:16 69:17                       |
| pursuing 68:22               | 6:2 8:14 9:22     | 57:16 61:2        | relating 3:10     | 78:10                       | Rewards 120:8              | 76:3,5 80:3,4                     |
|                              |                   |                   | 25:4              |                             |                            |                                   |
| 117:5 119:13                 | 11:4 12:1         | 71:21 90:18       |                   | research 3:8                | rhetorically 4:9           | 82:24 83:5,6,7                    |
| pursuit 13:5                 | 23:17,20,22       | reasonable 53:8   | relation 2:3 17:8 | 64:18 70:8                  | <b>Richards</b> 115:9      | 83:23 85:8                        |
| 46:19                        | 27:2,20 36:11     | 101:22,25         | 21:14,19 29:5     | 95:25                       | right 1:12 3:25            | 102:8 111:1                       |
| <b>put</b> 2:16 3:4          | 42:11 54:23       | reasonably 1:24   | 29:8 59:4 75:3    | reserve 19:1,2              | 4:13,19,19,21              | 117:6,21,24                       |
| 10:19 18:15                  | 68:11,12 70:6     | reasoning 107:2   | 82:12 105:21      | resist 36:9                 | 5:6,7,12,14,22             | 118:14 119:9                      |
| 22:20 42:8                   | 86:25 94:2,22     | reasons 6:4 7:5   | 115:6             | resolving 103:15            | 6:4,5,6,17,18              | roles 104:11                      |
| 43:16 44:5,16                | 94:23 106:6       | 19:12 22:21       | relationship      | 103:17                      | 6:19 7:2,8,16              | room 12:11                        |
| 45:1 60:1                    | 118:22 121:18     | 24:4 25:21        | 64:21 66:13       | resource 18:11              | 7:19,21 8:12               | 27:10 39:5,25                     |
| 63:12 64:13                  |                   | 35:7 36:3,10      | 110:15            | 57:2                        | 8:21,22,22,24              | 49:13 53:8                        |
| 67:23                        | R                 | 36:11,12,12,23    | relationships     | respect 31:24               | 8:25 9:3,5,7,10            | 68:9                              |
|                              | race 33:5         | 36:24 40:12       | 109:7,23 110:4    | 36:11 37:12                 | 9:15,24 10:3,8             | rough 12:20                       |
| Q                            | Racial 11:2       | 41:18,23 42:13    | relatively 37:13  | 61:7 80:16                  | 10:16,21 11:18             | roughly 25:3                      |
| qualification                | racist 50:18 52:3 | 46:23 47:16       | relevance 39:16   | 88:1,4,9,10,12              | 11:21 19:1,2               | 65:12                             |
| 9:24 10:21                   | railway 6:23      | 50:21 56:24       | relevant 32:18    | 88:15,15 89:5               | 19:13 27:18,20             | round 14:19                       |
| qualifications               | raise 20:22 55:18 | 72:21 88:17       | 32:21 39:17,20    | 89:8 91:7,8,17              | 32:4,17 35:4               | route 30:3 70:12                  |
| 11:2,12                      | 113:4,10          | 94:10 109:15      | 68:21 81:21,23    | 91:18 102:17                | 37:14 39:13                | Rowan 64:6,7                      |
|                              | ,                 | rebalanced        | 82:8 91:24        | 102:19 108:10               | 40:18,25 43:1              | Royal 106:4                       |
| qualified 5:18,21            | raises 6:9 18:20  | 111:23            |                   |                             |                            | rubric 15:22                      |
| 5:23 8:22 9:9                | 55:14             |                   | religious 11:2    | 108:22 109:5                | 43:16 44:6                 |                                   |
| 11:17 26:18                  | raising 51:22     | received 78:8     | 54:19             | respected 80:24             | 46:13 48:1,4,7             | rules 31:9 38:23                  |
| 72:15                        | ramifications     | recognise 15:15   | remark 50:18,18   | respectfully 84:5           | 48:17 49:1,3               | run 39:14 106:24                  |
| qualifier 78:25              | 90:11             | 41:1 45:15        | remarks 13:3      | 87:23                       | 50:15 51:17,18             | runs 95:19                        |
| 79:6                         | range 55:25 67:7  | 48:16 121:19      | 19:14,16 52:5     | respecting 88:21            | 51:22 52:1,5,7             | ~                                 |
| qualifiers 78:23             | 85:14 96:11,21    | recognised 1:19   | remedies 114:7    | 88:21                       | 52:8 53:16,17              | S                                 |
| qualifies 111:11             | 97:12,19 101:7    | recognising       | remember 66:10    | respects 118:20             | 53:23 55:8,9               | sake 82:3 92:1                    |
| qualify 108:25               | 103:20 108:9      | 97:15 112:17      | 66:22             | response 55:21              | 55:11,12,17                | sanctioning                       |
| 116:7                        | 108:23 118:20     | records 27:21     | remove 116:6      | responsibilities            | 57:4 60:4                  | 35:10                             |
| que 14:13                    | 120:17            | recruit 81:25     | removed 59:3      | 35:3 36:21,22               | 65:24 66:1,9               | satisfactory                      |
| question 5:24                | rationale 31:13   | recruiting 82:1   | repeat 63:13      | 37:1,3 80:18                | 73:21 74:6,18              | 111:7                             |
| 6:13,14 7:3,4                | rationality 96:5  | redress 73:14     | report 19:8 78:3  | 102:18,22,25                | 74:24 75:22                | satisfied 25:2                    |
|                              |                   | refer 1:18 104:13 | 114:15,19         | 104:8 118:12                | 86:9 87:15                 | satisfies 60:2                    |
| , , ,                        | reached 14.21     |                   |                   | 101.0110.12                 | 00.7 01.13                 | Baublics UU.Z                     |
| 9:4,5,18,23                  | reached 14:21     |                   |                   | responsibility              | 89-11 15 15                | caving 39.14                      |
| 9:4,5,18,23<br>10:3 18:12,20 | read 17:21 24:17  | 109:7             | 115:2             | responsibility              | 89:11,15,15<br>94:15 96:11 | saying 38:14                      |
| 9:4,5,18,23                  |                   |                   |                   | responsibility<br>33:9 35:1 | 89:11,15,15<br>94:15 96:11 | <b>saying</b> 38:14<br>40:17 46:8 |
| 9:4,5,18,23<br>10:3 18:12,20 | read 17:21 24:17  | 109:7             | 115:2             |                             |                            |                                   |

|                   |                                |                     |                   |   |                                  | Page 133         |
|-------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------|-------------------|---|----------------------------------|------------------|
|                   | ı                              | I                   | 1                 | ı                                       | I                                | I                |
| 50:16,24 70:5     | 77:15,20 79:18                 | 50:5 59:19          | sort 6:9 15:24    | 8:7,14,18,19                            | statutory 61:15                  | 88:18            |
| 72:22 73:1        | 81:3,9 85:20                   | 86:10 105:12        | 17:3 18:3         | 8:21 9:10,11                            | 75:20 76:6                       | submissions 2:20 |
| 77:5 83:7         | 88:12 89:18                    | 105:13              | 24:13,16,17       | 9:12,13,24                              | stays 49:16                      | submitted 17:20  |
| 84:17 94:7        | 91:4,14 99:4                   | Similar 103:7       | 27:3 28:9         | 10:25 11:5,7,9                          | step 56:20                       | subprinciples    |
| 116:8             | 112:13,14                      | simple 44:7         | 31:17 32:25       | 11:16,18 12:5                           | stereotypes                      | 79:22            |
| says 6:17 7:7     | 119:14                         | 48:22 49:6          | 35:7 36:6         | 12:7,8,13,16                            | 17:14 19:21                      | substitute 34:25 |
| 11:1 12:11,23     | sensible 78:12                 | 103:15              | 39:21 41:9        | 12:17,19 13:2                           | stereotypical                    | subtle 106:25    |
| 72:9 87:3         | sent 106:11                    | simply 5:16         | 42:17 47:3        | 13:6,7,13,14                            | 17:22 18:5                       | suddenly 21:4    |
| scrutiny 27:14    | separate 76:23                 | 16:17 20:23         | 51:14 52:5,10     | 13:23,24 14:8                           | Stirling 64:17                   | 43:21,21         |
| seat 95:16        | 77:1                           | 32:24 33:6          | 58:1 60:15        | 14:13,15,18,19                          | stop 77:21 118:3                 | Sudoku 29:24     |
| second 7:3 27:4   | separated 42:2                 | 44:13 45:8,23       | 61:15 63:14       | 14:20,21 15:11                          | 118:10                           | Sue 35:18        |
| 28:15 42:20       | sequence 102:8                 | 55:22 61:10         | 76:25 78:1        | 15:12,16,18                             | stopped 75:12                    | suffering 89:10  |
|                   |                                |                     |                   |   |                                  | U                |
| 51:21 72:25       | 107:25                         | 78:25 90:23         | 80:4,9,12 82:3    | 19:4,18 20:4                            | stories 67:7,14                  | sufficient 4:23  |
| 78:5 79:6,22      | series 9:8 20:17               | 92:1 94:3           | 84:13,17,19       | 25:11 30:16                             | 78:7 91:8                        | 26:2 44:8,15     |
| 83:3 99:16        | serious 16:24                  | 113:20 120:12       | 86:21 93:14       | 32:4,17 39:4                            | 97:19 103:8                      | 45:10,12,14      |
| 102:24            | 25:10 27:8                     | sincerely 2:21      | 94:15 102:22      | 41:15,15 48:2                           | <b>story</b> 37:10,19            | 110:25           |
| secondary 103:9   | 61:20,20 89:10                 | <b>Sir</b> 95:12    | 105:11,18         | 48:4,10,13,17                           | 37:21,25 38:18                   | sufficiently     |
| secondly 25:22    | 112:20                         | <b>sit</b> 115:10   | 107:12 109:8      | 51:4,7,8 52:10                          | 55:8,13,15                       | 87:18 101:10     |
| 88:3 96:23        | seriously 112:21               | situation 24:25     | 118:17 119:9      | 52:10 69:19                             | 63:2,3 78:9                      | 101:10,25        |
| 112:17 118:4      | 121:9                          | 40:8 45:23          | 119:20            | speech/freedom                          | straightforward                  | 115:24           |
| section 55:20     | servants 27:17                 | 53:21 57:9          | sorts 4:13 5:10   | 54:15                                   | 49:5 99:1                        | suggest 79:9     |
| 82:14,15 86:25    | serve 9:11 96:25               | 70:21               | 16:2,6 20:2       | <b>speed</b> 59:4,6,8,10                | straightforwar                   | 80:10 83:5       |
| 88:8 100:3        | 97:5 108:25                    | situations 6:7      | 24:4 31:9         | speeding 59:12                          | 36:22                            | 93:13 115:23     |
| 102:25 119:2      | served 59:17                   | slack 13:8          | 35:23 41:2,12     | spent 18:4                              | stress 75:23                     | suggested 20:20  |
| sections 98:23    | 110:21                         | slander 93:9        | 50:21 61:9        | sphere 46:25                            | 77:11 91:6                       | 94:4 115:22      |
| securities 87:7   | serves 25:18                   | slap 47:22          | 64:21 74:19       | 66:4,12 68:17                           | stressing 90:18                  | suggesting 26:19 |
| security 98:3     | 96:18 108:24                   | <b>slight</b> 53:10 | 86:20 88:23       | 68:19 69:11,16                          | strict 5:12                      | 34:11 80:25      |
| 103:23            | 111:1                          | slightly 10:19      | 104:12 110:8      | 76:4 78:17,17                           | strike 72:17                     | suggestion 81:10 |
| see 2:20,25 7:23  | service 118:15                 | 55:1 102:8          | 110:13 112:6      | 80:6 82:24                              | 75:22                            | 114:11           |
| 26:23 33:23       | serving 104:11                 | 105:16 107:15       | sound 11:10       | 83:5,11,13                              | strikes 12:13                    | suggests 57:24   |
| 53:18 59:8        | 112:15 115:12                  | slippage 111:13     | 21:20 78:12       | 85:9,11 94:11                           | 107:6                            | suitably 46:17   |
| 61:10 63:22       | 118:14                         | 111:20              | sounded 2:22      | spoke 33:18                             | striking 112:4                   | sum 18:19        |
| 65:22 66:15       | set 2:20 3:7                   | slow 59:9           | source 25:20      | spoke 33.16<br>spoken 1:4 14:10         | string 112.4<br>stringency 58:13 | summarise        |
| 73:10,11 77:3     | 46:15 60:20                    | small 27:22         | 73:24,25          | 14:11                                   | stringent 25:1                   | 119:21           |
| 79:22 82:21       | 76:25 99:1                     | 51:11 100:19        | sources 28:6      | spontaneously                           | 55:24 58:7                       | sums 44:19       |
| 84:11 85:4        |                                | 100:21 108:3,7      | 71:21 72:11       | 60:24                                   | stronger 29:2                    |                  |
|                   | 104:9 106:8,23<br>117:16 118:6 |                     |                   |   |                                  | supermarkets     |
| 92:16 98:11       |                                | societies 40:11     | 73:17             | spree 9:10                              | strongly 112:5<br>struck 76:1    | 80:5             |
| 102:20 107:17     | setting 53:11                  | society 19:21       | space 18:2,7,9,17 | squeamishness                           |                                  | supplies 25:24   |
| seeking 44:11     | 106:20,22                      | 27:12 29:18         | 30:21 51:16       | 36:7                                    | 87:12                            | support 80:16    |
| seeks 49:8        | sexist 50:18                   | 33:10 35:20         | 109:21            | stake 1:14 74:8                         | structural                       | 85:15 86:19      |
| seen 24:15 27:9   | sexual 43:8                    | 40:8 45:24          | speak 3:2 10:15   | 74:11                                   | 113:18                           | suppose 24:1     |
| 61:14 62:25       | shame 81:6                     | 54:15,20 57:3       | 11:17 30:19       | stamped 67:21                           | structure 61:18                  | 57:16 58:3       |
| 70:21 75:18,20    | shameless 42:24                | 57:24 65:10,15      | 38:7 60:13        | stand 48:25 50:2                        | 62:7 75:6                        | 65:14 69:25      |
| 92:11 99:12,14    | shape 31:6,20                  | 65:18 66:23,24      | 85:17             | standards 36:2,4                        | 78:17 101:2                      | 74:10 76:19      |
| 111:14,21         | shaped 16:7                    | 67:2 71:5,24        | speaking 62:25    | 57:11 60:25                             | structures 16:3,6                | 84:6,12 87:25    |
| sees 59:10        | shaping 83:5                   | 71:25 79:5          | 71:22             | 61:4                                    | 101:3,4,24                       | 91:12 96:14      |
| 118:21            | shares 87:7                    | 82:4 92:10          | special 35:14     | star 93:20,23                           | 114:20,21                        | 98:12,13         |
| select 99:10      | <b>sharp</b> 80:10             | 97:9 98:8           | 37:12,17,24       | start 20:12 42:21                       | <b>Stuart</b> 10:23              | 102:14 105:7     |
| <b>self</b> 76:17 | 86:22                          | 104:22 108:12       | 39:9              | 69:7 94:11                              | 49:21                            | 106:2,19         |
| self-determina    | sharply 80:1                   | 108:15,16,18        | specialised 3:15  | starting 1:21                           | student 39:6                     | 107:12 109:13    |
| 1:10              | <b>short</b> 64:4 95:10        | <b>sole</b> 83:7    | 3:20              | 64:9                                    | students 13:2                    | 111:6 115:14     |
| self-enclosed     | shortly 3:6                    | solutions 78:13     | species 26:11     | state 11:21 22:2                        | 23:10 112:4                      | 119:4            |
| 46:14             | shout 10:5 13:3                | 78:14               | specific 43:4     | 54:21 67:19                             | studies 106:8                    | supposed 4:6     |
| self-regulation   | shouting 10:1,4                | somebody 4:20       | 79:22 85:24       | 77:24 119:3                             | 121:7                            | 7:25             |
| 58:8 61:12        | show 20:15                     | 45:25 50:17         | 87:10 116:10      | stated 43:25 45:6                       | subject 51:23                    | sure 22:1 25:15  |
| 75:19 76:7        | showing 49:4                   | 56:25               | specifically 1:17 | statement 33:5                          | 52:1 60:11                       | 26:5,17,17       |
| self-regulatory   | 109:2                          | someone's 5:14      | 14:16 15:15       | 65:6 94:4                               | 73:19 80:7                       | 31:2 56:24       |
| 76:14             | shown 21:6                     | 37:21               | 17:19 32:9        | 95:19,20 96:15                          | 98:18                            | 57:21,24 72:7    |
| seminar 12:11     | side 90:14,14                  | something's         | 54:13 82:12       | 96:16 106:5                             | subjective 20:21                 | 81:21 83:14      |
| 13:2 39:5         | 99:19 100:15                   | 32:19 68:10         | 87:11             | states 111:8                            | 20:24 90:23                      | 85:15 86:22      |
| send 120:16,18    | 103:25 104:2                   | somewhat 119:1      | specify 9:5,6,7   | statesmen 42:16                         | 91:4                             | 87:13 92:2,3,4   |
| senior 64:16      | 108:9 111:16                   | soon 59:8           | 10:8              | statesmen 42.10                         | subjects 15:25                   | 93:6             |
| 109:18            | 118:5,7                        | sooner 12:12        | specifying 53:22  | stating 117.6                           | 67:7 91:8                        | surely 26:21     |
| sense 5:12 9:10   | sides 98:19                    | sorry 2:21 72:25    | speech 1:5 3:11   | status 65:12 66:6                       | submission 2:17                  | 34:18 58:5       |
| 22:9,10,16        | significance 52:9              | 76:9 81:19          | 3:11,25 6:11      | 66:7 69:15                              | 2:18 64:10,14                    | surface 14:3     |
| 44:11 76:21       | significant 12:15              | 106:18              | 7:15,17,21 8:2    | 79:12,14                                | 68:8 69:8 88:7                   | surprised 86:25  |
| 77.11 /0.21       | Significant 12.13              | 100.10              | 1.13,17,21 0.2    | , | 00.0 07.0 00.7                   | Surpriseu 00.23  |
|                   | •                              | •                   | •                 | •                                       | •                                |                  |

|                   |                               |                  |                                       |                   |                                       | rage 131         |
|-------------------|-------------------------------|------------------|---------------------------------------|-------------------|---------------------------------------|------------------|
|                   | I                             |                  |                                       | I                 | I                                     | I                |
| SUSAN 2:9         | 46:6,13 51:13                 | theme 39:14      | 38:3 40:5,6,18                        | 116:16 117:1,6    | 36:12 73:6                            | 104:12 107:6     |
| suspect 74:7      | 52:15 53:19                   | theoretical 96:2 | 41:20,21,24                           | 119:7 120:2,9     | 74:14                                 | 117:22           |
| 84:18             | 56:5,10 57:6                  | theoretically    | 42:1,9 43:4,5                         | 120:11 121:18     | tortured 6:5,17                       | type 75:5 105:25 |
| suspicion 113:2   | 60:12                         | 66:14            | 43:10,12,15                           | 121:20            | 7:3                                   | types 1:20 27:18 |
| suspicions 84:19  | task 62:19,20                 | theories 9:13    | 44:4,16 45:13                         | thinking 14:7,18  | touched 13:11                         | 27:20 30:10      |
| suspicious 76:20  | task 02.17,20<br>tasked 114:5 | theory 39:22     | 45:14,16,17,18                        | 17:18 24:19       | 17:3 108:6                            | 101:1 102:4      |
| swift 111:5       |                               |                  | , , ,                                 |                   |                                       | 120:14           |
|                   | tautologous                   | they'd 59:9      | 46:1,7,13                             | 25:11 26:10       | touches 115:14                        |                  |
| sworn 95:14       | 92:25                         | thing 4:20,21    | 47:17,25 48:4                         | 27:5 34:12        | tough 43:11                           | typical 17:17    |
| symbolic 71:18    | teach 3:10                    | 6:11,12 12:11    | 48:9,15,16                            | 38:11,13 55:4     | tower 116:5                           | typically 4:5    |
| 72:22 79:4        | teaching 96:9                 | 18:25 19:10      | 49:6 50:14,19                         | 64:21 73:18       | training 120:12                       | 19:14            |
| symbolically      | 112:3                         | 22:11 23:5       | 51:14,21 52:3                         | 74:19 75:15       | 120:14,19                             | tyranny 25:18    |
| 71:5              | television 29:25              | 29:20 31:11      | 52:4,7 53:14                          | 79:4 81:19        | 121:1,3                               | 29:3,8,14,22     |
| system 31:8       | tell 23:10 64:17              | 32:5,8 36:6      | 53:19,20 54:1                         | 88:6,8,25         | transcript 63:21                      | 30:7,8           |
| 46:14 56:2        | 88:22 93:2                    | 48:20 56:21      | 54:7,23,25                            | 90:19 99:6        | treat 6:2                             | , .              |
| 58:6 78:2         | 95:25                         | 69:13 73:1       | 55:3,6 56:5,10                        | 100:14 112:2      | treated 16:25                         |                  |
| systematic 5:2    | telling 37:24                 | 74:5 75:23       | 58:9 60:12                            | thinks 11:8       | treating 6:4                          | UCL 2:16         |
| 28:22             | 102:16                        |                  | 61:17 63:9                            | 14:15,15 15:12    | 87:23                                 |                  |
|                   |                               | 76:1 81:4,20     |                                       |                   |                                       | UK 71:23 72:2    |
| systematically    | tells 38:8 89:9               | 82:8 83:10       | 65:6,11,17,18                         | 48:1,6,15         | treatment 37:14                       | unacceptable     |
| 101:1             | tempted 84:4                  | 84:19 86:21      | 65:22,23 66:18                        | 111:19            | 37:18                                 | 20:10            |
| systems 41:17     | ten 120:9                     | 106:2 107:17     | 66:22 67:4,9                          | think's 80:9      | tremendously                          | unalloyed 22:19  |
| 62:5              | tenancy 22:18                 | 114:24           | 68:3,4,7,8,15                         | third 56:21       | 47:4 119:24                           | unaware 115:21   |
| -                 | tend 74:9                     | things 9:19,21   | 68:23 69:6,6,6                        | 59:24 80:14       | trial 70:23,24                        | underlie 78:2    |
| T                 | tendency 7:10                 | 16:12 19:6       | 69:9,25 70:3                          | 87:19             | trials 70:18,21                       | underlies 68:13  |
| tab 64:11 95:12   | 15:21                         | 20:5 23:22       | 70:10,11,14,19                        | Thomas/Anita      | tried 45:4                            | underlying       |
| take 9:8,18 15:20 | tender 104:3                  | 26:24 29:15      | 71:3,13,17,23                         | 43:6              | tries 31:6 45:22                      | 16:10,10 48:21   |
| 18:2,19 26:23     | tends 48:3                    | 40:10 43:15      | 71:24 72:17,23                        | thought 7:11      | trouble 49:24                         | 65:14 70:15      |
| 32:7 33:10        | tension 79:11                 | 49:1 51:18,23    | 73:4,9 74:6,12                        | 10:21 11:9        | true 23:3 34:9                        | 72:5 80:21       |
|                   | 82:3 91:7                     |                  |                                       | 13:23 31:17       | 89:8 91:9 93:1                        |                  |
| 35:6 39:5,8       |                               | 53:25 56:4,13    | 74:15,16,18                           |                   |                                       | 82:22            |
| 44:8 45:21        | 106:20                        | 57:8 66:23       | 75:21,22 76:11                        | 41:14 42:4        | trump 111:16                          | undermine 61:9   |
| 46:2 47:24        | tentative 70:6                | 68:4,5 69:7      | 76:23,25 77:2                         | 60:9 65:8,10      | <b>truth</b> 12:9,12,19               | 83:15            |
| 48:9 50:15        | 71:21 81:1                    | 72:17 73:14      | 77:9,11,16,19                         | 65:14,16,19       | 12:22,24 13:5                         | underpin 94:5    |
| 58:20 59:2        | tentatively 71:22             | 74:9 75:19,21    | 77:20 78:15,22                        | 70:23 78:15,20    | 14:18,20 88:9                         | underpinning     |
| 62:21 64:2        | tentativeness                 | 78:20 79:7       | 79:1,3,5,6,10                         | 79:1 81:1 82:8    | 91:2 95:20                            | 76:8 78:13,15    |
| 66:3,12 69:13     | 78:25                         | 84:7 86:20       | 79:25 80:1,3,4                        | 88:10 91:22       | 119:6,12                              | underpins 94:11  |
| 69:16,19 71:19    | term 11:7 34:25               | 88:23 89:25      | 80:7,25 81:13                         | 93:10,25          | truthfulness                          | understand 1:13  |
| 72:6 79:1         | terms 1:17 3:23               | 97:13 98:2       | 81:14,21,22,23                        | 105:24 120:22     | 12:22 97:16                           | 3:1 7:24 12:4    |
| 82:25 83:6        | 3:23 4:9 11:20                | 100:15 101:20    | 81:23 82:3                            | 121:24            | 103:5                                 | 36:9,15 40:9     |
| 84:21 89:9        | 11:21 12:1                    | 101:22 102:1     | 83:9,22 84:6,6                        | thoughts 16:18    | truths 88:23                          | 46:14 50:14      |
| 95:16 102:2       | 13:9,10 21:23                 | 106:15 109:3     | 84:10,24 85:6                         | 63:25 91:11       | try 10:18 12:4                        |                  |
|                   | 25:11 48:4                    | 113:6,11,12,18   | 85:15,20,20                           | threat 54:4       | 13:20 30:14                           | 55:18 56:24      |
| 113:1 119:2       |                               |                  |                                       |                   |                                       | 62:15 74:23      |
| taken 48:7 93:13  | 61:17 69:6                    | 116:17 118:10    | 86:7,17 87:3                          | threatens 4:11    | 36:6 39:11,14                         | 99:21 106:22     |
| 101:4 112:21      | 73:16 78:1                    | 118:10 119:2     | 87:13,18 88:5                         | three 2:5 51:10   | 43:2 65:15                            | understanding    |
| takes 18:9 23:14  | 90:23 98:9                    | 119:13,13        | 88:6,8,17,18                          | 55:24 56:4,5      | 91:19 106:8                           | 7:21 25:6        |
| 27:7 52:24        | 103:14 104:21                 | 121:4,8,13,19    | 88:20 89:15,16                        | 56:11,16 57:6     | <b>trying</b> 3:1 12:24               | 40:24 45:11      |
| talk 11:20 20:2   | 107:18,18                     | think 3:3 5:2,10 | 89:22,23 90:18                        | 57:13 58:4        | 13:12 14:3,12                         | 46:18 112:14     |
| 47:17 60:14,19    | 117:17,22                     | 7:19,21 9:3,4,9  | 90:20,20 91:6                         | 63:12 64:24       | 36:1,15 38:20                         | 117:15           |
| 66:18 83:3        | terrible 53:4                 | 9:15 10:9 11:7   | 91:11,14,15,16                        | 69:7              | 46:15 60:15                           | understands      |
| 88:9 94:21        | terribly 42:18                | 12:9,10 13:12    | 91:20,22 92:2                         | thrive 25:25      | 71:14                                 | 118:18           |
| talked 1:8 33:18  | 50:20                         | 13:14,24 14:14   | 92:10,11 93:1                         | ticking 121:1     | turn 4:25 81:17                       | understood       |
| 98:12 120:1       | territory 45:19               | 14:17,19 15:7    | 94:1,6,9,13                           | time 10:12 18:2   | 120:5                                 | 25:12 118:14     |
| talking 14:1 16:1 | terrorist 6:22                | 15:9,21,22,23    | 95:19 96:17                           | 18:4 50:4 91:9    | turns 34:13 46:4                      | unduly 60:3      |
| _                 | thank 2:5,7,23                | 16:9,23 17:1     | 97:12 99:5,5                          | 94:9 95:4         | tutins 34.13 40.4<br>tutorial 23:15   |                  |
| 16:3 17:6 20:1    |                               | 17:10 18:24      |                                       | 115:10 121:10     |                                       | unfair 62:11     |
| 25:9 34:19        | 3:5,13,17 7:14                |                  | 99:16 100:2                           |                   | Twitter 32:11                         | unhelpfully      |
| 60:3,16,23        | 8:4,20 34:23                  | 19:5,7 20:20     | 101:19,19,21                          | 121:12            | two 7:1 13:21                         | 68:23            |
| 89:17 101:15      | 63:9,11,25                    | 20:22 21:6,7     | 102:3,4,12,12                         | times 98:5        | 14:24 16:24                           | unimaginable     |
| 105:1             | 64:9,12,12,15                 | 21:25 22:14,19   | 102:19 105:14                         | today 1:6 2:5     | 25:21 28:2                            | 115:8            |
| Tasioulas 2:6,10  | 64:24 71:8                    | 23:7,19,22       | 105:15 106:10                         | tolerate 19:12    | 35:18 39:25                           | universities     |
| 2:15 3:18 4:1     | 92:13 94:17                   | 24:1,8,15,24     | 106:14 107:8,8                        | toleration 3:16   | 40:20 42:13                           | 12:25            |
| 5:9,24 6:25       | 95:3,6,6,13,18                | 27:2,2,9,24      | 107:11 108:23                         | Tomorrow 2:3      | 46:4,23 51:10                         | University 2:13  |
| 8:23,24 10:3      | 96:12 102:7                   | 28:2,8,12,14     | 109:4,24 110:6                        | tools 57:1        | 51:14 53:22                           | 2:15 64:16       |
| 15:20,21 19:10    | 109:7 119:19                  | 28:17 29:10,11   | 110:12 111:5,7                        | top 94:21 109:11  | 55:24 56:5,16                         | 95:23            |
| 20:4,8 21:24      | 121:14,17,25                  | 29:12 30:5,8     | 111:10,12,25                          | 119:7 121:19      | 62:14 72:17                           | unnecessarily    |
| 21:25 24:23       | 122:1                         | 31:11,15,19,24   | 112:8,11,23                           | topic 7:15 10:15  | 76:23 78:23                           | 46:2             |
|                   | thanks 63:13                  | 32:16,23 34:5    | 113:5,9,11,13                         | 13:18 16:20       | 82:20 93:19                           |                  |
| 27:24 30:5,25     |                               |                  |                                       | 82:7              |                                       | unpacking 120:2  |
| 31:2,5 32:16      | theatre 10:2,4,22             | 35:11,22,25      | 114:2,3,13,14                         |                   | 94:1,13 95:7                          | unpleasant       |
| 35:1,4 40:4,5     | 11:14                         | 36:8 37:3,23     | 115:8,17,22                           | torture 6:18 7:11 | 96:18 98:19                           | 88:23            |
|                   | <u> </u>                      | <u> </u>         | <u> </u>                              | <u> </u>          | <u> </u>                              | <u> </u>         |
|                   |                               |                  | · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · |                   | · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · |                  |

|                             |                                      |                                       |                                |                                   |                        | Page 1 | 135 |
|-----------------------------|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------|--------|-----|
|                             | l                                    | l                                     | l                              | l                                 |                        |        |     |
| use 15:17 17:5              | violence 93:9                        | 58:4 59:25                            | window 62:16                   | 51:11 57:9                        | 8                      |        |     |
| 36:20 38:24                 | virtue 31:22 39:7                    | 60:1,14 62:8                          | windows 10:19                  | 81:8 91:15                        | <b>8</b> 5:21 82:11,16 |        |     |
| 52:1 80:24                  | 42:3 45:5                            | 63:15,17 65:25                        | wins 53:17 55:17               | 116:18,18                         | 82:20 86:2             |        |     |
| 88:16                       | 48:12 55:9                           | 67:23 68:7                            | wisdom 105:18                  |                                   |                        |        |     |
| useful 29:9,10              | 57:12                                | 70:13 71:6,13                         | wish 23:11 29:16               | X                                 | 9                      |        |     |
| 46:12 68:7                  | visibly 59:10                        | 78:19 81:5                            | 63:16 94:25                    | <b>X</b> 83:13                    | <b>9</b> 82:14,15,15   |        |     |
| 69:14                       | 77:14,23                             | 100:23 104:7                          | 95:7                           |                                   | 85:25                  |        |     |
| uses 53:1                   | visit 56:16                          | 107:12 117:2                          | wished 94:24                   | <u> </u>                          | <b>9-page</b> 64:10    |        |     |
| usually 11:9                | vocabulary                           | 118:13 119:8                          | wishing 103:19<br>witness 64:6 | <b>Y</b> 83:14                    | <b>95</b> 17:3         |        |     |
| 39:20                       | 52:25                                | ways 4:24 5:10                        | 95:12,18 96:16                 | yeah 80:13 93:18                  |                        |        |     |
|                             | <b>voice</b> 17:7,9<br>69:20 85:9,17 | 30:13 31:6<br>44:18 47:22             | witnesses 2:5                  | 98:1 100:7                        |                        |        |     |
| valid 28:24                 | 101:18                               | 53:22 62:5                            | 64:24                          | 102:20 107:8                      |                        |        |     |
| valuable 22:8,9             | voices 17:9 113:5                    | 67:3 70:14,25                         | women 17:22,24                 | 116:9 117:12<br>119:14            |                        |        |     |
| 22:10,14,16                 | voluntarily                          | 71:2 104:4                            | 18:5 54:20                     | year 114:16                       |                        |        |     |
| 46:16 110:3,4               | 44:22,24 45:1                        | 108:24 109:4                          | wonder 17:25                   | year 114.10<br>years 3:16,19      |                        |        |     |
| 116:11 121:21               | voluntary 44:17                      | 110:5,8,13                            | word 15:18 22:1                | 21:3 23:14                        |                        |        |     |
| value 2:25 22:24            | vote 22:20                           | 117:5                                 | 22:19 36:20,20                 | 90:2,2,10                         |                        |        |     |
| 23:2,2,23 28:3              | voted 43:24                          | wealth 28:17,19                       | 38:24 52:25                    | York 2:15                         |                        |        |     |
| 28:7 46:19                  | voters 7:25                          | week 21:1,3                           | 76:17 115:8                    | 1 VIK 2.13                        |                        |        |     |
| 54:1,2,8 65:9               | vulnerable 17:14                     | 115:7                                 | words 29:4 36:7                | 0                                 |                        |        |     |
| 84:2 96:5                   |                                      | weighed 55:4                          | 39:9 51:9                      | <b>00882</b> 78:3                 |                        |        |     |
| values 4:13                 | W                                    | weighing 55:7                         | 96:13                          | <b>00884</b> 82:16                |                        |        |     |
| 56:14 61:9                  | wall 26:1                            | weighs 54:23                          | work 14:5 68:9,9               | <b>00885</b> 86:2                 |                        |        |     |
| 94:5,14 111:18              | want 6:8 7:1                         | weight 4:7,8,23                       | 70:20 71:6,7                   | <b>00909</b> 109:12               |                        |        |     |
| vanished 73:13              | 10:11 12:12                          | 26:2                                  | 84:9 96:9 97:6                 | <b>00913</b> 102:24               |                        |        |     |
| variation 41:18             | 13:14 19:2                           | welcome 95:2                          | 105:21,22                      |                                   |                        |        |     |
| variety 101:6               | 22:13 30:4                           | welfare 103:22                        | 115:15 116:6                   | 1                                 |                        |        |     |
| various 4:9 31:9            | 37:11 40:23                          | wellbeing 89:3                        | 119:23 120:15                  | 1 88:8                            |                        |        |     |
| 70:25 109:4                 | 41:11 45:21                          | 89:18                                 | workable 87:14                 | <b>1.15</b> 122:3                 |                        |        |     |
| vast 12:17 62:7             | 46:3,3 47:8                          | well-known                            | worked 106:4                   | <b>10</b> 5:21                    |                        |        |     |
| verdict 38:20               | 51:24,25 52:1                        | 69:20                                 | working 21:20                  | <b>10.00</b> 1:2                  |                        |        |     |
| versus 53:24                | 53:19 57:9                           | we'll 64:2 77:1                       | 61:12 98:11                    | <b>11.41</b> 64:3                 |                        |        |     |
| 54:6                        | 58:3 61:4,24                         | <b>we're</b> 12:4 13:12<br>17:6 20:25 | 121:6,11<br>works 115:19       | <b>11.47</b> 64:5                 |                        |        |     |
| victim 21:3<br>victims 21:6 | 63:20,24 75:23                       | 21:4 22:23                            | world 12:10                    | <b>12.30</b> 95:9                 |                        |        |     |
| view 14:4 16:21             | 77:2,20,21,22<br>77:23 79:9          | 27:3 38:10                            | 13:24 22:18                    | <b>12.32</b> 95:11                |                        |        |     |
| 18:3,5,23 34:5              | 80:9 81:11                           | 40:9 53:7 55:4                        | 42:24 57:17                    | <b>13(2)</b> 87:1                 |                        |        |     |
| 45:10,12,15                 | 83:12,13,14                          | 55:6 60:16,16                         | 58:1                           | <b>14</b> 72:8 95:19              |                        |        |     |
| 46:12 59:12,24              | 87:16,16 90:25                       | 60:23 68:5                            | worry 74:17                    | <b>16</b> 1:1                     |                        |        |     |
| 61:11,11,23                 | 91:20,23 92:3                        | 74:16 77:10                           | 75:11 93:2                     | <b>1960</b> 34:6                  |                        |        |     |
| 62:12 65:7                  | 95:1 109:20                          | 82:14 83:7                            | worrying 75:17                 |                                   |                        |        |     |
| 66:2,24 70:20               | 110:2 117:21                         | 88:24 89:17                           | worse 90:22 91:3               |                                   |                        |        |     |
| 70:23 71:9                  | 118:2 120:13                         | 101:15 116:2                          | worth 17:25                    | <b>2</b> 5:20                     |                        |        |     |
| 75:13 76:13                 | 121:22                               | we've 3:22 13:10                      | 81:22                          | <b>2,000</b> 6:23                 |                        |        |     |
| 90:2 92:24                  | wanted 33:16                         | 17:5,11 24:15                         | worthwhile                     | <b>2.15</b> 122:2 <b>2012</b> 1:1 |                        |        |     |
| 107:4 110:24                | 77:11 88:16,24                       | 47:8 52:19                            | 22:11                          | <b>2012</b> 1:1<br><b>25</b> 3:16 |                        |        |     |
| 116:16,18                   | 91:5,19                              | 53:10 60:3                            | wouldn't 6:8                   | <b>23</b> 3.10                    |                        |        |     |
| viewed 97:21                | wanting 36:23                        | 63:17,19 108:6                        | 11:25 16:10                    | 3                                 |                        |        |     |
| views 9:21 10:18            | 36:24 91:18                          | 120:16                                | 26:16 31:17                    | 3 5:20                            |                        |        |     |
| 17:22 39:25                 | wants 49:12                          | whatsoever                            | 44:19 52:4,8                   | 3 3.20                            |                        |        |     |
| 43:25 44:1                  | warded 27:19                         | 30:20                                 | 59:20 86:15                    | 4                                 |                        |        |     |
| 62:21 63:16,18              | warned 56:8                          | whistle-blowing                       | 87:15,16                       | <b>4</b> 107:24,25                |                        |        |     |
| 96:4 109:5,16               | wary 70:5 74:11                      | 113:7 120:7                           | 114:25                         | <b>40-odd</b> 23:14               |                        |        |     |
| 110:20 116:1                | wasn't 26:19                         | white 49:25                           | wrist 47:22<br>write 96:5      | <b>47</b> 64:11                   |                        |        |     |
| <b>vilified</b> 11:16       | 58:17 81:9                           | widely 17:15<br>42:2,7                | 100:20 111:19                  | <b>49</b> 95:12                   |                        |        |     |
| 39:6<br><b>violate</b> 35:8 | <b>way</b> 7:12 8:10<br>11:17 12:3   | wider 3:4 18:8                        | writer 44:10                   |                                   |                        |        |     |
| 93:22                       | 16:12 22:2                           | 32:24 33:6                            | writing 44:13                  | 5                                 |                        |        |     |
| violated 29:6,7             | 23:1,25 35:10                        | 38:8,10,12                            | 63:13 87:7                     | <b>5</b> 78:3 79:23               |                        |        |     |
| 55:16 89:2                  | 35:25 36:5,15                        | 41:2,6                                | written 15:5                   | 110:19                            |                        |        |     |
| violating 5:14              | 39:22 40:9,20                        | wife 42:9                             | 37:4 63:18                     | <b>500</b> 21:6                   |                        |        |     |
| 57:13 73:15                 | 41:14 45:18                          | Williams 12:22                        | 65:6 68:8 69:8                 |                                   |                        |        |     |
| 74:18                       | 46:3 47:10,19                        | willing 27:16                         | 88:18 94:4                     | 7                                 |                        |        |     |
| violation 5:15              | 51:6 52:2                            | 72:1 81:4                             | wrong 5:14 9:9                 | <b>7</b> 82:16 102:8              |                        |        |     |
| 73:10                       | 55:18 56:15                          | win 54:9                              | 27:15,15 51:11                 | 103:1 107:25                      |                        |        |     |
|                             |                                      |                                       |                                |                                   |                        |        |     |
|                             |                                      |                                       |                                |                                   |                        |        |     |