

Witness: Andy Hayman
Statement No: 1
Exhibits Referred to: AH/1, AH/2, AH/3
Date Statement Made: 14 February 2012

The Leveson Inquiry into the Culture Practices and Ethics of the Press

Witness: Andy Hayman

Address: c/o Metropolitan Police Service, New Scotland Yard

1. I have been asked to give a statement to assist the Leveson Inquiry. In this statement I have attempted to address all the questions asked of me in the s.21 (2) Notice. I begin each section of this statement by listing the questions to which I am responding.
2. In addressing the questions raised by the Inquiry, I describe matters as they were at the time I was serving in the police force concerned and as I can best recall them. Some questions relate to events ten years ago which may mean my recollection is sketchy and records do not exist to assist me.
3. Things may have changed since I left each police force.

Personal History

Q1 - Who you are and a brief summary of your career history.

4. I joined Essex Police in 1978, serving in a variety of uniform and CID roles. I was promoted through the ranks to Chief Superintendent where

I was a Divisional Commander in charge of a policing division in Essex. I was then promoted to Commander and transferred to the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) in November 1998.

5. As Commander I was in charge of the drugs agenda. Then, for a short spell, I served in Operation Trident and dealt with drug-related murders. I then went to serve in the Complaints and Discipline Department.
6. On promotion to Deputy Assistant Commissioner I assumed overall command for the Professional Standards Department (PSD), reporting directly to the Deputy Commissioner. PSD was an amalgamation of corruption investigations and conventional complaints investigations.
7. I was the Chief Constable in Norfolk from January 2002 to February 2005 when I transferred back to the MPS as an Assistant Commissioner in charge of Specialist Operations. This gave me the command responsibility for Special Branch, Anti Terrorist Branch, the protection of the Royal Family, senior Ministers and visiting diplomats resident in London, and protection of the Palace of Westminster and Heathrow and City Airports.
8. Following my admission into the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), I participated in the ACPO Committee Structure. In around 2003 I was selected by the then President of ACPO, Sir Chris Fox, to be Head of the ACPO Media Committee. At the time the President was keen to enhance the profile of the police within the national media. The purpose of this was to ensure that the UK Police Services were reported on in a more informed fashion. More importantly, it was felt

that when the police needed to ask for public support in investigations it would be more productive to have an established relationship with the media in place. I attach to my statement as exhibit AH/1 a copy of my interview presentation and the terms of reference of this committee.

9. I embarked on a structured programme of work to achieve that aim, and I continued this work when I returned to the MPS. Within this role in the MPS I was wearing two hats: one was the ACPO Media Lead and the other was Assistant Commissioner of Specialist Operations (ACSO). At times the work crossed over, for example at the time of the bombings in London on 7th July 2005 (7/7 attacks) and when engaged on joint working groups with the national media. Occasionally, I gave speeches to media groups such as the Society of Editors to help position the work of the police within the media. Chief Constable Andy Trotter now holds the post of ACPO Media Lead.
10. I announced my retirement from the MPS on 4th December 2007 and left the organisation on 17th April 2008.

The Culture of Relations between the MPS and the media

Q2 - What were your impressions, over the years, about the culture of relations between the MPS and the media?

Q12 - What mechanisms were in place to monitor and record meetings with the media, whether formal or informal, by members of the MPS?

Q18 - Set out your understanding of the type of contact which Metropolitan Police personnel have had with the media covering nature, extent, and (in general terms) topics / content.

Q19 - Were contacts with the media restricted to certain staff or were all staff able to deal with the media?

Q20 - What did you expect the Metropolitan Police to gain from such contacts with the media?

Q21 - What did the media seek from such contacts with Metropolitan Police personnel?

Q30 - What systems, policies and procedures were in place in the Metropolitan police to ensure that all members of the force (including civilian employees) know what was and what was not appropriate contact with the media?

Q31 - Were you satisfied that the policies and procedures described above were sufficient and worked effectively? Did you consider that they were capable of improvement?

Q32 - What training was in place in the Metropolitan police to ensure that all members of the force (including civilian employees) knew what was and what was not appropriate contact with the media?

Q94 - What is your current impression of the culture within the MPS in relation to its dealings with the press?

11. I feel that it is important for the MPS and all police forces to maintain a healthy, collaborative working relationship with the media so that they can build and maintain public confidence in the police. They need to seek public support for the work they do. The relationship between police and the media is also important because national and local media reporting has an impact on police morale.
12. Due to the size of the MPS and the high profile cases worked on, it is natural that its relationship with the media will be different from the relationship that provincial police forces have with the media; that is not to say that their work is any less important. It is also relevant that most national media outlets have their main UK headquarters located in London.
13. When I was a serving officer I felt that the general view of the rank and file police officer, and also of some senior colleagues, was that the media would do more harm than good. As a generalisation, most police officers would be hesitant and nervous when considering contact with the media and would therefore avoid such contact. This is a view that I shared until obtaining a senior position. From conversations with the media, I would conclude that at times they felt it was a one-sided relationship where the police only made contact when they needed something from the press, such as help in the form of a criminal appeal.

This polarised position between the police and the press was not necessarily helpful when trying to investigate crime or when trying to develop the understanding of the public as to the difference between the fear of crime and actual crime. This reading of the relationship between police and media was a strong driver for the developmental work I was trying to carry out as ACPO Media Lead.

14. It is worth making the distinction between contact with the media that must be done as part of your duty as a police officer and pro-active contact for the purpose of establishing an ongoing professional relationship. The latter can be utilised at a time of crisis or when public appeals are required - for example making requests for witnesses, reporting to the public, informing the public of major events or indeed sharing good news stories to enhance the profile of the police.
15. Upon entering ACPO, I remember that I started to challenge the more reserved position of colleagues who preferred to keep the media at arms length. It seemed to me that the more senior you became in the police force the more untenable it was to avoid contact with the media. Firstly, at a senior level one would be expected to represent the force as the "talking head" at times of crisis. Secondly, the good work and performance of the police needed to be promulgated at a senior level within police forces and within the media. Finally, my view is that the public expected a senior officer to be visible.
16. Between 1998 and 2000, I gave some more thought to how the media operated and tried to define, in my own mind, what the relationship

between the police and the media ought to be. I concluded that there was benefit on both sides to having a professional relationship, but that the terms of engagement between the two had to be clearly understood. My view was that there was more to be gained from regular contact and closer working in calmer times, in order to have an established relationship in place ready for high profile criminal investigations or national emergencies, when each party would need to perform their respective roles. An ongoing working relationship would help facilitate a more reliable and informed public message. This very much influenced my decision to apply for and take up the role as the ACPO Media Lead.

17. An example of how a good working relationship between police and press can be productive involves my time spent as ACPO Lead on Drug Crime. Prior to the ACPO conference covering the topic of drugs (which was an issue of great public interest) Radio 4 was keen to interview me for the "Today" programme. I therefore met with them the night before the conference started in order to brief them on what the conference was going to be about. This "working partnership" ensured accurate reporting for public benefit.
18. The type of contact which MPS officers had with the media would include meetings, press conferences, broadcast and written interviews, providing press releases, answering press inquiries and crime appeals. The type of contact would vary and would depend on the issue involved and the rank of officer involved. As I saw it there were typically three

tiers of contact - the senior tier of officers and the Directorate of Public Affairs (DPA); the middle tier of Senior Investigation Officers (SIO) and local Commanders getting messages out to the public, and the lower tier where officers would have informal contact through their local press offices or directly with the media, for example where a victim has given permission for details of the crime to be disclosed in order to assist the investigation.

19. Officers of all ranks were able to speak to the press on a case-by-case basis about matters they had experience of, the caveat being that officers below Inspector rank needed to have their line manager's permission to do so. My view is that it is important for officers who are on the ground to engage with the media for a variety of reasons, including to publicise appeals and to provide details of local policing issues in their area. This helps to increase public understanding of policing, to provide public scrutiny of police actions and policies, and to help get information to the public about matters of local crime and local interest.
20. To the best of my recollection when I was a serving officer at the MPS there was no requirement to make a record of meetings or engagements with the media, save where it was considered "hospitality", in which case a record would be made in the Hospitality Register.
21. I understand that the Inquiry has been given access to current and past MPS policies covering the media, hospitality and gifts, DPA training and

reporting wrongdoing and so will be fully informed about these issues.

The policies applicable during my tenure as a senior officer in the MPS are contained at tabs A, B and C of the MPS Master Bundle.

22. I have no detailed recollection of what media awareness and broadcast training was provided but I am informed that other witnesses will be covering this issue and that the Inquiry will be able to refer to the relevant policies applicable to this subject.
23. It is right to have contact with the media to ensure that any unfair and any overly negative impression of the MPS is addressed and to help the public understand the work of the MPS.
24. Save for the above I have nothing further to add about the current culture within the MPS in relation to its dealings with the press as I retired over 4 years ago.

Personal Contact with the Media

Q3 - Describe the personal contact which you had with the media at the various stages of your career. The Inquiry would like an overall picture of the type, frequency, duration and content of your contact with the media.

Q4 - Without prejudice to the generality of question (3) above, please set out the contact which you had with the following persons employed by (or formerly employed by) News International, giving the dates and summarising the gist of the communications which you had with:

- a. Neil Wallis.
- b. Rebekah Brooks.
- c. Andy Coulson.
- d. Colin Myler.

Q5 - Describe what you were seeking to gain for the Metropolitan Police through your personal contacts with the media.

Q6 - Describe in general terms and using illustrative examples what you consider the media has been seeking from you in your personal dealing with them during your career.

Q14 - Whilst you were serving in the Metropolitan Police, did you ever meet either James or Rupert Murdoch? If so, please give full particulars.

Q15 - Are you aware of any meeting between James or Rupert Murdoch and any member of the MPS? If so, please give full particulars.

Q27 - What policies and procedures were in place whilst you were an Assistant Commissioner to record contact between: (a) the Commissioner and the media; (b) senior

managers and the media; (c) other personnel and the media? For the avoidance of doubt please answer in relation to both formal and informal communications.

Q60 - Did you ever do any media work, paid or unpaid, whilst still a serving member of the police service?

25. My personal contact with the media would take the form of meetings, functions and attendances at events hosted by various organisations such as the Crime Reporters Association (CRA). On occasions, such meetings would be formally structured and held in a meeting room at New Scotland Yard (NSY). More informal meetings were held over lunch, dinner or breakfast or just a quick tea or coffee.
26. I have served in the MPS and two regional forces and I feel there is a real contrast to be drawn between media handling in the MPS compared to a regional force. During my junior service in Essex, contact with the media was rare. Upon being promoted to a higher rank I had some contact with local media such as interviews or discussions with local newspaper representatives in relation to particular operations or campaigns. I would say that up to the rank of Commander (a period of 20 years) I cannot recall that I had any informal contact with the media. I would rely totally on all contact being facilitated by the publicity or media department within the police force I was working with.
27. As Chief Constable of Norfolk Constabulary I experienced greater contact with local and regional media representatives, consisting of occasional interviews but also some meetings relating to policing issues at the time, together with some social contact which will be dealt with later on in my statement.

28. I have been asked about contact with four specific individuals employed by News International. All four held senior positions at various times. I cannot remember the date but I remember being introduced by the DPA to Neil Wallis, Rebekah Brooks and Andy Coulson whilst I was ACSO. I think that was some time early into my tenure as ACSO (so around early 2005). Given their roles, I would not normally have had routine contact with them. I cannot recall ever giving any hospitality to, or receiving any hospitality from, Rebekah Brooks. In respect of Andy Coulson and Neil Wallis, it is significant that they were Editor and Deputy Editor for the Sunday newspaper that had made it known that they wanted proactively to help with the prevention and detection of terrorist attacks. To the best of my recollection the contact I had with them between 2005 and 2008 was minimal and was focused on work to do with terrorism. I recall one example which did not involve hospitality but epitomises the relationship with them. This was a meeting where I attended the *News of the World* (NOTW) office to ask the newspaper to show on their internet site a reconstruction of what could have been achieved by the airline plotters in blowing up an aircraft. I was accompanied at this meeting by Dick Fedorcio, the Director of DPA. It led to the newspaper agreeing to put the reconstruction video on their website, allowing members of the public to access it. It was promoted within the body of an article which they ran inside the newspaper.
29. In respect of Colin Myler, he was not employed by NOTW when I was a serving police officer. I had not met him nor did I know of him when I

- was a serving officer. I recall only one meeting with him since being retired.
30. I have never met either James or Rupert Murdoch nor am I aware of any other members of the MPS having personal contact with James or Rupert Murdoch.
31. I believe that the media were interested in my views, as ACSO, on how I saw the current and future policing challenges concerning the areas of policing I was dealing with, particularly national security and counter terrorism given the acute nature of the terrorist threat and the attacks that had been successfully mounted. Therefore media representatives would want to have meetings and when I believed this to be to the benefit of the MPS and its mission, I would agree to meet with them.
32. I would like to think that the media saw their contact with me as an opportunity to gain a better understanding of the challenges the police were facing and how we were approaching and dealing with those challenges, as well as to have a point of contact who they could check the factual accuracy of stories with. I felt that if, at a senior level, I did not engage with the media this would not be in the best interests of the police or the community who rely on the media to understand what is going on in policing.
33. In my role with ACPO I had spent about 2 years developing a strategy concerning media relations. My professional relationship with the media became more intense as I performed the national roles of ACPO Media Lead and was in charge of Counter Terrorism policing for the UK.

34. As part of this process of developing relationships, regular lunch meetings with representatives of the CRA were organised (I think about every six weeks or so) by the DPA. When I attended these I was always accompanied by a DPA member of staff. I cannot recall if I inherited this initiative or if it was developed on my watch but I am fairly sure it was not my idea. The lunch meeting was at the CRA's cost and at the meetings policing issues of public interest were discussed. There were no inappropriate disclosures of confidential information but discussions were of a more general nature. As I recall these discussions were off the record.
35. At times of intense terrorist activity, this relationship proved helpful in avoiding unreliable and speculative media reporting. For example, between 2005 and 2007 there were numerous terrorist plots thwarted. Rumour and speculation about these activities was rife in the media as we were all still reeling from the 7/7 attacks. I remember that some reporting was so inaccurate and misleading it was verging on the irresponsible. However, that cuts both ways: it can be as irresponsible for the police to make no comment or correction as it is for a journalist to go ahead and publish inaccurate stories. I believe a major benefit of developing this CRA contact was that it was an opportunity to provide a guide on reportable facts. I understand the two successors to my post continued this contact. I do remember after a period of time feeling slightly uncomfortable that the MPS were not sharing the cost of these events and so I recall on two occasions paying for the lunch on behalf of the MPS, as a gesture. This expense was declared in my monthly

- expenses return and published on the internet as a disclosure in accordance with MPS policy.
36. Other formal meetings with the media were arranged through the DPA and they were normally arranged as and when the need arose. I probably had about three to four informal contacts a month with a variety of journalists in response to their queries. Sometimes I would initiate phone calls to them where I felt a response was required. I did not keep any record of these meetings nor were they entered into the Gifts and Hospitality Register as there was no "hospitality" involved.
37. In trying to understand the distinction between hospitality and day to day working or contact, I felt that where, for example, I had a meeting in a local café with a group of journalists who were trying to clarify points of fact ahead of a story, the purchase of, say, cups of coffee and cheese rolls would not amount to "hospitality" that needed to be entered into the Gifts and Hospitality Register. Over time the costs of such light refreshment would be shared within the group, including myself. I don't know whether others claimed for this but I did not and I didn't consider such items to be hospitality or refundable expenses.
38. On the other hand, whenever I attended something more substantial, like a lunch, dinner or function, it was clear that was hospitality and I always attempted to notify my private office staff so that they could record it in the Hospitality Register. That said I would not claim that every item of hospitality was recorded as I am sure there were

- occasions when that was overlooked. This was not being devious or dishonest but just a reflection of an extremely busy work schedule.
39. In my role as ACPO Media Lead my remit included formulating a 3-year strategy concerning relations between police and the media and putting into place a meeting structure which included a formation of a joint working party. This included two representatives from the CRA: Jeff Edwards from the *Daily Mirror* was the Chair of the CRA as I recall, and he would be accompanied by another CRA colleague. Representatives from the Society of Editors would also attend together with ACPO colleagues. The committee meetings would address issues concerning national policy. National conferences were arranged for media representatives and I personally visited many of the 43 police force press offices and met with regional, local and national journalists in TV, radio and print media.
40. Save for my ACPO role as set out above or liaising with the media as part of my official duties, I did not do any other "media" work, paid or unpaid, whilst still a serving member of Essex Police, the MPS or Norfolk. My recollection is that this would not be allowed by police policy.
41. Hospitality was recorded in my private office hospitality book and monthly declarations were published on the internet, as noted above. As I recall, the requirement to record hospitality in the register applied to all officers, from the Commissioner down.

The Times

Q54 - When did you first work for The Times?

Q55 - How did you come to work for The Times? In particular, did you apply for an advertised work, did you ask for work from The Times, were you asked to work for The Times (and, if so, when and who by) or did you come to do work for The Times in other circumstances (if so, please provide a full explanation)?

Q56 - When did you last work for The Times?

Q57 - What work did you do for The Times?

Q58 - Did you consider that there was any ethical difficulty in working for The Times given your involvement with the phone hacking investigation? If not, please explain why not.

Q59 - Have you undertaken any other work (whether paid or unpaid) for any other part of the Murdoch media empire? If so, please give full particulars.

42. I first began working for *The Times* in 2008. I was on holiday for the majority of August 2008, and my contract with them was signed soon after I returned, I think it was in September of that year.

43. When it became more widely known that I had retired from the MPS in the middle of April 2008, I received several invitations from both the print and TV industry to consider being a commentator on contemporary policing issues. This was something that I hadn't seriously considered doing but, having been invited to do so, I thought that it would be a role I would enjoy and that I could also help to better inform the comment and analysis about policing at the time. I remember drawing an analogy with the sport and financial industries where viewers, listeners and readers benefited from former professionals' views on current affairs - I saw no real difference in someone doing this on the subject of policing.

44. I was not experienced in the field of recruitment and so I sought the help of a specialist agency who could represent my position in negotiating any future roles. I recall meeting with an agent who told me that more than one newspaper and more than one television company

wanted to engage me. In relation to *The Times*, I was approached by Sean O'Neill (their Crime & Security Editor) and was then interviewed by the Editor and Deputy Editor whom I had never met previously. This was an opportunity for both sides to understand more about the potential role, whether I was suitable for them and whether they were suitable for me. I cannot be sure when that was: it certainly was not any earlier than two months after my retirement in April 2008. Following that interview, I discussed the opportunity with the agent, comparing it with the other invitations, and decided to accept the terms being offered. This was shortly followed by employment with ITN, NBC and more latterly LBC. Contracts were renewed with all four news agencies up to the summer of 2011. I last carried out work for *The Times* in July 2011. I am not aware of any restrictions in my MPS terms of contract which prevented me from doing this work. I saw nothing different in this role to that performed by Lord Stevens, a previous MPS Commissioner who wrote for the NOTW. The Metropolitan Police Authority (MPA) neither supported nor challenged my roles in the media.

45. There were two types of pieces that I would write. The first would be in direct response to an ongoing or recent police related incident where the News Editor felt that a commentary would complement a direct news reporter's account. A way of describing that relationship is that a journalist can report what has happened but may find it difficult to understand why it has happened or what the police would be doing about it. My role would be to explain why the police were doing what

- they were doing and offer an opinion, either supportive or critical. The second type of commentary would be more of a piece which was anticipating something occurring, for example when new legislation on a police subject was being debated. In these circumstances I would look into writing a longer and more thoughtful piece which took a particular position supporting or disagreeing with the new legislation. Such an article would be more analytical than contemporary.
46. There were also occasions when I was asked to provide advice and guidance before reporters would submit their final copy. I recall one article describing senior officers' pensions where some of the detail was inaccurate and another when the police were trying to arrest Raoul Moat and the reporter was unclear on what type of tactics the police were using and the guidelines for using tasers.
47. I have been asked whether I thought there was any ethical difficulty in working for *The Times* given my involvement with the phone hacking investigation. This is a point upon which I have frequently been challenged and whilst I can understand the view that there may appear to be a conflict, at the time I did not recognise it as such.
48. My reasons for this view were as follows: First, whilst *The Times* is part of the News International stable, I saw them as being detached from the NOTW, especially as my understanding was that editorially they were separate. Second, I was never aware of there being any evidence of wrongdoing occurring at *The Times* arising out of the investigations being carried out under Operation Carylaid. Third, I cannot recall any

occasion where anyone at *The Times* enquired about, or tried to elicit, any information pertaining to any investigation that I may or may not have been involved in. Fourth, at no time during my work with *The Times* was my position as a former police officer ever compromised, nor were unethical demands ever made of me by *The Times* or other employees of News International. I was informed by *The Times* that they approached me as they had heard that another newspaper was keen to offer commentary work to me. At no time did I personally approach any newspapers asking for employment opportunities.

49. On that basis, whilst acknowledging a perception problem I do not think that it was borne out in practice.

50. I have not been contracted by any other News International title.

Gifts and Hospitality

Q7 - To what extent did you accept hospitality from the media?

Q8 - Insofar as you accepted hospitality from the media, what was the nature of the hospitality that you accepted?

Q9 - To what extent did you provided hospitality for the media on behalf of the Metropolitan Police Service?

Q10 - Insofar as you provided hospitality to the media, what was the nature of the hospitality that you provided?

Q11 - In relation to the hospitality which you accepted from any company owned by the Murdoch family, or any member thereof, or from any employee or director of such a company, please specify:

- a The hospitality which you accepted;
- b The person who offered the hospitality;
- c When the hospitality was offered and how;
- d Your reason for accepting the hospitality;
- e How you accepted the hospitality;
- f When you first formally declared the hospitality;
- g Are you aware of any other member of the MPS accepting such hospitality? If so, please name them.

Q22 - What hospitality were MPS personnel permitted to accept from the media? Inter alia, were they entitled to accept a meal or a drink from a journalist?

Q23 - What hospitality were personnel permitted to afford to the media?

Q24 - What mechanisms were in place to record hospitality as between the media and MPS personnel?

Q25 - How (if at all) was hospitality between the MPS (including yourself) and the media overseen, controlled and/or regulated?

Q26 - Were the hospitality rules governing contact between MPS personnel (including yourself) and the media different from those covering contact with other third parties? If so, what were the differences?

Q28 - Were records of hospitality and other contact with the media audited and/or policed and, if so, how and by whom?

Q29 - In your opinion did the policies and procedures described above: (a) work effectively; (b) were they sufficient; (c) were they transparent enough; and (d) were they capable of improvement?

51. Details of gifts and hospitality were ordinarily recorded in the Gifts & Hospitality Register, on my behalf, by various members of my private office. My understanding is that the register was compiled from my diary entries. My diary, like most professional or business diaries, recorded planned future events, accordingly the register would reflect recorded diary commitments. Everything that was planned should have been recorded in the diary but, inevitably, some would be cancelled at the last minute due to other work commitments. As a result, it is possible that the register records events that, in fact, I did not attend. Conversely there may also be entries in the register that were not put in the diary. A copy of the handwritten register pertaining to my tenure as ACSO is contained in the MPS Master Bundle (Gifts & Hospitality). This Register was then published on the MPS website and also submitted quarterly to Management Board.
52. My recollection is that the Gifts and Hospitality policy applied to gifts and hospitality from any third party: it was not specific to the media.
53. On a few occasions there would be informal meetings or gatherings following a planned event. I do not think these gatherings would have been recorded in the Hospitality Register as they were seen as part and parcel of the same event.

54. In relation to any hospitality accepted from a company owned by the Murdoch family, I would direct the Inquiry's attention to the list which I attach to my statement as exhibit AH/2. To the best of my recollection such hospitality was accepted in line with the general aim of fostering a professional relationship with the media, details of which I have set out earlier in my statement.
55. I am not aware of any formal hospitality provided to the media but on a personal level I can say that I believed in a "knock for knock" approach and so on some occasions, I would pay for hospitality on behalf of the MPS. Other than the occasions I have mentioned earlier in paying for some refreshment for the CRA meetings, I cannot recall other specific examples and would rely on the register as the most accurate written record existing. As an aside, when I entertained other senior officials I would use a fixed price menu restaurant and pay using my MPS-issued credit card.
56. Towards the end of my service the use of corporate credit cards, including mine, was referred to the MPA Professional Standards Committee. In my case no further action was taken.
57. I am not aware of a specific policy on what hospitality police personnel were permitted to afford to the media. However, I do remember that the MPS would host, for example, a Christmas drinks reception for newspaper editors and others connected to the media industry, such as the Home Affairs Press Correspondent, national and local press etc.

These were either held in the run up to Christmas or called the "12th Night Drinks" and held after Christmas in January.

58. As to what level of hospitality to accept my understanding is that the existing Gifts and Hospitality policy does not prevent a meal or drink being accepted from the media. The hospitality had to be of benefit to the MPS and not be excessive.
59. It was common for the person holding the ACSO role to be invited to the Wimbledon Tennis tournament. I was given Wimbledon tickets one year from the Chairman of the All England Lawn Tennis Club. Certain days were themed days: the day I attended was for personnel from the security industries and I recall that personnel from Whitehall also attended.
60. Another example of a hospitality event was when I attended a function for the Canadian Ambassador at the Albert Hall, along with other senior security personnel. I can only recall attending a handful of these types of events throughout my tenure as ACSO.
61. I believe that the policies and procedures covering contact with the media were largely effective. However, I do not think there is any organisation that can be confident enough to say that a policy could never be enhanced or improved. Normally events that occur over time will test whether a policy is sufficient or requires improvement. In the case of hospitality between the media and the police, I know of no suggestion being made before the phone hacking affair to the effect that they were not sufficient.

Politicians

Q13 - Did you ever discuss the media, or media coverage, with politicians? If so, how important is such communication and why?

Q16 - Did you ever know, or sense, that a politician has put pressure on you to take a particular course of action as a result of lobbying or influence exerted on that politician by the media? If so, please explain (although you need not identify the politician at this stage if you do not wish to do so).

Q17 - Did the prominence which politicians have given to subjects ever give rise to pressure to alter policing priorities so as to allocate more priority to the subject being given prominence by the politicians? If so, please explain.

62. As discussed below, I had regular meetings with politicians, from the Prime Minister down, to discuss operational issues and government policies. To the best of my recollection I did not discuss the issue of the media or media coverage with them. I am not aware of any occasion where any of these politicians, either senior or junior, ever tried to influence my contact with the media or put pressure on me to take a particular course of action as a result of lobbying or influence exerted on that politician by the media. By way of illustration there are two occasions where I had close contact with Cabinet Ministers and on both occasions the politician was consulting me, as a professional police officer, to test my thinking on possible legislative proposals.

63. The first example occurred when I was ACPO Lead on Drug Crime and the government of the day were looking to develop policy which would seek to tackle the causes of drug dependency rather than slowly soldiering on with punishing offenders. The aim was to get an offender treated for their addiction so that they would stop taking drugs and therefore obviate the need to commit crime in order to buy drugs. I was asked by the government to pull together a multi-leveled representation from the UK police forces to meet with the Prime Minister and the

- Home Secretary to share with them operational experience. At no time did I feel they were trying to influence the view of the police or encourage the police to lobby the media or other politicians: this was simply a policy meeting about street level policing.
64. A more recent example was the government's proposal to extend the period of detention for terror suspects to 90 days without charge. This was one of the many proposals for new legislation that the government intended to draft after the 7/7 attacks. Indeed, the Prime Minister had publicly pronounced that "the rules of the game have changed". As Head of Terrorism for UK policing I, along with the Commissioner, were asked for our professional views on all proposals. The proposals for detention without charge attracted the most media and political attention: there is no doubt that the proposals substantially challenged civil liberties and resistance to them came from many quarters. From my perspective, understanding the level of the threat, I felt responsibility to protect the safety and security of law abiding citizens as against the rights of terrorists. In hindsight I do concede that I underestimated the degree of political objection from all parties: government backbenchers joined the opposition in challenging the basis for the proposals. Throughout all of this I was continually being asked my opinion by the media but to the best of my recollection I only gave on the record comments.
65. At no time was I ever asked by any Minister to lobby or promote a government line. Some of the legislative proposals chimed with my own

personal view, but others did not (for example I was never a supporter of government proposals in relation to identity cards or control orders).

66. I have been asked if the prominence which politicians gave to subjects ever gave rise to pressure to alter policing priorities, so as to allocate more priority to the subject in question. It is a fact that political policy inevitably influences policing priorities, not least because budgets are linked to policing activity. For example, a policy to decriminalise cannabis possession in a public place would inevitably mean a (loss of budget and a reshaping of policing on the streets even through privately the police chief in question may disagree with the importance given to that policy. At no time during my career did I ever feel that the operational independence of the police had been compromised. A distinction should be drawn between politicians testing the viability of their ideas with the police, and politicians trying to grab the operational reins. In my experience it was always the former rather than the latter.

Leaks / Disciplinary / Bribery - Directorate of Professional Standards / Financial Transactions

Q33 - To what extent were leaks from the Metropolitan Police Service to the media a problem during your career with the MPS?

Q34 - What systems and procedures were in place to identify, respond to and detect the source of leaks?

Q35 - What payments (if any) were considered to be legitimate financial transactions between MPS personnel and the media?

Q36 - What policies and/or guidance were in place in relation to financial transactions between MPS personnel and the media.

Q37 - To what extent do you believe bribery of personnel by the media was a problem for the Metropolitan Police Service (if at all)?

Q38 - What steps were taken: (a) to educate your personnel about bribery; (b) otherwise to prevent the bribery of your personnel; (c) pro-actively to detect bribery; (d) retrospectively to investigate bribery; and (e) to discipline personnel (if any) who are found to have accepted bribes from the media?

67. At the MPS it is the Directorate of Professional Standards (DPS) that would investigate reported or suspected leaks to the press or bribery by the press concerning officers. I am informed that during my time as Commander DPS from September 2000 to April 2001 and as Deputy Assistant Commissioner for DPS from April 2001 to December 2002 there was one public complaint made alleging leakage of information to the media by an officer and the result of the investigation that followed was that the complaint was unsubstantiated. I do recall one successful leak investigation which occurred in my time as ACSO and was led by my then Deputy, Peter Clarke. This investigation, which was resource-intensive, resulted in a member of civilian staff being convicted.
68. Given the size of the MPS and the volume of valuable information it holds, leaks to the media might unfortunately always be a risk, albeit to a small extent.
69. I understand that the current Commissioner has included details in his statement of the current regime at the MPS to deal with inappropriate disclosures to the media.
70. I have been asked whether there are payments which would have been considered to be legitimate financial transactions between MPS personnel and the media. The Gifts and Hospitality policy covered this with regard to payments made for interviews, broadcasts or for speaking at an external event. I am informed that payment can only be retained by the individual subject to the following conditions: the subject matter of the interview must be unconnected with their normal duties,

membership of the MPS must not be an integral part of the interview/broadcast, the matter must be reported to a supervisor and prior approval obtained and the interview/broadcast must not be carried out in MPS time or using MPS facilities. In my view this would occur very rarely and I myself never accepted payment for any interviews etc whilst I was a serving officer.

71. DPS also deals with all aspects of bribery offences committed, or alleged to have been committed, by MPS personnel and with attempts to bribe MPS personnel. The Anti-Corruption Command of the DPS conducts all pro-active investigations into these offences whilst the Specialist Investigations Unit deals with retrospective investigations.
72. Any intelligence or information alleging instances of bribery are examined within the DPS Intelligence Bureau and when corruption is suspected the information is passed to one of the above units for full investigation. Any member of MPS personnel found to have accepted bribes will, where there is sufficient evidence, be the subject of criminal charges or disciplinary procedures as appropriate.

Directorate of Public Affairs

Q39 - What role did the Metropolitan Police Service Directorate of Public Affairs (especially the Press Bureau) fulfil? What, in practice, did it do?

Q40 - How, in practice, did the media get access to you? Did the Head of Public Affairs act as a gatekeeper?

Q41 - To what extent did the Press Bureau exist to manage the Metropolitan Police Service's corporate image in the media?

Q42 - Why was it necessary for the MPS to have a Press Office, and what was your view as to its utility and role?

Q43 - What was the media's attitude towards the MPS Press Office? In particular, were they satisfied by the provision of information and the routing of communications through your press office or did they prefer direct contact with individual personnel within the MPS?

Q44 - How many personnel worked in the Press Bureau when you were an Assistant Commissioner?

Q45 - How many of the personnel who worked in the Directorate of Public Affairs, including the Press Bureau, whilst you were an Assistant Commissioner had previously worked for the News of the World? Insofar as you are able to please name them.

Q46 - How many of the personnel who worked in the Directorate of Public Affairs, including the Press Bureau, whilst you were an Assistant Commissioner had previously worked for a title owned by Rupert Murdoch? Insofar as you are able to please name them?

Q47 - What proportion of personnel who worked in the Directorate of Public Affairs, including the Press Bureau, whilst you were an Assistant Commissioner had previously worked in the media? Insofar as you are able to, please name them.

Q51 - What limitations, if any, were there on staff from the Metropolitan Police Service leaving to work for the media and vice versa?

Q52 - Were records kept of those who joined the MPS from the media, or went on to work for the media after leaving the MPS? If so, please describe the system in place.

Q53 - To the best of your knowledge were there any discernible patterns in the movement of personnel from the media into the MPS and vice versa?

73. The DPA provides professional services to support the MPS' communication aims. It provides support to police operations and investigations. It keeps the public informed and promotes and protects the MPS's reputation. Examples of the work it does in practice are: promoting operational activity, publicising appeals and assisting with information campaigns to the public. It also provides guidance to officers about interaction with the press and media. It is the channel by which the MPS gets its messages across, helping to inform Londoners and build confidence.

74. Due to the volume of intense media interest in the MPS, if there was no press office then officers would have to be taken away from front line duties to manage the numerous requests for information from the media. This would be a heavy burden to place on officers' shoulders given that the Press Bureau needs to be staffed 24 hours a day, 365 days a year and handles hundreds of calls every day from local, national and international journalists.

75. DPA also provides an immediate response to incidents such as fatal collisions, shootings, murders or major incidents. This has been an important feature, especially since the advent of 24-hour news.
76. I am asked about DPA staff joining the MPS from media organisations. I have no personal knowledge of exactly how many people work in DPA nor how many of them worked for the NOTW (or, indeed, any other newspaper) before they joined the MPS.
77. I have no knowledge of whether records are kept of those who joined the MPS from the media or who went to work for the media after leaving the MPS. I am not aware of any patterns in the movement of personnel from the media into the MPS and vice versa.
78. Finally, I would say that in my opinion DPA do a great job under immense pressure.

Metropolitan Police Authority (MPA)

Q48 - What role did the Metropolitan Police Authority play in relation to oversight of the Metropolitan Police Service's relations and communications with the media?

Q49 - What level of contact and oversight was there from the MPA in relation to the MPS' relations and communications with the media?

Q50 - What level of contact and oversight was there from the MPA in relation to the MPS' policing of offences committed, or suspected as having been committed, by the media?

79. The MPA does not exist any more: it has been replaced by the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime (MOPC). My recollection is that the Commissioner attended monthly meetings with the MPA and that these meetings were held in public. In this way the MPS, through the Commissioner, would be publicly held to account.

80. The MPA can scrutinise any aspect of the MPS' work and in this way they had full oversight of all policing issues. I understand that the MOPC has taken over this responsibility.

The MPS' Investigation into Phone Hacking

Q61 - What is your view now, with the benefit of hindsight, of the decisions that were taken as to the decision: (a) to prosecute Glenn Mulcaire and Clive Goodman; and (b) the lack of further investigation at the time?

Q62 - Please explain your role and the part that you played in the investigation which led to the arrest and subsequent convictions of Glen Mulcaire and Clive Goodman.

Q63 - Who led the investigation?

Q64 - How much involvement did you have during the 2006/7 phone hacking investigation with: (a) day-to-day decision making; (b) strategic decision making; and (c) any other form of decision making including the allocation of resources?

Q65 - What was the MPS' view of the applicable law? Where did it come from? What consequence did this view have when applied to the evidence gathered during the course of the investigation?

Q66 - When did the CPS first become involved?

Q67 - Did the CPS shape or help to shape the investigation? If so, in what ways?

Q68 - What was the CPS' view of the applicable law? How did it differ from the MPS' view of the law (if at all)? What consequence did the CPS view of the law have when applied to the evidence gathered during the course of the investigation?

Q69 - What was counsel's view of the applicable law? How did it differ from the MPS' and/or the CPS' view of the law? What consequences did it have when applied to the evidence gathered during the course of the investigation?

Q70 - Approximately how many persons were named in Glen Mulcaire's notebooks?

Q71 - Of those named in Glen Mulcaire's notebooks, approximately how many were associated with mobile telephone numbers?

Q72 - Of those named, with mobile telephone numbers, in Glen Mulcaire's notebooks, approximately how many were associated with evidence which amounted to prima facie proof that the person's voicemail had been hacked?

Q73 - What decisions were made as to parameters of the investigation, by whom and why?

Q74 - Was there a decision to limit the investigation to the activities of Goodman and Mulcaire? If so, why and by whom?

Q75 - Was there a decision to limit the analysis of the evidence to certain victims? If so, which victims, why and by whom?

Q76 - There appears to have been a decision to prosecute selectively in relation to specific victims:

a. Is this correct? If so, who made this decision and why was this approach adopted? If not, please explain the decision making process and the basis for the ambit of the prosecution of Goodman and Mulcaire.

b. Was there a desire to avoid publicising certain victims? If so, which victims and why?

Q77 - In relation to the above four questions, the Inquiry notes the allegations made in *The Guardian* on 4 April 2010 in an article by Nick Davies entitled "*Police ignored News of the World phone hacking evidence*" which, amongst other things, alleges:

a. That there was a police briefing paper, referred to by the CPS in a file noted dated 30 May 2006, informing the then Attorney General and the then DPP that "*a vast number of unique voicemail numbers belonging to high-profile individuals (politicians, celebrities) have been identified as being accessed without authority. These may be the subject of wider investigation.*"

i. Is it true that there was such a document?

- ii. Is it true that there was a vast number of unique voicemail numbers belonging to high-profile individuals (politicians, celebrities) which had been identified as being accessed without authority?
 - iii. Why was there no wider investigation at the time?
- b. Police persuaded prosecutors to: "*ringfence the case to minimise the risk of extraneous matters being included*".
- i. Is it true that prosecutors did so seek to persuade prosecutors?
 - ii. If so, what are the extraneous matters referred to and why was there a desire to avoid their inclusion?
- c. The CPS agreed with police that: "*the case should be "deliberately limited" to "less sensitive" witnesses*".
- i. Is it true that the CPS so agreed?
 - ii. If so, who in the CPS made the decision?
 - iii. Who were the sensitive witnesses to be avoided?
- d. Police agreed (with prosecutors) that they would approach and warn all potential victims but that this was not done at the time.
- i. Was there any such agreement or decision to approach and warn all potential victims?
 - ii. If so, please give full particulars.
 - iii. If not, was there any consideration given to notifying victims / potential victims and what the upshot of any such consideration.
 - iv. To what extent, if at all, were victims notified in 2006/7 that they had been, or might have been, the subject of phone hacking?
 - v. Why was more not done in 2006/7 to notify victims / potential victims of phone hacking?

Q78 - Is it true that the evidence was not logged onto a computer database during the 2006/7 investigation and prosecution? If it was entered onto a database, please identify the database and explain, in summary form, the extent to which data was entered onto a database? If data was not entered onto a database in 2006/7, why was this not done?

Q79 - To what extent (if any), and in what way, and for what reasons, were any of the following important factors in the decision to prosecute Glenn Mulcaire and Clive Goodman in 2006/7 and to go no further at that time:

- a. The CPS' view of the law
- b. The MPS' view of the law.
- c. Counsel's view of the law.
- d. The depth and extent to which phone hacking at the news of the world was investigated (please explain any failure fully to investigate at the time).
- e. Sufficiency of evidence.
- f. Media lobbying.
- g. Political lobbying.
- h. Your views at the time.
- i. The views of others at the MPS (please give full particulars identifying the person, the view, and its influence).
- j. Resources (including competition for resources).
- k. A desire not to alienate and/or damage relations with the News of the World.
- l. Any other material factor (please identify any such factors).

Q80 - Was there any investigation of *The Sun* given the existence of a corner name referring to this title in Glen Mulcaire's notebook? If there was, what was done and with what result? If not, why not?

Q81 - Given the existence of a number of different corner names in Glen Mulcaire's notebook other than Clive Goodman's, why was no other reporter from the News of the World prosecuted?

Q82 - Given the fact that Clive Goodman was the News of the World's Royal correspondent but the victims selected in the prosecution of Mulcaire included victims who would not have been of interest to a royal correspondent: (a) why did the MPS accept the "rogue reporter" line deployed by the News of the World; (b) why were more journalists not prosecuted?

Q83 - Was there any political lobbying in relation to the MPS' handling of the phone hacking investigation and subsequent prosecutions in 2006/7? If so, please describe the same and identify the source of the lobbying.

Q84 - Was there any media lobbying in relation to the MPS' handling of the phone hacking investigation and subsequent prosecutions in 2006/7. If so, please describe the same.

Q85 - What communications (if any) were you aware of as between the MPS and anyone employed by the Murdoch empire in relation to the investigation and prosecution of phone hacking by, or on behalf of, the News of the World in 2006/7.

Q86 - Were there any such communications between other parts of the media and the MPS? If so, please explain.

Q87 - To what extent was the phone hacking investigation and prosecutions in 2006/7 a matter which was dealt with, or considered (in any way, whether formally or informally) at Commissioner level and/or with the senior management team?

Q88 - What involvement did the then DPP have in the investigation, handling, the decision to prosecute or any other aspect of the phone hacking investigation and prosecution in 2006/7?

Q89 - What involvement did the then Attorney-General have in the investigation, handling, the decision to prosecute or any other aspect of the phone hacking investigation and prosecution in 2006/7?

81. I have been asked to comment upon certain aspects of Operation Caryatid, the MPS' initial investigation into phone hacking.

82. I gave evidence to the Home Affairs Select Committee (HASC) as to my role and that of others, in relation to the decision not to investigate beyond the handful of victims that led to the two convictions. I attach to my statement as exhibit AH/3 a copy of the transcript of the evidence that I gave. At the heart of this issue is the structure of the MPS and responsibilities of individuals within it, not only in Operation Caryatid but more generally in serious crime investigation. My failure to properly explain these points in the past has led, in my view, to ongoing confusion about some of the early decision making in Operation Caryatid.

83. At the heart of this discussion is the difference between accountability and responsibility, a point I believe Lord Blair outlined in his evidence to HASC. As a Chief Constable, or as ACSO, I would always remain accountable for the work of all those under my command, to the point

that if a colleague's actions or decisions were shown to be seriously flawed and led to an incident of public concern, it could ultimately lead to my resignation. That is distinctly different from being responsible for day-to-day actions. That is a more individual liability and falls to a named person. So in a murder or other serious criminal investigation day-to-day decisions influencing the direction of the investigation fall to the Senior Investigating Officer (SIO) and would probably be reviewed and overseen by his or her line manager. It would be wholly impractical for a Chief Constable to be both accountable and responsible given the number of concurrent investigations that are running at any one time.

84. I have set out my personal history at paragraphs 4 - 9 above, which go some way to providing details of the responsibilities I had during my role as ACSO, but I consider that it would assist the Inquiry to be provided with full details of what this role consisted of in order to understand my "role" in Operation Caryatid.
85. As ACSO/Head of the MPS Business Group I had responsibility for a growing portfolio:
- Specialist VIP Protection (protection of designated individuals, members of HM Government, visiting heads of state)
 - Member of MPS Management Team running the MPS
 - Royalty Protection (protection of the Royal family)
 - Diplomatic Protection
 - Palace of Westminster (provision of security to the House of Commons and Lords)
 - Aviation Security (Heathrow and City Airports)

- Counter Terrorism (Intelligence, liaison with Security Agencies and investigation of terrorist offences including War Crimes and offences against the Royal Family)
86. In 2005 I was also appointed Chair of the ACPO Drug Crime sub-committee responsible for developing police policy in England & Wales and additionally I was Chair of the ACPO Media Advisory Group.
87. Throughout 2005 and 2006 I provided the strategic direction to remodel counter terrorism policing in England and Wales. This involved:
- Amalgamation of the MPS Special Branch with the Anti-Terrorist Branch to form the Counter Terrorism Command.
 - The design and delivery of a Counter Terrorism network across the UK. This involved negotiation with the Home Office, Police Authorities and Police Forces to provide a national capability that was regionally based.
88. In the course of this work I was elected as Chair of ACPO Terrorism and Allied Matters Business Area. I would report to the Commissioner of Police, the Home Office, ACPO Chief Constables' Council and the MPA. I chaired the Specialist Operations Chief Officer Group where ACPO rank officers and staff reported on their lines of responsibility.
89. Therefore, although I remained accountable for Operation Caryatid (in other words the "buck stopped with me") I was not personally involved in the day-to-day running of the operation or the strategy/decision making process and would not ever have been expected to be so involved. Had I allowed myself to be drawn down into the day to day detail I would have neglected my role to create an environment where

not only that investigation, but other investigations, could be conducted properly and in accordance with their terms of reference. In practice that would mean my deputies alerting me to resource requirements and the need to brief critical stake-holders around unfolding events. With regard to all the terrorist incidents my department was dealing with (including those of a high profile nature such as the assassination of Litvinenko, the terrorist attacks at Glasgow Airport and Haymarket, and the raids at Forest Gate) I would spend the majority of my time trying to find and provide resources for investigations, acting as a conduit at Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR) meetings and briefing ministers, senior management within the MPS and other agencies. The day-to-day cut and thrust of the phone hacking investigation was managed by DAC Peter Clarke who was overseeing the SIO.

90. So when it is reported that I was in charge of Operation Caryatid, this is true. Ultimately I had overall accountability as it was being conducted by my command. However, the SIO would have had immediate responsibility for the day-to-day running of the operation. On reflection, it may have helped commentators and politicians if these distinctions had been clarified.
91. I am aware that DAC Peter Clarke, has given detailed evidence of the issues raised by the Inquiry to HASC. He is also providing a statement to this Inquiry and, in this statement, he will cover this issue. I am also aware that the SIO, Detective Superintendent Phil Williams, also gave evidence to HASC about this very subject. As I have not examined the

case papers, nor was I involved in the decision making process at the time, I am unable to answer the various questions raised by the Inquiry in this section. I accept what DAC Peter Clarke has said on this subject.

IPCC / Surveillance Commissioner / Information Commissioner

Q92 - Whilst you were an Assistant Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis did contact with the IPCC and/or the Surveillance Commissioner and/or the Information Commissioner ever give rise to questions about the leakage of information to the media and/or private detectives? If so, please explain?

Q93 - What contact have you had with the IPCC, formal and/or informal, in relation to matters concerning the phone hacking investigation or any related matter?

92. In 2006, the IPCC supervised the MPS DPS who were investigating alleged leaks to the media from the West Midlands based Operation Gamble (the terrorist plot to behead a British Muslim soldier). A thorough investigation, which included myself and others explaining telephone contact with the media concluded that no-one was to be the subject of any disciplinary or criminal charges of any sort.

"Media Crime"

Q90 - What levels of awareness and experience were there in the Metropolitan Police Service of "media crime" and in particular: (a) unlawful interception of communications (including the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act); (b) bribery of officials by the media; (c) blackmail; (d) harassment by paparazzi and journalists; (e) traffic and/or public order offences committed by photographers and journalists pursuing stories; (f) inciting officials to communicate confidential information held by the MPS / conspiring with them to obtain such information; and (g) crime within media organisations other than the foregoing (e.g. dishonest expense claims)?

Q91 - What sort of priority was given to, and what level of resources are available to deal with, the above?

93. The term "media crime" is not a term I recall as part of operational police terminology. However there are a lot of very experienced

officers at the MPS who would have a thorough knowledge of the offences mentioned. Any of the matters listed in the question would be dealt with as an individual allegation, and the relevance of any "media" aspect would be addressed on a case-by-case basis. This might mean seeking guidance from the DPA or restricting access to Crime Reporting Information System (CRIS) or Criminal Intelligence System (CRIMINT) if the matter is sensitive.

94. Resources for all investigations would be a local matter first and foremost and would depend upon the priority levels set for the type of crime under local policy. For example, it is likely that traffic or public order offences committed by photographers and journalists pursuing stories would be dealt with by borough but leaks to the media would be handled by DPS.

HMIC

Q95 - What is your view of the recommendations contained in the HMIC's recent report "Without Fear or Favour"? If you have not already seen a copy, it is available online.

Q96 - Do you consider that there are further steps which could and/or should be taken to ensure that relationships between the police and the media are and remain appropriate?

Q97 - From your own experience of HMIC, is the HMIC sufficiently equipped to provide sufficient oversight of relations between the police and the media? What improvements might realistically be made to the system in this regard?

95. I understand that the current Commissioner has responded to the questions concerning the HMIC. As he is a serving officer I feel that it is more appropriate for him to offer his views in this respect.

Your time as Chief Constable of the Norfolk Constabulary

96. I have been asked a number of questions concerning Norfolk Constabulary (NC), which I left nearly 7 years ago. Given the passage of time, the Force Solicitor of NC and the Chairman of the Norfolk Police Authority (NPA) have been contacted and they have produced information concerning the questions asked. Therefore the responses I make are a combination of my personal recollection and the information they have provided.

Media Relations

Q98 Describe the personal contact which you had with the media whilst Chief Constable of the Norfolk Constabulary. The Inquiry would like an overall picture of the type, frequency, duration and content of your contact with the media during your tenure as Chief Constable of the Norfolk Constabulary.

Q99 Describe what you were seeking to gain for the Norfolk Constabulary through your personal contacts with the media.

Q100 Describe in general terms and using illustrative examples what you consider the media sought from you in your personal dealing with them during your time as Chief Constable of the Norfolk Constabulary.

Q112 Set out your understanding of the type of contact which Norfolk Constabulary personnel had whilst you served with the force with the media covering nature, extent, frequency and (in general terms) topics / content.

Q113 Were contacts with the media restricted to certain staff or were all staff able to deal with the media?

Q114 What did you expect the Norfolk Constabulary to gain from such contacts with the media?

Q115 What did the media seek from such contacts with your personnel?

Q121 What policies and procedures were in place to record contact between: (a) yourself and the media; (b) senior managers and the media; (c) other personnel and the media. For the avoidance of doubt, the reply to this request should cover both on the record and off the record contacts.

Q123 In your opinion did the policies and procedures described above: (a) work effectively; (b) were they sufficient; and (c) were they capable of improvement.

Q124 What systems, policies and procedures were in place in the Norfolk Constabulary to ensure that all members of the force (including civilian employees) knew what was and what was not appropriate contact with the media?

Q125 Are you satisfied that the policies and procedures described above were sufficient and working effectively?

Q126 What training was in place in the Norfolk Constabulary, whilst you were Chief Constable, to ensure that all members of the force (including civilian employees) knew what was and what was not appropriate contact with the media?

Q149 What was your impression of the culture within the Norfolk Constabulary overall in relation to its dealings with the press?

97. Before I was appointed Chief Constable of NC, it was a typical rural force that had suffered from under-investment, in both revenue and capital terms. The Chief Constable before me, Kenneth Williams, had done all that he could to counter that by beginning a period of improvement following the establishment of the independent Police Authority governance system in 1995. Mr. Williams left to join HMIC in Wakefield. I was appointed by the NPA in 2005.
98. There were no formal “rules of engagement” covering the expected conduct of the Chief Constable of Norfolk with regard to the media at the time of my period in office. This was not considered necessary. The then Chairman of the NPA, Jim Wilson, was himself ex-media having been a senior manager/director of Anglia TV before joining the NPA as an independent member. He and the NPA were not happy with the existing state of local media coverage, and I was aware that the relationship between the Constabulary Press Office and local media was an area where the NPA expected me to improve matters. To that end I engaged a Director of Communications in 2004 and she was tasked with fostering working relationships with local media outlets.
99. Prior to my arrival at NC, there had been leaks to the local media that I understood had probably emanated from within the ranks of junior police officers. I remember the then Chairman and other members of the NPA being particularly unhappy with a range of headlines in the *Eastern Daily Press* (EDP), the newspaper which served the whole county. Although some of the articles themselves seemed to be clear

and balanced, the headlines to the stories appeared to be negative and unhelpful to public perception of crime levels in the county. NPA members were concerned that these headlines stoked the fear of crime which was disproportionately higher than the actual levels of crime in the county.

100. The NPA and NC did not have, nor did they seek, national media attention. Back in 1999 NC had suffered very negative coverage of the shooting of Fred Barras, a young accomplice to a prolific burglar, by householder Tony Martin and NC were still labouring under that negative national perspective when I arrived.
101. Even then, neither NPA nor the Norfolk ACPO Team considered that there was a need for specific rules, or even for a guiding protocol to be issued with regard to media relations. The view of the NPA was that what was key was for the relationship between NC and the media to be open and based on transparent and demonstrable integrity. During my period in office the NPA was content to rely on general application of the appropriate Police Regulations in relation to any allegations of impropriety. There were no allegations of impropriety whilst I was Chief Constable.
102. There was weekly, if not daily, contact between me and the NPA Chairman and/or the Chief Executive, which resulted in a close and effective working relationship. That relationship saw a significant improvement in overall force performance during my tenure as Chief Constable for Norfolk.

103. The NPA expected me and my top team to handle media relationships on an open and constructive basis. I do not believe that senior officers or members of the NPA had any reason to doubt the integrity of my relationship with the media at any time during my tenure.
104. As far as I am aware the motives of the media for establishing a relationship with NC were the same in Norfolk as in London and vice versa. The difference in the relationship between the media and NC and the media and the MPS are set out in paragraphs 12 and 26-27 above.
105. Whilst I was Chief Constable there was media training for all managers in conjunction with the University of East Anglia. In addition, there was a media awareness element to the core leadership development programme for individuals of Sergeant rank or above (or the civilian equivalent). I did not attend these training sessions.

Gifts & Hospitality

- Q101 To what extent did you accept hospitality from the media whilst Chief Constable of the Norfolk Constabulary?
- Q102 Insofar as you accepted hospitality from the media, what was the nature of the hospitality that you accepted?
- Q103 What did you consider that the media was seeking to gain from affording you hospitality?
- Q104 To what extent did you provide hospitality for the media on behalf of the Norfolk Constabulary whilst you were the Chief Constable of that force?
- Q105 Insofar as you provided hospitality to the media, what was the nature of the hospitality that you provided?
- Q106 What were you seeking to gain by affording hospitality for the media?
- Q107 What mechanisms were in place to monitor and record hospitality as between the Chief Constable of the Norfolk Constabulary and the media?
- Q108 What mechanisms were in place to monitor and record meetings with the media generally?
- Q116 What hospitality were your personnel permitted to accept from the media? *Inter alia*, were they entitled to accept a meal or a drink from a journalist?
- Q117 What hospitality were your personnel permitted to afford to the media?

- Q118 What mechanisms were in place to record hospitality as between the media and your personnel?
- Q119 How (if at all) was hospitality between the Norfolk Constabulary (including yourself) and the media policed?
- Q120 Were the hospitality rules governing contact between Norfolk Constabulary personnel (including yourself) and the media different from those covering contact with other third parties? If so, what were the differences?
- Q122 Were records of hospitality and/or contact with the media audited and/or policed and, if so, how and by whom.

106. I cannot recall receiving any gifts whilst Chief Constable at NC. I received limited and infrequent hospitality from the media. Upon appointment I received the normal flurry of lunch invitations to meet local media editors and possibly the odd invitation to the local football match at Norwich City. I held monthly media briefings where tea and coffee were served and invited local editors to the annual Chief Constable charity ball where they received a dinner with drinks. These events were publicised. All these interactions were to promote a productive ongoing working relationship.
107. During my time at NC there was a Register of Expenses. The NPA had access to the Register of Expenses but did not regularly check or countersign the Chief Constable's expenses at that time.
108. There were no specific requirements beyond open recording of gifts and hospitality in the context of appropriate police regulations.
109. The Treasurer was responsible for internal and external audit of the NPA, which included the NC. The NPA were always deemed to have complied with relevant financial codes of conduct and accounting principles throughout my tenure of office and, I have been informed, since this time.

110. The NPA made no differentiation between hospitality offered to/by the media and hospitality offered to/by other third parties.
111. I am informed that the NC policy on "Gifts, Loans, Donations, Sponsorship and Hospitality" was first published in 2007, after my tenure as Chief Constable, and so I cannot usefully offer any further comment on this matter.

Politicians

Q109 - Did you ever discuss the media, or media coverage, with politicians whilst Chief Constable of the Norfolk Constabulary? If so, how important is such communication and why?

Q110 - Whilst you were the Chief Constable of the Norfolk Constabulary did you ever know or sense that a politician was putting pressure on you to take a particular course of action as a result of lobbying or influence exerted on that politician by the media? If so, please explain (although you need not identify the politician at this stage if you do not wish to do so).

Q111 - Did the prominence which politicians gave to subjects ever give rise to pressure to alter policing priorities so as to allocate more priority to the subject being given prominence by the politicians? If so, please explain.

112. General policing issues may well have come up in regular meetings with Norfolk MPs and/or leaders of the county and district councils at which I and members of the NPA were present. I have no recollection of specific discussions given the passage of time. By the very nature of the composition of the NPA (9 councillors drawn proportionately from the county council), as Chief Constable I would therefore have talked about media relationships with "politicians". However, I refer to the general contextual issues outlined above in paragraph 62 and 65.
113. As Chief Constable I was part of the open democratic processes at NPA meetings, which politicians could attend. I never knew about or sensed any politician putting pressure on me to take a particular

operational course of action as a result of lobbying or influencing exerted on that politician by the media.

114. The prominence which politicians gave to subjects gave rise to pressure to alter policing priorities only in the context of the members of the NPA discharging their statutory responsibilities. I also refer to the general comments I have made about the role of police authorities at paragraphs 80 and 81.

Leaks & Bribery

Q127 To what extent were leaks from the Norfolk Constabulary to the media a problem during your tenure as Chief Constable?

Q128 What systems and procedures were in place to identify, respond to and detect the source of leaks?

Q129 How many investigations were conducted into actual or suspected leaks from the Norfolk Constabulary to the media during your tenure as Chief Constable (if you cannot access statistics please state your recollection in subjective terms as best you can) and how many led to the successful identification of the source of the leak. What was the outcome of the other investigations to the best of your recollection?

Q130 Was disciplinary action been taken against any member of staff (whether civilian or uniformed) for leaking information to the media during your tenure as Chief Constable of Norfolk Constabulary? If so, please identify the number of cases and their outcome. There is no need to identify the person or persons the subject of the disciplinary process.

Q131 To the best of your recollection what procedures were in place to prevent and/or detect data leaks.

Q132 To the best of your recollection what protections (if any) were in place to ensure that databases used by Norfolk Constabulary, including the CISS internal crime system, personnel were not misused?

Q133 What payments (if any) were considered to be legitimate financial transactions between Norfolk Constabulary personnel and the media.

Q134 To what extent did you believe bribery of personnel by the media to be a then current problem for the Norfolk Constabulary (if at all)?

Q135 What steps were taken: (a) to educate your personnel about bribery; (b) otherwise to prevent the bribery of your personnel; (c) pro-actively to detect bribery; (d) retrospectively to investigate bribery; and (e) to discipline personnel (if any) who were found to have accepted bribes from the media?

115. It is now some years since I was Chief Constable but I do not recall any specific issues in relation to leaks during my time there. NC had an anti-corruption capability whose remit included looking at the prevention

and detection of information leakage (to the media or anyone else), but I do not remember any indication that this was a particular problem for the force.

116. From recollection I do not believe this to have been an issue of any significance. Even the very few suspected leaks that did arise were more about resisting organisational change rather than individual personal greed or corruption issues. I do not remember any indication that bribery was an issue in the force during the relevant period.

Norfolk Constabulary Press Office

Q136 what role did the Norfolk Constabulary Service Press Office fulfil? What, in practice, did it do?

Q137 To what extent did the Norfolk Constabulary Press Office exist to manage the Norfolk Constabulary's corporate image?

Q138 Why was it necessary for the Norfolk Constabulary to have a press office and what is your view as to its utility and role?

Q139 What was the media's attitude towards the Norfolk Constabulary's Press Office? In particular, were they satisfied by the provision of information and the routing of communications through your press office or did they prefer direct contact with individual personnel within the MPS.

Q143 What limitations, if any, were there on staff from the Norfolk Constabulary leaving to work for the media and vice versa.

Q144 Were records kept of those who joined the Norfolk Constabulary from the media, or who went on to work for the media after leaving the Norfolk Constabulary. If so, please describe the systems in place to the best of your recollection.

Q145 To the best of your recollection were there any discernible patterns in the movement of personnel from the media into the Norfolk Constabulary and vice versa.

117. NC had press officers in every police division and a main Press Office at HQ. In the main these colleagues were responsible for all types of press releases and general communication messages ranging from publicising the annual force charity event through to requests for witnesses to serious crime. The benefit of having this function is that it

- freed up officers to do their job and brought professional media handlers in to support policing. This was important when the force was trying to promote a constructive and positive corporate image.
118. I am not aware of any document or policy which described the remit of the press office at that time, or indeed the extent to which its activities related to corporate image.
119. There was some cross over of staff between the media and the NC. That was inevitable in a county like Norfolk where the professional media pool was limited. My view is that we would not have had any power to prohibit an individual from working for any other organisation once they had left the constabulary. However, individuals leaving the organisation would still be covered by the Official Secrets Act in relation to their activities whilst working for NC.

Norfolk Police Authority (NPA)

Q140 What role did the Norfolk Police Authority play in relation to oversight of the Norfolk Constabulary's relations and communications with the media? Do you consider that it would be in the public interest to make any changes to this role? If so, what changes?

Q141 What level of contact and oversight was there from the Norfolk Police Authority in relation to the Norfolk Constabulary's relations and communications with the media whilst you were the Chief Constable.

Q142 What level of contact and oversight was there from the Norfolk Police Authority in relation to the Norfolk Constabulary's policing of the media whilst you were the Chief Constable?

120. I refer to the response above to paragraphs 113-115. There was frequent contact and exchange of information about media relations between the Chief Constable, ACPO representatives and the NPA members and officers. This was particularly so in the case of the

Chairman and the Chief Executive. My brief from the NPA was to update and professionalise the contacts between the media and the force, and I tried to do this as best I could.

Media Crime

Q146 What level of awareness and experience were there in the Norfolk Constabulary of "media crime" and in particular: (a) unlawful interception of communications (including the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000); (b) bribery of officials by the media; (c) blackmail; (d) harassment by paparazzi and journalists; (e) traffic and/or public order offences committed by photographers and journalists pursuing stories; (f) inciting officials to communicate confidential information held by the Norfolk Constabulary / conspiring with them to obtain such information; and (g) crime within media organisations other than the foregoing (e.g. dishonest expense claims)?

Q147 What sort of priority was given to, and what level of resources were available to deal with the above?

121. During the relevant period of my tenure at NC, the force had limited experience of dealing with these matters. What little experience there was related to the policing of high profile Royal Residences or Royal visits and associated press interest. Minimal resources would have been given in relation to the above as this was not seen as a priority for the force.

IPCC/Surveillance Commissioner/Information Commissioner

Q148 Whilst you were the Chief Constable of the Norfolk Constabulary did contact with the IPCC and/or the Surveillance Commissioner and/or the Information Commissioner ever give rise to questions about leakage of information to the media and/or private detectives? If so, please explain?

122. I have no recollection of this issue arising with contact with these agencies.

I believe the facts stated ~~in~~ this witness statement are true

Signed.....

Dated..... 14 - 2 - 12